00038860



Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 26 March, 2016

CORRESPONDENCE

CHARLES, FIRST MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

38860
ab

EDITED, WITH NOTES,

BY CHARLES ROSS, ESQ.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

LIBRARY
OF THE
BOMBAY
BRANCH
OF THE
ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY

5582

LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.
1859.

The right of Translation is reserved.

942.073
Cor/cor
38860

923.542

00038860

LONDON: PRINTED BY W. CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET,
AND CHARING CROSS.

LIBRARY OF THE ROYAL BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE ASIATIC

CONTENTS OF VOL. II.

CHAPTER XII.—*continued.*

Embassy to China — Administration of the Carnatic — Conduct of the Madras Government — Renewal of Company's Charter — Arrears of the Nabob of Arcot — Proceedings at Chandernagore — Lord Cornwallis embarks for Madras — The Messrs. Hollond and their Dubash Paupiah — Preparations for the Campaign .. .. Page 1

CHAPTER XIII.

Arrival of Lord Cornwallis at Madras — Mr. Hollond sent to Europe — Movements of the army — Siege of Bangalore — Convention with the Marathas — Siege of Coimbatore by Tippoo — Successes of Lord Cornwallis — Inquiry into Mr. Hollond's conduct — Prospect of terminating the war — Conduct of the Nizam — Tippoo attacked and defeated — Offers to negociate — Account of the campaign — Proposed Congress — Political situation of India — Debate in House of Lords — Votes of approbation in both Houses 68

CHAPTER XIV.

Campaign of 1792 — Attack on the lines of Seringapatam — Attempt to assassinate Lord Cornwallis — Progress of the Siege — Censure of a Court Martial — Prospect of returning to England — Difficulty of finding a successor — Terms offered to Tippoo — Treaty of Peace — Lord Cornwallis returns to Madras — Discussions with the Nabob of the Carnatic — Unsatisfactory termination of negociations with the Marathas — Lord Cornwallis raised to the Marquisate — State of affairs in England — Disorders in Assam — Mission to Nepaul and to Assam 134

CHAPTER XV.

British mission to Nepaul — Declaration of war with France — Final Regulations respecting the Land Settlement — State of the Revenue under previous Governors — Comparative advantages of a decennial and a permanent settlement — Judicial Regulations — European principles applied to the Criminal law — Obstacles to the due administration of justice — Police Regulations — Lord Cornwallis proceeds to Madras — Sails thence for England 188

CHAPTER XVI.

Lord Cornwallis returns to England — State of affairs on the Continent — The War in Flanders — Jealousies of the Austrians and Prussians — Lord Cornwallis proceeds to the seat of war — Conduct of the Emperor — His motives in leaving the army — Interview with Marshal Möllendorf — Lord Cornwallis returns home — His plan for new-modelling the Indian army — Proposal to confer on him the chief command of the Allied Armies — His explanation to the Duke of York — Disgraceful conduct of the Austrians .. Page 228

CHAPTER XVII.

Lord Cornwallis Master-General of the Ordnance — Threatened invasion of England by the French — Celebrated retreat of Admiral Cornwallis — Military arrangement for India — State of the Indian army — Court Martial on Admiral Cornwallis — The Nabob of Arcot — Discontent of officers of the Bengal army — Judicial regulations in India 281

CHAPTER XVIII.

Discontent of the Officers of the Bengal Army — Dislike of Lord Cornwallis's plan of amalgamation — Objects and proceedings of the Discontented — Alarm of the Indian Government — Delay in the news reaching England — The New Regulations — Lord Cornwallis sworn in as Governor General — Concessions to the Bengal Officers — They return to their duty — Lord Cornwallis resigns his appointment — Bad effect of the concessions 314

CHAPTER XIX.

Alarming state of Ireland — Formation of the Volunteer Corps — The Convention — Society of United Irishmen — Their negociations with the French Directory — Attempt of the French to invade Ireland — The Rebel newspapers — Vigorous measures of the Government — Contests with the Rebels — Extent of the insurrection — Necessity of uniting the civil and military command — Lord Cornwallis appointed Lord-Lieutenant and Commander-in-Chief — Proceedings of Irish Parliament — Proclamations of pardon — Decline of the Rebellion — Proposals of the Rebel leaders to surrender — Special Commission for trial of State-prisoners — General Humbert's expedition — Affair at Castlebar — Disposal of State-prisoners — Another French armament — Court-martial on Whollagan — Union question brought forward — Opinions on the measure — Lord Longueville's jobbing — The "Lawyers' Infantry Corps" — Clamour against the Union — Alterations by Government in the proposed measure 337

APPENDIX.—INDIA—*continued* 459

ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA.

VOLUME II.

Page	Note	Line	
3	1	4	.. After "*Beatson*," insert "*Esq.*"
4	2	-	.. Marquis del Campo, d. April, 1800.
7	7	-	.. For "*William, 9th Landgrave*," read "*William IX., Landgrave.*"
16	1	2	.. After "1790," insert "*to* 1796."
30	1	-	.. The Duke of Orleans was believed to have offered very large sums, as a loan, to the Prince of Wales. See *Ann. Reg.*, 1787, p. 124.
33	1	-	.. Mr. Roebuck was b. 1752. He was much implicated in pecuniary transactions with the Native Princes, and, when Mr. Benfield was ordered to England, he was sent to Gavjam, on account of his proceedings with the Nabob of the Carnatic. When the debts of that Prince were investigated, Mr. Roebuck claimed, as principal or agent, 460,000*l.* Only one claim (of 30,000*l.*) had been adjudicated upon by the Commissioners at the time of his death, and that was rejected.
54	-	5	.. For "*Dupuis*," read "*Du Puy.*"
54	-	24	.. For "*Ghiretty*," read "*Gyretty.*"
55	-	8	.. For "*Ghyretty*," read "*Gyretty.*"
62	1	-	.. General Duff d. March, 1803.
66	1	-	.. Paupiah claimed, as principal or agent, 1,400,000*l.* from the Nabob of the Carnatic. Up to 1812 only 6,400*l.* were allowed, and 216,000*l.* rejected as forgeries.
71	-	last line	For "*Goorumeonda*," read "*Gorumconda.*"
73	3	-	.. Major-General Cuppage m. Mrs. Cairnes.
85	-	7	.. For "*Pallemaneve*," read "*Palimaneve.*"
92	-	25	.. For "*Peishwa*," read "*Peshwa.*"
100	-	-	.. These debentures were for 100*l.* each, and though they contributed to the arrest of the Fermiers-Généraux, were not the principal cause of their trial. The Duc de St. Aignau, however, was tried and guillotined because he compelled a money-lender to take some back. See 'Souvenirs de M. Berryer.'
105	-	1	.. For "*Hippisley*," read "*Hippesley.*"
131	-	19	.. For "*Sevendroog*," read "*Savendroog.*"
131	-	26	.. For "*Sevendroog*," read "*Savendroog.*"
143	4	-	.. Lord Carlisle was Lord Steward from May, 1782, to February, 1783.
143	-	3 from bottom	.. For "*Outradroog*," read "*Ootradroog.*"
149	1	-	.. For "*Cummerr*," read "*Cummur.*"
166	-	31	.. For "*Outradroog*," read "*Ootradroog.*"
180	-	9	.. For "*Adawlet*," read "*Adawlut.*"
211	-	16	.. For "*dispatch*," read "*despatch.*"

Page	Note	Line	
218	-	18	.. For "*Brunswic,*" read "*Brunswick.*"
223	-	20	.. For "*Poligars,*" read "*Polygars.*"
231	2	-	.. And also for the plunder of the Maréchal de Duras in 1679.
234	1	-	.. Lord Hobart m. 2nd, June 1, 1799, Eleanor Agnes, dau. of William, 1st Lord Auckland.
261	-	6	.. For "*ief,*" read "*Chief.*"
310	2	-	.. Moreau married Nov. 1800.
338	2	-	.. For "*Harvey,*" read "*Hervey.*"
339	1	-	.. Mr. Rowan m. Aug. 2, 1781.
341	1	7	.. For "*his son,*" read "*he soon.*"
344	2	6	.. For "*Baggot,*" read "*Bagot.*"
346	-	1	.. For "*Colchough,*" read "*Colclough.*"
347	6	1	.. For "*Dungarvon,*" read "*Dungarvan.*"
351	3	2	.. For "1779," read "1776."
353	-	1	.. Sir James Steuart afterwards took the name of Denham.
353	5	-	.. Sir John Parnell was born 1756.
385	1	7	.. For "*Sanders,*" read "*Saunders.*"
385	-	8	.. For "*Sanders,*" read "*Saunders.*"
396	3	2	.. After "*England,*" insert "*died.*"
401	-	1	.. For "*Mochill,*" read "*Moehill.*"
401	-	3	.. For "*Mochill,*" read "*Moehill.*"
408	-	17	.. Before "*Marquis,*" insert "*the.*"
418	4	2	.. For "*Elliott,*" read "*Elliot.*"
422	2	-	.. Lord Londonderry was only Minister at Berlin.
439	-	30	.. Before "*Marquis,*" insert "*the.*"
446			.. For "*have,*" read "*had,*"
450	1	-	.. For "*Malmsbury,*" read "*Malmesbury.*"
452	-	11	.. Before "*Marquis,*" insert "*the.*"
463	-	49	.. For "*rulers,*" read "*rules.*"
490	-	25	.. For "*nett,*" read "*net.*"
491	-	6	.. For "*lacks,*" read "*lacs.*"
491	-	26	.. For "*indispensible,*" read "*indispensable.*"
497	-	18	.. For "*Sirear,*" read "*Circar.*"
497	-	26	.. For "*Tritchinopoly,*" read "*Trichinopoly.*"
500	-	33	.. For "*Bahar,*" read "*Behar.*"
505	-	16	.. For "*Cavari,*" read "*Caveri.*"
506	-	31	.. For "*lack,*" read "*lac.*"
511	-	11	.. For "*Avakerry,*" read "*Arrakerry.*"
514	-	25	.. For "*Arakerry,*" read "*Arrakerry.*"

CORRESPONDENCE

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

CHAPTER XII.—*continued.*

Embassy to China — Administration of the Carnatic — Conduct of the Madras Government — Renewal of Company's Charter — Arrears of the Nabob of Arcot — Proceedings at Chandernagore — Lord Cornwallis embarks for Madras — The Messrs. Hollond and their Dubash Paupiah — Preparations for the Campaign.

RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Private.] Received March 4, 1790.

MY DEAR LORD, Wimbledon, Aug. 1, 1789.

This letter is intended for your information on the subject of the China embassy. The difficulty of finding such a successor to Colonel Cathcart as was altogether satisfactory, has occasioned a frequent change of resolutions on that subject. We had determined to commit the whole execution of this business to you, and with that view the accompanying papers were prepared, but against this resolution a legal doubt was stated by the Chancellor, importing that the King's authority could not be delegated to any other person; but that both the appointment of the person of the ambassador, and the instructions to be given to him, must flow from the King himself. In addition to this difficulty, another circumstance has recently come to my knowledge. I have discovered that the Court of Directors are rather hostile to the expedition, and give out that it may be highly prejudicial to their interests, if, by creating jealousies among the Mandarins and other Chinese at Canton, it should suspend in any degree the intercourse with them, by which only, under the present circumstances, their trade can be carried on. I feel so much the importance of establishing a commercial connexion with the great empire of China, that I am not disposed to be

discouraged from the plan by any trivial obstructions; but considering the near approach of the period when a total new arrangement with the East India Company must take place, and considering how much the prosperity of their affairs depends on the resources of the China trade, it occurred to me as imprudent to give them a handle for saying that any measure suggested or promoted by Government had proved prejudicial to them. I stated the difficulty to Mr. Pitt and Mr. Grenville, and they concur in opinion with me. We are all, however, desirous that as much forwardness as possible should take place in the business, either with a view to final completion, or further information. For this purpose I trouble you with this letter. From the instructions to Colonel Cathcart formerly sent to you, and the papers herewith sent, you are in the full possession of all our ideas; and if no material objection occur to you against it, we would suggest to you the propriety of selecting some person from among those in India, in whose discretion and abilities you can confide, and employing him to make his way to China, either as a secret agent, and without any avowed authority, or as commissioned by you to settle such points as fall within the sphere of your Government. By means of such a person, sent in whichever of these modes you may judge most prudent, we conceive you may receive information as to such particulars of the Chinese Government, dispositions and commercial wants, as may enable you and us to judge how far we are justified in the notion we entertain of the importance of a more extended commercial connexion with China, and how far there is a reasonable prospect of our being able to accomplish it.

I have, &c.,

HENRY DUNDAS.

RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Received March 4, 1790.]

MY DEAR LORD, London, Aug. 1, 1789.

Although the Secret Committee is the proper official channel through which I ought to correspond with your Lordship on points of a confidential nature, still from the constitution of it, and the members of which it often consists, it is more eligible for me to convey to you in a less official manner, my own and the sentiments of my colleagues on many points. It is on that ground that I in this manner chuse at present to advert to what you have stated in your letter of the 15th of December, 1788, respecting the death of the Nabob's second son, and your opinion in consequence thereof,

that the Carnatick should be administered under an assignment similar to that which took place under Lord Macartney. At the time when the Board of Controul gave the order for restoring the Nabob's country to him, they had no doubt that every reason of expedience founded on considerations of the due administration of the Nabob's country operated against that order, but when they attended to the terms under which Lord Macartney had obtained possession of that country, and the importance it was to restore, if possible, by every means, the credit of Great Britain with the native powers, they felt themselves constrained to view the subject merely on the footing of the obligations under which they lay by the then subsisting treaties with the Nabob. They have continued hitherto to view the transaction in the same light. We are perfectly satisfied of the expediency of the Carnatick being under the administration of the Madras Government, but we have never seen sufficient means fairly to obtain that object; and if we entertained sentiments of that nature before, we are certainly much confirmed in them by the recent conversations we have held with Sir Archibald Campbell and Mr. Oakley,[1] the late President of the Committee of Assigned Revenue. They differ a little as to the progress the country has made in improvement since the termination of the late war, but they both agree in thinking the country is by no means improved in the degree it ought to have been, and they likewise agree that there is little prospect of its doing so while under the management of the Nabob.

Under these circumstances, your Lordship must be sensible how much we concur in the reasoning of the letter to the Secret Committee of the 15th of December, and nothing but the good faith of our transactions with the Nabob stands in the way of resorting to the conclusion our wishes naturally suggest. We are, however, much encouraged to hope for being more speedily extricated from this dilemma, than we were before the death of the Ameer ul Omrah; Sir Archibald Campbell has intimated to us that the eldest son has expressed himself to him in terms which imported a strong inclination on his part, that the affairs of the Carnatick were under a system of administration similar to that which took place under the Assignment, and this idea is conformable to the general idea we had formed of his character, and predilection for the British Government in India, and we cannot help flattering ourselves with

[1] Mr., afterwards Sir Charles Oakeley, Bart., so created June 5, 1790, b. Feb. 16, 1751, d. Sept. 7, 1826; m, Oct. 19, 1777. Helena, dau. of Robert Beatson, of Killerie, Governor of Madras from April, 1790, to Aug. 1791. He acted as Governor while General Medows was in the field.

an opinion that, however adverse the Nabob himself was to such a system when he was under the influence of his second son, and when his temper was heated by the altercations with Lord Macartney, he may now be more reconciled to such an arrangement, especially if his avarice can be anyhow gratified, which we understand is now, more than any other, his ruling passion. After having troubled your Lordship with these general observations, you will naturally anticipate the conclusion we draw from them. We wish not to infringe the terms of any existing treaty, but if, consistent with that principle, your Lordship can devise any means by which this important point can be gained, either immediately by treaty with the Nabob, or by treaty with his eldest son in the event of his father's death, we shall feel that you have accomplished a measure of much importance to the interest of Government in India, and no less so to the interest of the Nabob's family, and the prosperity of the Carnatick. This can only be accomplished by the Government on the spot acting under your Lordship. You are in the full possession of our principles and wishes on this important subject, and in conformity to them we make no doubt you will act in consequence of the very general terms in which, for the reasons already alluded to, we have thought proper to answer your letter to the Secret Committee of the 15th of December, 1788.

I remain, &c.,

HENRY DUNDAS.

CHARLES TOWNSHEND, ESQ., TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Received March 4, 1790.]

MY LORD, Old Burlington Street, July 23, 1789.

. . . I flatter myself that we shall send you no war from our part of the globe before your return, because I can hardly think that the French will be in a situation to disturb us before that event takes place.

Who could have expected to have seen so soon a King of France led in triumph by the mob of Paris, and forced to go to the Church of Notre Dame to thank God for his own humiliation?[1]

I heard the Spanish Ambassador[2] say to-day, that the French were

[1] This is incorrect. On July 16, the municipality of Paris and the Archbishop, together with many other eminent personages, *did* attend a *Te Deum* at Notre Dame, to celebrate the concessions made by the King. Louis XVI. came to Paris the following day from Versailles, and went to the Hôtel de Ville, but not to Notre Dame.

[2] The Marquis del Campo was ambassador in England from March, 1783, to 1795. He gave a great fête to the Queen and the Royal Family on the King's recovery.

busy in establishing peace and good order before they proceed to establish their new Government. The House of Bourbon pay dearly for the support which they gave to the Americans. It is impossible to guess what will be the consequence of this Revolution, which will entirely alter the state of Europe.

As for home, the Session, thank God, is now near its conclusion, and everybody is gone or going into the country, where I hope they will get rid of their ill humours and party rage, which has been more violent than ever this winter.

It has been peculiarly fortunate for me at this time to be in possession of Chislehurst,[1] which is my chief residence, and where I hope to give you a bottle of claret and show you my dairy of Suffolk polls in a year or two.

You will see by the papers that my brother has made a good retreat[2] from the vexations of this world. He has the place of Chief Justice in Eyre, on the same terms as Lord Grantley,[3] viz. 2500*l.* a-year, and his son John[4] goes to the Admiralty.

I this morning saw the pretty Marchioness Townshend[5] confined by the gout. I go to-morrow to Pepperharrow, where I shall find my sister Lady Middleton[6] just recovered from her second fit of the same distemper. The misfortunes of these two ladies will surprise you as much as the Revolutions in France, and you will be apt to suspect that they are not the two persons of the family who have most deserved this punishment. My sister has however by way of compensation, had one turn of good fortune. Her son Charles,[7] who

[1] A small estate in Kent, which he had brought from Lord Robert Bertie, and is now the property of Viscount Sydney.

[2] Lord Sydney resigned the office of Secretary of State June 5, 1789, and remained Chief Justice in Eyre till his death.

[3] Fletcher, 1st Lord Grantley, so created April 9, 1782, b. June 23, 1716, d. Jan. 1, 1789; m. May 22, 1741, Grace, dau. of Sir William Chapple, a Puisne Judge of the King's Bench. Solicitor-General, Jan. 25, 1762; Attorney-General, Dec. 16, 1763, till Sept. 1765. Chief Justice in Eyre, vice Lord Cornwallis, Jan. 1769, till his death, and Speaker of the House of Commons, Jan. 23, 1770, till Oct. 1780, when he was defeated by Mr. Cornwall by a majority of 203 to 134. It is singular that both these competitors were Chief Justices in Eyre, and died within one day of each other. M.P. for Wigan from Nov. 1762 to March, 1768, and then for Guildford till he was created a peer.

[4] Hon. John Thomas Townshend, afterwards 2nd Viscount Sydney, b. Feb. 21, 1764, d. Jan. 20, 1831; m. 1st, April 12, 1790, Sophia, dau. of Edward, 17th Lord de Clifford; 2nd, May 27, 1802, Caroline, dau. of Robert, 1st Earl of Leitrim. Under Secretary of State from Dec. 1783, to Aug. 1789; Lord of the Admiralty to May, 1793; and then Lord of the Treasury till he became a peer; Ranger of the Parks till his death. M.P. for Whitchurch from Nov. 1790, till he succeeded to the Peerage, June 13, 1800.

[5] Anne, dau. of Sir William Montgomery, Bart., of Magbie, and 2nd wife of George, 1st Marquis Townshend, b. Aug. 6, 1753, d. March 29, 1819; m. May 19, 1776. She and her two sisters, Mrs. Beresford, wife of the Right Hon. John Beresford, and Mrs. Gardiner, wife of the Right Hon. Luke Gardiner, afterwards 1st Viscount Mountjoy, were celebrated for their beauty, and sat to Sir Joshua Reynolds as the Three Graces adorning the altar of Hymen. The picture is now in the National Gallery.

[6] Albinia, wife of George, 3rd Viscount Middleton, b. 1732, d. Sept. 18, 1808; m. May 1, 1752.

[7] Hon. Charles Brodrick, b. May 3, 1761, d. May 6, 1822; m. Dec. 8, 1786, Mary, dau. of Richard Woodward, Bishop of Cloyne.

Mr.

is in orders, and resides in Ireland, has got the living of Middleton by the gift of his father-in-law, which, besides its value of 800*l.* per annum, is so peculiarly eligible on account of its situation on Lord Middleton's estate.

I have not seen Lord Brome lately, but I hear very good accounts of him, as well with respect to his health as his improvement in everything which you can wish. I have not been at Eton since the death of poor Young, who, if he had been now alive, would have been highly entertained at the wonders of the present age; the Marquis de la Fayette commanding 50,000 French militia to dethrone his own King, whilst Washington was giving an entertainment on account of the recovery of the King of England, and the towns of Philadelphia and Boston rejoicing upon the same occasion. . . .

Be so kind as to remember me to Colonel Ross, and believe me to be, &c.,

CHARLES TOWNSHEND.

P.S. M. de Bailly,[1] who was presented to the King of France to be approved by him as Mayor of Paris, an office created in the room of the man[2] who was beheaded, and held the office of Prevôt des Marchands, made a speech to His Majesty, and told him that he now delivered up to him the same keys which had been given to Henry IV. on his conquering his people, and that he now delivered them to him upon their conquering the King.

THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Received March 4, 1790.]

MY DEAR LORD, Bowood Park, Aug. 13, 1789.

. . . I write to you in the midst of affliction for the loss of Lady Lansdowne; though I was taught to expect it long before it happened, I cannot help being excessively stunned with it. I am

Mr. Brodrick was made Bishop of Clonfert, 1795; of Kilmore, Jan. 1796; and Archbishop of Cashel, 1801. Pepperharrow, in Surrey, was Lord Middleton's English residence.

[1] Jean Sylvain Bailly, b. Sept. 15, 1736, executed Nov. 12, 1793. Contrary to the wish of his parents he adopted the profession of *homme de lettres*, and acquired some reputation as an astronomer. Unfortunately for himself he became a violent politician, was elected President of the Etats Généraux in 1789, and soon after was made Mayor of Paris. It was in that capacity that he addressed the King. "Ce bon Roi (Henri IV.)," he said, "avait conquis son peuple, c'est aujourdhui le peuple qui a reconquis son Roi." Madame Campan says the Queen was much offended. When his old associates found he declined supporting their extreme views and resigned his office, Nov. 1791, they denounced him as a traitor. He was tried and condemned, and put to death the following day, after undergoing the most brutal treatment.

[2] Jacques de Flesselles, Prevôt des Marchands, b. 1729, murdered July 14, 1789, the day the Bastille was taken.

fighting up against the effects of it as well as I can, by riding and quiet with a mixture of very quiet society, which Miss Vernon [1] and Miss Fox [2] are so good to afford me, who are so good to continue the same habits as when Lady L. was living.

I have been for months past out of the way of all politicks. Among the very few people I saw in London was our old friend Schleiffen,[3] who has been most shamefully treated by the Landgrave of Hesse,[4] and as generously received by the King of Prussia. He is come over to settle with our Ministry a plan of defence for Holland, in case the French should meditate any steps in favour of the body of refugees [5] whom they are still at the expense of subsisting. However I think that everything of late seems taking a pacific turn, which will be best for us, for, independent of other circumstances, the Revolution in Holland was very incomplete, and has left that country in a state of strange inefficiency, so as that for years to come it must prove a burthen to any alliance. It has been the accidental interest of the different parties with us to commend it extravagantly, but I have the best grounds for conceiving a very different opinion. There are several reports of differences in our Cabinet, and though I am perfectly ignorant how far they may be founded, I should suppose that the Ministry are upon too narrow a bottom to continue long as they are. As to French politicks, you will find them very accurately stated in our papers. The best accounts of them are in the Gazetteer and Morning Post. Most of their refugees are likely to rendezvous at Turin; some are come here, and many more are expected. As far as I can collect from some whom I have been obliged to see, neither King nor Queen discovered the least resource of any kind, and are at this moment completely deserted.

Be so good to make my kind compliments to your brother, and

Believe me, &c.,

LANSDOWNE.

[1] Caroline, dau. of Richard Vernon, Esq., M.P., b. June 7, 1768, d. Dec. 11, 1833; m. Aug. 1797, Robert Smith, Esq., M.P., well known as Bobus Smith.

[2] Hon. Caroline Fox, dau. of Stephen, 2nd Lord Holland, b. Nov. 3, 1767, d. unmarried, March 12, 1845. Her mother was sister to Lady Lansdowne.

[3] Martin Ernest, Comte de Schleiffen, b. 1732, d. Sept. 15, 1825, unmarried. He had been in the Hessian service, and served in America with Lord Cornwallis. In consequence of some dispute with the Elector of Hesse he entered the Prussian service in 1789.

[4] William, 9th Landgrave of Hesse, b. June 3, 1743, d. Feb. 27, 1821; m. Sept. 1, 1764, Wilhelmina Caroline, dau. of Frederick V., king of Denmark. After the peace of Luneville, Feb. 9, 1801, he called himself Elector of Hesse.

[5] Many of the democratic leaders, after the restoration of the Stadtholder's power in 1787, took refuge in France, where the party at this time in authority thought they might be rendered available to excite fresh disturbances in Holland.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

[Private.]

DEAR SIR, Calcutta, April 1, 1790.

. . . I am very happy not only to be assured that the general tenor of my measures which were known to you previous to the sailing of the Vestal, corresponded very much with your general sentiments on the affairs of this country, but to feel conscious that those which I have pursued since that time are likely to meet with your approbation.

I have not time, and indeed it is needless for me to enter into the general detail of the preparations for the war against Tippoo, as you will see the whole in my letters and in those from the Board to the Court of Directors and Secret Committee. The decided and spirited conduct of the Nizam, who has already taken the field, and the favourable state of the negotiation with the Marattas, added to our own exertions, leave us very little to apprehend as to the final success of the war; but the very criminal conduct of the late Government of Madras will prevent our making much progress before the setting in of the rains in the Mysore country, and, what is still worse, will probably occasion the loss and destruction of the territories of our ally the Rajah of Travancore.

Medows has adopted Musgrave's plan of operations, which is to invade Tippoo's country with one very considerable army from Trichinopoly, and leave all the rest of the Carnatic force on the defensive. I am not quite sure that I perfectly approve of this, for although our army will by this means possess the rich country of Coimbatoor, yet as they cannot pass the Ghauts which divide that part of Tippoo's dominions from the Mysore country, until the rains cease in the latter (for you must understand that in Coimbatoor they have the rains at the same time as in the Carnatic, and in Mysore at the same time as on the Malabar Coast), I cannot help apprehending that during the period in which our army will be detained in Coimbatoor, the Carnatic will be greatly exposed to the incursions of Tippoo's cavalry. But it was too late, even if I had been convinced of its imperfection, and had possessed sufficient local knowledge to have proposed a better, to have rendered it prudent for me to attempt to alter it.

Cockerell's detachment, to which I am now sending by the Houghton Indiaman a reinforcement of artillery, will be of great use, and if he is joined by a body of the Nizam's cavalry, and can enter the Cuddapa country, which is on the west side of the Ghauts, before the rains begin, I think he may make Tippoo's detachments

very cautious how they venture through the narrow passes which divide the Mysore country from the Carnatic. I am not yet able to say whether the Bombay army will act separately or in conjunction with the Marattas, but perhaps I may receive information of the adjustment of that business before the sailing of the Chesterfield. . . . I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO H. R. H. THE DUKE OF YORK.

SIR, Calcutta, April, 1790.

. . . I have been honoured with your Royal Highness's letter dated the 9th of August by the Vestal frigate, and I am infinitely flattered in finding that I still hold a place in your recollection.

The events of the last year in Europe have indeed been particularly interesting. It is however with satisfaction that I see our Northern alliance make a progress in firmness and respectability, and I hope that Britain will long retain the importance which she has now recovered amongst her neighbours.

It is impossible to look without compassion upon the wretched state of France, but when we consider that the unprovoked and unjustifiable part which that nation took against us in the late American war, has perhaps greatly contributed to produce the present convulsions, we cannot say that they are totally unmerited, and although it may be natural for your Royal Highness to feel disappointed at not having the means of improving yourself in your profession, I must candidly confess that I reflect with no small degree of satisfaction, that our tranquillity in Europe is not likely to be soon disturbed by that late powerful and restless neighbour.

The cloud which hung over our domestic prosperity is, thank God, entirely dissipated by His Majesty's most happy recovery, in which joyful event no one of his subjects, either from the feelings of duty and loyalty or from those of gratitude and personal attachment, could have taken a more sincere part than myself. . . .

The backwardness of our preparations on the coast, which was owing to the shameful conduct of Mr. Hollond, and his disobedience of the clear and positive orders of this Government, will I fear render it impossible to bring the contest to an happy issue before the setting in of the periodical rains, which commence in that part of the Mysore country which is situated beyond the Ghauts, in the month of June, so that with all the exertions of ourselves and our

allies, we can hardly hope at soonest for an honourable and advantageous peace before the beginning of the next year.

Under these circumstances, it becomes very doubtful whether I shall be able with propriety to return to England in the year 1791, which at my time of life is a very serious disappointment, but after having undertaken the government of this country, I shall not think myself at liberty to resign it, until there could be no reasonable ground for apprehending that it might be attended with any material detriment to the public interest.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MINUTE BY THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

April 2, 1790.

I have read with great attention the minutes of Mr. Edward John Hollond,[1] which have been transmitted to us by the Governor in Council of Fort St. George, in answer to our letters dated the 8th and 11th of February, requiring of that Government to assign reasons, or to give explanations of those parts of their conduct which we stated to have appeared to us in a very disadvantageous light, and I am persuaded that the other members of the Board will be as little satisfied as I am, with the justification that has been offered for several apparent neglects of public duty, but particularly for the disregard and disobedience of the clear and explicit orders contained in our letters dated the 29th August and 13th November last, which positively stated that Tippoo should be considered as at war with the Company if he should attack any part of the dominions of the Nabob of Arcot or Rajah of Travancore, which were guaranteed to them by the Company at the late treaty of peace.

As Mr. John Hollond has thought proper to relinquish his station in the Council of Fort St. George, and to return to Europe, I shall forbear at present from expressing my sentiments respecting him further than by declaring, that exclusive of the principal share which falls to him of the culpability of the measures of his Government, he is particularly responsible for not forwarding the letter to Tippoo Sultaun, which according to our orders proposed the appointment of commissioners, to examine the tenure by which the Dutch held Cranganore and Jacottah, at the same time that the letter on that subject was despatched to the Rajah of Travancore. Had no delay

[1] Edward John Hollond was a brother of Mr. John Hollond, the acting Governor of Madras. On his brother's departure for England Feb. 13, 1790, he succeeded him in the supreme authority for a few days.

intervened in despatching that letter, it would have reached Tippoo before the day on which he attacked the Rajah's lines, and it is not absolutely impossible that the reasonable propositions contained in it, might have induced him to open a negotiation for settling the points in dispute if he had received them previous to his having actually commenced hostilities.

It must also be imputed principally to Mr. John Hollond, as a most culpable neglect, that he gave no communication to the Residents at Hydrabad and Poonah, of Tippoo's having violated the treaty with the Company by attacking the Rajah of Travancore's lines on the 29th of December; but after the above neglect, he is still more reprehensible for the manner in which he communicated to Captain Kennaway that part of Tippoo's letter dated the 1st of January, in which he asserts that the attack was made by accident and without any orders from him, because Mr. Hollond well knew that the reports of Mr. Powney, the Resident, and accounts through different channels, positively said that the attack was not only made by Tippoo's direct orders, but that there was every reason to believe that he actually conducted it in person, and was himself wounded or bruised in the action.

Mr. Hollond must also, independent of these reasons, have been sensible that as the general tenor of that letter was so far from being conciliatory, that it principally consisted of a repetition of the offensive and inadmissible demands that the Rajah should destroy part of his lines, and restore Cranganore and Ayacottah to the Dutch, the disavowal which it contained of an intention to commit hostilities on the 29th of December could on no reasonable ground whatever be entitled to the least attention; and by conveying the information of Tippoo's disavowal to Captain Kennaway, without explaining the notorious circumstances which rendered the truth of his assertion improbable, Mr. Hollond could only have intended to impress Captain Kennaway, and Mr. Malet through him, with a belief that all differences would be amicably adjusted, and consequently they might have been induced, by so high an authority, to slacken in their zealous endeavours to secure the friendship and co-operation of the Nizam and the Mahrattas, in exacting reparation from Tippoo for his flagrant breach of the treaty.

In all the other measures which either come under the head of neglect of duty, or of direct disobedience of our orders, the members of the Board participate in culpability with their late President, as no dissent or disapprobation of any resolutions of Government have been offered in their vindication, and the attempt of Mr. Edward John Hollond to justify himself for the criminal disobedience of our

orders, in not acting as if he considered the Company to be at war with Tippoo after that chief had attacked the Rajah of Travancore's lines, by stating that a considerable saving had been made by his delay in making the necessary preparations for carrying on the war with vigour, must impress the Board with particular indignation, when we reflect that we have been during a considerable time exposed to the risk of its being rendered impracticable, by an incursion of Tippoo's cavalry, to collect a sufficient number of draught and carriage bullocks to enable the army to take the field; and still more especially, as we have been informed that by so criminal a procrastination it is even at this moment impossible for the Carnatic army to move in force, although we know that the dominions of a faithful ally are in the most imminent danger of being overrun and ravaged by an implacable and barbarous enemy, against whom our honour, interest, and regard to the faith of treaties, call loudly upon us to defend them.

Our censures for the above culpable acts, are likewise applicable to Mr. Edward John Hollond, who as a member of that Board has a share of responsibility for the measures that I have stated of the late Government; and as I consider it to be no less requisite for the support of the authority of the Supreme Government, than it is necessary for promoting the success of the present war, that a man who has been guilty of such misconduct should be deprived of any authority in the management of the Company's affairs, I propose that he shall be suspended from his seat in the Council of Fort St. George, and from the emoluments that are annexed to that station, until the pleasure of the Court of Directors shall be known, and that the Governor in Council shall be directed to call another member into Council in the room of Mr. Hollond.

I am also called upon by a sense of public duty to declare that I should at any time have looked upon Mr. Taylor as a very unfit person to be a member of the Government of Madras, because it appears upon record that his own subsistence and that of a large family depend upon the regular payment of the dividends to the private creditors of the Nabob of Arcot, and that he has already allowed his public conduct to be influenced by considerations of his private interest; but independent of this very weighty objection against Mr. Taylor as a Councillor, I must likewise add that although he is not so deeply implicated in the blameable disobedience of our orders as either of the other members of the late Government, yet he can by no means be acquitted of a considerable degree of criminality even on that head, unless it should appear upon the proceedings of the Governor in Council of Fort St. George that Mr. Taylor took an

immediate opportunity, as the importance of that business demanded, to record his disapprobation of the conduct of his colleagues in office, in neglecting to provide such equipments as should enable the army to take the field, after that decided circumstance had occurred of Tippoo's attack on the possessions of the Rajah of Travancore, under which they were positively directed by our orders of the 29th of August and 13th of November to consider themselves at war with Tippoo, and to take measures to prosecute the war with vigour.

I propose therefore that General Medows should be directed to examine the proceedings of the Madras Board, from the day on which Mr. Taylor took his seat until the date on which our orders of the 27th of January arrived at that Presidency; and if it should appear that Mr. Taylor during that period declared no disapprobation upon record of measures which were in direct contradiction both to the letter and spirit of our instructions, I must consider him as a sharer in the guilt of that Government of which he was then a member, and I trust in that case that the Board will agree with me in seeing the necessity, in the present critical situation of the Company's affairs in the Carnatic, that Mr. Taylor should likewise be suspended, and his place at the Board supplied in the same manner as Mr. Hollond's.

The words of the Act of Parliament, as well as the peculiar responsibility for the affairs of the Government of Fort St. George which is annexed to General Medows' station, require that it should be left entirely to his discretion to select the persons who would be proper to succeed to the seats in Council, which will become vacant by the suspension of Messrs. Hollond and Taylor: but I think it right that we should offer to his consideration, whether, in making this selection, it may not be proper to hesitate in appointing any person who will not declare upon his honour that he is not, directly or indirectly, a creditor of the Nabob of Arcot or the Rajah of Tanjore, and that he will not become a creditor of either of them, unless from a succession by will, or some unavoidable cause, so long as he shall continue to be a member of the Government.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

[Private and Confidential.]

DEAR SIR, April 4, 1790.

In my other *private and confidential* letter I have contented myself with giving the most precise and minute answers in my power, to some of the queries that you stated in your letter addressed to me, as well as to the Governors of Madras and

Bombay. But as I am very sincerely anxious for the reputation and permanency of the present administration, and shall ever feel most warmly concerned for our national prosperity in this country, I should not act a friendly part by you, or properly in other respects, if I omitted on this occasion to give you my sentiments most freely on some of the principles that may come under discussion, when you proceed to frame a plan for the government of our Indian possessions after the expiration of the Company's present charter.

I must acknowledge that I was happy to hear that the principles of that plan were still under deliberation, and that it was only upon the supposition that the commercial branch might be left to the Company, and the other departments taken into the hands of Government, that you had stated those queries. Many weighty objections occur to the separation that you propose, for it is almost beyond a doubt with me, that no solid advantages would be derived from placing the civil and revenue departments under the immediate direction of the King's Government; and I am perfectly convinced that if the fostering aid and protection, and, what is full as important, the check and control of the Governments abroad, are withdrawn from the commercial department, the Company would not long enjoy their new charter, but must very soon be reduced to a state of actual bankruptcy.

I am not surprised that after the interested and vexatious contradictions which you have experienced from the Court of Directors, you should be desirous of taking as much of the business as possible entirely out of their hands, but I know that great changes are hazardous in all popular Governments, and as the paltry patronage of sending out a few writers is of no value to such an administration as Mr. Pitt's, I should recommend it to your serious consideration, whether it would not be wiser when you shall no longer have to contend with chartered rights, to tie their hands from doing material mischief without meddling with their imperial dignity or their power of naming writers, and not to encounter the furious clamour that will be raised against annexing the patronage of India to the influence of the Crown, except in cases of the most absolute necessity.

That a Court of Directors formed of such materials as the present, can never, when left to themselves, conduct any branch of the business of this country properly, I will readily admit, but under certain restrictions, and when better constituted, it might prove an useful check on the ambitious or corrupt designs of some future Minister. In order however, to enable such Directors to do

this negative good, or to prevent their doing much positive evil, they should have a circumscribed management of the whole, and not a permission to ruin uncontrolled, the commercial advantages which Britain should derive from her Asiatic territories.

It will of course have been represented to you that the India Company formerly was supported by its commerce alone, and that it was then richer than it is at present, and that when their Directors have no longer any business with governing empires, they may again become as thrifty merchants as heretofore. I am persuaded however, that experience would give a contradiction to that theory, for if they should not have lost their commercial talents by having been Emperors, this country is totally changed by being under their dominion. There are now so many Europeans residing in India, and there is such a competition at every aurung of any consequence, that in my opinion even an upright Board of Trade sitting at Calcutta could not make advantageous contracts, or prevent the manufactures from being debased; and therefore that unless the Company have able and active Residents at the different factories, and unless those Residents are prevented by the power of Government from cheating them as they formerly did, London would no longer be the principal mart for the choicest commodities of India.

If the proposed separation was to take place, not a man of credit or character would stay in the Company's service if he could avoid it, and those who did remain, or others who might be hereafter appointed, would be soon looked upon as an inferior class of people, to the servants acting under appointments from his Majesty.

The contempt with which they would be treated would not pass unobserved by the natives, and would preclude the possibility of their being of essential use, even if they were not deficient in character or commercial abilities, and upon the supposition that the Company could afford to pay them liberally for their services.

When you add to the evils which I have described and which no man acquainted with this country will think fictitious, the jobbing that must prevail at the India House in a department which is in a manner given up to plunder, you will not, I am sure, think that I have gone too far in prophesying the bankruptcy of the Company.

In answer to this statement of the impossibility of the Company's carrying on the trade, when all the other parts of the administration of the country are taken into the hands of Government, it may be said by people who have reflected but little on the subject; If the Company cannot carry on the trade, throw it open to all

adventurers. To that mode I should have still greater objections, as it would render it very difficult for Government to prevent this unfortunate country from being overrun by desperate speculators from all parts of the British dominions. The manufactures would soon go to ruin, and the exports, which would annually diminish in value, would be sent indiscriminately to the different countries of Europe.

Although I can see no kind of objection to your opening the export trade from Britain to this country as much as you please, I cannot bring myself to believe that any person well acquainted with the manners of the natives, and with the internal state of this country, would seriously propose to throw the export trade from India entirely open, because it must necessarily come previously under consideration, whether the surplus revenue could be remitted by bills of exchange, and whether a more efficacious mode can be devised for securing the greatest possible advantages from this country to the British Government and to the nation at large, than by transmitting yearly a valuable investment of the best goods that Hindostan can afford, which will not only furnish a large sum in duties to the State, but bring foreign purchasers from all quarters to the London market. We have made our investments these last two years under every possible local disadvantage, viz. the exorbitant price of grain and cotton, the total failure of the silk, and the dreadful famine and inundations in the Dacca district; yet if you could get Mr. Scott[1] the Director, or some other person who would make a fair report, to enquire into the merits of these investments, I have no doubt of its appearing that the Company have not for many years received an investment of so good quality, or one that would have been likely to have afforded so large a profit, if besides all other disadvantages, the India sales in London had not been considerably injured by the troubles in France and by the war in other parts of Europe, as well as by the powerful competition of the British manufactures.

I know that it is much easier to point out defects in any plan that may be proposed than to substitute another good one in its place, and you will be sufficiently aware that the Opposition in Parliament will spare no pains or exertions to throw ridicule and odium upon any system that you or Mr. Pitt may bring forward, without thinking it incumbent upon them to propose any remedies for the errors or imperfections which they will lay to its charge.

[1] David Scott, d. Oct. 4, 1805. M.P. for Forfar County from Nov. 1790, then for Forfar Boroughs till his death. An East India Director for many years, and Chairman in 1796 and 1801.

As a multiplicity of affairs continually press themselves upon me for immediate despatch, I am not able to give up much of my time to reflect deliberately upon this extensive subject, and as there are but few people here of comprehensive views and abilities, with whom I can examine and fully discuss the various objects which ought to be included in so important a plan, I do not feel perfectly confident that I should, after more mature reflection, be entirely satisfied with all the opinions upon it which I at present entertain; but I have thought it right to state without ceremony the ideas that I have at present formed, for yours and Mr. Pitt's consideration.

As the new system will only take place when the rights of the present Company cease, you cannot be charged with a violation of charters, and the attacks of the Opposition in Parliament will therefore be confined to an examination of its expediency and efficacy; I fancy I need hardly repeat to you that they would above all things avail themselves of any apparent attempt on your part to give an increase of patronage to the Crown, which could not be justified on the soundest constitutional principles, or on the ground of evident necessity, and would make use of it to misrepresent your intentions and principles, and to endeavour to inflame the minds of the nation against you.

An addition of patronage to the Crown, to a certain degree, will however in my opinion be not only a justifiable measure, but absolutely necessary for the future good government of this country. But according to my judgment, a renewal of the Company's charter for the management of the territorial revenues and the commerce of India for a limited time (for instance ten or fifteen years), and under such stipulations as it may be thought proper to annex as conditions, would be the wisest foundation for your plan, both for your own sakes as Ministers, and as being best calculated for securing the greatest possible advantages to Britain from her Indian possessions, and least likely to injure the essential principles of our own Constitution.

The present Court of Directors is so numerous, and the responsibility for public conduct which falls to the share of each individual is so small, that it can have no great weight with any of them, and the participation in a profitable contract, or the means of serving friends or providing for relations, must always more than compensate to them for the loss that they may sustain by any fluctuation that may happen in the market-price of the stock which constitutes their qualifications. I should therefore think that it would be very useful to the public, to reduce the number of

Directors to twelve, or to nine; and if handsome salaries could be annexed to those situations, I should be clear for adopting means for their being prohibited from having an interest directly or indirectly in contracts, or in any commercial transactions whatever, in which the Company may have the smallest concern.

At the same time however, if one or both of these points should be carried, I would not by any means recommend that they should retain the power of appointing Governors, Commanders-in-Chief, or Members of Council, at any of the Presidencies; the honour and interest of the nation, the fate of our fleets and armies, being too deeply staked on the conduct of the persons holding the above-mentioned offices, to render it safe to trust their nominations in any other hands but those of the executive Government of Britain. But as this measure, though not in fact deviating very widely from the existing arrangement, by which the King has the power of recalling those officers, would at first appear a strong one, and would be vehemently opposed, I would give it every qualification that the welfare and security of the country could admit of. I would establish it by law, that the choice of the Civil Members of Council should be limited to Company's servants of a certain standing (at least twelve years), which would in the mind of every candid person leave very little room in respect to them for ministerial patronage, and it should be left to the Court of Directors to frame such general regulations for the appointment to offices in India, as should be consistent with the selection of capable men, and to establish the strictest system that they can devise of check and controul upon every article of expenditure at the different Presidencies.

I would likewise recommend that it should be clearly understood and declared, that the Court of Directors should have a right to expect that His Majesty's Ministers would pay the greatest attention to all their representations respecting the conduct of the Governors, Commanders-in-Chief, and Councillors; and that in case satisfactory redress should not be given to any of their complaints of that nature, that they should have a right to insist upon the recall of any Governor, Commander-in-Chief, or Councillor whom they should name, and that the utmost facility should be given to them to institute prosecutions against such Governors, &c., whose conduct may appear to them to have been culpable, before the Court of Judicature which has been established by Act of Parliament for the trial of Indian delinquents.

In regard to the Military arrangement, I am clearly of opinion that the European troops should all belong to the King, for expe-

rience has shown that the Company cannot keep up an efficient European force in India; this is a fact so notorious, that no military man who has been in this country will venture to deny it, and I do not care how strongly I am quoted as authority for it.

The circumstances however, of the native troops are very different. It is highly expedient, and indeed absolutely necessary for the public good, that the officers who are destined to serve in those corps, should come out at an early period of life and devote themselves entirely to the Indian Service; a perfect knowledge of the language, and a minute attention to the customs and religious prejudices of the sepoys, being qualifications for that line which cannot be dispensed with. Were these officers to make a part of the King's army, it would soon become a practice to exchange their commissions with ruined officers from England, who would be held in contempt by their inferior officers, and in abhorrence by their soldiers, and you need not be told how dangerous a disaffection in our native troops would be to our existence in this country. I think therefore that as you cannot make laws to bind the King's prerogative in the exchanges or promotions of his army, it would be much the safest determination to continue the native troops in the Company's service, and by doing so you would still leave to the Court of Directors the patronage of cadets, and of course give some popularity to the measure.

The ultimate line to be drawn, would give to the Court of Directors the appointment of writers to the Civil branches of the service, and of cadets for the native troops, and the power of prescribing certain general rules under the descriptions I have mentioned, for the disposal of offices by the Governments in India, and of calling the Governors, &c., to an immediate account for every deviation from these rules, but they ought to be strictly prohibited from appointing or recommending any of their servants to succeed to offices in this country, as such appointments or recommendations are more frequently granted to intrigue and solicitation than to a due regard to real merit or good pretensions, and such interference at home must always tend in some degree to weaken the authority of the Government in India.

The mode of choosing the Directors, the term of their continuance in office, and the manner in which they should render an account of their own conduct, and lay statements of the affairs of the Company before the Proprietors of the Stock, with a variety of other points of that nature, will be subjects of regulation upon the present occasion; but upon the supposition of the charter's being renewed, it appears to me highly requisite for the public good that

the right of inspection and controul in the King's Ministers should be extended to every branch of the Company's affairs, without any exception as to their commerce; and as altercations between the controulling power and the Court of Directors must always be detrimental to the public interest, whether occasioned by improper encroachments on one side, or an obstinate or capricious resistance on the other, it seems particularly desirable that not only the extent, but also the manner in which the Ministers are to exercise the right of inspection and controul, should be prescribed so clearly as to prevent if possible all grounds for misapprehension or dispute.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO JOHN SHORE, ESQ.

DEAR SIR, Calcutta, April 15, 1790.

I send you a copy of my second minute according to my promise. I shall desire it to be sent to you by the coach, as I am afraid you would not think it worth the postage.

Although Tippoo has opened batteries of heavy artillery against the poor Rajah of Travancore's contemptible lines, he had made no considerable impression upon them on the 18th of last month, and Powney then wrote me word that it was reported he was detaching part of his army towards Coimbatore.

The Marattas and Nizam have shown the utmost willingness to join us, and sent propositions which were really very fair for an alliance against Tippoo; I have approved and returned them for ratification. I flatter myself that with such a confederacy, and the assistance of the Nairs, and Tippoo's other oppressed and discontented subjects, the contest cannot last long. If you see Dick Johnson,[1] you may tell him from me, that no man, except his friend Mr. Hollond, is half so much abused here as himself.

I am, with very sincere good wishes for your health and happiness, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO C. W. MALET, ESQ.

SIR, Fort William, April 19, 1790.

I received on the 17th instant your letter dated the 24th ultimo, containing the articles agreed upon between you and the

[1] Richard Johnson, M.P. for Milborne Port from June 1791 to Feb. 1794. He married the widow of Mr. Watts, who had been Governor of Bengal. She was mother to the 1st Lord Liverpool's 1st wife.

Peshwa's ministers, and in addition to the satisfaction which I received, at seeing this important business on the point of being settled so completely according to my wishes, I had the pleasure of knowing that you would, soon after the date of your letter, be relieved from your apprehensions in regard to Captain Kennaway's negotiation, as you would learn from himself, that everything was going on perfectly as we could wish at Hydrabad.

I was extremely happy to find that the Nizam had been treated with so much delicacy in the arrangements that form the basis of the treaty; and I conclude his Highness will make his option for the second mode that is submitted to him for the partition of conquests, as being conformable to the principles of the propositions which he transmitted to me through Captain Kennaway, and to which I have already given my assent; and indeed upon the whole I am inclined to think that it will be the most eligible, and the least likely to occasion jealousies and differences during the continuance of the war.

Under different circumstances, the first mode might have been preferable, as being calculated to incite the parties by considerations of their immediate private interests, to great ardour in the prosecution of the war; but when the prospect of success is so great as that which is held out by the present alliance, I am in great hopes that it will prove a sufficient spur to zeal and activity in all the confederates.

Should this mode be adopted, it may with propriety be urged by any of the parties, that each Government should pay their own troops, in whichever army they may be employed, as the object of their services will be to contribute equally to the advantage of all the confederates, by promoting the success of the common cause. If this should be brought forward by the Marattas, you will of course act according to circumstances, and you have already received an ample latitude from me. But the same agreement will be of equal force for requiring that they shall continue to pay such of their own cavalry, as it may at any time be found expedient for the general good to employ in conjunction with our army.

In answer to the reference made to me in the 14th Article, I must confess, that in forming an alliance like the present, I do not see how we can object to the mutual guarantee of each other's possessions after the peace. It will however be highly proper that it should be distinctly explained, that the party attacked shall have no claim to the assistance of the other confederates, unless it should clearly appear that he was not the aggressor, by committing any previous act of hostility or injustice.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR PALMER.

SIR, April 23, 1790.

Enclosed I send you a copy of a letter dated the 25th ultimo, from the Governor in Council at Bombay, in consequence of the death of the Nabob of Surat,[1] in addition to the extract of the letter from Colonel Abercrombie, on the same subject, which I transmitted to you on the 20th instant.

You will observe in the letter now forwarded, that it is thought of consequence to the interests of the Company that the office of Nabob should be abolished, and a sunnud obtained from Shah Allum to invest the Company with the entire Government and Revenues of the city of Surat and its dependencies, or if the present system of government should be continued, that certain terms should be settled for the Company, on appointing his successor.

I cannot, however, recommend that the sunnud should be applied for in the name of the Company, because the late Nabob's eldest son appears to have a claim to the office by right of inheritance; and I am likewise unwilling to lay much stress on a sunnud from the King, as a formal acknowledgment of its validity might be turned to the disadvantage of the Company upon some other occasion. I should also dislike very much at this time to ask a favour of Scindia, as it might raise expectations in him of obtaining some return for it, which could not be granted.

Should you therefore learn, that the appointment is to be given to the Nabob's eldest son, without burthening him with any unreasonable stipulations, you will make no opposition to its taking place; but should you discover it to be the intention of the Mahrattas either to take it directly or indirectly to themselves, or to procure it to be given to any other person than the Nabob's eldest son, I desire that you will interfere, and require that Scindia shall defer the final determination upon a point in which the Company's interests are so materially concerned, until he can communicate with, and obtain the concurrence of this Government.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

[1] The Nabob of Surat, Kutab-ud-Din Meer Kussoodin, succeeded his father, Mir Achand (who had usurped the power in 1746), March, 1763, and died March, 1790. His brother and successor, Nasir-ud-Din, was b. 1755, d. Jan. 9, 1799. The Company are now in possession of the territory.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ABERCROMBY.

DEAR ABERCROMBY, May 3, 1790.

. . . I am very glad to find that you have determined to send a body of troops to the relief of the Rajah of Travancore, who, from the inactivity of the two battalions that are with him, and the excessive length of time required to put the Carnatic army in motion, will I apprehend entertain great doubts of the sincerity of our desire to assist him, and indeed I am afraid that your efforts will be too late to save him from much distress and mortification.

From the last accounts which I received of Tippoo's approaches, I conclude that the lines must be carried before your reinforcement can arrive; but the appearance of your armament upon the coast will probably prevent him from reducing the country, especially as he must have detached a considerable part of his best troops to oppose the very formidable army which is assembling at Trichinopoly.

It is not easy to say at present, where the Bombay army may at present be most usefully employed after the rains. The first object must undoubtedly be to co-operate with General Medows, and you will of course correspond in the fullest manner with him upon that subject.

The Mahrattas too are not to be neglected, as you must, I am sure, be perfectly sensible of the value of their assistance during the present war. If they should after the rains make a point of sending them some more troops, or if the success of their operations appears to depend upon our doing it, it would not I think be advisable to refuse them.

If General Medows should leave you to act for yourself, and you should receive no pressing application from the Mahrattas, I see at present no reason to object to your putting yourself at the head of the sort of corps that you mention, and adopting such measures as may be concerted amongst us to promote the success of the common cause.

The conduct of the French in withdrawing their troops from Pondicherry, and the distracted state of their Government at home, render it highly improbable that they should have entertained any views of disturbing the tranquillity of the British possessions in India. . . .

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO CHARLES W. MALET, ESQ., RESIDENT AT POONAH.

SIR, Fort William, May 10, 1790.

. . . I have received a letter from Captain Kennaway, by which I have the satisfaction to find that all impediments on the part of the Nizam to the final adjustment of the treaty are likely to be removed, as his Highness, by approving of Captain Kennaway's letter to you, dated the 17th ultimo, has in fact engaged to accede to whatever the Minister and yourself may determine upon the alterations which he has proposed.

You are already so fully acquainted with my inclination to make almost any sacrifice that could be required, for the purpose of obtaining an immediate and vigorous co-operation of the Peshwa's government in the present war, that I need not say more upon that subject.

Considering however, that the eventual operation of the Confederacy may deprive the Peshwa of the tribute which he now receives from Tippoo, I will freely confess that I do not think it by any means unreasonable in him to expect that a tribute from the restored Zemindars, to the amount of twelve lacs, may be allowed to him, exclusive of his share in the general partition of the countries that may be conquered by the arms of the alliance.

Upon the whole, after making allowance for the distance of the correspondence and the pressure of the time, I must, in justice both to you and Captain Kennaway, say that everything has been as well settled as our most sanguine expectations could have led us to hope. When the treaty is reduced to a proper form and transmitted to me, I shall ratify it with the greatest pleasure. . . .

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN COUNCIL TO THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL, FORT ST. GEORGE.

HONOURABLE SIR, Fort William, May 11, 1790.

We have received your letter dated the 1st instant, and it gives us the greatest concern to learn from it, that, notwithstanding the pressure of your wants at this critical juncture, you have not been able to obtain payment of the arrear which is at present due by the Nabob of Arcot to the Honourable Company, according to the tenor of the treaty concluded with his Highness by Sir Archibald Campbell, in the year 1787, or according to the

terms of the propositions from the Court of Directors, contained in their letter dated 20th August, 1788, and which have been recently accepted by the Nabob. We are also much concerned that there is no reasonable ground to hope that he will fulfil the engagements contracted by that treaty to furnish the specified proportion of his resources, towards defraying the expenses of the war in which the Company is now involved with a prince, whose father's or his own ambitious and violent disposition, has occasioned so many calamities to his Highness's family and dominions, and repeatedly threatened them with utter ruin.

From a regard to the long connexion that has existed between the Nabob and the English nation, and from the respect which is due to his Highness's station and personal character, we are persuaded that you will be inclined to treat him on every occasion, not only with the strictest justice, but also with the greatest delicacy.

The latter consideration cannot, however, consistently with the duty that you owe to your own public station, be allowed to operate to the essential prejudice of the Company's affairs, and especially on an occasion when a weak forbearance on your part might prove highly injurious to his Highness's own substantial interests.

Upon that principle we do not hesitate in declaring, that at a time when the Company's resources are so much strained, and when pecuniary supplies are so indispensably necessary for ensuring the success of the war, it would even be criminal in you to relax in requiring of his Highness the full execution of the above-mentioned treaty and propositions, either by a punctual discharge of the proportion of his revenues which he is bound to furnish at the periods that were specified, or by an immediate surrender of the districts that were named, to the management of your Government.

We are likewise so much convinced that his Highness's weakness, indolence, and facility of disposition has long left his subjects to groan under a corrupt and most oppressive system of administration, that we are clearly of opinion, that by obtaining possession of the entire management of the whole country, you would essentially serve the Nabob himself and the Company, as well as the interests of humanity.

We, therefore, not only entirely agree in opinion with you respecting the utility of the measure, but we recommend in the most earnest manner that you will use every persuasive means in your power to induce him to entrust your Government, at least

during the continuance of the present war, with the uncontrolled management of the whole of his territories. And should you be so fortunate as to prevail upon him to adopt this salutary determination, we are convinced that you will see the necessity of taking every possible means to show him, in the most clear and satisfactory manner, that you take no more for the general expense of the war than the precise sum stipulated by the treaty, and that you are punctual in paying the portion due to him regularly into his Highness's treasury.

Many solid advantages would result to all parties from this arrangement, and it would not be the least important, that it would put it in your power, by fair and equitable treatment, to conciliate the good-will and attachment of his Highness's tributary Polygars in the southern districts, who are often driven to despair by the oppressive exactions of his managers, and whose hearty co-operation would be of the utmost value to us in the present contest.

You will, of course, understand, that the sentiments which we have given respecting your line of conduct towards the Nabob, are, upon the present occasion, equally applicable to the Rajah of Tanjore. We have the honour to be, &c.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO COLONEL BRATHWAITE,[1] Commanding the Troops on the North side of the River Kristna.

SIR, Fort William, May 31, 1790.

I have this day received information from Captain Kennaway, that he has acquainted General Medows that a requisition has been transmitted to me from the Nizam, that the whole or part of the detachment under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Cockerell may be ordered to join and co-operate with his Highness's army. But at this distance I cannot at present judge whether previous arrangements will have permitted General Medows to render it practicable to comply with that requisition.

In the event, however, that General Medows has directed the whole or any part of the detachment to remain on the north side of the Kristna, until my instructions on the above point shall arrive, I desire that you will order Lieut.-Colonel Cockerell to proceed immediately with the whole, or such part of his detachment as may have been detained by General Medows for that purpose, to join the Nizam's army, in the manner and by the route that may be prescribed to him through Captain Kennaway.

[1] Colonel, afterwards Major-General Sir John Brathwaite, Bart., so created Dec. 18, 1802, b. 1739, d. Aug. 16, 1803; m. April, 1761, Elizabeth, dau. of John Brown, Esq.

. . . There are, at the same time, three circumstances that may occur, any one of which you are to consider as a sufficient ground for preventing the effect of this order:—1st. An application to you from the Board at Fort St. George, or from the commanding officer of the centre division, that the detachment may proceed on its march to assist in the defence of the Carnatic. 2nd. Your being informed by Captain Kennaway that the detachment can be of no material use to the Nizam's army during the season of the rains. 3rd. Your being acquainted by that gentleman of his Highness having dispensed with the junction of the detachment.

The two latter are very likely to happen, if the Nizam's army should not have crossed the Kristna before the swelling of the river; but in either of the three cases that I have mentioned, you are to order the detachment to continue its march to the southward.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

H. R. H. THE PRINCE OF WALES TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Received June, 1790.]

MY DEAR LORD, Carlton House, May 30, 1789.

I must begin by thanking you for the very kind and friendly letter I received from you by the last ship from the East Indies, it was so long since I had last heard from you, y^t^ I begun to think you had forgot all y^r^ old friends in this part of the world. How things have chang'd and what a chequered scene of Life I have been obliged to go thro' for the last six months! Ere this, I suppose you will have heard of the King's Indisposition, and how the Minister attempted to destroy *my Rights*, but to deprive every other individual of our family of the common liberties and rights of Englishmen. Supported I have been by some *real and true friends*, at the head of whom your Friend my Brother stood foremost, w^h^ has gained immortal Honor, had you been here my dear Lord I doubt not y^t^ we sh^d^ have had the happiness of meeting with a similar support from you, tho' I am sorry to say that your members consulted the interests of the *cause of Pitt*, instead of the Rights and Independence of the Constitution of this Country as well as of the House of Brunswick. Everything has fallen into very different hands. The King is convalescent, that is to say he certainly is

[1] This letter, by some accident, was not received by Lord Cornwallis till more than a year after it was written, which deprived it of much of its interest.

better, everything is thrown into the hands of the Queen, every Friend y^t^ supported me and the common cause of succession in the Family, if they had any place have been dismissed, such as the Duke of Queensberry, and our little Friend Lothian. Queensberry has been dismissed by order of the Queen and Mr. Pitt from the bedchamber. Lothian has left his regiment of Horse-Guards, they have had the Insolence to threaten the Duke of York with taking his Regiment of Foot-Guards, and when they at last did not dare do that, they have brought officers into his Regiment and committed towards him every species of Indignity to force him to resign, w^h^ he has had prudence and coolness sufficient as well as firmness enough to resist, not only these great Officers but numberless of a lower class whose sole dependence in life, and sustenance depended upon their Places, have been disgracefully dismiss'd from their offices for their disinterested support of me, and our Family. You will forgive me my dear Lord for thus expatiating upon a subject w^h^ I w^d^ not have done but to *such a Friend* as I consider you. I cannot but confess y^t^ I feel for the dangerous situation in w^h^ the Rights and Liberties of this Nation are at present, as well as the very critical position in w^h^ every Individual of Our Family stands at present. However the very precarious state of the King's health, renders some People a little upon their Guard who are not driven to a state of dispair, such as not only pervades the Minister himself, but his Adherents in general. I will not bore you any further at present as I suppose you will have heard by many Letters of our critical situation in this Country at the present Period, but trust you will attribute my prolixity to the intimacy of an old Friend.

Before I conclude I must thank you for the kind expressions you have made use of to me respecting my Protégé Mr. Treves. I confess I feel myself much interested in his wellfare, and success in Life, and nothing can make me more happy than thinking y^t^ he will owe y^t^ Success to you, I have just heard from a Friend at the India House, y^t^ the object of Treves' ambition at present is, to be appointed to the Adaulet of Benares, w^h^ is now held by a Black named Alii Cann.[1] Understanding y^t^ most of the Adaulets are now held by Europeans, and as I am informed y^t^ it is the intention y^t^ the Europeans are to be so placed in future in preference to the Natives, I sh^d^ be vastly happy if without committing any injustice you c^d^ place young Treves in y^t^ situation, as I shall feel myself personally obliged to you for his promotion.

[1] Alj Ibrahim Khan, Chief Criminal Judge at Benares, a man of great talent, and universally respected. See Lord Cornwallis to the Prince of Wales, Aug. 14, 1790.

I will not trespass any further upon you, but conclude with desiring you to believe me, my dear Lord,

Ever sincerely your Friend,

GEORGE P.

LORD SYDNEY TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Received June, 1790.]

MY DEAR LORD, London, Jan. 27, 1790.

I received with great pleasure your letter of the 9th of August. I was at Frognall, and though I cease to be of the number of H. M.'s Ministers, I thought it my duty to come up to London to lay before H. M. *some parts* of the contents of it. I was the more strongly of this opinion, as Mr. Dundas was then, where he at present continues, in Scotland. The King expressed himself in terms of the strongest approbation of your management, both with regard to the Nizam's ambassador, and the intended address from Bengal.[1] H. M. has ordered Mr. Grenville to have the measures proposed in your letter taken with regard to the first of these subjects. As to the latter, H. M. agrees entirely with you, that the fewer addresses come to him from foreign parts, especially from India, the better. He regrets the loss of your services in India, and without compliment it will not be an easy matter to replace you to the satisfaction and advantage of the country. By what I hear, though Mr. Hollond took the same measure as your Lordship, of endeavouring to stop the address at Madras, not indeed with the same success, the same motives are not attributed to him. Party spirit is supposed to have guided him, and it is said, with the observations you may conceive, that he, his brother, and my old (not quite right-headed) friend, W. Burke, were the only persons who refused to sign it. I ought not to omit that H. M. received with great satisfaction your Lordship's assurances of the affection, duty, and loyal attachment of His Subjects in Bengal.

Thank God, H. M.'s health continues as good as possible, and from the diminution, though not very considerable, which He has made in His exercise, and the reasonable improvement He has made in His diet, He is really much better than He has been for many years. He looks as likely to live as any man in England. I am sure He enjoys the good wishes of His subjects as generally as any prince ever did.

[1] Lord Cornwallis had quietly interfered to prevent any address from the inhabitants of Calcutta to congratulate the King on his recovery, and he had been equally successful in prevailing upon the Nizam not to send an ambassador to England.

The state of our neighbours is the most extraordinary that can be imagined; they seem to be forming a constitution, which they boast is to be freer than ours. It is an arduous task. They have read too many of the volumes of Opposition pamphlets of this country, from the Revolution to the present day, and cannot be supposed to be able easily to separate the corn from the chaff. Insurrections happen frequently, but at present the bourgeoisie of Paris seem to govern France. No taxes are paid, and that seems the circumstance which the multitude look upon as the real test of liberty. We swarm with French of the first families, many of them in great distress. . . . The Duke of Orleans[1] is here, caressed only by a very few *high in rank*, detested by his own countrymen here, despised by us, and probably driven from France by both parties there. It is supposed, and I believe with truth, that he was very cavalierly treated by La Fayette. Flanders exhibits as extraordinary a scene as France. Driven to despair by the absurd measures, equally weak and harsh, of their sovereign, they have at length divested him of his power. All the great towns and citadels, which have tried the skill and strength of the great generals of Europe for the last two centuries, fell in a few days and with little bloodshed, into the hands of priests, burghers, and students of universities. Luxembourgh, and possibly the citadel of Antwerp, still remain under the government of the Emperor. But the Flemings have still difficulties to surmount. The *States* of the Low Countries have carried this great work through, but there seems a disposition to dispute the legality of their Government, and to force them to convoke a General National Assembly. The clergy jealously watch the interests of the Roman Catholic Religion, and even of the Papal power. The peasantry still retain a respect for the old Government. Here are jarring interests and wishes enough to give an opening to the House of Austria, but the weak state of health and perverse head of the Emperor, as well as the multitude of enemies, domestic as well as foreign, which he has *acquired* for himself, will probably prevent him, if he should live another year, from availing himself of it. I do not think the least probable turn that things may take will be a General Assembly, and in the end, for a time at least, an almost absolute Democracy. So much for our neighbours.[2]

[1] Louis Phillipe Joseph, Duke of Orleans (Egalite), b. April 13, 1747, guillotined Nov. 6, 1793; m. April 5, 1769, Louise Marie Adelaide, dau. of Louis Jean, Duc de Penthièvre. He had been sent to England ostensibly to transact business, but really because he was suspected of having organised the disturbances of Oct. 1789. He was very coldly received in London, and, except the Royal Princes, who at one time had it in contemplation to borrow large sums from him, few showed him any countenance.

[2] The death of the Emperor took place a fortnight after the date of this letter. His

At home we are perfectly quiet for the present; the revenue increasing, and the people in general viewing with pleasure the contrast between this country and our rival neighbour. The Dissenters are taking however very eager measures for the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts, and avail themselves of the approach of the general election. There is another subject which is disagreeable, which is that of the abolition of Negro Slavery and the Slave Trade. The P. of W. is taking all possible pains to form a strong party against the Government. He affects a great regard for the King. The Q. is held out as the object of the most inveterate as well as the most ungenerous and undeserved abuse. H. R. H. governs His two Br^s;[1] another has lately returned post from Geneva, but is going to Gibraltar.

Mr. Pitt stands high, and as deservedly so as any man ever did, in the public esteem. Unless something unforeseen arises, the Dissenters' business[2] and that of the Slave Trade seem to be the only topics likely to be much agitated this Session. . . .

I am now retired from the very laborious and responsible situation which I lately held, to the quiet one which your Lordship formerly held of Chief Justice in Eyre. I have it on better terms, following the precedent of my immediate predecessor, who understood a bargain better than your Lordship. My son, quitting the Secretary's office with me, is at the Admiralty Board.

You will see that I ought to be, and I can assure you that I am, perfectly satisfied and grateful to the King, as well as sensible of the friendship of Mr. Pitt. My appetite is not so keen, nor my digestion so quick as those of some of my neighbours. I do not feel the least inclination to join Lord North, Lord Stormont, and Lord Loughborough. Adieu, my dear Lord; accept my best wishes and those of my family.

I am, with the greatest truth and esteem,

SYDNEY.

brother Leopold, Grand Duke of Tuscany, who succeeded him, soon effected a reconciliation with his Belgian subjects, by the moderation of his conduct.

[1] The Dukes of York and Clarence; the third was Prince Edward, afterwards Duke of Kent, who had resided for some time at Geneva.

[2] Mr. Beaufoy's motion, May 8, 1789, for the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts, had been rejected by 122 to 102. A similar motion was made by Mr. Fox, March 2, 1790, and negatived by 294 to 105. The only legislative measure proposed this year on the Slave Trade, was the renewal for a limited time of Sir William Dolben's bill, regulating the numbers to be carried in each ship, which met with no opposition. Some evidence was also heard at the bar on the general question.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO CAPTAIN KENNAWAY.

SIR, Fort William, June 17, 1790.

. . . The Madras Government having a few days ago transmitted the copy of a letter which was addressed by Tippoo Sultaun to General Medows, I am glad to embrace the opportunity which it has furnished, to give the Nizam a specimen of the openness with which I am determined to conduct myself towards our allies in all transactions with that Prince.

I therefore enclose a copy of Tippoo's letter, and of the answer which the Madras Government has been directed to return to it, in order that by your communicating the (or the substance of the) papers to his Highness and his Ministers, you may be enabled to show that they may depend upon the sincerity of the assurances that you have already given them, that we will adhere strictly to our engagements, and enter into no negotiations with Tippoo without the knowledge and full approbation of the other members of the confederacy.

At so early a stage of our military operations, we cannot form a judgment of the terms to which it may be in our power to oblige Tippoo to submit, but that we may be properly prepared for discussions at the time that any negotiations shall be opened, I wish you to ascertain and communicate to me, as soon as you possibly can, the objects which his Highness would be principally desirous to acquire at the conclusion of a peace.

You will have known before this time that General Medows with the army under his command has attacked Tippoo's southern dominions, and I make no doubt of your having availed yourself of that information, to incite the Nizam to make the most vigorous exertions on his part to distract and distress the common enemy.

. . . Your uniform accounts of the good disposition of the Nizam and his Ministers give me great satisfaction, tho' for the sake of his Highness' own reputation and interest, as well as that of the other members of the confederacy, I cannot but lament that the movements of his forces are so exceedingly tardy.

At the same time I must in candour admit, that it was not unreasonable in him to expect that our southern army should shew him an example by commencing its operations, and I am also obliged to acknowledge that from your report of the state of the Madras detachment, upon Major Montgomery's own authority, his Highness has great reason to complain of a failure on our part, in affording him the support which he is entitled to by treaty and by repeated promises.

It may not be possible to apply any immediate remedy to the defects of those two battalions; but you may assure his Highness and his Ministers, that I am highly displeased at their having been sent to him in so unmilitary and so imperfect a condition, and that I shall not only call the commanding officer of the Northern Division of the Carnatic Army, or any other person who may have participated in the negligence of employing troops that seem to be so unfit for service, to a most rigorous account for his misconduct, but I shall also take the earliest possible opportunity to replace them with others, that are complete in numbers and perfect in military discipline.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO BENJAMIN ROEBUCK, ESQ.,[1] MADRAS.

[Private.]

SIR, Calcutta, July 25, 1790.

I have received your letter dated the 3rd ultimo, and I beg leave to assure you, that after the handsome manner in which you stood forward and offered your services to expose the conduct of a Government, which has been so prejudicial to the interests and so disgraceful to the honour of our country, I could not entertain a suspicion that you had in any degree relaxed in your zeal for the public welfare.

The hurry of business in which General Medows must necessarily have been engaged, from the hour of his landing at Madras until his departure for the army, and the situation of his Council during the greatest part of that time, rendered it impossible for him to enter upon the important investigation which I so strongly recommend to him, and which I am sure his sense of duty and public spirit, will induce him most eagerly to follow up, whenever the circumstances of his Government will admit of his undertaking it.

I have great satisfaction in learning from you, that altho' the delay will render the business more difficult, you are still of opinion that the enquiry, if properly conducted, cannot easily be defeated. I can only promise that it shall not fail for want of any encouragement and support that it may be in my power to give, and I trust that you will omit no opportunity of obtaining such information as will be likely to contribute to its success.

I am, with much esteem, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

[1] Benjamin Roebuck, d. Aug. 1809. He was very instrumental in unravelling the frauds committed at Madras, but his temper was very impetuous, and in 1808-9 the line he took against the Governor, Sir George Barlow, who was engaged in a similar task, was so offensive, that he was removed from Madras to a station on the coast, where he died.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO H. R. H. THE PRINCE OF WALES.

SIR, Calcutta, Aug. 14, 1790.

The letter which your Royal Highness did me the honour to write to me on the 31st of May, 1789, was through some accident omitted to be sent by the Vestal frigate (which was the only ship that sailed in the course of that summer), and consequently I did not receive it till the Indiamen of the last season had all sailed from hence. This circumstance has mortified me exceedingly, lest your Royal Highness should think me remiss in replying to your commands in regard to Mr. Treves, about whom I know that you take an earnest concern.

The Civil Courts of Justice throughout the Company's provinces have been for many years in the hands of the Company's servants, and it is my wish and intention, if I can accomplish it, to place the Criminal Courts likewise under their superintendence and jurisdiction.

This case however has been different in the Province of Benares, nor was any judge ever appointed by this Government for that district, until Mr. Hastings gave the office of Judge of the City to Ali Ibrahim Khan after the troubles in 1781.

The great and truly respectable character of that magistrate, would have rendered it a very difficult and unpopular measure for any Governor-General to have removed him, even if the plausible pretext of preserving an uniformity of system with our other possessions in this part of India, by appointing European Judges of Adaulet, could with propriety have been admitted. But as not only the Court over which Ali Ibrahim Khan presides, but the other native Courts which we have since instituted in the principal towns of that district, are subject to the immediate inspection and controul of the Resident, who acts as a coadjutor with the Rajah in the government of the country, the measure of removing Ali Ibrahim Khan, which would be in the highest degree disgusting and offensive to the natives, could neither be defended on the principles of expediency or system.

I must likewise add, if Ali Ibrahim Khan was to be turned out, or to die to-morrow, and it should then be thought advisable to appoint an English Judge for the city of Benares, the allowances to be annexed to that station would necessarily be regulated by those which have been granted to the judges of Patna, Moorshedabad, and Dacca, and, without adverting to the impropriety of appointing so very young a servant of the Company to an office of so much gravity and importance, would render it impossible to give

it to Mr. Treves, as, according to the Act of Parliament, he would not, from his standing in the service, be qualified to receive a salary of that amount.

Besides my most earnest desire to gratify every wish of your Royal Highness, I really have otherwise a strong inclination to serve Mr. Treves, on account of the prudence of his conduct for some time past, and his attention to the duties of his present station. But from his being at the very bottom of the list of the Company's servants (except those of the present year), and vacancies in the Civil Line that would suit him falling but rarely, I cannot venture to say whether anything, or what, can be done for him during my stay in the country. I can therefore only assure your Royal Highness that I will not omit an opportunity, if it should offer.

So much time has elapsed since the date of your Royal Highness's letter, and the situation of affairs at home is now so much altered in every respect, that, wishing as I at all times do, to avoid the subject of politics, I feel the strongest disposition to decline entering at all upon the unpleasant topic on which your Royal Highness has so fully and so earnestly expressed yourself, and no consideration should now induce me to speak upon it, if I did not apprehend that after the open and confidential manner in which you have done me the honor to write to me, my total silence might be attributed either to a want of candor or to disrespect.

I shall not endeavour to combat with arguments any of the positions that your Royal Highness has laid down, not having so far forgot the effects of party on the minds of men, as to be sanguine enough to suppose that I should be successful, and as from the total change of circumstances, it could answer no useful purpose to make the attempt.

I will however rely with confidence on the natural liberality of your Royal Highness's disposition, and trust that my acknowledging a dissent from some of those positions, will not be ascribed to improper motives.

I can at the same time with the utmost sincerity declare, that you will only do me justice in believing that no man can love and admire more than I do, your Royal Highness's amiable qualities and virtues, that I feel the warmest gratitude for your personal kindness to me, that I am a determined friend to the liberties of my country, the just prerogatives of the Crown, and the rights of the House of Brunswick, and that I should feel the highest gratification in being able to coincide on all occasions in political sentiments with the Duke of York; but after having said this, I must honestly confess

that if I had been in England in the winter of 1788-9, I should have thought it my duty, however painful it might have been to me, to have taken a different line from his Royal Highness in Parliament.

The war into which Tippoo so wantonly forced us, has in a few months swallowed up a large portion of the fruits of my three years' economy; but the alliance which we have formed with the Marattas and the Nizam, and the connexion which we have successfully established with the Nairs, and all the chiefs on the Malabar coast who are tributary to Tippoo, in addition to the very respectable state of our own military force both European and native, must, I think, in a few months, according to the common course of human affairs, put a period to the contest, and enable us to indemnify ourselves from the usurped spoils of the aggressor, for the heavy expense which his violence and ambition have brought upon us.

Tippoo has abandoned the rich and extensive country of Coimbatore to General Medows without obliging him to fire a single cannon-shot, and without material opposition of any kind. There were only a few skirmishes of cavalry, in which our troops killed or took about an hundred of his Irregular Horse, without the loss on their part of a single man.

I have likewise from our last advices great reason to believe that Medows has by this time taken the fortress of Palacatcherry, which from its situation is very important, as it opens an immediate communication for him with the Malabar Coast, and puts it in his power to receive any supplies from thence, or reinforcements from the troops of the Bombay establishment.

Our allies are in motion, and have no doubt already created much alarm and embarrassment to Tippoo; but during the rains of the south-west monsoon, which prevail at this time in every part of India, except the Carnatic and Coimbatore, it cannot be expected that they should act with much efficacy. But they give the strongest assurances that they will adhere to their engagements, and invade Tippoo's northern dominions in the month of October, with numerous and powerful armies.

Your Royal Highness will easily conceive, that the probability of my not having it in my power to return next year to England, must, at my time of life, be a severe disappointment. But if we can bring this war to an honourable and advantageous conclusion, and I can have the satisfaction of leaving this country in a state of peace and prosperity, I shall think my labours amply repaid.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

LORD SOUTHAMPTON TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Received Aug. 1790.]

MY DEAR LORD, London, March 6, 1790.

Probably this will have the good fortune of reaching your hands safe, as I give it in charge to Ramus, late page of the backstairs to the K. He goes out recommended, as I understand, by H. M., as a free merchant. The man is almost broken-hearted, and is one of the débris of the wreck of last year's mysterious business.[1] I understand that he is to carry out letters from the K., the P. of W., and the Duke of Y. to your Lordship: they will be more useful credentials than any that I could give. With us politicks are greatly changed. All those who thought the P. of W.'s cause just, are proscribed, and all who acted with Mr. Pitt, are distinguished by some mark of favour: no one can blame him for availing himself of his power to secure the future adhesion of his party. As for myself, I come under the description of the proscribed, but do not feel any other marks of resentment, except a colder reception at Court from the man I love and honour, and from the Q., to whom I have great obligations. Such was my situation and under such circumstances did I stand at the moment, that I could take no other part than that which I did take; and what would have been most curious was, that had the Regency taken place, it would most probably have made it impossible for me to have remained where I am. I dare not venture to write an explanation of this mysterious business. You are constant, I find, in your correspondence with the D. of Y., which I am glad of: *we are not popular;* less so than our Elder Brother, yet there is always a stronghold with the Father, and a confidential communication that keeps things together, and may be productive of good, the great bar to that, is the want of affection in the present moment towards the *Mother*. It is a great misfortune, and I shall always think originated in error. Nature had certainly imprinted in the Mother's breast a love to her Eldest Son, beyond the power of ambition and competition to eradicate, and I am convinced that the part that she took in the last year's business, was doubly to secure the power to her husband if he should recover, and use it as her son should direct, in case all chance of recovery should cease. By the time you return,

[1] Four pages, two German and two English, were known to have given secret information to the Prince of Wales, and were dismissed. There is no trace of any recommendation of this man by the King, and nothing could be less probable.

things will have taken a strong and unalterable bias, and you will be able to form your own opinion. . . .

Respects from all here. Believe me, &c.,

SOUTHAMPTON.

MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Received Aug. 29, 1790.]

MY DEAR LORD, London, March 17, 1790.

. . . I wish it was in my power to send you any intelligence that might be useful or interesting, but I doubt very much whether it is in anybody's to tell you in what state you will find things. The Ministry continue the same as you left it, but I believe there is no doubt of their being divided, and that principally on account of foreign affairs. Prussia complains of our tardiness,[1] and things are so ripe upon the Continent, that I imagine you will find us either at war, or a general peace concluded. It is the fashion, particularly at Court, to suppose France *hors de combat* for several years to come, that their finances are irretrievable, and that a bankruptcy and a civil war must ensue before their Government can be settled; but I cannot see myself any good ground for thinking so.

Our old friend Schleiffen is become a very great Personage, and likely, as I am assured, to become a Cabinet Minister in Prussia: he preserves however his simplicity of manners and his philosophical turn. Lord Wycombe tells me that the Duke of Brunswick has taken up a line of the greatest reserve since the publication of Mirabeau's book.[2] But I hope you have correspondents who inform you better on all these subjects.

As for myself, you will find me as you left me, unconnected with any party, and consequently in the secrets of none, but always with the same regard and attachment

Yours, &c.,

LANSDOWNE.

[1] Prussia had complained, that England had not interfered with sufficient energy to prevent the aggression of Russia.

[2] Honoré Gabriel de Mirabeau, b. March 9, 1749, d. April 2, 1792; m. June 22, 1772, Emilie, dau. of the Marquis de Marignane. His private and political career are well known. The book to which Lord Lansdowne alludes, is probably 'L'Histoire Secrète du Cabinet de Berlin,' in which the Duke of Brunswick is much praised, but every other person mentioned so grossly libelled, that the book was ordered to be burnt by the common hangman in Paris. He had previously published in 1788, in 4 vols. 4to., 'La Monarchie Prussienne.'

LORD SYDNEY TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Received Aug. 29, 1790.]

MY DEAR LORD, Grosvenor Square, April 19, 1790.

I take the opportunity of the departure of some of the last ships for India to trouble you with a few lines. I have the happiness of acquainting you, that the King remains in the most perfect state of health. I do not believe that he ever was better since he was born; and the difference he has made in his regimen, both as to diet and exercise, has had the best effect. Though he has increased the former and diminished the latter, his life is very far indeed from being one of excess or inactivity. Our session of Parliament has been one of the quietest ever known. The Opposition have had one pretty strong division for repealing the last year's excise upon tobacco,[1] in hopes of a cry against the excise, against the general election. Sheridan has made a most fulsome panegyrick on himself, and the point was, to show a reconciliation between the different branches of the Opposition. The Irish Parliament is dissolved. There has been much abuse in the debates of the session there which has just ended, but it has chiefly been directed against the late Lord Lieutenant.[2]

The French politicks go on progressively toward republicanism in the first instance, anarchy in the second, and what the chapter of accidents may produce in the last. The Prince of Conti,[3] however, has ventured to return to Paris. In this town many persons, whose sagacity and penetration I very much envy, foretell without hesitation how these disturbances will end, but as they are by no means agreed in their opinions, and I have not talents enough to enable me to decide between them, or even understand them, I do not undertake to transmit them. I am very impatient to hear what effect the changes and fluctuations in France produce in your part of the world. The French army is in a strange state: at Lisle the garrison is supposed to be driven into the citadel by the armed bourgeoisie, and would starve there, were it not for their threat of firing red-hot balls upon the town, if their provisions were stopped. This is one of many equally strange pictures of confusion.

[1] The numbers, April 16, were, Ayes 191, Noes 147; April 29, 141 to 72; and April 30, 100 to 22. The previous year, July 12, 70 to 20.

[2] George, 1st Marquis of Buckingham.

[3] Louis François Joseph, Prince de Conti, b. Sept. 1, 1734, d. March 14, 1814; m. Feb. 7, 1759, Fortunée Marie d'Est, dau. of Francis, Duke of Modena. He emigrated in 1789, returned next year, and lived on his estates till he was arrested in 1793; released in 1795 he was obliged to leave France after 18 Fructidor (Sept. 4, 1797), when he went to Spain. He was shut up in Barcelona during the whole time the French were in possession of that city, and died there.

Affairs in other parts of the Continent have not a very pacific appearance, but it is not easy to conjecture what turn they may take. The new King of Hungary[1] takes great pains to make himself popular by rescinding many of the absurd edicts of his brother and predecessor.

'So much for politicks. I am now very much out of the *courant* of them, and am very well pleased to be so. . . .

My son has just entered into the holy state of matrimony with a very pretty and very amiable girl. She is the second daughter of the late Lord de Clifford,[2] whom you probably remember better by the name of Mr. Southwell. Her character is everything I could wish it to be, and I cannot help adding that she is fortunate in being married to the best-tempered young man breathing. To be sure it is hardly modest in a Father to be making a panegyric upon his Son, but something is due to a young man whose whole life has been one continued scene of attention to his Parents. I trust that they have every reasonable prospect of happiness. . . .

Believe me, &c.,

SYDNEY.

WARREN HASTINGS, ESQ., TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Received Aug. 29, 1790.]

MY LORD, London, April 22, 1790.

I have had the honour to receive a letter from your Lordship by one of the dispatches of the last season; for which, and for the permission you have given me in it to continue my letters of introduction, I return you many thanks. But of thanks I have a large debt due from me to your Lordship for many and substantial favours; for your great goodness to my old domesticks; for your distinguished notice of my friends; and for the liberal manner in which you were pleased to proclaim your allowance[3] of the testimonials which were subscribed in my favour, and to authenticate them by the transmission of them to the Court of

[1] There being no King of the Romans at the death of Joseph, it was necessary to wait for an election before any person could assume the title of Emperor of Germany. Leopold was, meantime, called King of Hungary.

[2] Edward, 17th Lord de Clifford, b. June 6, 1738, d. Nov. 1, 1777; m. Aug. 20, 1763, Sophia, dau. of Samuel Campbell, Esq., of Mount Campbell. M.P. for Bridgewater, Nov. 1762, and for the county of Gloucester from Nov. 1763, to April, 1776. His dau. Sophia, b. June 10, 1771, d. Nov. 9, 1795; m. April 13, 1790, the Hon. John Thomas Townshend.

[3] The friends of Mr. Hastings were desirous of obtaining, especially from the natives, addresses or testimonials in his favour. Lord Cornwallis, who had a very high opinion of Mr. Hastings, was ready to facilitate the preparation of such testimonials, although he thought it would be improper in him to take any active steps in promoting them.

Directors. By the term allowance, I do not mean to measure the extent of my obligation for that act, but rather to mark my sense of its propriety. You might, my Lord, have done more to indicate your countenance of those subscriptions, had I been entitled to such a proof of your personal goodwill; but, though I should have felt as I ought for the motive, I should have regretted that you had yielded to it. Such a proceeding would have been construed into a transgression of the line of public duty, and have defeated its own purpose, by inducing a suspicion that the testimonials were extorted by the influence of authority. Considering the subject in its relation to your Lordship, I applaud the nice discretion with which you tempered a conduct impelled by a desire to promote the redress of an injured character. Regarding it merely as it affected myself, I am equally thankful for what you did, and for stopping precisely where you did stop.

I have, &c.,

WARREN HASTINGS.

LIEUT.-GENERAL GRANT TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Received Aug. 31, 1790.]

MY DEAR LORD, Sackville Street, April 3, 1790.

. . . We have had a very easy Session, not a late day but one, in the service of the Dissenters, when they were beat at three in the morning by a very large majority. I think all the Scots members were in the majority or were absent, except Sir Thomas[1] and Colonel Dundas, who voted for those levelling gentlemen. I understand that some of the high-flyers in Scotland will endeavour to bring the test business before the General Assembly, in hopes that the *Kirk* may be induced to take it up, which was not the case upon the late occasion, for the *ministers* were perfectly quiet, though in general they are well enough inclined to give trouble.

. . . The popularity of the King and his Minister will operate strongly at the general election. The friends of Administration say that the Ministers, when the new Parliament meets, will be stronger by sixty. Opposition, on the contrary, insist that they will carry twenty additional friends. In Scotland, the Opposition will certainly lose considerably. Sir Thomas Dundas 'tis

[1] Sir Thomas Dundas, 2nd Bart., created Lord Dundas Aug. 13, 1794, b. 1741, d. June 14, 1820; m. May 24, 1764, Charlotte, dau. of William, 3rd Earl Fitzwilliam. M.P. for Richmond from March, 1763, to March, 1768, and then for the county of Stirling till he was made a Peer.

thought will be beat both in Orkney and Stirlingshire,[1] but his son[2] stands candidate for the University of Cambridge, and I am just told that Lord Euston is in danger, which I did not think was possible: it certainly will be an extraordinary event if a Scotsman should get the better of the Duke of Grafton's son at Cambridge. Our friend Phillipson will be astonished, for he laughed at the idea of Dundas canvassing, as Lord Mountstuart's son[3] declined, for he was pressed to stand for the University. Sir Elijah Impey visits Stafford[4] in return for many favours received from Sheridan. Burke hints that he wishes to retire; I don't believe it. The unfortunate Anstruther,[5] who was to have gone out Chief Justice to India, will not be able to come into Parliament at the next election. Sir Gilbert Elliot[6] will be in the same predicament. Welbore Ellis[7] will probably retire, Weymouth and Melcombe Regis having fallen into Pulteney's hands. Ellis don't like to make a new bargain, indeed, I have heard that Pulteney does not

[1] In the county of Stirling, Sir Thomas Dundas beat Sir Alexander Campbell by 28 to 22, but in Orkney, Mr. Balfour beat Colonel Dundas by 19 to 13.

[2] Lawrence Dundas, afterwards 2nd Lord Dundas, created Earl of Zetland July 2, 1838, b. April 10, 1766, d. Feb. 19, 1839; m. April 21, 1794, Harriet, dau. of General John Hale. The poll at Cambridge was:—

Right Hon. W. Pitt	509
Earl of Euston	483
Mr. Dundas	207

[3] John, Lord Mountstuart, afterwards 4th Earl of Bute, made Marquis of Bute March 1, 1796, b. June 30, 1744, d. Nov. 16, 1814; m. 1st, Nov. 12, 1766, Charlotte Jane, dau. and coheir of Herbert, 2nd and last Viscount Windsor; 2nd, Sept. 7, 1800, Frances, dau. of Thomas Coutts, Esq. M.P. for Bossiney from Jan. to May, 1766, when he was created Baron Cardiff; ambassador in Spain for a short time in 1783. His father, the Minister, nominated him Auditor of the Imprest, a sinecure of at least 12,000*l.* a year, which he held for many years. His son John, b. Sept. 25, 1767, d. v.p. Jan. 22, 1794; m. Oct. 12, 1792, Elizabeth, dau. and sole heir to the title and estates of Patrick, 5th Earl of Dumfries. He was M.P. for the Cardiff Boroughs from Nov. 1790 till his death.

[4] Mr. Sheridan was returned without a contest.

[5] Afterwards the Right Hon. Sir John Anstruther, younger son of Sir John Anstruther, 3rd Bart., b. March 27, 1753, d. June 26, 1811; m. Maria, dau. of Edward Brice, Esq., of Berners Street. Chief Justice in Bengal, 1798 to 1806. M.P. for the Anstruther Boroughs from Dec. 1782, to June, 1790; Cockermouth to May, 1796; Anstruther Boroughs again to July, 1797, and a third time from Dec. 1806, till his death.

[6] Sir Gilbert Elliot, 4th Bart., created Oct. 10, 1797, Baron, and Feb. 24, 1813, Earl, of Minto, b. April 23, 1751, d. June 21, 1814; m. Jan. 3, 1777, Anna Maria, dau. of Sir George Amyand, Bart. Viceroy in Corsica in 1795-6, during the whole time it was under British authority; Minister at Vienna, July 2, 1799, to Aug. 21, 1801; President of the Board of Control, Feb. 12 to July 16, 1806, when he was made Governor-General of India, which office he held to Oct. 1813. M.P. for Morpeth, July, 1776, to Feb. 1777; Roxburgh, to March, 1784; Berwick, 1786 to 1790; and lastly for Helston, till June, 1795.

[7] Right Hon. Welbore Ellis, created Baron Mendip Aug. 13, 1794, b. 1714, d. Feb. 2, 1802; m. 1st, Nov. 18, 1747, Elizabeth, dau. of the Hon. Sir William Stanhope, K.B.; 2nd, July 19, 1765, Anne, sister and heir of the Right Hon. Hans Stanley. Lord of the Admiralty, Feb. 1747, to Dec. 1755; Joint Vice-Treasurer of Ireland thrice between Aug. 1756, and Sept. 1777; Secretary at War, Dec. 1762 to July, 1765; Treasurer of the Navy, June, 1777, to April, 1782, when, on the resignation of Lord G. Germain, he was made Secretary of State, which office he held for only two months. M.P. for Cricklade, Weymouth, and Aylesbury, from Dec. 1741 to March, 1768; Weymouth again, Nov. 1774 to June, 1790; and Petersfield, from April, 1791, till he was made a peer.

intend to sell, he is out of humour that the title of Bath[1] was given to Lord Weymouth, and rather appears inclined to Opposition. I am told that a *great little* Duke,[2] having lost sight of the Ordnance, repents most heartily what he did last year, and is inclined to wheel, but he will not be received with open arms. Emolument was a sad object for him to think of. . . .

People are tired of Hastings' trial, and it probably would be brought to a conclusion when Parliament meets on the 22nd, if Burke did not insist upon going on with the enquiry, but a new Parliament[3] will undoubtedly put an end to a vexatious persecution, and a considerable unmeaning expense; for, supposing him to be guilty of some of the charges brought against him, he surely has suffered sufficiently in the course of four years, and his fortune must be amazingly reduced, for the expense of his defence has been very great. But my idea upon the whole is that he will be indemnified for the expenses, and that he will be put in a high situation to make up for his sufferings,—but that is a private opinion, for I have no ground to go upon.

After the dissolution of Parliament there will be a promotion of Peers, some of the Scots will be made Peers of Parliament, but before that takes place they will take the advantage of their votes[4] for the sixteen. Douglas[5] and Fife[6] are to be peered, and Sir W. Erskine[7] is come to town to be made a Baronet. Poor Heathfield is going abroad to be married to our old German acquaintance: his whole fortune is in his power,—they say 60,000 to 70,000*l.*, exclusive of his 1500*l.* pension, which is not settled upon the

[1] Mr. Pulteney's daughter was created, July 23, 1793, Baroness, and, Oct. 26, 1803, Countess of Bath in her own right.

[2] Hugh, 2nd Duke of Northumberland.

[3] The new Parliament, Dec. 17, 1790, determined, by 143 to 30, that a dissolution did not abate an impeachment.

[4] Scotch Peers having English titles were supposed not to be entitled to vote for the representative Peers, but that doctrine was overruled by the House of Lords in deciding upon the merits of this very election. Only 13 Peers were returned, six others having each 33 votes. After a protracted scrutiny, and long legal arguments, two only of the six were declared duly elected.

[5] Archibald Douglas, son of Sir John Stewart of Grantully, and Lady Jane Douglas, only sister and heir of Archibald, only Duke of Douglas. Created Lord Douglas July 8, 1790, b. July 10, 1748, d. Dec. 26, 1827; m. 1st, June 13, 1771, Lucy, dau. of William, 2nd Duke of Montrose; 2nd, May 13, 1783, Frances, posthumous dau. of Francis, Earl of Dalkeith, son of Francis, 2nd Duke of Buccleugh. M.P. for Forfar County Jan. 1782 to 1790. His claim to the Douglas estates was disputed by the guardians of the Duke of Hamilton, on the ground that he was a supposititious child. This gave rise to the celebrated Douglas cause, which was ultimately decided by the House of Lords, Feb. 17, 1769, in favour of Mr. Douglas.

[6] James, 2nd Earl of Fife (Irish honours), created Lord Fife in England, June 19, 1790, b. Sept. 28, 1729, d. Jan. 24, 1809; m. June 4, 1766, Dorothea, dau. and sole heir of Alexander, 9th Earl of Caithness. M.P. for the county of Banff from Nov. 1754 to March, 1784, and then for the county of Elgin to 1790.

[7] Sir William Erskine, of Torrie, created a Bart. June 21, 1791, b. March 27, 1728, d. March 19, 1795; m. May 29, 1767, Frances, dau. of James Moray, Esq., of Abercairny, and widow of George Drummond, Esq. of Blair Drummond.

title. He cannot bear his son,[1] and his friends are afraid that he will make very improper settlements with regard to his family; none of them dare speak to him. Colonel Loftus,[2] who you may remember in America, has five children, and is to be married to Lady Elizabeth Townshend,[3] with her father's consent. Lord Sydney's son is to be married. His uncle Charles went to him and said,—I have always intended to leave you 10,000*l.*, but I expect to live a long time, and as you may have use for the money now, I think I may as well give it you at present,—and did so: that was handsome in your cousin, and

I have, &c.,

JAMES GRANT.

MAJOR-GENERAL GRENVILLE TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Received Sept. 26, 1790.]

MY DEAR LORD, New Burlington Street, April 26, 1790.

. . . I have but little news to communicate to you, as things here remain pretty near in the same state as when I last had the honour of writing to you. The dissolution of Parl[t] is hitherto kept a profound secret, some think it will take place in the course of Summer or Autumn, others think it will die a natural death; in the mean time canvassing goes on very briskly in some counties, but from what I can collect Mr. Pitt has nothing to fear from the present complexion of things in regard to a new Parliament, his own popularity and the horror which the reasonable and thinking part of the Nation entertain of the *leaders* of Opposition, will I hope have its due weight and influence in the general election, nothing but a war, which I am in great hopes we shall be able to avoid, could possibly remove Mr. Pitt from his present situation. The state of affairs in France and in the Netherlands is pretty near the same—as bad as it can well be. The King of Prussia has been making and still continues to make great preparations for war, and it was thought some time ago, upon his signing a treaty of alliance with the Porte,[4] offensive and defensive,

[1] Francis, 2nd and last Lord Heathfield, a General and Colonel 4th Dragoons, b. Dec. 31, 1750, d. Jan. 29, 1813, unmarried.

[2] Colonel, afterwards General William Loftus, Colonel 2nd Dragoon Guards, and Lieut.-Governor of the Tower, b. 1752, d. July 15, 1831; m. 1st, Margaret, dau. of Maccarel King, Esq., of Lesson Hall, county Dublin; 2nd, May 7, 1790, Elizabeth, dau. of George, 1st Marquis Townshend. M.P. for Tamworth from Nov. 1802 to 1812, and then for Yarmouth, Norfolk, to 1818. In Ireland for Bannow from 1797 to the Union.

[3] Lady Elizabeth, wife of the preceding, b. Aug. 1766, d. March 21, 1821.

[4] This treaty was signed Jan. 31, 1790. The engagement was to attack both Austria and Russia. It included a reciprocal guarantee, and various commercial articles. The Porte further undertook to try and persuade Austria to abandon her Polish provinces.

that a war was inevitable. It is however strongly reported at present that he is gone to Breslau to negotiate with the two Imperial Courts, and it is rather thought that the new King of Hungary will come into his terms, provided they are not too exorbitant. The present moment is certainly too favourable for His Prussian Majesty to let it slip by without taking some advantage of it, but how far he will be supported in any unreasonable claims which he may wish to push, I know not, but am inclined to believe that some check has already been put to them. Politicks at all times are very much an affair of speculation, but more particularly so in the present moment, from the very unsettled and confused state of things upon the Continent, I shall therefore not trouble your Lordship any further upon a subject I am so little able to talk upon, and with which, thank God, I have so little to do. I am sorry to say how much I feel myself disposed to concur in sentiments with you, in regard to forming connexions and associating with princes. The conduct of a certain person, who has so cruelly disappointed both you and myself, still continues such as to give me great uneasiness, more especially as I see no great hopes of amendment. . . .

I have the satisfaction to acquaint you that His Majesty is in *most perfect health and spirits*, and that he may long continue so, is the sincere wish of every good subject. And now, my dear Lord, I shall hasten to conclude with assuring you that we all look forward with the greatest pleasure and impatience to this time twelve months, when we hope to see you return in good health to enjoy the society of those who are happy enough to be honoured with your friendship.

I am, my dear Lord, with the truest attachment,

Ever yours, &c.,

R. GRENVILLE.

P.S. May I beg leave to trouble you to remember me to my friend Ross? I flatter myself that this will be the last letter I shall have to direct to you on the other side of the water.

THE PRINCE OF WALES TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Received Oct. 1790.]

MY DEAR LORD, Carlton House, April 16, 1790.

It is so long since I had last the pleasure of hearing from You y^{t} I am quite afraid You have forgot Your old Friends on this side the Water, I therefore think it high time to assure You y^{t} there are *a few of us* who have had the pleasure of passing many pleasant

and happy Hours in Your Society who ever are most happy in hearing be it ever such short Letters, y^t^ You are well and situated to Y^r^ satisfaction. By this time You must have heard of the treatment the shameful unjust treatment our little worthy Friend Lothian has experienced from the Minister, I would expatiate much more upon this Subject was it not so perfectly of a piece with every thing y^t^ has been *inflicted not only upon* other Individuals, but upon every relative and relation of the King's Family, who acted from principles of disinterested honor, y^t^ had it not happened one might have been astonished y^t^ for once, the natural mean, paltry, and revengeful disposition *of the Minister*, did not demonstrate itself in the odious and oppressive light w^h^ now it has in every instance in w^h^ either *could or dared* give it vent. I will not my dear Lord intrude further upon y^r^ time as I know how much it must naturally from y^r^ situation be taken up, however, before I conclude, I must just mention to You how much I wish to recommend to y^r^ protection Young Mr. Watts [1] who is I believe in the Company's service, I understand y^t^ his wish is if possible to get equal rank in the Regulars to y^t^ w^h^ he has in the Company's troops, I do not know whether this is an easy matter to be done or not, I must leave y^t^ entirely my dear Lord to y^r^ better judgment and knowledge of the possibility of effecting these matters, however I only hope y^t^ sh^d^ this plan not be possible to be arranged you will have the goodness to employ the Young Man in some other line to w^h^ You may deem he has abilities. Pray excuse hurry and scrawl, and believe me my dear Lord,

Ever most truly Y^r^ Friend,

G. P.

THE SECRET COMMITTEE TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND COUNCIL AT BENGAL.

[Received Nov. 1790.]

MY LORD, India House, June 3, 1790.

. . . Before concluding this letter, we think it proper to observe, that we have not been inattentive to the various letters from you respecting the island of Salsette, and the wishes of the Poonah Government to obtain the possession of it, and we are perfectly aware of the expectations we have given you of receiving particular instructions from us on that subject, but circumstanced

[1] William Henry Watts. Lord Cornwallis could not comply with this request, and Mr. Watts, partly owing to bad health, returned to England, where he obtained a commission in the army, and d. Nov. 1804, Captain 6th West India Regt.

as we are, we feel it impossible to give any precise directions. Thus far we can say, that the island of Salsette does not appear in itself so essential to our interests, as to entertain a wish to keep that island if a proper equivalent is offered, but as nothing resembling a proper equivalent has yet been mentioned by the Marattas, we have of course no proposition before us upon which we can exercise our judgment or give a decision; we do not even observe whether the proposition made by the Bombay Government, of obtaining in return for Salsette, the surrender of Broach, with the Maratta and Guicowar Chout at Surat, has ever been brought under serious discussion.

We enter fully into everything stated respecting the Cuttack country, and entertain no hesitation that if Salsette could any way be made an instrument in negotiation for obtaining that country, it could not be made subservient to any more proper purpose; but your last letters gave us little reason to entertain expectations of that kind. Having therefore put you in possession of our general sentiments on this subject, it must rest with you to cultivate any opportunity that may offer of acting upon them.

We have, &c.

MINUTE OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Nov. 6, 1790.

I know that the other members of the Board participated in my anxiety concerning the present state of the war with Tippoo Sultaun, and are equally apprehensive that the late occurrences in the country of Coimbatore, may be attended with several disadvantageous consequences to the public interest.

The general success of the operations of the southern army since the commencement of hostilities, and particularly the speedy reduction of the important fortresses of Dindigul and Palacatchery, and the gallant behaviour of the detachment under the command of Colonel Floyd,[1] have undoubtedly occasioned great detriment to the enemy, and, in the opinion of all who are candid and know the truth, have done singular honour to the British arms. It cannot however be denied that the retreat of Colonel Floyd's corps, and the loss of the artillery which he was obliged to abandon, have furnished the enemy with plausible means of imposing upon his own

[1] Colonel, afterwards General Sir John Floyd, Bart., so created Jan. 23, 1816, Colonel 8th Dragoons; b. Feb. 22, 1748, d. Jan. 10, 1818, m. 1st, Jan. 29, 1791, Rebecca Juliana, dau. of Charles Darke, Esq. of Madras; 2nd, July 29, 1805, Anna, dau. of Crósbie Morgell, Esq., of Castle Morgell, and widow of Sir Barry Denny, Bart. He was in action in Germany before he was 12 years old.

subjects and upon our allies, by laying claim to a victory, and the real interruption that has been given to the collection of provisions, and the loss of magazines that has been sustained by Tippoo's irruption upon that occasion, will, I am much afraid, be attended with the bad effects of preventing our army from entering the Mysore country before the commencement of the Carnatic rains, and consequently of reducing it to a state of entire inactivity till the month of January next.

I have the highest opinion of General Medows's zeal for the public good, as well as for his professional abilities, and I am perfectly convinced that no exertion would be wanting on his part, in expediting every arrangement which may be necessary to continue without interruption, or to resume without delay, the execution of our offensive operations, which can alone produce an honourable termination of the war; but if unfortunately our armies in the Carnatic should not be able to act before the beginning of January next, we should not only be under great difficulties to account for the delay to the satisfaction of our allies, but we should also have the most serious grounds for apprehension, that Tippoo would avail himself of that opportunity to turn his whole force against the Mahrattas and the Nizam, and endeavour either to weaken their power, or intimidate them into a negotiation for a separate peace.

Under these circumstances it has appeared to me; that, exclusive of every measure that may be adopted for promoting our own offensive operations against the Mysore country in the beginning of January, it may be of great consequence to the public interest that some immediate steps should be taken, which may tend to animate and encourage our allies to persevere with firmness in the favourable disposition which they have lately shown to perform their engagements; and although I am not vain enough to suppose that the military operations would be conducted more ably or with more success by myself than by General Medows, yet from the station which I hold in this country, and from the friendly intercourse which I have hitherto had the good fortune to maintain both with the Nizam and the Peshwa, I conceive it to be possible, that my presence in the scene of action would be considered by our allies as a pledge of our sincerity, and of our confident hopes of success against the common enemy, and by that means operate as an encouragement to them to continue their exertions and abide by their stipulations.

I am aware that some inconvenience may arise by my absence from the seat of Government, and that the existing laws do not describe the powers which ought in such a case to be delegated by

the Supreme Board to the Governor-General. But notwithstanding these objections, I am so fully impressed with the belief that the public interest will be on this occasion best promoted by my undertaking the direction of the war in person, that I have resolved, with the approbation of the Board, to proceed to Madras in the beginning of the next month; and should the Board concur in opinion with me on the propriety and utility of this measure, I need hardly suggest, that it will become necessary to invest me with such powers as may be thought suitable to my station of Governor-General, and which may appear to be calculated to enable me to apply the whole force of the Company with energy for the prosecution of the war, or to avail myself with promptitude and effect of any favourable opportunity that may offer, for negotiating and obtaining an honourable and advantageous peace.

Enjoying as I do the high satisfaction of living on terms of cordiality and friendship, both public and private, with my colleagues in office, and well acquainted as I am with their earnest desire to support my endeavours for promoting the public prosperity, I could not entertain a doubt, even if I had not formerly on a similar occasion been flattered with the most liberal declarations of their confidence, that the measures for the internal government of Bengal which I have hitherto pursued, and in the success of which my share of responsibility is great, will, during my absence, be uniformly supported and punctually executed. The completion of the settlement of the revenues upon the principles which have been already adopted, and adherence to all regulations that have been established, and a strict regard to economy in all branches of the public expenditure, are amongst the principal objects which I trust will command the attention of the members of the Board; and from my knowledge of their disposition, I have the most implicit reliance on their communicating with me upon all points of internal business, in the manner that will best tend to promote the public good, and to preserve my authority in this Government.

The Members of the Council may on the other hand be assured, that I shall correspond and communicate my sentiments to them, with as much punctuality and expedition as the nature of the Service in which I am going will allow, and that I shall not only give an accurate detail of any material transactions or occurrences that may happen, but also endeavour to render a satisfactory account of every part of my public conduct; I shall likewise on all occasions receive their advice and suggestions with all the attention and deference which is due to private friends, and to the acting Members of the Supreme Government.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

[Private.]

DEAR SIR, Calcutta, Nov. 12, 1790.

. . . The flattering prospect of a speedy and advantageous termination of the war, which I held out to you in my letter of the 8th August last, is now a little clouded. We have lost time and our adversary has gained reputation, which are two most valuable things in war; I am afraid I was too much in the right, when I doubted the propriety of Musgrave's plan of attacking Tippoo's southern dominions.

It is vain now to look back, we must only consider how to remedy the evil, and to prevent the ill effects which our delay may occasion in the minds of our allies. It immediately occurred to me that nothing would be so likely to keep up their spirits, and to convince them of our determination to act with vigour, as my taking the command of the army; I have accordingly declared my intention of embarking for Madras in the first week of next month, and besides the 73rd Regiment, and a detachment of 12 or 14 hundred sepoys, I mean to endeavour to transport in small vessels called dhonies, about the end of next month, our 1st Regiment of cavalry, completed to six troops by drafting the men and horses of the 2nd, three or four hundred horses for remounting the Madras cavalry, and one thousand large bullocks for the service of the artillery. If this attempt should succeed, of which I entertain but little doubt, the novelty and vigour of the undertaking will undoubtedly have a considerable influence upon our friends and our enemies.

Some inconvenience must necessarily attend my leaving Bengal, but the three Counsellors have all promised so fair, and Stuart has given me such strong assurances, that he will do nothing without consulting the official people in whom he knows I principally confide, that I flatter myself no material mischief will happen.

It will give me great concern if a war with Spain should take place, not to be able to give any assistance, but I do not at present see that it will be possible to do it, even in the most limited degree. I shall write more fully to Mr. Grenville on this subject, and in the hurry of business in which I am now engaged, I must refer you to my letters to the Court of Directors, for the business of this country.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE BISHOP OF LICHFIELD AND COVENTRY.

DEAR JAMES, Calcutta, Nov. 16, 1790.

Our war on the coast has not succeeded hitherto so well as we had a right to expect. Our army, the finest and best appointed that ever took the field in India, is worn down with unprofitable fatigue, and much discontented with their leaders, and the conduct of both Medows and Musgrave highly reprobated. In these circumstances I have no other part to take but to go myself and take the command, and try whether I can do better: I shall therefore embark in little more than a fortnight for Madras in the Vestal frigate, with the melancholy reflection that I had hoped about that time to have been bound for a happier port. I have in this war everything to lose and nothing to gain, I shall derive no credit for beating Tippoo, and shall be for ever disgraced if he beats me.

I send you a copy of a letter which I have written to Brome, which contains fully my sentiments about the future disposal of him, and I believe it agrees pretty much with yours, except that perhaps you would not have given so free a choice about the army, but I remember what I felt at his age. Now, my dear James, let me beg of you to act with confidence about him, and if any other circumstances should arise, against which I have not in my directions provided, be assured that I shall approve of whatever you think right; I gave *carte blanche* in my last about his shooting, of which you know I wish him to be fond, and I should hope that by degrees the great care about his health might be done away.

. . . The measures which Administration ordered us to take in this country in the event of a war with Spain were wise and spirited, and, if we had not been engaged in this odious contest with Tippoo, would probably have had a most decisive effect on the war, and put a great deal of money into the Commodore's pocket.

. . . The *Queen* Indiaman was so long on her passage, that I received only a few days ago your letter of the 23rd of Feb. You tell me in it that I am accused of being remiss in my correspondence with a certain personage. Nothing can be more false, for I have answered every letter from him by the first ship that sailed from hence after I received it. The stile of them, although personally kind to excess, has not been very agreeable to me, as they have always pressed upon me some infamous and unjustifiable job, which I have uniformly been obliged to refuse, and contained much gross and false abuse of Mr. Pitt, and improper charges

against other and greater personages, about whom, to me at least, he ought to be silent. Your truly affectionate brother,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO VISCOUNT BROME.

MY DEAREST CHARLES, Calcutta, Nov. 16, 1790.

I am convinced that we both looked forward with equal earnestness to an happy meeting in May or June next, but this is a world of disappointments, and instead of embarking with the prospect of embracing you and Mary, and enjoying the society of my nearest relations and best friends, my duty to my country obliges me to go to Madras, in order to take the field against Tippoo Sultaun, who has proved a more formidable enemy than we at first apprehended.

The moment I can leave this country with honour, I will do it, and I am sure you would not wish me to do it sooner, in the mean time the thought that is nearest to my heart is how to dispose of you.

I had always intended that you should stay at Eton till the Christmas holydays after you were seventeen, and it would be no great sacrifice to you to stay till the Easter following, which would be very near the time of my return, if the war should admit of my going home about January twelvemonth.

I shall in the course of next summer be able to form a pretty good judgment how that is likely to turn out, and if there should at that time be appearances of my being still detained, the Bishop must ultimately decide what you are to do upon your leaving school.

You will then be too young to lay aside all thought of improving your mind; the question will therefore be whether you shall go to the University, or to some foreign academy, where you will learn to speak French and perhaps German, as well as the exercises of riding, fencing, and dancing, and be accompanied by your tutor, that you may not forget all your past studies; I must own that I am not partial to the University.

As I hope to be able to give you an easy fortune, I do not wish you to go into the army, especially as I have doubts of the strength and hardiness of your constitution, and I earnestly exhort you not to do it, unless you feel a decided and insuperable inclination for that profession, in which case I will not withhold my consent, for it is your happiness and not my own, that I am to consider. But I

think it my duty to warn you, if you really mean to be a soldier, and aspire to military reputation (without which I am sure you would not put on the idle trappings), that it is a thorny path, full of disappointments, and that I have had years of heart-aches, for moments of gratification.

You are a sensible Lad: reflect on what a most anxious Father has said to you, and then decide for yourself. At any rate, if you shall determine for the Army, which I sincerely hope you will not, except under the circumstances I have described, of your feeling so strong an impulse as to make it in your opinion necessary for your happiness, your doing so need not interfere with any part of the plan I have mentioned, except your going to the University, for you may get a commission with a year's leave of absence to complete your education.

I shall tell the Bishop what I have said to you, and you will consider him as acting in every respect for me, till I come home, with this only difference, that as he is not impelled by the same powerful bonds of nature which engage a Parent's heart, you have more obligation to him for his care and tenderness, and I am persuaded you will never fail in the most dutiful behaviour towards him.

I am, my dearest Charles,

Your truly affectionate Father,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO SIR WILLIAM JONES.

SIR, Calcutta, Nov. 17, 1790.

I take the liberty of sending the Foujdary propositions, according to your obliging permission, and earnestly request that you will use no ceremony with them, but scratch out and alter every part that you do not approve.

I shall consider it as a great favour, if you will give them as early a perusal as possible, for I am very anxious to put them in a way of coming forward, before I embark for the coast, and I have fixed Saturday or Sunday fortnight for my departure.

I am, with the greatest esteem, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

The feelings of the violent party in France had extended to the French settlements in India. In May, 1790, the inhabitants of Chandernagore had formed themselves into a Committee, and had

practically deposed the legally appointed Governor, the Chevalier de Montigny.[1] The Governor-General in Council did not choose to recognise this usurped authority, and refused to transact any business with this self-constituted body.

The Comte de Conway and M. Dupuis,[2] to whom respectively as Governor and Intendant du Roi, the management of the affairs of France east of the Cape of Good Hope was committed, had meantime represented to M. de Montigny, that without a supply of money from Bengal, it was highly improbable that they could maintain their authority over the troops in the Isle of France. M. de Montigny totally failed in raising money, but Lord Cornwallis agreed to lend him, out of his private resources, 40,000 rupees (4000*l.*). This sum proved insufficient, and the Supreme Council therefore agreed to advance 110,000 rupees, including the 40,000 already paid.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN COUNCIL TO THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

HONOURABLE SIRS, Fort William, Nov. 17, 1790.

We are concerned to inform you that the violent and unauthorized conduct of the Committee of the Inhabitants at Chandernagore, has forced us to interfere in their internal dissentions in a manner that we were very desirous to avoid.

On the 3rd of September, a letter from Colonel Bie, the Governor of the Danish settlement at Serampore, acquainted us that about four o'clock that morning, the house at Ghiretty, at which Colonel De Montigny, the Commandant of Chandernagore, had taken up his residence, had been surrounded by an armed force from that place, and that Colonel De Montigny and the other gentlemen residing with him, had been made prisoners.

Although we had for some time winked at the breaches of treaty committed by the inhabitants of Chandernagore, in erecting works and mounting cannon at that place, yet we thought we could not, consistent with the dignity of this Government, submit tamely to the gross insult which they offered to us, in presuming to violate the Company's territory by marching armed men over part of it, in order to carry their plan of seizing their countrymen

[1] François Emanuel Dehaies, Chevalier de Montigny, a Lieut.-General, Governor of Chandernagore and the French possessions in Bengal, b. April 7, 1743, d. June 27, 1819. He had seen much service.

[2] André Julien Comte du Puy, b. April 13, 1753, d. Jan. 7, 1832; Intendant du Roi, 1789; First Secretary of Embassy at Amiens, 1801; Governor of the Indian possessions of France, 1816; and died Pair de France.

at Gyretty House into execution. We therefore directed the Town-major the next day to proceed to Chandernagore, and deliver to the inhabitants, or to their Committee, certain declarations and propositions of this Government, for the purposes therein mentioned.

In order to show that we were in earnest in making these declarations, three Battalions of Sepoys were ordered to cross over from Barrackpore to Ghyretty, to be in readiness to proceed to Chandernagore, if such a movement should be necessary, after a fixed time given to the inhabitants to reply.

On the 6th of September the Commanding officer of the detachment that proceeded with the Town-major to Gyretty, informed us that the President of the Committee of the French Inhabitants had communicated to him their resolution to put Colonel De Montigny immediately to death, should the English troops march from Gyretty towards Chandernagore.

On receiving this information, we again sent the Town-major to Chandernagore, with another declaration to the inhabitants of that place, the object of which was to prevent the perpetration of a crime so repugnant to every feeling of humanity. . . .

A small French schooner, which was overtaken in the vicinity of Diamond Harbour, submitted to be searched without making any material resistance, and in consequence our orders were executed without injuring the vessel or any of its passengers or crew.

Colonel De Montigny and three French gentlemen, who had been taken at Gyretty on the 3rd of September, were found in confinement on board the schooner; and as they were desirous of being released, they were set at liberty. Four other Frenchmen who had been taken on the same occasion were also found on board, but were left in the vessel, as they declared that they did not wish to be set on shore.

In thus asserting your just rights, we have every reason to believe that we also did an act of great humanity, the wretched condition in which the prisoners were found, the crowded state of the schooner, and the very scanty stock of provisions on board, totally disproportioned to the number of the crew, made it highly probable, that not only the former, but a great part of the latter, would have fallen victims to this rash and unjustifiable undertaking of the French inhabitants.

We are, &c.

SIR WILLIAM JONES TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

MY LORD, Court House, Nov. 20, 1790.

The adjournment of the Court having given me a whole day of leisure, I have spent the morning in reading, with great attention, your Lordship's minute on the administration of criminal justice in the provinces, and in perusing the papers which accompany it. I read them all with my pen in my hand, intending to write without reserve all objections that might occur to me; but I found nothing to which I could object, and did not meet with a single paragraph to which, if I were a member of the Council, I would not heartily express my assent. The power of pardoning, which (in para. 44) is reserved to the Court, should be always exercised, I think, by the Governor in Council in his *executive*, not his *judicial*, capacity; and in para. 64 the words, *which is always to be received with circumspection and tenderness*, are applied to the *accusation*, though I presume they were intended for the prisoner's confession. These are trifling remarks, but I cannot start one serious objection, and think the whole minute unexceptionably just, wise, and benevolent.

I am with great respect
Your Lordship's ever faithful servant,
W. JONES.

MINUTE OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL, DECEMBER 3, 1790.

All material preparatory arrangements being now nearly completed, it is my intention to proceed on the 5th inst. in the yacht, to embark at Diamond Harbour on board the Vestal frigate for Madras.

I trust that an honourable termination of the war in which we are now engaged will, before a long period elapses, admit of my returning to the duties of my station in Bengal. But I cannot forbear to avail myself of this opportunity of expressing the satisfaction that I feel of knowing that the management of the public affairs, will, during my absence, devolve upon colleagues in government for whose principles and public spirit I have the highest respect, and of repeating my strongest sense of the manly and liberal sentiments by which they have been uniformly actuated, since the infraction of the treaty by Tippoo Sultaun, in adopting and supporting every measure that has appeared to be calculated to vindicate and maintain the honour and interests of the Company and of the British Nation.

After the apprehensions which I entertained for Mr. Stuart's life, during the late crisis of his dangerous illness, I feel some consolation for his absence this day, from the reasonable prospect which his present situation affords that his health will soon be completely re-established; but I cannot avoid regretting that he is still unable to receive my assurances in person, that from my knowledge of the integrity of his principles, joined to the advantage of the experience which he has acquired in conducting the business of this Country, I consider his recovery at this juncture, as it will fall to his lot to take the principal lead in it, to have been an object of no less importance to the public interests, than it has been a source of joy to his private friends. . . .

The flattering marks of personal confidence and friendship which I have constantly experienced, both in my public and private capacity, from the members of the Board, have made the most lasting impression on my mind, and claim my warmest acknowledgment. I shall always think it fortunate when opportunities may offer to enable me to give convincing proofs of my regard and esteem for them, and they may be assured, that they shall have no reason to alter the favourable opinion which they have hitherto expressed of me, by any part of my future conduct.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE BISHOP OF LICHFIELD AND COVENTRY.

DEAR JAMES, Calcutta, Dec. 5, 1790.

. . . To-morrow morning at daybreak I shall embark for Madras, with a head full of care, and an aching heart. Although I shall have no time to write long letters, you may depend upon having a line from me by every possible opportunity. If Brome should decide for the Army, you will be so good as to speak in my name to Sir William Fawcett, who would immediately mention it to the King: it would be immaterial what corps he entered into, as I would not have him join any regiment till my return. You have had so much trouble about all my affairs, that I should have been very sorry if you had given yourself any additional plague about the Suffolk election, but Rous[1] was the only one of the candidates that I was the least anxious about, and when I mentioned Bunbury to you, I only meant to convey, that, although it

[1] Sir John Rous, 6th Bart., created Lord Rous, May 28, 1796, and made Earl of Stradbroke, July 18, 1821, b. May 30, 1756, d. Aug. 17, 1827, m. 1st, Jan. 26, 1788, Frances Juliana, only dau. and heir of Edward Warter Wilson, Esq., of Bilboa, County Limerick, and 2nd, Feb. 23, 1792, Charlotte Maria, dau. of Abraham Whittaker, Esq. M.P. for the County of Suffolk from Oct. 1780 till he was made a Peer.

was a bitter pill, as I think him a very unworthy representative of the County, still I believed I must be for him, for old acquaintance' sake, in preference to any new candidate.

I shall now for some time think of nothing but the Mysore war. God send that I may get well out of that scrape! My Bengal arrangements and the settlement of the revenue, have answered beyond my most sanguine expectations.

I am, &c.,
CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO SIR CHARLES OAKELEY, BART.

SIR, Fort St. George, Dec. 17, 1790.

It has given me great satisfaction to learn since my arrival here, that the extravagant charges which have been made by the officers who have been entrusted with the expenditure of the public money, with the detachment that has joined the Nizam's army, has not only attracted the serious attention of this Government, but that several of the measures which appeared to me to be necessary for censuring and correcting abuses so ruinous to the Company's interests, have already been adopted.

I am not willing to impute the conduct of the persons concerned, to the worst of the motives from which it may be supposed to have proceeded. But if, instead of deliberate peculation, they may have only been guilty of a blameable inattention to public economy, I consider them as deserving of strong marks of disapprobation; and that, although the censure applies more particularly in the first instance to the paymaster, who, in the different offices of which he performs the duties, has made the greatest part of the exorbitant charges, it also with the utmost propriety extends to the commanding officer of the detachment, who, instead of restraining, gave a sanction to those charges; and I am sorry to add, that such charges as have been made by the commanding officer of the detachment of artillery, have also had a very unsatisfactory appearance.

I therefore recommend that those three gentlemen may be immediately recalled, allowing the command of the whole corps to devolve upon the senior Captain, and that of the detachment of artillery upon the senior artillery subaltern, until a Captain can be spared from hence for that duty; and that a civil servant in whom you can confide, may be sent with all convenient despatch to replace the present paymaster.

Your own zeal for the public good will suggest to you such steps as may be proper to take at a convenient time, for investigating the parts of the conduct of the gentlemen whom I have recommended to be recalled, that have appeared to be culpable, and I request that the gentlemen who succeed to their stations may be cautioned that it will be particularly expected from them, that they shall furnish no grounds for similar complaints against them, in the discharge of the duties of the stations to which they shall be appointed.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO CAPTAIN KENNAWAY.

[Secret.]

SIR, Fort St. George, Dec. 20, 1790.

. . . The siege of Gopaul does not seem likely to be brought to a speedy conclusion; but in other respects his Highness appears to be more in earnest than he has hitherto been in the prosecution of the war, and I trust that he will in a short time have reason to feel more confident.

The junction of our two armies and their march in pursuit of Tippoo to Tritchinopoly, has for a time left his Highness's operations in Cannamore unprotected. But, although I would have you at first confine yourself to general assurances that I am determined to act with the utmost vigour, I think it right to inform you that I have directed General Medows to move immediately towards the centre of the Carnatic, and that I mean to march in two columns through the Western Passes, and, unless Tippoo chooses to fight, to begin my operations with the attack of Ossoor and Bangalore.

The knowledge of my intentions will enable you to give advice with boldness, and you will disclose them by degrees, as the progress of our army shall render their concealment of less consequence. . . . I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEDOWS TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Secret.]

MY DEAR LORD, Camp near Tritchinopoly, Dec. 21, 1790.

I received your's of the 25th of November, with your Minute of Council yesterday; as well as your's of the 15th of this month.

To receive your orders, to understand them, and obey them, are the same thing. I shall march the army to Trinomalee as soon as possible, and I hope to set out this day sennight. I think Caroor may be left as it is, and the garrison of Coimbatore, except the company of Topazzes, sent to Palghautcherry, and the garrison at Palizaut sent to Col. Hartley[1] or General Abercromby, two brigades shall be left at Tritchinopoly for the purpose you mention, or to make strong convoys if they should hereafter be wanted. An escort I hope will return from Madura and Dindigul, with bullocks, with money and rice, and one from Tanjore with your escort, which I have directed to escort your friend Buhcagee Razonath, the Maratta vakeel, if he chooses to join here. We shall bring eight brass eighteen-pounders, and two iron ones, bringing all the grain and arrack we can.

I wait to finish this for your explicit instructions which I expect to-day, and which, as soon as I clearly understand, I will implicitly obey.

The Dindigul convoy is the only thing I know can detain me, and they ought to be here on Monday, and if so, we may certainly march easily on Wednesday.

Be assured I will exert myself to execute your plans as if they were my own, and be delighted should they prove the best.

We both want nothing but success!

Dec. 21.

I received your instructions yesterday, and would wish you should join your army before you divide it, that you may see the world of followers and baggage that I shall have to defend against his swarms of cavalry, with one regiment of dragoons. I have never thought our army or cavalry could be divided. I fancy we shall be a good deal more than thirty miles asunder, and Baillie was undone at eleven; however you may be sure I will do my best and push for Sussoor while my rice lasts. I shall have but four iron eighteens, and I believe but seven brass. The Dindigul convoy may delay us a day or two; but I hope nothing can prevent our being off by the first of the New Year at furthest.

I am, &c.,

WM. MEDOWS.

[1] Colonel, afterwards Major-General James Hartley, b. 1745, d. Oct. 4, 1799, unmarried. He had been in the Company's service, and been promoted, for his distinguished conduct, out of his turn, to be Lieut.-Colonel. Subsequently it was ordered that he should receive no further step till his seniors who had been passed over should have regained their former position: in consequence he was taken into the King's service, and made Lieut.-Colonel of the 73rd.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEDOWS TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Secret.]

MY DEAR LORD, Camp near Tritchinopoly, Dec. 26, 1790.

I was favoured with yours of the 22nd this day; and shall comply with your aversion to brass eighteens. I have four iron and four brass, and shall send into Tritchinopoly two of the last to-morrow.

I propose sending no more infantry with Colonel Cockerell's detachment, and all the cavalry but one regiment; and then the Company's European battalion and two regiments of coast sepoys that are joined to Floyd's corps, and called the advance, as I think I have not afterwards, with but one regiment of cavalry, more than will be necessary to protect my baggage and artillery, and fight, if it should be necessary, the enemy; but before I arrive at Trinomalee, I shall be able to receive your further instructions. I hope to march on Wednesday, and if not, am sure will do it on Friday. . . .

I wish to God you would meet us there. Oh! to eclipse the brilliant action of Colonel Hartley![1]

Adieu! my dear Lord, sincerely yours,

Whilst!

W. MEDOWS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO LIEUT.-COLONEL ——.

[Private.]

DEAR ——, Fort St. George, Dec. 29, 1790.

It was with the greatest surprise and concern that I last night received your letter of the 24th, inclosing one which you had intended to have sent on the 22nd, and which from the former letter of that date which I had received, I had been induced to hope was for ever laid by in your drawer.

I have little to add to what I said yesterday,[2] except to remind you (if the instance of Pearse[3] had made any impression upon you) that Pearse did not come to the coast as an artillery officer, but as an officer commanding a brigade in the line. Had

[1] Colonel Hartley had, Dec. 10, 1790, with one regiment of Europeans, two of sepoys, and 500 Travancoreans, 1500 men in all, attacked and totally defeated a large corps of Tippoo's troops, 13,000 strong, near Calicut. Colonel Hartley lost 52, the enemy about 1000 killed, and 900, including their general, taken. Furruckabad surrendered in consequence on the 12th.

[2] It has been thought unnecessary to print both letters.

[3] Colonel Thomas Deane Pearce, d. June 15, 1789. He was second to Hastings in his duel with Mr. Francis.

he been considered as an artillery officer, he must have commanded all the artillery of the army.

It is vain however for me to expect that, in your present temper of mind, any reasoning I can offer about Duff[1] can have any weight with you.

Despairing to convince you, of what I am most perfectly convinced, that no offence has been committed against you, I hope that I am not too sanguine, when I flatter myself that you now believe that no offence was intended against you; and if this hope is well founded, I must sincerely exhort you to reflect on the step which you are going to take, and to consider well whether it is worth your while, merely for the sake of giving a public mark of your resentment against me, who at least never intended to injure you, to sacrifice in so great a degree the interest of your country, and the honour of the Bengal army, in which you have spent so many of your best days.

You cannot but be sensible of the pernicious effects which must attend your quitting the command of the —— detachment at this critical period, and how unfit the Major whom I named for the service, entirely in compliance with your wishes, and who has been so little accustomed to the native troops, would be to take your place.

I hope never to be driven to the necessity of taking any public notice of your letter, and I certainly shall not do it till we meet. In the mean time turn the matter well over in your mind, and put the question fairly to yourself, whether, if disaffection and desertion should prevail in your Brigade, it will not in your retirement give you many painful sensations to have been a principal cause of the failure of the campaign, and whether it may not be very possible that those who now encourage your ill-humour, will be the first to abuse you for leaving your post, at a time that your services were so much wanted.

Believe me, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEDOWS TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Secret.]

MY DEAR LORD, Camp near Tritchinopoly, Dec. 29, 1790.

We march to-morrow with four iron eighteens, and only two of your detested brass. I propose at present marching three days and

[1] Colonel, afterwards Major-General Patrick Duff, of Hatton, Banff, d. 1803, m. Jan. 10, 1794, dau. of —— Hay, Esq., of Blaireye. He was a large and very powerful man, and was called Tiger Duff, from having been severely lacerated by a tiger, which he is said to have squeezed to death.

halting Sunday, and then marching the other five running, which will bring us to Trinomalee, where I shall expect your commands as to when I am to send off one division of the army to Arnee, and when to begin to march with the other division myself; the men carry ten days' rice, which is a great effort, for in general they carry but five, but by this exertion we shall have, when we arrive at Trinomalee, above forty days' rice for our fighting men. The followers, that is the allowed followers, set out with twenty, and where they will get more, God knows.

Adieu, my dear Lord. The greatest blessing will be success; God send it soon; and may you ever believe me, what I must ever be,

Sincerely yours and Ross's,

WM. MEDOWS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO SIR WILLIAM FAWCETT.

[Private.]

DEAR FAWCETT, Fort St. George, Dec. 30, 1790.

I found the 14th and 15th Regiments of His Majesty's Electoral troops, which are in garrison at this place, so very weak as to be by no means in a condition to answer the gracious intentions of His Majesty, when he consented to permit them to remain for a time in this country, if it should be thought that their services could be of use.

The only mode that occurred to me of fulfilling His Majesty's wishes, was to direct Colonel Wagenheim[1] to re-enlist all the soldiers who could be prevailed upon to renew their engagements in the Hanoverian service, to serve for one year in His Majesty's 14th Electoral Regiment, and to order the officers and staff of the 15th Regiment to return to Europe in the Company's ships of this season, with the invalids, and such men as refuse to enlist either in the Hanoverian or the Company's service.

Colonel Wagenheim, who is a very respectable and zealous Officer, has executed my orders with earnestness and success, and we shall by these means obtain the services of a good regiment of about 700 men, completely and properly officered.

[1] Colonel, afterwards Major-General Christoph August von Wagenheim, b. March 23, 1741, d. June 26, 1830; m. after his return from India, a dau. of Baron Löw von Steinfurth. When Bernadotte took possession of Hanover, General Wagenheim among others attended his levee. Bernadotte asked him if he had been present at the siege of Cuddalore, and being answered in the affirmative, inquired if he recollected a French sergeant who had been wounded and taken prisoner, and whom General Wagenheim had taken into his own tent till he recovered. General Wagenheim, after a little consideration, said he remembered the circumstance, and should be happy to know what had become of the sergeant, about whom he had felt much interest. "That sergeant," said Bernadotte, "is now before you, and will be too happy to prove he has not forgotten former kindness."

I am sensible that by acting as I have done, I have gone a little beyond the letter of my instructions, but knowing as I do the anxious concern which His Majesty takes in the prosperity of every part of his dominions, and being sensible that the present state of our affairs in this country, could not have been foreseen at the time the orders respecting His Majesty's Electoral Regiments were sent from England, I considered it my duty to do what I thought best for the public service. If in the arrangement of this business, I have inadvertently acted in any respect contrary to the intentions or wishes of my Royal Master, I trust to his goodness, who well knows my zeal and devotion to his service, for forgiveness.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO SIR CHARLES OAKELEY, BART., AND COUNCIL.

GENTLEMEN, Fort St. George, Dec. 30, 1790.

I deferred giving my sentiments on the subject of your letter dated the 19th ultimo, addressed to the Governor-General in Council, until I should see the report of the Committee which was appointed to examine and investigate the grounds of the complaints that were exhibited by his Highness the Nabob of Arcot, against the two Messrs. Hollond and their Dubash Paupiah, and which I was informed, upon my landing at this place, would soon be prepared.

Having now perused that report, as well as the enclosures which you transmitted with the above-mentioned letter, I must declare that the reasons for believing that the two Messrs. Hollond and their agent Paupiah have been guilty of the flagrant acts of peculation and corruption with which they have been charged, are so strong and convincing to my mind, that I consider it to be the duty of the Honourable Company's Governments in this country to take every step in their power to oblige those three persons, or either of them, to submit to the issue of a trial for those offences before a competent court of justice.

The Court of Directors will take such measures as they may think expedient respecting Mr. John Hollond, who is now in England; and it will be proper in you to consult the Company's Law officers on the most regular and effectual mode of proceeding to bring Paupiah to justice in this country; but Mr. Edward John Hollond can be tried nowhere but in Britain for the crimes of which he has been accused, and his presence at home becomes indispensably necessary for that purpose.

My inclination would lead me to avoid making use of personal harshness towards Mr. Edward Hollond, as far as might be compatible with a due discharge of my public duty, and if it had appeared that he had engaged a passage to England in any of the Honourable Company's ships of the season, I should have only proposed that your Board should have given an order in the secret department to the commander of that ship, after Mr. Hollond's embarkation, to hold himself responsible for retaining him in safe custody, and for not allowing him to land again, until he should receive instructions concerning him from the Court of Directors. But I cannot learn that Mr. Hollond has taken measures for returning to Europe in any of the Company's ships, and under charges of such enormity, I doubt whether it would be justifiable in you to accept bail of any extent, for his surrendering himself in England; and I do not think it proper, if it can be avoided, to put him under so close a confinement on shore in this climate, as would effectually prevent him from making his escape.

My opinion therefore is conformable to the latter suggestion in your letter, that he should be compelled to embark in the first Company's ship that may be despatched from hence for Europe, and as the Rodney may be now hourly expected from Bengal, I recommend that measures may be taken by the Board, for securing Mr. Hollond's person, and for embarking him as soon as that ship comes to an anchor in these roads, in order that he may employ the period between the day of his embarkation and that of the despatch of the ship in the arrangement of his private affairs; and that you should also render the commander of the Rodney responsible for keeping Mr. Hollond in safe custody, until the Court of Directors shall give further orders respecting him after his arrival in England.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

[Private.]

DEAR SIR, Fort St. George, Dec. 31, 1790.

My instructions to Medows and Abercromby, copies of which are enclosed in my letter to the Court of Directors, will explain my plan of operations. I shall, I am afraid, notwithstanding the supplies from Bengal, find it difficult to procure a sufficient number of bullocks, and still more so of drivers, to carry on a proper battering-train for our intended sieges, but I shall leave no expedient untried to effect it. The western garrisons are so well stored

with grain, that I have no great apprehension of our being distressed for that article, at least for our fighting-men, provided we can make these sieges.

As we appear to have full as many troops on this coast as, with our means of carriage, we can make use of, I have determined to send the 73rd regiment to Abercromby, and if from the evacuation of Coimbatore, and consequent reinforcement of Palacatcherry, he should get two or three battalions from the latter, I should hope that he may be in a condition to give us important assistance, and I think that we shall then have brought every man into active service that it has been possible to employ.

I hope you will give Medows full credit in England for his generous and noble conduct on the trying occasion of my superseding him in his command. I knew the excellence of his temper and of his heart, but he has really in this instance surpassed my expectations. It is besides but justice to him to observe, that, owing to untoward accidents, the first intelligence that he received of my coming was attended with the most mortifying circumstances, for although I had, out of delicacy, kept my resolution a profound secret for three weeks after I had written my intentions to him, it unluckily happened, owing to the interruption of the posts, that he first heard of it from the Madras Board. . . .

I have not yet read the Report of the Committee, appointed to inquire into the Nabob's complaints against the Hollonds and their Dubash Paupiah;[1] but I am told that several of the charges are clearly proved against them. The Military storekeeper, who purchased his office from them, is inclined to speak out, provided that the punishment for his share of the transactions should extend no further than the loss of his present employment, and that his pretentions for future preferment should stand upon his former good character; and I own that I feel much disposed to acquiesce in his terms, as it is of such infinite importance for the public benefit to bring delinquent Governors and Councillors to punishment, and, in this instance, to substantiate a positive proof of this most gross and pernicious species of corruption.

The whole system of this Presidency is founded on the good old principles of Leadenhall-street economy—small salaries and im-

[1] Avadanum Paupiah Braminy. The dubashes are a class peculiar to the southern part of India, and act as stewards, interpreters, or cash-keepers, and in former times, occasionally as the medium of communication between the British and native governments, especially with the Nabob of Arcot. Paupiah was one of the most eminent of his class, and had, in the palmy days of Benfield and others, made, by very corrupt means, a large fortune, which however melted away when the Carnatic frauds and forgeries were investigated. He died, almost ruined, it is said of grief and vexation at his losses, Jan. 1809.

mense perquisites, and if the Directors alone could be ruined by it, everybody would say they deserved it, but unfortunately it is not the Court of Directors, but the British nation who must be the sufferers.

We must however put an end to the war before we can attempt any serious reform, and my thoughts for some months to come will be wholly occupied in endeavouring to reduce the overgrown power of Tippoo.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

CHAPTER XIII.

Arrival of Lord Cornwallis at Madras — Mr. Hollond sent to Europe — Movements of the army — Siege of Bangalore — Convention with the Marathas — Siege of Coimbatore by Tippoo — Successes of Lord Cornwallis — Inquiry into Mr. Hollond's conduct — Prospect of terminating the war — Conduct of the Nizam — Tippoo attacked and defeated — Offers to negotiate — Account of the campaign — Proposed Congress — Political situation of India — Debate in House of Lords — Votes of approbation in both Houses.

LORD Cornwallis arrived at Madras Dec. 12, 1790, and, in the words of the Supreme Council, "his presence in the scene of action was considered by our Allies as a pledge of security and of our confident hopes of success against the common enemy."

Though the results of the last campaign had fallen short of the expectations entertained at its commencement, some objects of great importance had been attained. The forts commanding most of the main roads had been captured, and experience had pointed out the deficiencies which existed in the equipments of the army, and shown how they might best be remedied.

During the whole of this campaign Lord Cornwallis wrote only two despatches to the Court of Directors on the details of his operations. These, necessarily of great length, are printed in the Appendix, and it is therefore advisable to give a slight sketch of the movements of the army, in order to render intelligible the letters addressed by Lord Cornwallis to his subordinate officers, to the Residents at the several Courts, and to the Government at Madras.

On the 29th of January Lord Cornwallis assumed the command at Vellout, where the army had been assembled a few days before, and on February 5th moved towards Vellore. His intention was to besiege Bangalore, a place of very considerable strength, about 200 miles from Madras; but fearing that Tippoo, if he penetrated his designs, would take possession of the passes through which he must necessarily ascend the Ghauts, he indicated an intention of moving by the passes of Amboor and Baramahal. Suddenly turning to the North and then to the West, he reached the pass of Moogla, and with his whole army took up his ground on the table-land of Mysore without losing a man, or even firing a single shot. On the 5th of March Bangalore was invested, not without some opposition on the

part of Tippoo's cavalry; but the casualties on the side of the English did not exceed five men, and the whole of their stores were safely collected on the plateau. This successful operation, in which great military skill was exhibited, animated the whole army with confidence, and the stern repression of the first act of licentious pillage which occurred, effectually put a stop for the future to all similar outrages, and inspired the natives with such confidence, that the cultivation of the land was not interrupted, and on more than one occasion was carried on, even within half a mile of the British batteries while actually firing on the breach.

The siege of Bangalore was steadily prosecuted without any untoward event, except that the indiscretion of Colonel Floyd (who was himself very severely wounded) brought on a sharp skirmish, attended with a heavy loss of horses, which could ill be spared from the weak numbers of the British cavalry. The pettah was stormed on the 7th of March with the comparatively small loss of 131 men, but among them was Lieut.-Colonel Moorhouse,[1] commanding the artillery, who was killed at the gate.

The stores of grain found in the pettah were of great importance, as they furnished food for the followers of the army, by that time in great distress for want of provisions; but forage became very scarce, the cattle were daily dying of hunger, and the ammunition was nearly exhausted. The loss of the heavy guns would probably have followed the raising of the siege, which would have equally depressed the spirits of the British and encouraged Tippoo, and have rendered the prosecution of the war almost impracticable. Under these circumstances, Lord Cornwallis determined to storm the Upper Town. On the night of the 21st, the troops advanced to the attack, and the storming party, though it did not amount to one-fourth of the garrison, surmounted all obstacles and triumphantly planted the British colours on the summit of the fort, notwithstanding that Tippoo's whole army, fully aware of the intended attack, was encamped nearly within gunshot of the place.

One large detachment of the Nizam's cavalry, about 10,000 strong, joined the English in April. Unfortunately their General, Tejwunt Sing,[2] a Hindoo, was totally incompetent for the command, and was even suspected of being a traitor. So far from acting as skirmishers and reconnoitring the ground, his troops

[1] Colonel Moorhouse rose from the ranks, and had become a most distinguished officer. To use the words of Colonel Wilks, "Nature had made him a gentleman—uneducated, he had made himself a man of science—a career of uninterrupted distinction had commanded general respect, and his amiable character universal attachment;" b. 1754, killed March 7, 1791.

[2] Raja Tejwunt Sing. He turned out to be a most inefficient officer, if not worse.

kept in the rear of the British army, and instead of foraging for themselves, they actually plundered villages within the English lines. Notwithstanding these impediments, Lord Cornwallis moved forward as rapidly as the exhausted state of his draught-cattle would permit, and reached Arikera on the banks of the Caveri, about 9 miles east of Seringapatam, on the 13th of May. The river had already begun to fill, and it was almost impossible to establish a safe communication with the other bank, an operation necessary to enable Lord Cornwallis to co-operate with General Abercromby, who was advancing from Bombay, and was then within 50 miles. Tippoo assembled his force to prevent the further progress of the English army, but on the 15th he was driven from all his positions with considerable loss, the Nizam's cavalry acting with some energy. But this victory did not remove the difficulties under which Lord Cornwallis laboured, and he was obliged to move towards the fords of Caniambaddy, nearly 20 miles distant, where he hoped to cross the river. Before he could reach it, it became evident that the equipments of the army were exhausted. The artillery for the last two days had mostly been drawn by hand, and the scarcity of provisions amounted almost to famine. Tippoo's cavalry had so completely cut off all communications, that Lord Cornwallis had no accurate information as to the progress of General Abercromby's army, and was totally ignorant where the Maratha cavalry might be, but believed that they were at the distance of some hundred miles. Added to this, the season was now so far advanced, as to leave little hope that, under the most favourable circumstances, it could be possible to reduce Seringapatam before the commencement of the rainy season. Lord Cornwallis, under these circumstances, destroyed his battering-train and heavy baggage on the 22nd, having transmitted orders to General Abercromby to retrace his steps towards Bombay. On the 26th the march towards Bangalore commenced; the difficulty of transporting the sick being so great, that the native cavalry was dismounted in order that their horses might be used for that purpose. Scarcely had the army moved from its ground, when a large body of cavalry made their appearance on the left flank. Instant preparations were made to receive this supposed enemy, when to the astonishment and satisfaction of all, the firing, which was commencing, was stopped by the exclamation of a horseman that it was the advanced guard of the Maratha army, and a few hours later, Hurry Punt[1] and Purseram Bhow[2] rode into the camp. So perfect had been the means

[1] Hurry Punt commanded the Marathas in the war with Tippoo in 1786; d. about 1794.

[2] Purseram Bhow had long been a distinguished officer in the service of the Peshwa. He

employed by Tippoo in intercepting intelligence, that neither when at a distance, nor when within a few miles of his camp, did a single messenger despatched by the Marathas ever succeed in reaching Lord Cornwallis. Had they arrived but a few days sooner, the fate of the campaign would probably have been altered. Certainly neither artillery nor baggage would have been destroyed, and possibly the siege of Seringapatam might not have been raised. No other native power ever equalled the Marathas in providing food and forage for their own troops, and their habitual skill was in this instance most useful to the British. The Maratha bazaar, amply provided with food, furnished full supplies to the English army and its followers, but, according to the usual mercantile habits of that tribe, at almost exorbitant prices.[1] After remaining a few days in their position to cover the large convoys which were following the Maratha army, the English pursued their march, capturing one or two insulated forts which impeded their movements. Before reaching Bangalore, a convention was entered into with the Marathas, who were to receive about 150,000*l.* as the price of their assistance. As the money could not easily be supplied from the Treasury either of Fort St. George or Fort William, Lord Cornwallis took upon himself the responsibility of arresting the sum intended for the Chinese investment. Had any proof been required to show how judicious was the decision of Lord Cornwallis to take the command himself, this alone would have sufficed; for no one but a Governor-General, confident that for private and political reasons he would be fully supported at home, could have ventured to take such a step, and without it, the alliance with the Marathas would probably have been dissolved.

The operations of the other armies which had been intended to co-operate in the reduction of Seringapatam, were not very important. The Nizam's troops, to whom were added a British Contingent of two battalions of Sepoys, and some European artillery, after great delay invested Capool, October 28, 1790, but it did not surrender till April, 1791. Some other forts were also captured, and in that quarter Goorumconda alone remained in the

He was mortally wounded and taken prisoner in Sept. 1800, in action near Putunkoodee, against the Raja of Kolapoor and Chitour Sing.

[1] "The bazaar of a Mahratta camp," says Colonel Wilks, "presented an exhibition of no ordinary character, and to their famished visitors exhibited a picture of the spoils of the East and the industry of the West. From a web of English broad cloth to a Birmingham penknife, from the shawls of Cashmere to the second-hand garment of a Hindoo, from diamonds of the first water to the silver earring of a poor plundered village maiden, from oxen, sheep, and poultry to the dried salt fish of Concan; almost everything was seen that could be presented by the best bazaars of the richest towns; but, above all, the tables of the money-changers, overspread with the coins of every country of the East, in the open air, gave evidence of an extent of mercantile activity utterly inconceivable in any camp excepting that of systematic plunderers."

possession of Tippoo. The Marathas, who were also supported by a British detachment, commenced in like manner the siege of Darwar, which held out from the beginning of January to April 4, 1791. The surrender both of Capool and Darwar was hastened by the intelligence of the fall of Bangalore, though even the latter would have availed nothing, but for the courage and discipline of the English contingents, on whom fell the whole weight of conducting both these sieges. The rapid movements of the Marathas brought under subjection the country north of the Toombuddra, and they joined Lord Cornwallis, as has already been mentioned, near Chercodi.

General Abercromby encountered no serious impediment in his march, and had reached, without loss, the Upper Ghauts, when he was ordered by Lord Cornwallis to retrace his steps. He accordingly buried his artillery, and fell back into the British territory. His movements had been materially aided by the Raja of Coorg,[1] whose history would at any time have been considered worthy of the age of chivalry. The whole tale is most romantic, and his character stands out in strong relief, as compared with those of other Eastern Princes. Throughout the war he was a most faithful Ally, and he received his recompense when the treaty of peace was signed.

In the early part of the year Tippoo had, on more than one occasion, professed his desire to enter into negociation, and immediately after the retreat from before Seringapatam, opened fresh communications. Lord Cornwallis had previously insisted on receiving written propositions from Tippoo, but he yielded to the representations of Hurry Punt, and agreed that commissioners should be appointed by each party. He therefore consented that duly authorized Ministers should proceed to Bangalore. Tippoo, in accordance with his usual policy, endeavoured to sow distrust among the Allies by opening a separate communication with the English, which he accompanied with a Khelaut, and a present of fruit. To the intense delight of the whole army, who had no wish for peace, they saw the following morning the loads of fruit returning unaccepted.

Another similar attempt was made in August, and Apajee Ram arrived on the part of Tippoo, but Lord Cornwallis, considering that his own position placed him on an equality with Tippoo,

[1] Beer, or Vira, Rajindra, b. 1768, d. 1808. His daughter at first succeeded him, but was replaced by his brother Linga, grandfather of the young Princess of Coorg who has embraced the Christian faith, and is now (1857) residing in this country. The male descendants have sadly deteriorated from the Raja mentioned above. The misgovernment of a later Vira Rajindra, the son of Singa, rendered his deposition an act of necessity. See Wilks's 'Mysore' for the details about the Raja of Coorg.

would only treat with an envoy, through the intervention of a plenipotentiary on his own part. Apajee Ram, whose instructions did not allow him to adopt this course, was therefore obliged to depart without having even obtained an interview.

The months of July, August, and September, were spent in reducing the numerous Droogs, or hill forts, which studded the country and intercepted the communications of the army. Some surrendered without resistance, very short sieges sufficed for the subjugation of the remainder, till the British forces came to Nundydroog, a granite rock of tremendous height, totally inaccessible on every side but one. It was defended by a large garrison under one of Tippoo's best officers, and yet such was the skill and courage of the British, that it was taken by storm on the 19th of October, having been invested only 22 days. The total loss of the assailants was 120, of whom only 30 were killed or wounded in the assault.

The siege of Coimbatore by Tippoo deserves some notice. As the post had not been considered tenable, it was ordered to be evacuated, but Lieutenant Chalmers,[1] after removing everything valuable, thought he might be able to hold it, though the force under his command consisted only of 120 of an irregular native corps, and 200 Travancoreans under a young Frenchman, M. Migot de la Combe.[2] One 4-pounder and two 3-pounders formed the whole of his artillery. After two months of open trenches, the place was assaulted, but the enemy were repulsed with great slaughter on the 11th of August, and on the same day Major Cuppage[3] arrived with a small force to relieve the place. He threw in some reinforcements, which raised the garrison to 700 men, but the siege was recommenced October 6, by a force of 8000 regulars, with a large body of cavalry and irregulars. Major Cuppage again attempted to relieve them, but failed in the endeavour, and Lieutenant Chalmers was compelled to surrender November 3, when he obtained most honourable terms; but they were grossly violated, and he and his brother officers were sent close prisoners to Seringapatam. Contrary however to Tippoo's usual practice, they were well treated. Lord Cornwallis had strongly disapproved of the retention of Coimbatore, considering, justly as it proved, that it could not be permanently retained. But he passed strong eulogiums on the conduct of Lieutenant Chalmers, at the same time

[1] Lieutenant, afterwards Major-General Sir John Chalmers, K.C.B., d. March 31, 1819.

[2] Migot de la Combe was in the service of the Raja of Travancore. He behaved with exceeding gallantry. Colonel Wilks states that he could not ascertain whether he was present during the second siege, nor what ultimately became of him.

[3] Major, afterwards Colonel John Cuppage, d. March 31, 1834.

blaming Major Cuppage for not having taken more effectual measures for his relief.

Every fort between the coast of Coromandel and Bangalore was now in the possession of Lord Cornwallis; a few, and those the strongest, on the road towards Seringapatam, remained to be subdued. Of these the most important was Savendroog, called also the "Hill of Death,"[1] situated upon a granite mountain, apparently inaccessible from below. The circumference at the base is eight miles, and at about two-thirds of its height the rock is divided into two citadels, quite independent of each other. The siege began December 10, and on the 21st at midday the assault was ordered. A lodgment had been effected close to the breach, and the troops escaladed a precipice on the eastern side, so steep that, when the storm was over, they were actually afraid to descend it. The rapidity and impetuosity of their advance was such, that they entered the western citadel along with the fugitives. Not a single European soldier or sepoy was killed on this occasion. Ootradroog was next invested. In it were seven distinct lines of ramparts one behind the other. It was attacked the day following the summons, some of the gateways were blown open, but most of the lines were escaladed. A few wounded were the only casualties attending the capture of this important place.

The Marathas had not been as prosperous in their undertakings. They had besieged Gorumcoonda for some time, and although, with the aid of some British artillery, they had been able to capture the pettah, they were afterwards driven out of it with severe loss.

The attention of Lord Cornwallis had been so engrossed with his military operations, that he had little time to devote to civil arrangements; but it will be seen that he did not neglect that part of his duty, though all material questions were postponed to another year.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO CHARLES WARRE MALET, ESQ.

SIR, Fort St. George, Jan. 3, 1791.

. . . The answer given by the Durbar to Tippoo's proposals was as satisfactory as I could reasonably expect, but I should wish in future that it might be agreed between the confederate powers, that if overtures should be made from Tippoo to one of them, the party to which he may address himself should

[1] From the insalubrity of the vicinity.

require specific propositions from him, and refer them to the Allies for their sentiments before any answer is returned. . . .

After what has passed between Nana Furnaveze and yourself, relative to his leading the Peshwa to the field, the decision must now rest with the Minister; but in the mean time, you should urge his making every amends in his power, even for the suspense, by using the utmost exertions to increase the armies in the field. I take it for granted that Hurry Punt will act with fidelity if Nana earnestly requires it, but I must desire that you will tell the latter from me that, although I cannot be supposed, after the implicit confidence which I have so often placed in his honour, to suspect that he would employ any Chief, whom he believed to be adverse to the general interests of the confederacy, yet as it is known throughout Hindostan that Rasta[1] is the friend of Tippoo, I conceive that it must damp the ardour of the soldiers, and be highly prejudicial to the common cause, to suffer a near relation of his to attend the army, and that I am under the necessity of objecting against it in the strongest terms. . . .

I am glad to find that you have been able to set Colonel Frederick[2] in motion. I have no personal acquaintance with him, but I have been told that his temper is violent and ungovernable. General Abercromby has promised me to recall him if he should have any disagreement with the Mahrattas, and I must desire that you will give the General the earliest information of the appearance of any symptoms of ill humour between them. . . .

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO CAPTAIN KENNAWAY.

SIR, Fort St. George, Jan. 3, 1791.

The tardiness of the arrival of the reinforcements from Bengal, and especially of the bullocks for our battering-train, without which our entering the Mysore country could be attended with no solid advantages, will occasion considerable delay in the commencement of our march. But you may with confidence assure the Nizam that not a moment's time shall be unnecessarily lost, and, without making too early a communication of the exact objects of my plan, you will continue to encourage him to expect

[1] Rastia, or Madho Rao Rastia, imprisoned by the Peshwa in 1801. This family was one of the principal Jaghedars under the Peshwa.

[2] Colonel Charles Frederick, son of Sir Charles Frederick, K.B., b. Oct. 9, 1748, d. March 13, 1791, unmarried.

the most complete and efficacious co-operation, and you may add, that, as soon as I enter the enemy's territories, I will endeavour to communicate with the different Chiefs, who, I should hope, would be likewise instructed to write to me, and that if at any time I should think it for the advantage of the common cause to join a body of our troops to any of the confederate armies, I shall most readily adopt that measure.

I have great doubt, from what you say, whether any essential benefit would be derived from the Nizam's taking the field in person, and it must be a matter of the most serious consideration both for the Minister and for yourself, whether the risk of losing part of his influence with his Master by his absence, might not outweigh any good consequences that would be likely to issue from his presence with the army.

My own wish would undoubtedly be, that the Minister would take the command of the army in person, as I should then feel a confidence that its operations would be supported by the whole power of his Highness's Government; but you may inform Azeem ul Omrah, that, after taking my suggestions into consideration, I shall leave the decision upon that point entirely to himself.

Yours, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEDOWS TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Secret. Received Jan. 6.]

MY DEAR LORD, Camp at Worrangoor, Jan. 4, 1791.

Here we are without any let, check, or impediment,—the Maratta Vakeel admiring very much (indeed it was the only thing he seemed to admire, though I rode him along the whole line) the ease with which the four iron 18-pounders were got over some difficult places.

That we may surmount all difficulties as easily, and of which I have no doubt after you join us, is the sincerest wish of him who is, in the sincerest manner,

Most truly yours and Ross's, whilst

WM. MEDOWS.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEDOWS TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

MY DEAR LORD, Camp at Pannadoor, Jan. 7, 1791.

I received yours of the 31st yesterday; and am not a little happy that my letter must have anticipated your wishes with regard to my intentions.

I received yesterday a letter from General Abercromby, and one from Colonel Hartley. Cannanore surrendering so soon proves Tippoo defends places no better than he attacks them.

He is ambitious, and may be a great statesman, which I doubt, but I deny that he is a warrior or a hero; and I mean that the three Governors, the Nizam, and the Peshwah, should dine at Seringapatam, with the old Queen of Mysore[1] sitting at the head of the table. One is just as likely as t'other, but it is more than likely we may crush this disturber of the public peace, if it is not sounder politicks only to cripple him; but for my own part I freely confess I should prefer the dignity and justice of dethroning this cruel tyrant and usurper, and restoring the kingdom to the Hindoo family—the lawful owner—to the wiser policy perhaps of only clipping his wings so effectually that he could soar no more in our time. In the mean time

I am ever yours and Ross's, whilst

WM. MEDOWS.

TO MEER MIJUNAL DEEN[2] (SYED SAHEB).

Jan. 17, 1791.

Lord Cornwallis has received your letter dated the 1st of Jamadi ul Awal, and has understood its contents.

He directs me to say in answer to it, that Tippoo Sultaun well knows that it has been his earnest desire, since he has had the direction of the affairs of the English Company to adhere strictly to treaties, and to live in peace with all the neighbouring states; and that it was the flagrant violation of the articles of the late treaty of peace that Tippoo committed, by the unprovoked attack which he made upon the Rajah of Travancore, the Ally of the Company, that obliged him, after having tried every conciliatory proposition in vain, to draw the sword in defence of a Prince who had a right by treaty to claim his protection.

[1] Lechmee, dau. of Copand Raj, and widow of Chiam Raj whom Hyder had dethroned in 1763. Chiam Raj's son by a previous wife died in 1796, leaving a child 3 years old, who was restored to the throne of his ancestors in 1799, on the death of Tippoo.

[2] Meer Mijunal Deen, or Syed Saheb. He was a relation of Tippoo, and was killed May 4, 1799, at the storm of Seringapatam.

The innocent inhabitants of both circars must unavoidably suffer much distress during the continuance of the war, which is a subject of great concern to Lord Cornwallis, although the blame and responsibility rests solely with the aggressor; but he desires me to remark, that, whilst the English troops abstain from all violence against defenceless people, and direct their efforts against armed enemies only, the villages that are in flames and the mangled carcases of the wretched ryots which are spread over the face of the Carnatic, exhibit a very different scene, and render Tippoo peculiarly accountable for carrying on war with a cruelty which can produce no advantage to himself, but which disgraces human nature.

Lord Cornwallis likewise directs me to add that he should be happy to see peace restored, when reparation can be obtained for the losses and injuries which the English and their Allies have suffered, but that it could answer no useful purpose that either side should depute a person to the other to treat on the terms of peace, until certain preliminary conditions can be settled. When he was forced into this war, Lord Cornwallis thought it proper to form alliances with other powers, who had likewise sustained great losses and injuries by the violence and ambition of Tippoo and his Father; and as he is a faithful observer of his engagements, he cannot now agree to any terms of peace until those Allies, as well as the English, shall obtain ample indemnification and satisfaction.

If Tippoo has any propositions to offer, Lord Cornwallis will not decline to receive them in writing directly from himself, and, after having transmitted them for the consideration of the Allies of the Company, and having obtained their opinions upon them, he will return an answer.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO CAPTAIN KENNAWAY.

SIR, Fort St. George, Jan. 18, 1791.

. . . I was glad to see that my intended plan of operations was received with so great satisfaction by the Nizam and his Ministers, and their strong expressions of confidence and offers of directing the movement of their troops, according to the instructions they may receive from us, give us reason to be convinced of their sincerity.

A general systematic arrangement for directing the efforts of the Confederacy would no doubt have been desirable, but when the

armies of the three combined powers advance into the enemy's country, circumstances must unavoidably produce a general co-operation, although no precise plan should have been previously concerted for that purpose; and in the mean time we must bear with their dilatoriness and jealousies of each other, as I do not think it would answer any good purpose for us to press the Courts of Poonah and Hydrabad further, to do what the former does not appear earnestly to wish, and what the latter seems determined to avoid,—I mean a junction of their forces.

Our plans will admit of our exceeding the expectations of both these powers, as instead of furnishing only an additional detachment we shall be in a situation to support them with our main army. . . .

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

GENERAL MEDOWS TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Secret.]

MY DEAR LORD, Camp at Streepermadoor, Jan. 26, 1791.

We are here without anything extraordinary, after a longish *jungly* march, and we go to Vellout to-morrow, where I expect yourself or your orders. Endless are the applications for going to the Presidency, which I refuse without exception till I see you or hear from you upon the subject. But if I do neither to-morrow, Floyd is so impatient to be married to Miss Darke,[1] that though he sees through her, as we always do before marriage, "as through a glass darkly," yet as I think Abradate[2] so worthy of Panthee, I shall make him an exception and let him go. . . .

And I am ever yours, &c.,

WM. MEDOWS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

[Private.]

DEAR SIR, Fort St. George, Jan. 27, 1791.

The calm and southerly winds which, contrary to the order of things, have so cruelly prevailed for these last five or six weeks in the Bay of Bengal, and hitherto disappointed us of the greatest part of our cavalry and bullocks, have likewise greatly retarded the arrival of the Rodney, and given me an opportunity of sending you a few more lines by that conveyance.

[1] Lady Floyd, d. Feb. 3, 1802. She was mother of several children, of whom one was Lady Peel.

[2] Two characters in Madame de Scuderi's romance of 'Alcamene, ou le Grand Cyrus.'

The army arrives this day in the neighbourhood of Poonamale, where I mean to join it on the 29th, and hope to begin my march on the 3rd. I flatter myself that if things go tolerably right I have time enough to take Seringapatam before the rains, but there is not much to spare.

Stuart is doing vastly well in Bengal, and Cooper, who knows that I opposed his nomination, has acted a most honourable part, and consults on all points with those whom he believes to be best acquainted with my sentiments, so that I feel confident that nothing will go materially wrong in that country. When I see Medows I will press him to speak out, and to determine on no account to depart from his word about his stay in Bengal. Stuart talks of going home next season, and every care must be taken to keep —— from being temporary Governor-General, for although he is perfectly honest and disinterested in all pecuniary matters, yet he is so eccentric and so unfit for any kind of government, that he would as effectually ruin the country as a Rumbold[1] or a Hollond.

I trust you will exert yourself in Duncan's favour, in the event of Stuart's going home; remember that I speak not for Duncan, but for the public.

I have sent you Mr. Edward Hollond, whom we were obliged to embark with the appearance of force, and in such horror and detestation is he held in this settlement (which God knows is many degrees from correctness) that no European attended him to the boat, or showed him the least countenance, as is commonly the case when under the hand of power; but he walked to the beach leaning on the neck of the brother of his Dubash Paupiah.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO CAPTAIN JOHN KENNAWAY.

SIR, Fort St. George, Jan. 28, 1791.

. . . Acquainted as I am with the general character which His Highness bears of a propensity in his disposition to

[1] Sir Thomas Rumbold, Bart., so created March 23, 1779, b. Jan. 1736, d. Nov. 10, 1791. He married three times, 1st, a Miss Berriman, 2nd, a Miss Price, 3rd, April 28, 1772, Joanna, dau. of Edmund Law, Bishop of Carlisle. Governor of Madras from Feb. 1778 to April, 1780. The supposed peculations of Sir Thomas were brought under the notice of the House of Commons, and a bill was introduced in 1782 to sequestrate his property, and to prevent his leaving the kingdom, and was renewed, with some modifications, in 1783; but all proceedings against him were ultimately dropped. M.P. for Shoreham from Dec. 1770 to 1774. Elected for Shaftesbury in 1774 and 1780, but unseated both times for bribery; and for Yarmouth, Isle of Wight, from April, 1781, to March, 1784.

intrigue and procrastination, I must acknowledge that his zeal in the prosecution of the war, and the readiness which he has shown of late to allow his operations to be guided by my advice and recommendation, have given me particular satisfaction; but I must at the same time confess that I have felt no small concern at the frequent symptoms of jealousy and heat which he discovers in his discussions with the Mahrattas, because a coldness, and still more a declared difference, between those two powers would be extremely embarrassing to me, and prove highly detrimental to the general interests of the Confederacy.

My wishes undoubtedly were that there should not only have been a general co-operation amongst all their forces, but in particular that they should have cordially agreed in forming an united army, nearly upon the plan that was proposed by the Poonah Government, at the time that Hurry Punt was ordered to take the field, and I was only induced to desire that the latter measure should not be pressed upon them either by Mr. Malet or yourself, from my having considered the nomination of Rasta to attend Hurry Punt, and some other circumstances, as marks of a want of earnestness on the part of the Mahrattas, and from His Highness's aversion to allow any part of his troops to act with Hurry Punt being so openly avowed. . . . I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

THE SECRET COMMITTEE TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Received Jan. 31, 1791.]

MY LORD, East India House, Aug. 4, 1790.

You will observe by the enclosed copy of our letter to Sir Charles Oakeley, that we have directed an inquiry to be made into the various acts of corruption that are said to have been committed by Mr. John Holland during the time he filled the Chair at Madras. It has been rumoured that representations have been made to your Lordship, by some respectable person or persons resident at that settlement, upon the same subject, with an offer to come forward and substantiate the charges, provided they were previously assured of your Lordship's support. We desire therefore that your Lordship will aid the present inquiry, by affording every possible encouragement to the persons who have thus voluntarily offered evidence in support of the charges, and by such other means as shall, in the opinion of your Lordship, facilitate the object we have in view, that of vindicating the national character by punishing

the offenders by a due course of law, transmitting to us the result of your inquiry by an early opportunity.

We are, &c.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO STEPHEN LUSHINGTON,[1] ESQ.

SIR, Camp at Vellout, Feb. 4, 1791.

I have received by the John Packet your letter dated the 16th of September last, respecting Mr. ——. You will have seen in the general letter transmitted by the Princess Amelia, the answer of the Board to the paragraph to which you allude. It was painful to us to give such an answer, and it was difficult in a public letter to be sufficiently explicit; but the truth is, that Mr. —— is so very eccentric, and has led so strange a life, and been in such a state of apathy for several years, that he is absolutely unqualified to hold any efficient office, and there are no offices now on the Bengal establishment worth his holding, that are not efficient.

I beg leave to assure you, Sir, that I lament very much that Mr. ——'s habits and propensities have put it out of my power to give a public proof, by a ready compliance with your recommendation, that I am not insensible of the civilities which I have received from you since I have been connected with the East India Company, and to mark my respect for the character of his Father.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL MUSGRAVE.

SIR, Camp at Vellout, Feb. 4, 1791.

As it is possible that Tippoo may move with his whole force to Madras, and make an attempt upon the Black-town, as soon as our army has proceeded four or five days on its march to the westward, I wish you to detain the detachment of the 73rd Regiment which is destined for the Malabar Coast, until some judgment can be formed of the enemy's intentions. Whenever you shall receive advice that a considerable part of Tippoo's force has moved to the westward or southward, you will please, without loss of time, to embark the detachment on board the Queen Indiaman, to join General Abercromby at Tellicherry.

[1] Mr., afterwards Sir Stephen Lushington, Bart., so created April 26, 1791, b. June 17, 1744, d. Jan. 12, 1807, m. 1771, Hester, dau. of John Boldero, Esq., of Aspenden Hall. M.P. for Helston, St. Michaels, Penryn, and Plympton, from Nov. 1790 to April, 1807. An East India Director for many years, and Chairman 1790–91, 1795–96, 1799–1800.

Should I have occasion to order any movement of the troops stationed to the southward of the Coleroon, I will endeavour to give you the earliest notice of it. In the mean time you will recommend it to the Board, to dispose of those troops in the manner that you may think best for the protection of the country, or to bring a part of them to the northward either by land or water, if the latter can be done without violence to their religious prejudices.

If a rupture with France should take place, you will keep a watchful eye on everything that is going on at Pondicherry, and prevent as much as possible any communication between the Governor and Tippoo; but as the force left in the Carnatic will not be calculated for undertaking a regular siege, I cannot hope that you will be able to make yourself master of the place, unless an opening should offer for attempting a surprise, or it could be effected by the means of intelligence and assistance from discontented people in the garrison.

I need hardly add, how earnestly I wish that you may live on the most friendly terms with the Government of Fort St. George; and as I know Sir Charles Oakeley to be as anxious as yourself, or as any man, to promote the public good, I am sanguine in my expectations that no material difference can arise between you. I am persuaded that you will have no wish to interfere with any of the patronage or powers which have been usually exercised by the Board; and although your duty will be to offer such representations and advice, as in your judgment shall appear best calculated to forward the public service, yet that you will always recollect that as the ultimate responsibility is with the Civil Government, it is also incumbent upon you to acquiesce without anger or murmur in their opinion, when it happens to differ from your own.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO CAPTAIN KENNAWAY.

SIR, Camp at Vellore, Feb. 12, 1791.

After completing my battering-train, I propose to move on the 14th inst., by Chittoor and Moogly; and I expect to ascend the pass, which is not fifty miles distant from hence, on the 20th or 21st.

The head of the pass is about 110 miles from Bangalore, to which place I shall immediately direct my march, and which I hope to invest by the 5th or 6th of next month. It may not be

amiss, as a lesson to our friends, that you should observe how punctual I have been to the time which I mentioned two months ago.

I shall endeavour to communicate with Assud Ali Khan[1] by the help of the friendly Polygars, and in the mean time I wish you to encourage him to come towards us, as he will be very useful in preventing Tippoo's irregular horse from cutting off our supplies, and he can always retire upon our army, whenever he apprehends that he is likely to be attacked by a superior force.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO CAPTAIN KENNAWAY.

SIR, Camp, Palimaneve, Feb. 21, 1791.

On the day before yesterday, a letter was brought to me by a person of some consequence, attended by a camel Hircarrah from Tippoo himself, nearly to the same purport as that which was written to me by Seyd Saheb, and to which I shall give nearly a similar answer.

In the mean time I have dismissed the bearer of the letter and his attendants, and returned a Khelaut which he likewise brought for me. And as soon as I shall judge it expedient to despatch an answer, I shall transmit to you and to Mr. Malet copies both of it and of the letter, to be communicated to his Highness and to the Peshwa's Ministers.

I am perfectly sensible of your zeal and good intentions in proposing that the Minister's son should be invested with that command. But as an unexperienced young man would be incapable of conducting an army without the assistance of some of his subordinate officers, and as it is not certain that he would allow himself to be guided by those of the best abilities and most honourable principles, I am inclined to think that upon the whole, it would be most convenient for me that such a man as Rajah Teijewunt is described to be, should remain in that command, and you will therefore regulate yourself accordingly, in case the subject should again come under discussion. . . .

You will press the Nizam to enforce my request with positive orders from himself, and you will explain to his Highness, as I have done to the officer commanding the army, that the reason for limiting my request to cavalry, is principally because this army is

[1] Assud Ali Khan was next in command to Tejwunt, but was an object of suspicion to Lord Cornwallis, as he had betrayed the English at the battle of Alivera.

amply provided with infantry and artillery, and that it is also a material consideration with me, that the movement of cavalry alone may be so rapid, as to render it almost impossible for the enemy to obstruct our junction.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE BISHOP OF LICHFIELD AND COVENTRY.

Camp at Pallemaneve, Feb. 23, 1791, 7 miles to the westward of the Ghauts.

DEAR JAMES,

I take this opportunity, which will probably be the last I shall have this season, of informing you that everything hitherto has gone as prosperously as I could wish. I have brought all my heavy artillery and stores over the mountains without any accident, and to-morrow I shall begin my march for Bangalore, and I hope for Seringapatam.

We have changed our climate very much since we ascended the Ghauts, and have got, what to me is a great comfort, cold nights. Our thermometer rises 30 degrees from five in the morning to one in the afternoon, from 66 to 96 and upwards;[1] this morning, which was remarkably cold, it was down at 60; these great and sudden changes have not yet affected the health of our men, but I am not without my apprehensions on that score. Two or three months must probably bring this war to a crisis, and I shall then be able to form some judgment about the time of my going home. The winding up of the business, and settling the claims of our Allies, as well as our own, must be a work of time, and can only be done by me; Medows likewise speaks very doubtfully about going to Bengal, and unless he could bring himself to pay much more attention to business than he has hitherto done, I can hardly advise or wish it.

Give my love to Brome and Mary. Tell the former I wish he could see the elephants helping the heavy cannon through bad roads with their forehead and their trunk; you may assure Charlotte[2] that Charles Madan[3] is in health, and in every respect just what his most anxious friends could wish him.

Believe me to be, your truly affectionate Brother,

CORNWALLIS.

[1] The variation was often much greater. The Editor has heard from his father, whose tent was of course very large and kept as cool as possible, that the difference of temperature between night and midday frequently exceeded 50°, and occasionally the heat in his tent was 110°, or even more.

[2] Charlotte, dau. of Charles 1st Earl Cornwallis, b. Jan. 29, 1756, d. March 11, 1794, m. April 8, 1756, Rev. Spencer Madan, afterwards, 1792, Bishop of Bristol, and Feb. 6, 1794, Bishop of Peterborough.

[3] Captain, afterwards Colonel Madan, son of the preceding, b. 1762, d. Feb. 16, 1830, m. Jan. 16, 1793, Frances, dau. of the Rev. Dr. Falconer, of the Close, Lichfield.

GENERAL ORDER.

Feb. 26, 1791.

Lord Cornwallis has too high an opinion of the zeal, honour, and public spirit of the Officers of the Army, to doubt for a moment that every individual among them felt the same concern and indignation that he did himself, at the shocking and disgraceful outrages[1] that were committed on the last march. His Lordship now calls in the most serious manner for the active assistance of every Officer in the army, and particularly those commanding flanking parties, advance and rear guards, to put a stop to these scenes of horror: which, if they should be suffered to continue, must defeat all our hopes of success, and blast the British name with infamy.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO CAPTAIN KENNAWAY.

SIR, Camp at China Baleporam, April 2, 1791.

. . . After the communication contained in your letters, I must acknowledge that it was with the utmost astonishment and disappointment, that I received on the 31st ultimo, a letter dated the 23rd, which enclosed a copy of Rajah Teige Wunt's letter to me of the 22nd, conveying an account of the most absurd and unfounded information that he stated to have been received by him, of the measures that Tippoo had taken to prevent the junction of his Highness's cavalry with this army, and informing me, that regardless of my requisition, and of his Master's public orders, he had determined to remain at Winipilly, a place not above the distance of two moderate marches from Gungycotta, until he should hear from me that I had sent a detachment of infantry and guns to meet him at Chittagong.

As the Rajah must have had good grounds to suppose that his letter would reach me at the critical period of my being engaged in the siege of Bangalore, in presence of Tippoo at the head of his whole army, I am under the necessity of viewing the dilatoriness of his progress, and his motives for writing that letter, in the most disadvantageous light; and though I wish it to be done in guarded language, I must desire that you will on this occasion express my dissatisfaction to his Highness and the Minister, in the strongest terms.

You will state to them that after the most deliberate reflection upon the Rajah's conduct, it has appeared to me that it can only be accounted for by one of the three following reasons. 1st. That

[1] Several villages had been plundered and burnt by some marauders of the British army, and nine men were executed for this crime.

his public orders have been counteracted by private instructions; 2ndly, that his Highness has entrusted the command of a large part of the force of the state to a man who is no soldier; or 3rdly, that the Rajah has been actually corrupted by Tippoo's money. But you may assure them that my mind has immediately rejected all attention to the first supposition, though the impression that remains upon it of the probable existence of one or both of the latter causes, leaves me little reason to hope that I can ever confide in the Rajah for giving me a hearty support in carrying on this war.

You will at the same time, after desiring them to call to their recollection the openness and fairness of the whole of my public conduct towards his Highness, the vigour with which I have commenced the operations of the present campaign, and the celerity and success with which I took my measures after the reduction of Bangalore, to prevent Tippoo from disturbing the march of his Highness's cavalry, clearly give them to understand, that I will not tamely submit either to evident breach of engagement, or to strong marks of deception, and that in the present case, unless, instead of receiving frivolous excuses, I shall soon see the most satisfactory grounds to expect the speedy junction of the above-mentioned body of cavalry, I shall not waste time in waiting for them, but proceed with this army to the execution of my own plan of operations, without placing any further dependence upon their assistance.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO LIEUT.-COLONEL FLOYD.

SIR, Camp near China Baleporam, April 6, 1791.

I rode forward this morning a little before the line of march to look at the encampment, and when I came nearly to the camp colours on the extremity of the left wing, I was advised not to go any farther as there were none of our troops before me. I urged the impossibility of that fact, as there was a regiment of cavalry sent forward for the very purpose of securing the villages and country within a mile, or a mile and half, of the skirts of the intended encampment, and as it was impossible that any officer who had arrived at the command of a regiment could be so totally ignorant of his duty, and so unmindful of his own safety and that of the corps committed to his charge, as to neglect to occupy the heights on the left of the camp, over which there was a road leading directly to the enemy's army and to the garrison of Rymerbod.

I was however mistaken, and on my return I found, to my great astonishment, Major —— and his whole regiment dismounted under a hedge, and solely occupied in foraging a village in the very centre of the encampment, leaving two large villages that were full of forage on the left of the line, and even the Quarter-masters and camp-colour men of the left wing to be destroyed or carried off by a small party of the enemy's horse. It appeared to me, that even Major ——'s regiment itself, without a single man mounted, or vidette to look out, might have been surprised and had its horses carried away by a small detachment of active Sepoys.

I am sensible that, in strictness, the duty of my station would require that I should call Major —— to a more rigorous account, but in the present instance I shall content myself with directing you to assemble the Commanding Officers of the regiments of cavalry, and, after reading this letter in their presence, to reprimand Major —— in the most severe terms, for his un-officer like behaviour and gross inattention to my orders.

I am sorry to add, that although I did not see it myself, I am informed that Major * * * acted yesterday nearly in the same manner; I must therefore desire that you will communicate my displeasure to him, and inform the Commanding Officers of corps in general, that if anything of this nature should again occur, I shall think it my duty to take other means that will be effectual to enforce an implicit obedience to my orders.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO C. W. MALET, ESQ.

[Private.]

SIR, Camp 7 miles N.W. of Molwaggle, April 16, 1791.

. . . I have received your private letter dated the 21st of February, and although the expedient you mention *for quickening the motions of our Allies*, is as repugnant to my feelings as it can be to yours, yet in the present important crisis, I should not in my opinion be justifiable, if I do not make use of the same weapons that have been so successfully employed against us.

I shall therefore leave it to your discretion to proceed as far in the business as you may think it advisable, assuring you at the same time that I shall approve of whatever is done for the purpose of producing *vigour and dispatch, in a quarter where it is so much wanted.*

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO SIR WILLIAM FAWCETT.

Camp 24 miles to the westward of Amboor,
April 19, 1791.

DEAR FAWCETT,

After encountering many difficulties, and suffering great distress for want of forage, you will see by the public accounts that the troops under my command took Bangalore by assault on the 21st of last month. I have since been obliged to move considerably to the northward, in order to effect a junction with a large body of the Nizam's horse, and am now come to the neighbourhood of Amboor, to receive some reinforcements and a supply of stores and provisions from the Carnatic. I shall begin my march on the 22nd for Seringapatam, calling at Bangalore for the battering-train. Abercromby is waiting for me at the head of the Courga Pass, within thirty-five miles of the Capital, with a good body of troops and supply of provisions, and some 18-pounders. We are run in point of time rather nearer to the monsoon than I could wish, but as I understand that in general the rains are not violent on the eastern side of the Ghauts till the beginning of June, I flatter myself we shall not be too late. My worthy and gallant friend Skelly has been at the head of every attack this war, and led the Grenadiers and Light Infantry into Bangalore. He is ruining himself by serving as a Brigadier-General upon the pay of Major, and appointments have been so unfairly, though unintentionally, snatched from me for far less worthy objects, that I see no prospect of my being able to give him any rank. I shall be much obliged to you if you will represent this most humbly in my name to His Majesty, assuring him, that, from a regard to the merit of the officers serving under me, I should be highly gratified at his conferring some mark of his favour upon Major Skelly.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO SIR CHARLES OAKELEY, BART., AND COUNCIL, FORT ST. GEORGE.

GENTLEMEN,

Camp at Verkadagherry, April 20, 1791.

I have been favoured with your letter dated the 22nd ult. in the military department, and applaud your earnest desire of paying every mark of respect in your power to the memory of Lieutenant-Colonel Moorhouse.

I doubt very much whether it will now be possible to find the

body, but I shall order a search to be made for it, and if successful, I shall direct it to be removed as soon afterwards as may be practicable, to Madras.

I have, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO RAJAH TEIGE WUNT.

May 10, 1791.

When I yesterday took leave of yourself and Assud Ali Khan, I felt a degree of confidence that my representations had made some impression on you. I have however now the mortification to find that I was totally mistaken, for instead of 3000 men under some Chiefs of character, it has just been reported to me by Captain Dallas,[1] that there were not thirty more than 200 of your troops of inferior quality sent to join him; and notwithstanding your repeated promises to the contrary, our line of march was never more crowded and embarrassed than this day, by your numerous foragers and followers of every description, who ought to have marched and foraged on the left flank of the cavalry, where the country was in many places very open, but who, as usual, were hastening forward to fight with our guards for the few bundles of straw which they had been able to save from Tippoo's horse, and which are so necessary to preserve the existence of the bullocks that are drawing the heavy artillery to Seringapatam.

I have the highest respect for his Highness Nizam Ali Khan, your Master, and I am convinced of the sincerity of his disposition to fulfil his engagements in the most honourable manner: so much backwardness therefore on your part to concur with the troops under my command in measures that are absolutely necessary to promote his Highness's interests, as well as those of the other confederates, greatly surprises me, and it will render it incumbent upon me to state to his Highness the disappointment I have experienced, in having hitherto received no kind of support or assistance from the numerous body of cavalry, which, from his anxiety to act with vigour against the common enemy, he was pleased to put under my direction.

[1] Captain, afterwards Major-General Sir Thomas Dallas, G.C.B., b. 1759, d. Aug. 12, 1839. About 2000 of the best of the Nizam's cavalry had been placed specially under Captain Dallas, in the hope that he might render them efficient; but all his exertions were unavailing.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO SIR CHARLES OAKELEY, BART.

SIR, Camp near Seringapatam, May 16, 1791.

I have the honour to inform you that I had an opportunity yesterday of attacking Tippoo, and of giving him a total defeat; the vicinity of Seringapatam, and the batteries which he had erected on the north side of the island, saved his army from destruction. His loss of men must however have been very considerable, and, besides a number of colours, we took four pieces of brass cannon.

The difficulties of my own situation, in respect to forage and provisions, and particularly on account of the advanced season of the year, are not much relieved by this event, and indeed are very serious; and the obstacles which this river presents to a junction or co-operation with General Abercrombie (and which had never been described in any written or verbal account of it) appear at present almost insurmountable.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO C. W. MALET, ESQ.

SIR, Camp near Seringapatam, May 17, 1791.

. . . I received a letter from Hurry Punt on the 14th desiring me to communicate with his son, who was in the neighbourhood of Gungycottah, and to direct him what route to take to join me, to which I answered that when he approached nearer to me, I would give him every information in my power to enable him to form the junction.

I have hitherto had no accounts of the motions of Purseram Bhow, since the surrender of Darwar, and as there seems to be so much lukewarmness or slowness on the part of Hurry Punt, I must confess I do not think it would be prudent in me to adopt any plan which depended for success on the direct assistance or co-operation of either of these Chiefs.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO CAPTAIN KENNAWAY.

SIR, Camp near Seringapatam, May 17, 1791.

. . . You know that since his Highness's troops have joined this army, I have had reason to complain, that instead of giving the smallest assistance they have been a most intolerable

burthen to us. I was however pleased with the alacrity which they showed in the action of the 15th, and I have reason to believe that if the ground had been more favourable for them, they would have contributed to render the success of the day more decisive.

As this is the first action of consequence in which the Nizam's troops and ours have acted together, I have to present to his Highness the four field-pieces that were taken from the enemy, as a token of my personal respect for him, and of my desire to cement and perpetuate the friendship that exists between us, and I have offered to put Rajah Teige Wunt into immediate possession of them.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO TIPPOO SULTAUN.

May 19, 1791.

I received your letter in the middle of the night I left my last encampment, and the wounded men I gave in charge to your servants, who were the bearers of your letters, will no doubt have been safely delivered to the person that you sent for them.

The desire that you express in the letter to enter into a negotiation for terminating the differences between the two Governments, was highly satisfactory to me; but at the same time I was equally disappointed at your passing over unnoticed the declarations that I have repeatedly made to you, that I do not think myself at liberty to treat for the restoration of peace, except in concert with Nizam Ali Khan and the Peishwa, who are engaged in a treaty of alliance and confederacy with the Company.

Although the present situation of affairs might encourage me to hope that the arms of the Allies would continue to be successful, and although my late advices from Europe have informed me that the disputes which had subsisted for a few months between England and Spain had been amicably adjusted, which relieves me from the apprehension of being interrupted in the prosecution of operations by the interference of any European power whatever, yet you may be assured that I am earnestly desirous to put a stop to the miseries which millions of innocent people must suffer by the continuance of this destructive war, and that if you are disposed to make the concessions and compensations to the Company and to its Allies which justice demands, I shall cordially use my best endeavours to promote a speedy restoration of public tranquillity.

I shall not enlarge upon the regret which I felt, when I found that you were determined to violate the late treaty of peace and to force me into this war, but, having undertaken it in defence of one of the Company's Allies, I am resolved that in endeavouring to bring it to a conclusion, my conduct shall be regulated by the same regard to honour and good faith towards all the other powers, with whom I have entered into treaties of friendship and alliance; and I can only repeat to you, that, whilst the Allies adhere to their engagements with me, no consideration could induce me to be less attentive to their interests than to those of the Company.

I must, therefore, as a proof of the sincerity of my inclination to promote the re-establishment of peace, recommend to you, after reflecting upon the causes of the war, the great expense and numberless inconveniences which it has occasioned to the Company and to the other powers engaged in hostilities against you, and the grounds upon which they may expect to obtain a compensation for them, to transmit in writing to me such propositions, as in your opinion ought to satisfy the different members of the confederacy; and if they should appear in the same light to me, and you should in addition to them agree to give me sufficient security that you will not, before the conclusion of the treaty, depart from them, I shall not only recommend that a Congress of Deputies from all parties concerned shall be immediately assembled at some convenient place to endeavour to adjust the terms of a general peace, but I will also consent, if you should wish it, to a cessation of arms for a limited time and under certain conditions, which may be easily arranged, in order to facilitate the conduct of the negotiations. At the same time, to provide against your being a sufferer by following my advice, I will engage my word of honour, which I am incapable of forfeiting, that I will immediately restore to you such pledges or hostages as you may place in my hands, if the negotiation should fail in consequence of the Company's Allies not being satisfied with the propositions that I may transmit from you for their consideration.

In a case in which the interest of the Company's and your Government were alone to be discussed, I should, without the least difficulty or hesitation, receive a confidential person from you to treat with me upon them, but on the present occasion I still think myself under the necessity of declining the proposition, because I am not only determined to act in the most open and honourable manner towards the Company's Allies, but I am even unwilling to take any step which could furnish the least ground for jealousy or suspicion of my endeavouring to elude our treaty,

and to gain any exclusive advantages to the Company in a secret negotiation.

I have written the above with a view to prevent the total ruin of this country, which must be the infallible consequence of a continuance of the distresses to which the wretched inhabitants are at present subjected, and it will make me happy to hear that what I have said has made a proper impression upon you.

THE PERSIAN TRANSLATOR TO SYED AHMED ALI.

May 27, 1791.

I have received your letter and have understood its contents. . . .

As Tippoo Sultaun has been pleased to direct you to send a present of fruits through me to Lord Cornwallis, I have mentioned it to his Lordship, who has desired me to reply to your letter that in the present situation of public affairs, his Lordship cannot with propriety receive a present, but that, whenever peace shall be re-established between the two Governments, he will be happy, by every means in his power, to encourage and increase a friendly intercourse. . . .

EARL CORNWALLIS TO SIR CHARLES OAKELEY, BART.

SIR, Camp at Solure, July 2, 1791.

. . . Humanity, as well as good policy, calls loudly upon us to make the same provision for carrying the native sick of the Madras troops upon a march as those of the Bengal establishment.

It is hardly credible that so shocking a practice could have existed so long, and that successive Generals could, without making the strongest remonstrances to Government, have seen their wretched soldiers, either with a broken bone or a violent fever, squeezed into a blanket and carried by two of their comrades. The loss of the two bearers from the ranks is not the only mischief which arises to the public service from this false and cruel economy; for the disgust which it creates among the Sepoys occasions great desertion, as an instance of which I need only mention, that 22 of 24 men of Captain Brown's[1] battalion who deserted in one month were employed in carrying the sick. I have taken it upon myself to authorise the payment of the same allow-

[1] Captain, afterwards Lieut.-General Archibald Brown, d. May 4, 1825.

ance for doolies as that which is paid to the Bengal Captains, to the native corps on your establishment during the war, to commence the first of June.

The doolies of the Europeans are entirely worn out, and many bearers will be wanting for that service, I must therefore recommend to you to order three hundred doolies to be prepared immediately, and fifteen hundred bearers to be engaged in the Circars.

Three hundred platform carts will likewise be wanted for the use of the army, and they should be provided as expeditiously as possible.

I shall move on the 4th towards Bangalore, from whence the arrival of Captain Read's[1] convoy will enable me to proceed in a very few days to Oussore.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO CAPTAIN ORAM.[2]

SIR, Camp near Bangalore, July 11, 1791.

Captain Read has this morning communicated to me the contents of your letter to him dated the 7th instant, and I look upon the endeavours that you have used to procure the surrender of Kishnagerry by negotiation, as a strong proof of your zeal to promote the public good.

From the accounts that I have received of that fort, the difficulty of taking it by force would be so great, and the possession of it in my opinion would be of so much importance to us, that I shall readily agree to pay S.R. 6000 for obtaining it by a private negotiation with those who can deliver it up. You may therefore consider yourself as authorised by me to promise this, and to give them security to their satisfaction for your paying them that sum for its surrender, provided they will give you counter-security, by putting you in possession of their families, to surrender it to a detachment from this army that shall at a concerted time be sent to summon it.

In order to enable you to speak with confidence, and to act with efficacy and despatch in this business, I shall on the 15th inst. detach a battalion under the command of an intelligent officer, who will be instructed to proceed in the first instance to Trippaton, for the protection of the part of the Barramoule valley which lays

[1] Captain, afterwards Colonel, Alexander Read, d. May 19, 1804, at Malta.

[2] Captain, afterwards Lieut.-Colonel, James Oram, d. Aug. 13, 1799.

between that place and Amboor, and to take every step that may, after your consulting together, appear best calculated to bring this point to a successful conclusion. . . . I conclude that the people who may agree to give up the place, will, in addition to other conditions, require security for all their private property, and permission to reside in the Company's territories, and I shall therefore confirm your promises upon both these heads; and you may also inform the person that you have employed as an agent in this affair, that if the object shall be accomplished by his means, I shall think him deserving of a liberal reward for his services. . . .

As it is of the greatest consequence for the public service that the Maratta dealers should be perfectly satisfied with the treatment that they receive in the Company's territories, and that Hurry Punt's army should be able to draw supplies of grain from the Carnatic with facility and at reasonable rates, I desire that you will even open a bazar at a moderate price from the public store of paddy at Vellore, rather than suffer the Binjarries to be disappointed in obtaining without delay full ladings for the bullocks that they may carry with them; and I shall only add, that you must take the utmost care to prevent the smallest duty in any shape whatever from being exacted from them at the bazars, or in passing or repassing any of the ——[1] in your district, and that I shall put a great value on the exertions that you make to carry my wishes respecting the supplies to the Maratta army into complete effect.

I shall send a company of sepoys, under the command of an European Officer, with these Binjarries, to give them confidence and protection.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE BISHOP OF LICHFIELD AND COVENTRY.

DEAR JAMES, Camp near Bangalore, July 13, 1791.

I had so short notice of the sailing of the Leopard that I determined not to write a single line by that conveyance, but to trust that the Commodore or Sir C. Oakeley would tell you that I was well; and I was the more encouraged in this resolution as the Swallow Packet, which is to sail in the first week of September, will in my opinion be nearly as soon in England. As the communication, however, is now quite safe between the army and Madras, I wish to tell you that my health has not suffered, although

[1] Illegible.

my spirits are almost worn out, and that if I cannot soon overcome Tippoo, I think the plagues and mortifications of this most difficult war will overcome me. You will have heard that after beating Tippoo's army, and driving him into the island of Seringapatam, I was obliged, by the famine which prevailed amongst our followers, and especially the bullock-drivers, by the sudden and astonishing mortality amongst our cattle, owing to the scarcity of forage and a contagious distemper which unluckily attacked them when they were too weak to resist it, and by the unexpected obstacles to my forming a junction with General Abercromby, in time to attempt the enterprise before the rising of the river, to destroy my battering guns and to relinquish the attack of Seringapatam until the conclusion of the rains. Had the numerous Maratta army, which joined me on the 26th of May unexpectedly and without my having received the smallest previous notice, arrived a fortnight sooner, our success would have been complete, and that event which Mr. Francis and Mr. Hippesley[1] seem so much to apprehend—the destruction of Tippoo's power—would have actually taken place. It is however much crippled, and if he should not propose during the present rains such terms as the Allies can reasonably accept, I trust we shall take such precautions as will render our next movement to Seringapatam effectual. The political state of India is so much changed since the date of the orders which were read relative to the power of the Marattas, and Hyder's forming a barrier for us, that a man might with as much propriety have said to the Elector of Saxony, in the middle of the Seven Years' War,—To be sure the Prussian troops are doing no great good to your country, but yet you are lucky to have such a neighbour as Frederick, he forms a noble barrier for you against the King of Sweden, whose power was very troublesome to your family in the beginning of the century.

I now come to domestic matters and my own situation. I see no prospect of my leaving this country before January, 1793. The question then is, what is to become of Brome? If he should not insist on being a Soldier, I should incline, in the present state of Europe, to his going to the University, where I should wish that he might be induced to give a due attention to books, but in other respects I do not think that he should be too strictly watched from mixing in the gaieties and levities of those of his own age, as I have

[1] Mr., afterwards Sir John Hippesley, Bart., so created April 30, 1796, b. 1745, d. May 3, 1825; m. 1st., Feb. 1780, Margaret, dau. of Sir John Stuart, Bart., of Allanton; 2nd, Feb. 16, 1801, Elizabeth, dau. of Thomas Horner, Esq., of Mells Park, and widow of Henry Hippesley Coxe, Esq., of Stone Easton House. He was sent to India by Lord North in 1781, and came home in 1787. M.P. for Sudbury from Nov. 1790 to May, 1796, and from Nov. 1802 to 1818.

seldom seen that extraordinary care succeed. If he will be a Soldier, he had better go to some German academy, and, amongst other things, apply to the learning that language, the want of which I have often regretted. All this, however, I submit to your judgment. There may be letters from you now at Madras, which would make me unsay all I have said. The last I have received from you, from the difficulty that there has been in our communication, is dated the 28th of November. Be so kind as to order out everything as usual next year, and desire Carbonell to send fifteen chests of claret.

I am truly concerned that you have had so much plague about Eye, to which I am afraid that nothing can put a stop but my return. . . . Tell Brome and Mary, with my love, that I had not time to write to them, and assure Mrs. Cornwallis, and all your own family, of my sincere regard and best wishes.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO CAPTAIN KENNAWAY.

SIR, Camp near Oossore, July 16, 1791.

. . . You will see by my letter to the Nizam, that in consequence of Tippoo's compliance with the condition prescribed to him by Hurry Punt, of writing separately to each member of the confederacy, I have consented to Apajee Ram's coming to camp to make his proposals.

I long resisted this measure, more from an apprehension of its creating suspicion and jealousy in the mind of his Highness, than from a sense of its being in any other respect either improper or impolitic. But the arguments stated by Hurry Punt in favour of it had great weight. He said that if the negotiation was to begin by the proposal of terms in writing, it was according to all usage the part of the victors, and not of the vanquished, to make such proposals; that the desirable object, in his opinion, was to know as soon as possible whether Tippoo was inclined to make such concessions as were likely to form the basis of a treaty, in order to prevent our employing our time and thoughts in sending deputies and assembling a congress, when perhaps they ought to be wholly occupied in the most vigorous preparations for war, and that as no answer was to be given to Apajee Ram, and as the only use to be made of his communication was to enable the confederates to determine, from a knowledge of Tippoo's sentiments, whether it was

worth while to assemble a congress, he thought there could be no room for jealousy in either of the parties.

The earnest desire which Hurry Punt expressed that I should agree to the reception of Apajee Ram, and the confidence I felt that the Nizam would be persuaded that I would take no step which could be in any manner prejudicial to his interests, induced me to acquiesce; and I have now to request that you will state the matter fully to his Highness, and assure him that no answer shall be given without his approbation, communicated either immediately to myself, or by Meer Allum, or some other confidential person whom he may think proper to depute.

Oossore was evacuated yesterday. The garrison were preparing to destroy the works, but the brigade which I sent to take possession of it advanced so suddenly upon them, that they had not time to effect their purpose in any material degree.

I have directed Colonel Duff, who commands in Bangalore, to prepare some guns in case his Highness should want them for the attack of Garumconda.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO SIR CHARLES OAKELEY, BART.

SIR, Camp 7 miles west of Ryacotta, July 23, 1791.

The strong hill-fort of Ryacotta, the garrison of which had been reinforced by the Killedar and two companies of Sepoys who had retired from Oossore, surrendered last night to Major Gowdie; and I have directed that officer to proceed with his brigade to the attack of Veriabudderdergam, which is the strongest fort in this country next to Kishnagerry.

As we could not possibly have taken Ryacotta if the garrison had been disposed to defend it, and as it held out a day or two longer than it would otherwise have done in consequence of the presence of the Killedar of Oossore, I trust that I am not too sanguine in hoping that since there is no Killedar of Oossore in Veriabudderdergam, that place will not give us more trouble than Ryacotta.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO SIR CHARLES OAKELEY, BART.

SIR, Camp 8 miles south of Oossore, July 30, 1791.

I yesterday received a letter from the Board, dated the 21st instant, informing me of the enemy's irruption into the Coimbatore country.

I have looked forward to an event of this kind as almost certain, from the time that our army retired from the neighbourhood of Seringapatam, but as I understood that Lieutenant Chalmers[1] had orders to abandon Coimbatore whenever he had reason to believe that any heavy guns would be brought against it, and as from General Medows's report I considered Caroor to be in no great danger from such a force as the enemy in his present situation was likely to detach to so great a distance, I did not think that we should be exposed to any serious loss or mortification in that quarter.

You will easily conceive therefore, that I feel no small concern when I found that Lieutenant Chalmers had suffered himself to be invested in so wretched a post as Coimbatore, and with so feeble a garrison, by a detachment which he knew to be provided with artillery.

I know of no possible succour that Lieut. Chalmers can have received, and conclude, from what I have heard of Coimbatore, that before this time he must have been obliged to surrender. . . .

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO CAPTAIN KENNAWAY.

SIR, Camp 7 miles south of Oossore, Aug. 2, 1791.

. . . I am very glad to find the Nizam's troops are advancing to Garamconda, the capture of which place would undoubtedly be attended with great advantage. Four battering guns are prepared at Bangalore for the attack of that fortress, and will be despatched whenever his Highness shall send an escort and cattle for them. . . .

It is of great consequence in every point of view that the Nizam should execute his intention of sending his Son and the Minister with the reinforcements destined to act against the common enemy. I therefore desire that you will urge him in the strongest terms to

[1] The defence of Coimbatore did Lieutenant Chalmers the greatest credit, and when Lord Cornwallis was made acquainted with the real facts he bestowed high commendation upon him.

give them an early dismission, as I cannot help apprehending, from the procrastinating disposition of the natives of this country, and particularly of his Highness's court, that unless they are stimulated to exertion by frequent representations, the commencement of our operations, which should not be much later than the middle of October, may be retarded by waiting for them.

I am sorry to observe from your last letter that the Nizam seems to entertain an idea of employing Assud Ali Khan again in the field, because I consider him to be a man not only of a troublesome and unmanageable disposition, but of principles that render him highly unworthy of his Highness's confidence, and I have no objection to your conveying those sentiments of him both to the Nizam and to the Minister. . . . I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO C. W. MALET, ESQ.

SIR, Camp 7 miles south of Oossore, Aug. 3, 1791.

. . . However prevalent the spirit of intrigue may be in all Asiatic Durbars, I do not apprehend that either of our Allies can have a serious intention to depart from their engagements, or that they would venture to prefer a little temporary advantage to be held at the mercy of Tippoo, to the solid possession of what they may reasonably expect to acquire, in conjunction with, and under the guarantee of, the other confederate Powers.

I have seen enough of the Military Chiefs of both states to be quite certain of the dread they have of Tippoo's force, and of their consciousness that they could not resist it without our assistance. I can therefore hardly doubt that the policy of the conduct which I have supposed the Courts of Poonah and Hydrabad to adopt would occur to themselves without any suggestion on our part. It may not however be amiss, that you should take every favourable opportunity in your conversations with the Minister, of placing it strongly before his view.

From the circumstance of my having acquiesced, at the earnest recommendation of Hurry Punt, to receive Apajee Ram, you will easily conceive that I have no desire to assemble a Congress, until I shall be able to form some judgment from the overtures of the Vakeel, whether the measure is likely to be attended with success.

The proposal of a Congress was hardly a matter of choice with me, for after Tippoo's repeated declarations that he could not transmit to me in writing the concessions which he was disposed to

38860

make to the Confederates, I did not think it consistent with my professions, or consonant with my most anxious wishes for peace, to adhere rigidly to the line which I at first prescribed, and to decline to point out some other plan by which a negotiation might be opened, and situated as I then was, without a prospect of being joined by any person of rank or confidence from the States in alliance with us, I saw no other mode that would not have created jealousy and alarm at Poonah and Hydrabad.

At the same time, however, although I am not anxious for a Congress, nor certain that even Tippoo himself is at present desirous of it, yet I do not think it right that a direct objection should be made to the measure by the Peshwa; and as Meer Allum is now on his way to the army invested with full powers from the Nizam, and it would be highly unreasonable that the interests of two of the Confederated Powers should be exposed to danger or inconvenience by delays occasioned unnecessarily by the third, to the conclusion of a peace, I must desire that you will state my request in the most explicit terms to the Minister, that Hurry Punt, or any other person that he may think proper, may be invested with similar powers on the part of the Peshwa, in case Tippoo should at any time be disposed to make such concessions as would satisfy the Allies. . . .

Yours, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO COLONEL JOHN MURRAY.

DEAR SIR, Camp 7 miles south of Oossore, Aug. 6, 1791.

I received a few days ago your letter dated the 19th of June. Whatever opinion I gave on the circumstances of your appointment, after your arrival in 1788, were dictated by my ideas of the spirit and intention of the Act of Parliament, according to the only interpretation which I then thought, and which I still think, can be given to it. Nothing personal was ever meant on my part, and I am sure you will easily believe that after the ready and zealous assistance which you have afforded me, as well in your official capacity as in acts entirely separate from it, and which must have been attended with much disagreeable trouble and labour, it cannot be my desire that you should meet with any mortification. . . .

We some time ago gave Tippoo permission to send a Vakeel, who has arrived this day, to make some propositions, but I have no reason to hope that they will be such as will be suitable to the expectations of the Confederacy. Our preparations for the attack

03882

of Seringapatam, as soon as the season will admit, are in the mean time going on briskly, and from the general situation of our affairs there seems to be every reasonable appearance, that we shall be able before long to bring this business to an honourable termination.

I am, with great esteem and regard, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE BISHOP OF LICHFIELD AND COVENTRY.

DEAR JAMES, Camp near Oossore, Aug. 20, 1791.

The cares and troubles you have had about my dear Boy, Culford House, the estate, &c., although they have been in a considerable degree burdensome to you, have yet been attended with so many pleasant and satisfactory circumstances, that I trust the gratification which you have occasionally felt has made up in a great degree for the uneasy sensations they have cost you. But that is not the case with the borough of Eye: there everything has been, and I am afraid will continue to be, plague and vexation. Whatever my future resolutions may be in regard to the borough, on finding an insurmountable spirit of disinclination to the ancient connexion with our family, and of general discontent, I should at least wish, before I took so strong a step as to renounce all connexion with it, to try the effects of my return, and of passing some time at Brome. I do not therefore hesitate to authorize you to endeavour to support the interest at all events till I come home, and to recommend your purchasing all the land you can in Eye. If poor Phillipson should in the interim occasion a vacancy, I leave the choice of a successor entirely to your discretion, desiring only that he should not be ill-disposed towards those with whom I have acted. Whitbread[1] would have been most perfectly agreeable to me, but from what I saw in the papers, I conclude that he must come in for Steyning; I should doubt Bathurst's liking to come in, or the borough liking to choose him.

The predilection which you expressed for Cambridge in your letter of the 14th of February, made me repent of the letter that I had written to Brome in November last, which recommended the plan that you had proposed, and to which in your letter of the 4th

[1] Samuel Whitbread, b. Aug. 20, 1720, d. June 8, 1796, m. 1st, 1751, Harriet, dau. of Haytor, Esq.; 2nd, Aug. 13, 1769, Mary, dau. of Charles 1st Earl Cornwallis. By his first wife he was father of Mr. Whitbread, so long a leading politician. M.P. for Bedford from Nov. 1774 to June, 1790, and for Steyning from March, 1791, to May, 1796. At the time this letter was written Mr. Whitbread supported the Tory interest in Bedfordshire.

of April you have again reverted. I have seen so many good men and so many bad ones produced from the same systems, that I scarcely think any one of all those which a rational man could choose for his Son or Ward, would be capable of depraving a good mind or of rendering a virtuous youth vitious. I do not here mean the frailties to which all young men of life and spirit are liable, and which cannot be guarded against without hazarding worse consequences, and without rendering the person unfit for the society and circle in which he ought to live. Having said this, you will see that I shall be tolerably easy and confident under any measures that you may have adopted. I doubt only about Mr. Hayes being a proper person to go with him; he appears to me by his letters to expect too much from him, and I should suspect that he will always forget that he is out of the fourth form. All this however I submit entirely to you, well knowing that it is much easier to object to one man than to find another.

I certainly cannot leave this country till the beginning of 1793, and I trust it cannot be in the power of my evil stars to detain me longer in it. My plan of attacking Seringapatam before the swelling of the Caveri River did not succeed from various causes, which could neither be foreseen or avoided. The attempt however, besides the victory which it gave us over Tippoo's whole force under the walls of his Capital, was attended with many important consequences, and in particular it brought forward two large Maratta armies in haste to join me, which would otherwise have probably remained many months at a great distance from the scene of action, and employed themselves solely in collecting the resources of the country they had overrun.

We are now making the most vigorous preparations to prosecute the war after the breaking up of the monsoon on the Malabar coast. I have not however been inattentive to proposals of peace, and permitted two of Tippoo's *Vakeels* (*Envoys*) to come to the neighbourhood of our camp, but as they declined to open any negotiation with deputies to be appointed on our part, but insisted on transacting business personally with the Maratta General and myself, I have desired them to return immediately to their Master. When Tippoo finds that he cannot hope by indirect means to infuse jealousy amongst the members, and to disunite the Confederacy, I can hardly doubt that he will offer such terms as we can with safety and honour accept; and I can most truly assure you, whatever may be said in Parliament to the contrary, that no man ever entered into a war more unwillingly, or would be more sincerely rejoiced to get out of it, than myself.

Mr. Hippisley, who during the few years he resided in India was busily employed in making money, seems to be equally unacquainted with the geography of the country as with the facts which he has ventured to state. Cranganore is not on the sea-coast, it never was for an instant in the possession either of Hyder or Tippoo; it has belonged exclusively to the Dutch, as well as Jacottah, since the beginning of the last century, without acknowledging the supremacy of any other power whatever. The Rajah made his proposals for the purchase to the Dutch with the approbation and sanction of Sir Archibald Campbell in 1788. In June, 1789, the Resident at Travancore notified to Mr. Hollond's Government that the Governor-General of Batavia had consented to the sale, and that the bargain was to be immediately concluded, to which notification Mr. Hollond made no answer, and the Resident naturally concluded that he had no objection to the measure. Neither Sir Archibald's consent nor the notification to Mr. Hollond were communicated to me, and the first accounts which I ever received of the transaction, were by a letter from the Madras Board dated in August, 1789, which misstated all the facts and threw great blame upon the Rajah, and which produced the disapprobation of the measure which the Supreme Board declared in their letter dated in September. It was not from caprice that I afterwards altered my mind, but upon discovering the falsehood of Mr. Hollond's statements, who was at that time trying to extort money from the Rajah as the price of his consent. The subsequent papers are all before the House. Nothing could be so weak as Opposition's bringing on these questions, which could not possibly affect Pitt or Dundas, who were entirely ignorant of the whole business till some months after the war had taken place, and which must bring upon the movers the ridicule and odium of every man who wishes more earnestly for the honour and prosperity of his country, than for a place for himself. . . .

Believe me, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO C. W. MALET, ESQ.

SIR, Camp 8 miles east of Bangalore, Aug. 23, 1791.

By your letters to me I find you are most perfectly acquainted with the characters of the Maratta Chiefs.

It is not easy for a man of very different habits and temper to be a match for persons who possess the qualities you describe, yet I trust that I have not often been unguarded, and in the business

of the Vakeels have hitherto defeated the designs of Hurry Punt, who appeared to have taken them under his protection, and, by an unguarded letter which Apajee Ram wrote, seems to have promised to introduce them to me.

I positively declared that it never was my intention to treat with them personally, nor did I think it became any of the principals, such as Hurry Punt, Meer Allum, or myself, who possessed full powers from our respective Governments, to meet them, until they had explained to confidential persons deputed by us, the outline of the terms on which Tippoo was willing to negotiate, and I objected to their being received with honours, or being admitted into our camp, until the negotiation should be so far advanced as to give a certainty of a speedy accommodation. In the next line I pointed out Oossore as a proper place for their present residence, where they would be treated with great civility and supplied with everything they could want, and where our Deputies could conveniently meet them, to enter upon the business of their mission.

In all this Hurry Punt, after much reasoning, and, as he declared, against his own opinion, most unwillingly acquiesced. But he was so unguarded in his argument, as to give for a reason why he wished to see Apajee Ram, that he was an old acquaintance of his, and would speak more freely to him than to any other person; this reason, as you may suppose, had no great weight with me.

The Vakeels remained longer at Surgepore[1] than I could have wished, and pretended, in order to gain time, that they would meet with our deputies there, if I would not insist on their going to Oossore; but on finding that I was determined not to relax from my first resolution, they are gone this day to Bangalore, on their way to their Master.

Hurry Punt in the mean time talks to me of his distress for provisions and the ruin of his cavalry, and to Meer Allum of the necessity of making peace. He will probably hold the same language respecting the distresses of his army in his letters to Poonah, but you will have an opportunity of giving a complete refutation to those complaints, at least as far as any blame can be imputed to me, when I tell you that I have often repeated to him, that the Carnatic is as open to the Marattas as to ourselves, for purchasing all kinds of grain and supplies of every description, or that by sending detachments into the Burramaal and Salem countries, they would find the utmost abundance of forage and

[1] Properly, Surajpore.

grain without expending a single rupee, or without the smallest hazard of any material interruption from the enemy; but that I cannot prevail upon them to avail themselves of either of those means to relieve the wants of which they so constantly complain.

I must however observe that the prices of rice and grain, in comparison to those to which we were long accustomed after our junction, are by no means high in their camp even at this moment.

I shall probably in a short time be able to form a more certain judgement than I can at present of their real views and sentiments.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO SIR CHARLES OAKELEY, BART., AND COUNCIL, FORT ST. GEORGE.

GENTLEMEN, Camp 8 miles east of Bangalore, Aug. 26, 1791.

Tippoo's Vakeels, Deleel Deel Khan[1] and Apajee Ram, having refused to proceed to Oossore, and open the business of their mission to the deputies who would be sent thither to confer with them by Hurry Punt, Meer Allum, who is invested with full powers from the Nizam, and myself, and declaring that they had received orders from Tippoo which they did not dare to disobey, to proceed to the Camp, and to treat personally with Hurry Punt and myself, I did not see any means at present of opening a negotiation with them, as I conceived that it would be very imprudent to suffer the Vakeels of our enemy, with their numerous followers, to accompany our army; and that it would be highly improper for Hurry Punt and myself, who in our present delegated situation may be considered as principals, personally to meet the deputies from Tippoo, before we know whether the outline of the terms they had to propose was such as would afford grounds for the commencement of a treaty.

I desired therefore, as their continuance at Surgepore was very inconvenient to us, and could answer no good purpose, that they would return to their Master, and they accordingly went to Bangalore on the 23rd, and departed from thence on the 24th instant. . . .

I have, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

[1] Deleel Deel Khan was a Mahommedan, who for form's sake was sent with Apajee Ram, who was a Hindoo, and the real negociator.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO SIR CHARLES OAKELEY, BART.

SIR, Camp near Bangalore, Aug. 31, 1791.

. . . Our success in the Coimbatore country has greatly exceeded my expectations, and I have notified to Major Cuppage my warmest approbation of his and Lieutenant Chalmers' conduct, and have desired him to acquaint M. La Combe, that I shall express to the Rajah of Travancore the sense I have of his merit.

Lieutenant Chalmers appears to me to be highly deserving of some peculiar mark of favour, and as in the Company's service there are scarcely any means of conferring military rewards on officers of his rank, I must submit it to your Honourable Board whether it would not be proper to give him some pecuniary gratuity. . . .

The season is now too far advanced to render it probable that Tippoo would detach a large portion of his army to invade the Southern Provinces, or even to make another attempt upon Coimbatore, but in any event, no exertions in our power should be omitted in endeavouring to defend them. . . .

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MAJOR-GENERAL GRENVILLE TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Received Aug. 1791.]

MY DEAR LORD, New Burlington Street, Jan. 19, 1791.

. . . As to our politics in this part of the world, I have but little to communicate to you, as I take for granted that you will have heard long before this of our having settled the dispute with Spain relative to Nootka Sound[1] in an amicable way, and much to the honour and credit of this country, having obliged the haughty Don (though very reluctantly) to give up, under certain restrictions on our part, their unwarranted pretensions to an exclusive navigation of the greatest part of the South Seas. The very steady and spirited conduct of Ministry upon this occasion, and the extraordinary exertions made by the country in fitting out

[1] The Spanish Governor of California had seized a small fort built by the English at Nootka Sound, an island about 20 miles long, separated by a narrow channel from Vancouver's Island, and called Friendly Cove by Captain Cook. An ample apology and full redress were required from Spain. A large fleet and a considerable land force were equipped at an estimated expense of 3,000,000*l.* with a view of attacking Cadiz, or the Spanish West India Islands, but Spain accepted the terms proposed, and a satisfactory convention was signed Oct. 28, 1790.

and completely manning so large a fleet in so very short a space of time, has raised us very high in the opinion of all nations, and has given us that weight which we ought to have, and which we had very near lost, in the negotiations and treaties now carrying on upon the Continent. I saw our friend Ewart the beginning of last month; he has been obliged to come over to England on account of his health, in order to try the Bath waters, from which he has already found considerable benefit; he is very sanguine in his expectations of our being able to conduct, and to bring to a happy and to an advantageous conclusion, the very important concerns relative to a general pacification, and to establish a due balance of power amongst the Northern Potentates. The late successes of the Empress of Russia against the Turks[1] have made her Imperial Majesty so very obstinate and high in her demands, that it is thought she will refuse all mediation on the part of Prussia, who has concluded a treaty offensive and defensive with the Porte, and must of course interfere to save them from utter ruin. How far we shall be engaged in this business I know not; the reports of the day talk of press-warrants, &c., &c.; if it should turn out so, I am afraid it will not be a very popular war.[2] . . . Your aversion to the society of certain great personages is but too well founded. "Quantum mutatus ab illo Hectore," when you first was introduced to him at H[anove]r. Nothing can be worse than *our* present situation; if the loan, which I understand is negotiating upon the security of the three P—'s[3] should fail, we shall be obliged, I am much afraid, to cut and run. It grieves me to the soul (as I cannot help having an affection for him for his behaviour towards me, which is always the most kind) to see so fine a game lost, and it really vexes me so much, that I hate to talk upon the subject.

[1] *The capture of Ismail by Suwarroff, Dec. 11, 1790. Upwards of 33,000 Turks of both sexes and all ages perished in the assault.*

[2] Mr. Pitt tendered the mediation of England, which the Empress Catherine declined, On March 28, 1790, a message was sent to both houses to announce a large increase to the fleet. The Opposition violently resisted any interference with Russia. The address in favour of the measure was carried in the Lords by 97 to 34, and in the Commons by 228 to 135. The question was renewed April 12 by Mr. Grey; April 15 by Mr. Baker; and May 25 by Mr. T. Grenville. Notwithstanding three satisfactory divisions —253 to 173; 254 to 162; 208 to 114— Mr. Pitt ultimately abandoned his plan. It was on this occasion that Mr., afterwards Sir Robert, Adair was supposed to have gone to Russia with a secret mission from Fox.

"Or was it he—the youth whose ardent soul
With half a mission sought the frozen pole."
Anti-Jacobin.

[3] The Prince of Wales and the Dukes of York and Clarence. A large loan was effected, and a considerable portion of the bonds taken up in France, where they circulated at a heavy discount. One of the Fermiers Généraux having, in 1794, refused to receive them at par, was denounced as an aristocrat by some republicans who held the bonds. The whole of those financiers, thirty-one in number, among whom was the celebrated chemist Lavoisier, were thrown into prison for the supposed crime of one. Their trial and condemnation followed as a matter of course, and they were all executed May 15, 1794.

I have however the consolation to acquaint you that the King never enjoyed a *better* or *so good* a state of health as at present. I have frequent opportunities of seeing Him, being invited very often to make up the Queen's party at cribbage at Buckingham House. I have likewise the satisfaction to assure you that He always speaks of your Lordship in the kindest manner possible, with every mark of his esteem and approbation. . . .

Believe me, &c.,

R. G.

P.S. If the war against Spain had taken place, the expedition which was fitted out, and was actually under orders of march for Portsmouth, was to have been commanded, as report says, by Sir W. Howe. . . .

LIEUT.-GENERAL GRANT TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Received Aug. 1791.]

MY DEAR LORD, Sackville Street, March 3, 1791.

A vessel sails for India to-morrow, and contrary to the hopes and wishes of your friends, this letter will find you at Calcutta in June, in place of our having the expected pleasure of seeing you at dinner, to give an opinion about some claret, which I carefully keep by the desire of my friend Ross, who thinks that it may, in common with the proprietor, improve by age. The war is unlucky, but the measure was unavoidable; the expense is immense, but it is to be hoped Tippoo Sultan's defeat, and the loss of a great part of his dominions, will soon put an end to the expenditure, and perhaps, with a blessing upon your endeavours, some useful acquisitions to the Company may defray a part of the charge, which is here computed to be at least four million sterling a-year. Your conduct and government meet with the strongest approbation of the nation at large, and of a great majority of the House of Commons, where everybody without exception speaks with great respect of you; and even the gentlemen who are the most inclined to find fault with the war, express great regard for your personal character; but you know this country, and will not be surprised or hurt at our not being unanimous in our approbation. A motion was made by Mr. Hippesley,[1] reprobating the war, and the treaties concluded

[1] Mr. Hippesley moved (Feb. 28) that certain papers should be read, and then Mr. Francis proposed thirteen resolutions condemning every thing that had been done about Travancore, and urging peace to be made on any terms. They were negatived without a division. Mr. Dundas moved, March 2, counter-resolutions declaring that

with the Nizam and Mahrattas, without mentioning you; but as that evidently conveyed an implied censure upon your conduct, it was thought necessary by Mr. Pitt and Dundas, that the House, in justice to your Lordship, should express their fullest approbation of your conduct in every particular. The House was well attended, and Dundas introduced the motion, leaving it to its own merits and the conviction of the House, without saying a word. Very little was said, but by Francis, the "Chicken of the Law"[1] Taylor, for Hippesley, who was absent, and for himself. Mr. Fox was up at different times; had great respect for Lord Cornwallis, which had even increased since you went abroad; but he could not approve of the war, which he thought might have been avoided. Dundas seemed to be inspired when he got up to answer everything which had been expressed or alluded to in the course of the debate, and declared that his wish was to remain silent upon the merits of your administration till you returned; but the sort of censure which had been thrown out, made it necessary to show Europe, Asia, and the world, that your conduct in every particular met with the fullest approbation. I never heard him speak so well, and I sat just behind Mr. Pitt and him; and to do the Minister justice, he appears to me, as far as I can judge, in and out of the House, to give your conduct his hearty, warm, and cordial approbation; his sentiments were delivered fully upon the subject, when Hippesley made his motion; he speaks so well and so ably at all times, and in so superior a style to all the rest of mankind, that it is impossible to make use of the word best to any of his speeches; but as he had spoke so fully the preceding day, he only spoke occasionally last night in answer to Mr. Fox, who did not speak at length, but was up at different times. The House of Commons at present puts me a little in mind of the American war. Tippoo has not such powerful and numerous supporters as *Jonathan* had, but if the devil was to appear in the figure of an Asiatick Prince, and disturb the peace and quiet of the British Government, he would find some friends in this country, though it is flourishing, rich, and happy in its present situation. . . .

I am a letter in Ross's debt, but I have not time to write by

the conduct of Lord Cornwallis had been highly meritorious. These were carried without a division. Mr. Taylor, during the debate, *read* a speech from Mr. Hippesley, who was too unwell to attend.

[1] Mr., afterwards the Rt. Hon. Michael Angelo Taylor, b. 1758, d. July 16, 1834; m. Aug. 7, 1789, Frances, dau. of Sir Henry Vane, Bart. M.P. for Poole, Aldborough, Durham, Rye, and Ilchester, from May, 1784, to June, 1831 (except in the Parliament of 1802), and for Sudbury from Dec. 1832, till his death. It was in a debate, Feb. 9, 1785, on the Westminster scrutiny, that he called himself "a chicken of the law." On that occasion he voted in the majority against Mr. Fox.

this conveyance, as a gentleman having got into my house has kept possession all the morning, in spite of all the hints I could give him, and has hardly left me time to say that I ever am, &c.,

JAMES GRANT.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

[Private.]

DEAR SIR, Camp near Bangalore, Sept. 3, 1791.

It gave me great satisfaction to find that my ideas corresponded so nearly with your own on the subject of the Charter. I can assure you that they were given with the best intentions, and that after much reflection since the time I wrote, I have seen no reason to make any material alteration in them.

We do not differ in our estimation of the value of Guzerat, but I am well convinced that unless the power of the Peshwa's Government should fall to pieces by an internal convulsion, we can never obtain possession of it but by a Maratta war, which is a price that I believe neither of us at present are inclined to pay for it.

In the adjustment of the treaty which must terminate the present war, it would probably cause great embarrassment even to hint at such a proposition, for our good Allies want no spur to awaken their suspicion and jealousy; and exclusive of their almost unconquerable tenaciousness of ancient possessions, I am persuaded that the smallest appearance of a wish on our part to extend our territories, and increase our strength so near to the seat of their Government, would at the present juncture have the worst effect possible.

If contrary to all probability they could be brought to negotiate for an equivalent, I do not think that it would be practicable to arrange it with them, and indeed I fancy from the earnestness which they show to get the management of the negotiation into their own hands, that it is their intention to take, if they can contrive it, a great deal more than their share of what we may force Tippoo to concede to the Confederacy. I shall however be wary and guarded, and I trust that steadiness and plain dealing will be a match for cunning. . . .

The Committee for investigating the complaints against the Messrs. Hollonds have completed their report, and I am told that the evidence against those two great offenders is so clear, that they cannot escape conviction. I wish the charge of attempting to extort money from the Rajah of Travancore could have been included; but I still hope it may be brought forward. They cer-

tainly, I believe, received 12,000 pagodas in part from the Rajah, and, at the arrival of Medows' appointment, were endeavouring to screw him to the payment of a lac, as the price of their support.

You will easily conceive that I was not a little surprised when I heard the Mysore War, which I have always considered an act of the most absolute and cruel necessity, treated as on our part unjust, ambitious, and inexpedient, and the treaties with the Marattas and the Nizam, which were concluded in exact conformity to the letter and spirit of the Act of Parliament, and on the fairest principles of self-defence, called infamous.

I am perfectly sensible of the very handsome and honourable conduct of Administration on that occasion, and as far as it is possible to judge from a newspaper account, I think that Mr. Pitt's speech and yours in the House of Commons, and Lord Grenville's in the House of Lords,[1] must have convinced every man who would suffer himself to be open to conviction.

There are however some points which appear to me to be of importance, that were not noticed in the newspaper speeches, though perhaps they were not overlooked in the originals, such as, 1st, my letter to Tippoo in 1788, warning him not to attack the Rajah of Travancore, whose territories we were, by the treaty of Mangalore, specifically bound to protect. 2nd, the situation of Cranganore and Aycottah which, being perfectly defensive in respect of the Rajah's country, without affording the least convenience or advantage for invading Tippoo's dominions, could not possibly give any just grounds of apprehension or jealousy to the latter Prince, which, admitting (what nobody can deny) that he had not the smallest claim to these places, is the only pretence even in the argument of Opposition, that he could have for interfering. 3rd, the letter from Mr. Powney, in June, 1789, to the Madras Board, informing them *that the agreement between the Rajah and the Dutch, for the* purchase of the places in question was about to be concluded, and which they neither answered to him, or ever mentioned to the supreme Government.

There was another very material circumstance which was not only unknown to you, but likewise to myself till very lately, and which in poor Sir Archibald's bad state of health must have totally escaped his memory—I mean his correspondence in 1788 with

[1] Lord Porchester, on April 11, moved three resolutions similar to those moved by Mr. Francis in the Commons March 28. Lord Grenville moved the same resolutions which Mr. Dundas carried March 2. There were two divisions. The previous question was carried against Lord Porchester by 96, including 12 proxies, to 19, including 2 proxies. Lord Grenville's were carried 64 to 12. Lords Lansdowne and Rawdon spoke in support of Lord Cornwallis.

Captain Bannerman,[1] who was then on a public mission to the Rajah; for it now appears, and I have seen a copy of an acknowledgment of the fact from Captain Bannerman, that it was not only with the sanction, but with the advice of Sir Archibald, conveyed through Captain Bannerman, that the Rajah entered into the negotiation for the purchase of those places from the Dutch. I have desired Sir Charles Oakeley to require an account of this business from Captain Bannerman, and to transmit it in a private letter to you.

Believe me, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO C. W. MALET, ESQ.

SIR, Camp near Bangalore, Sept. 4, 1791.

You will inform Nana that from a consideration of the Peshwa's true interests, as well as of the late treaty of Confederacy, it is undoubtedly my wish and expectation that the whole force of the Maratta State should, if necessary, be employed in concert with the other Confederates, in a vigorous prosecution of the war against the common enemy; and it would be particularly acceptable to me if the Peshwa would follow my example, and take the field in person, to give *éclat* and weight to the efforts of his Government. But you will desire Nana to advert that in conducting negotiations, a Power cannot at the same time be a party and a mediator; and consequently, that the character of mediator would be totally unsuitable to the Peshwa, or to any other of the Confederates, who are all equally parties against Tippoo in the present war.

You may also state to Nana, that as neither of the Confederates has a right to put the others to inconvenience by unnecessarily protracting any negotiation that may be opened, no mode of conducting it can be more reasonable or useful to the whole, than that which we now possess in this camp, by my own presence, and that of confidential persons invested with full powers by the other members of the Confederacy. And you will likewise explain to him, that the object of immediate negotiation with Tippoo, can only with propriety be to ascertain the extent of the compensation to be obtained, for the losses and injuries that the Confederates have suffered from him; and that he can by no

[1] Captain, afterwards Colonel, John Alexander Bannerman, b. 1758, d. Aug. 1819. A Director from 1808 to 1817; then Governor of Prince of Wales Island, where he died. M.P. for Bletchingley from Jan. to April, 1807.

means be allowed to interfere in apportioning the share of each Confederate in that compensation.

I trust that Nana will not only acquiesce in the general principle of this reasoning, but that there will never be any difference in our public language on the subject, as by the terms of the treaty between the three Powers, all acquisitions that can be made from the common enemy (excepting certain districts named in the treaty, to which the Peshwa will have an exclusive right), are to be subject to equal partition amongst the Confederates; and Tippoo therefore, as I have already said, can in no shape be permitted to meddle in an affair of some delicacy, which can only be arranged by the Confederates themselves.

It appears highly improbable to me, that the Maratta State will find a difficulty in repelling any attack of which Ishmael Beg[1] can be capable, upon the province of Guzerat; but at the same time, if the Peshwa should require our assistance for its defence, I should be unwilling to refuse it.

Should therefore a formal application to that effect be made by the Poonah Government, you may, without further reference to me, make a requisition to the Bombay Government for the assistance of one or two battalions, if it can be afforded without material inconvenience.

But should you at the time of the application be doubtful of the continuance of tranquillity in Europe, you will refer it to me, that I may judge whether we can with safety comply with it.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO VISCOUNT BROME.

MY DEAREST CHARLES, Camp near Bangalore, Sept. 8, 1791.

Your ready acquiescence in everything that was proposed gave me the greatest satisfaction, and I most earnestly hope that the intended plan will not only turn out the most useful, but the most agreeable, to yourself.

If I had not come to India, I should have advised your going

[1] Ismael Beg, a Mahommedan chief, for some time in the service of Sindia, whom he deserted in 1787, with a view of establishing his own independence. He then joined Gholam Kadir Khan, and was with him at the capture of Delhi. At the time mentioned in the text, he was waging war with Sindia, by whom he was defeated Sept. 12. His restless and intriguing character led him to renew hostilities in 1792, but his army having been routed, he took refuge in the fort of Canoond, but was obliged to surrender to M. Perron, a French officer in Sindia's service, on condition that his life should be spared. He died in confinement at Agra in 1799.

into the army, because you would have been pinched in your circumstances, and would have wanted the assistance of a profession; but that will not now be the case, and unless you had been actuated by as irresistible an impulse as myself, I should have been very sorry that you had determined to follow the thorny path that I have trodden.

If Tippoo does not offer reasonable terms before that time, I hope to oblige him to do so by a successful attack on Seringapatam in November next; but however favourable a turn our affairs may take, I cannot now expect, consistent with the duty I owe to my Country, to leave India before January, 1793, and I trust that my evil stars cannot detain me longer than that period. I grow old and more rheumatic, and have lost all spirits, and shall only say when I return—a soldier worn with cares and toils of war is come to lay his wearied bones among you. You remember Wolsey's speech, but I shall have an easier conscience than he probably had.

God bless you, my dearest Charles.

I am, your truly affectionate Father,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE BISHOP OF LICHFIELD AND COVENTRY.

DEAR JAMES, Camp near Bangalore, Sept. 8, 1791.

. . . It is provoking that any man of common sense in England should suppose that we could have avoided this war, yet the letters of some members of Opposition to their friends here talk that language, and whatever inducement they may have to say in Parliament, they can have none to write to this country what they do not believe. *Everything* at present remains much in the same state as when I wrote before. Tippoo is still at or near Seringapatam, and the Maratta Court continues to make the strongest professions of friendship, and of its determination to adhere to engagements. Where the infamy can be, when you are, without the least provocation on your part, wantonly attacked by an ambitious and powerful neighbour, in concluding a treaty with two other neighbouring Powers to assist you, is only to be discovered by the penetrating genius of that lively statesman and *successful* negotiator, Lord Stormont.

If Tippoo does not propose admissible terms before that time, I hope to be able to begin my march to Seringapatam by the beginning of November, and if we can then find the means of

feeding the prodigious number of men and cattle that we shall carry with us, I think we cannot fail of success.

I have however been too much accustomed to disappointments to feel very sanguine about anything, and although I have decidedly fixed January 1793, for my leaving India, I am often disposed to think that so much happiness can never fall to my lot, as to be once more restored to my friends and country.

Yours, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

I cannot believe that Lord Porchester[1] could seriously think of attacking the Board of Control on a business of which he must see by the papers that they were perfectly ignorant, and could have no responsibility whatever.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE SECRET COMMITTEE.

[Secret.]

GENTLEMEN, Camp near Bangalore, Sept. 8, 1791.

It is necessary for your full information of our present political situation, that I should enter more into particulars on some points with you, than appeared to me to be proper in my public letter to the Court of Directors.

Tippoo's strength and resources are now so much reduced, that he must soon be forced to sue for peace upon any terms, provided our Allies will faithfully execute their engagements, and employ their forces vigorously in concert with us; but until he shall give up all hopes of being able by arts and intrigues to disunite the Confederacy, I have the strongest reasons to be convinced, that he will not negotiate with sincerity for a general accommodation with the three Powers.

Exclusive of his endeavours, in which he so long persevered, to open separate negotiations with the different members of the Confederacy, he has exerted his utmost industry by secret emissaries, to corrupt and gain several of the Nizam's and Peshwa's Chiefs; but although his success in some instances may have tended to encourage him, and to occasion considerable temporary inconvenience to me, yet the effects of these subordinate measures have not relieved him in any degree from the danger with which

[1] Henry Lord Porchester, so created Oct. 17, 1780, and made Earl of Carnarvon July 6, 1793, b. Aug. 20, 1741, d. June 3, 1811; m. July 15, 1771, Elizabeth Alicia Maria, dau. of Charles 2nd Earl of Egremont. Master of the Horse Feb. 1806 to March, 1807. M.P. for Wilton, May, 1768, to June, 1780.

he is threatened by the weight of the whole Confederate force, as I have never had any grounds to apprehend that they have had the least influence upon the councils of the States, to which the Chiefs who have at times listened to Tippoo, respectively belong.

You will learn from the general tenor of Sir Charles Malet's correspondence, that, in his opinion, the Poona Government would have no scruple in using any means that could secure for them the principal management of the negotiation, in the hopes of obtaining by it exclusive advantages to the Maratta State.

Hurry Punt, who is artful and able, and has been lately invested with full powers by the Peshwa, has plainly discovered a disposition to pursue the same object; but I shall take care that he shall not succeed in it, and indeed I had lately an opportunity, without giving him any ostensible grounds for being offended, to discourage him from making any further attempt of that nature.

At the time that I agreed to allow Tippoo to send a Vakeel to make propositions to the Confederates, I was perfectly convinced that the object of the Vakeel's mission would be to intrigue with individuals, and to create jealousies amongst the members of the Confederacy, but without the least intention to negotiate seriously for the conclusion of a general peace.

Accordingly it appeared almost immediately after the arrival of Deliel Diel Khan and Apajee Ram, the two persons whom he deputed, within our posts, that my suspicions had been well-founded; for they expressed their expectations of being received with public marks of distinction, and of being allowed to remain with all their followers in our camp, and Apajee Ram, who had resided on the part of Tippoo some time at Poona, declared that his Master had addressed him in particular to Hurry Punt, to be introduced through him to me; and Hurry Punt earnestly supported all these proposals.

On the other hand I stated the insidiousness of the declarations of the Vakeels in so strong and clear points of view to Hurry Punt, and the consequent necessity on our part to use the most rigid caution in transacting business with them, that he could not deny the solidity of my reasoning, and acquiesced, though reluctantly, in my proposal that a confidential person should be sent by each of us to the Vakeels, who were requested to repair to Oossore to meet these confidential persons, and to communicate to them the propositions with which they had been entrusted by their Master, for our consideration.

The Vakeels however declared, in answer to the letter which it had been concerted to write to them, that their instructions did not

permit them to desist from requiring to be received in camp, nor authorize them to open their business with deputies; and Hurry Punt, admitting that we could not now, without betraying great weakness and inconsistency, comply with the expectations of the Vakeels, agreed that I should signify to them our joint request that they would return to their Master, unless they would commence the negotiation in the manner that we proposed, and they accordingly left us soon after the receipt of that letter.

Meer Allum, who arrived in camp with full powers from the Nizam, two days before the departure of the Vakeels, warmly approved in his Master's name, of all the steps that had been taken respecting the Vakeels at my recommendation, judiciously observing, that if Tippoo's desire to negotiate a general accommodation on terms proportioned to the just expectations of the Confederates, were not at that time sincere, nothing but disadvantage could have resulted to us from the residence of the Vakeels in our camp; and that when he becomes anxious to obtain a peace, and sincerely willing to make the necessary concessions for it, he will not scruple to renew his application for leave to send the same or other Vakeels to make his propositions.

Although the Nizam's troops, from some of their Chiefs having been corrupted by Tippoo, and from their being totally destitute of discipline and subordination, were not only useless, but even an intolerable burthen upon us during the last Campaign, I have never yet seen the least ground to doubt the sincerity of his Highness's or of the Minister's intentions, to adhere strictly to the engagements of the treaty; and I am willing to hope that the authority of the Minister and of his Highness's Son, upon the spot with me, will render that cavalry much more serviceable in future than it has hitherto been.

The promptness with which the Nizam entered into the treaty, and the zeal that he has shown in carrying on the war in concert with us, may be partly, and perhaps principally, attributed to his hatred and dread of Tippoo; but I have also long seen reason to suppose that he indulges himself in hopes that his ready compliance with my requests or recommendations will, when the present contest shall be terminated, constitute a claim for the friendship of the Company, and induce them to form a close connexion with him, by which means he will hope to obtain a substantial protection against the continuance of the overbearing and avaricious interference, which the Marattas have for several years exercised in his affairs, and under which he has long been impatient.

It will, however, be a subject well deserving the most mature

consideration, how far it may be prudent in us to gratify these expectations, in a Prince who has no just claims of such a nature upon us, and whose Government must ever be weak from its total want of system and energy, at the hazard of exciting the violent jealousy of a people, who, although their power from the feudal constitution of their state can never bear any proportion to their numbers, or the extent of their possessions, must always have great weight in the politics of India.

The Marattas are too watchful and clear-sighted, where their interests are concerned, not to have observed the propensity in the Nizam that I have mentioned, and I must confess that I cannot help apprehending some inconvenience to the common cause from the suspicions they may have conceived on that head, in the course of the negociations in which we shall probably be soon engaged.

You may, however, be assured, that I shall not only use the greatest circumspection, in avoiding any step which could give either of the other two Members of the Confederacy just ground of complaint against us, but that I shall also do the utmost in my power to conciliate and preserve a good understanding between themselves.

I have, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE REV. B. GRISDALE.

DEAR GRISDALE, Camp near Bangalore, Sept. 8, 1791.

In the same packet of letters which contained yours of the 18th of December, I found one from Mrs. Cornwallis, informing me that she had given you the living of Withington.[1] I trust you know me too well to doubt the sincerity of the joy which I felt on that occasion: may you long enjoy every comfort and happiness of domestic life.

God knows where our war will end, I hope and trust it will be soon, or it will end me; I do not mean that I am sick, I have stood a burning sun, and cold wind as well as the youngest of them, but I am plagued, and tormented, and wearied to death.

God bless you my dear Grisdale, I have no time to send you news, but can only assure you that I am with great truth,

Your most faithful and affectionate friend,

CORNWALLIS.

[1] Withington was in the gift of the Bishop of Gloucester, but it was one of the options of which Mrs. Cornwallis, as widow of the Archbishop of Canterbury, had the disposal.

MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Received Sept. 26, 1791.]

MY DEAR LORD, London, April 27, 1791.

Mr. Baring tells me that the Company send their despatches to-night, which makes me sit down to write to you very hastily, an account of what passed in the House of Lords,[1] seeing everything much disfigured in the papers, and not knowing what accounts your friends may send you, with none of whom I am in any habits, except with Peter Bathurst, who is not, as you well know, a man of detail.

The Opposition insisted on three points,—1st. the War; 2nd, the Partition Treaty, which they stil'd infamous; 3rd, the Infraction of Treatys with the Nabob and the Rajah of Tanjore; and their object was to suppose everything that was done, was in consequence of orders from home, of which they could bring no proof.

Administration defended themselves and what was done, 1st, by the importance of the forts in Travancore; 2nd, by the punctilious regard due to the treaty with the Rajah of Travancore; 3rd, the general abhorrence in which Tippoo's character was held by every Englishman; concluding with rather an hyperbolical eulogy of your Lordship, but shying, as far as I could judge, all question of treatys, except what regarded Travancore. It was impossible they could do otherwise, considering the ground they stood upon in common with Opposition in all Hastings' prosecution, which still continues to be the general touchstone. I had no object in attending except to do your Lordship justice, and to do everything I could to this effect consistent with my own principles. I felt this very easy, by proving from extracts from your correspondence, that you felt the whole question of Travancore, as nothing to be put in comparison with the evils which must result from war. That your conduct therefore must have been governed by a conviction of Tippoo's conduct regarding Travancore making part of a general flow of hostility against the British power. This I conceived appeared from several passages in the papers before the House, and if it did not appear distinctly, it only proved that the materials were not sufficient to warrant any proceeding. The proceedings in regard to treatys was justify'd by the practice in Europe, still more by the practice of India, and the impossibility of this country's defraying the expence, without entering into the morality of political actions. Our present possessions in India were not insisted upon at the Peace of 1782, from a conviction of their importance, so much as

[1] See Lord Cornwallis to Mr. Dundas, Sept. 3 (note).

from point of honour. My own opinion was, that everything but Bengal and Bombay was a burthen upon us, and that if your Lordship had gone only, when I first proposed it to you, had I continued in, you would most probably have carry'd instructions to this effect; but that I was morally certain from a variety of circumstances, that, when you did go, your instructions went to the general preservation of the whole, and that your character as well as duty went to a manly and punctual execution of whatever orders you carried. I stated besides the unfairness of laying several papers before the House, such as your letter to the Nizam, one of the Nabob's letters to General Medows, and what you say about France, &c., and ended by moving the previous question, considering the acquittal about to be moved by Government as contemptible and unworthy, and that it would be doing you much more justice to wait your return, when you would be here to explain your conduct, and to await reward or censure, as your conduct should appear to deserve, from the King and the public. The case of Hastings sufficiently proves the futility of all such votes.

Whether I judged right or no, I do not presume to say in the case of another; but I can truly affirm, that if the case had been my own, it is what I should have wished. But, my dear Lord, as things grow serious where you are, you should have some confidential friend in London fully instructed as to all the motives of your conduct, who should be able to apprize your friends of what you desire, and not leave yourself in the power of any Administration. As to myself, you may depend upon my sincere desire to do you every possible justice, without the least wish to know the secrets of your Government, or to be further instructed than is necessary to accommodate as far as I can to events, without sacrificing my own character or principles, which I am sure you would never look for.

I must do Hastings and his friends the justice to say, that they are perfectly sensible of your very handsome conduct towards him, and are disposed to make every return in their power.

Mr. Baring is for the present at the head of the Company in Leadenhall-street, and I am persuaded will do everything he can to show you respect and regard. Nothing shall be wanting on my part to keep him attentive to your interests and honour.

As for general politicks, you must have correspondents much better informed than I am. I am in no confidence whatever, and seek none, being desirous to keep clear of all parties. I think there will be no war, at the same time that Administration[1]

[1] Lord Lansdowne seems never to have been on cordial terms with Mr. Pitt's government. His belief that the king was unfriendly to them was certainly not correct.

have got themselves into most unaccountable difficulties, while their hold at Court seems so precarious, that a short time must determine whether they are to continue for another year, or to break to pieces at the end of the Session. As to France, I may be wrong, for I differ from many, but I am much mistaken if they do not turn out more powerful than ever.

I am shock'd at the length of my hasty scrawl, but you will accept it as an undoubted proof of the attachment, with which I must ever remain,

Yours, &c.,

LANSDOWNE.

P. S. Since writing the above I am favoured with your letter of the 23rd of November.

The state of the Carnatick appears very critical, and we are in no want of inflammatory matter at home. But I am in no pain about what regards you personally. If things succeed you must necessarily have your full share of credit, as so much depends upon the execution.

If they fail, I am sure it will not be your fault, for I am persuaded it will be from the nature of things, which it belonged to Government here to foresee, and I consider you, my dear Lord, as merely *executive*. You may depend on my cordial zeal, whenever your name comes in question. I only wish you not to take too much of the general system upon you.

MAJOR-GENERAL GRENVILLE TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Received Sept. 1791.]

MY DEAR LORD, New Burlington Street, May 4, 1791.

. . . I take a most sincere pleasure in acquainting you that the attack made upon you in both Houses by the Opposition, tending to condemn the measures you had adopted in regard to the war with Tippoo, has not only completely failed, but has turned out so much to your honour and credit, that votes of approbation have passed both Houses, and Lord Grenville assured me that he never had a more easy or more pleasant task, than in defending your conduct and measures upon this occasion.

We have again been obliged to arm on account of the refusal on the part of the Empress, to listen to our terms of mediation in favour of the Turks; Opposition have fully availed themselves of the opportunity of Parliament's sitting, to cry down and to impede the measures of Government; and as John Bull does not under-

stand or approve of German politics and alliances, it is but too easy a matter to make the war appear unpopular, so that it is much doubted whether Mr. Pitt will think proper to go on with it, and of course the Empress will be encouraged to persevere, and I am much afraid, that instead of procuring us peace (which Opposition take credit for) it will in the end turn out the reverse, and be productive of very serious consequences to this country.

The Duke of York left England the day before yesterday, having obtained his Majesty's permission to make a campaign with the Prussian army, in case war should take place. His Royal Highness has not thought fit to take any one of his family with him, which has an extraordinary appearance and not easily to be decyphered; Lieut.-Colonel St. Leger[1] of the Prince of Wales's family, is the only one that attends him. If I had had any weight with him, I should have recommended to him to have taken Captain Crauford,[2] of his own family, who understands the language perfectly, and is a tolerable good draftsman, and would have been of great service to him upon many occasions. I know very little of Colonel St. Leger, but from his total ignorance of the language, and being very much a man of pleasure, I can hardly think that he will be of any further use to H. R. H. than that of an agreeable companion, to which no one could have had an objection, provided H. R. H. had taken Crauford by way of a fag for the purposes above mentioned. I am however inclined to think that there will be no war, and therefore it will not be of so much consequence if H. R. H. proposes to return to England about September, in case affairs are made up, and at all events about the latter end of November. I wish most sincerely that he could be persuaded to make a longer stay, for at least three years, and then there would be some chance of his extricating himself out of his present difficulty's, though I am afraid, *We are ruined past redemption in every respect*. I have this moment called upon your brother the Bishop, who tells me that I must send my letter to him this evening in order to go with his; I must therefore conclude with repeating to you my most sincere wishes for your success. Adieu! my dear Lord.

Believe me, &c.,

My best respects to Ross. . . . . C. G.

[1] Lieut.-Colonel John Hayes St. Leger, afterwards Major-General and Colonel 6th Dragoon Guards, Equerry to the Prince, b. July 23, 1756, d. 1799, unm. M.P. for Okehampton, Nov. 1790 to May, 1796.

[2] Captain, afterwards Lieut.-General Sir Charles Crauford, G.C.B., Colonel 2nd Dragoon Guards, d. March 26, 1821; m. Feb. 7, 1800, Anna-Maria, dau. of William 2nd Earl of Harrington, and widow of Thomas 3rd Duke of Newcastle. M.P. for East Retford from 1806 to 1812.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE.

MY DEAR LORD, Camp 12 miles north of Bangalore, Oct. 9, 1791.

I received a few days since your very kind and friendly letter, dated the 27th of April.

I am it is true engaged, and God knows most unwillingly, in a scene of trouble, but it has been my consolation and support, that my labours and vexations were inevitable, unless I had after the example of Sir Thomas Rumbold,[1] deserted my post in time of danger; for I never entertained the smallest doubt of the absolute necessity of the war. We might perhaps have obtained a short respite from hostilities by abandoning our ally, and *soaping* our nose, but that would not long have secured us from being kicked.

Tippoo had not the most distant shadow of right to interfere in the transaction between the Dutch and the Rajah of Travancore, for the transfer of Cranganore and Jacottah; nor could it be a matter of any consequence to his own situation, unless he meditated an attack upon the Rajah of Travancore, whether he or the Dutch were in possession of them.

The forts, if they deserve that name, were after all of very little consequence, and if I had been informed of what was going forward, I should have advised the Rajah not to purchase them. But although the Rajah was encouraged to make the proposition to the Dutch, by Captain Bannerman, the Resident at his Durbar from the Governor of Madras, with the knowledge, and consequently not against the consent of Sir A. Campbell and Mr. Hollond, the first intimation that I received of the business was conveyed in the letter from the Government of Fort St. George, dated in August, 1789, in which Mr. Hollond most grossly misrepresented the matter to me, in order to draw from me a disapprobation of the Rajah's conduct, with a view probably of being able more easily to extort from him a present of a lack of pagodas, for which it is confidently asserted he was then negotiating.

The circumstances of my treaties with the Marattas and the Nizam having been called infamous by Lord Stormont, from whose success as a negotiator and a minister, Great Britain has not derived very signal benefit, does not sit heavy on my mind. Being forced to have recourse to arms, without any alternative but the meanest and most contemptible submission to the insolent and unfounded claims of Tippoo, I conceived it to be my duty to secure

[1] Sir Thomas Rumbold, then Governor of Madras, quitted his post May, 1780, and Hyder commenced hostilities in June. He was charged with having bribed Hyder to delay the invasion.

every advantage in my power; nor could I have supposed that since the days of knight-errantry, any person would seriously have avowed a different sentiment.

What is it however that we astonished Indians do not read in your debates? We there see that Tippoo is our barrier against the Marattas. The Tiger a barrier against the Deer! As well might it have been said to the Elector of Saxony during the Seven Years' War, How fortunate are you to have so noble a barrier as the great Frederick, against the power of Sweden, which some years ago threatened the ruin of your dominions!

I am well convinced, my dear Lord, of your earnest desire to see justice done to my conduct, and I trust that will be the general sentiment of Parliament, as far as justice and party can go hand in hand.

The whole and real motives of my actions are fully and freely explained in my public letters, and I persuade myself that they will satisfy every candid and impartial man in the nation; and as I have no ground of complaint against your Administration, who have behaved to me since I have been in this country in a most fair and honourable manner, and as they have to my knowledge acted, on this quarter of the globe, an honest part towards their country, I certainly shall never give them any just reason to complain.

To the judgement of my countrymen at large shall I most cheerfully submit the points of my government; the more minutely every measure is investigated the more clearly will it appear that I have been a faithful, zealous, and economical servant to them. They will see that I have neither taken their money myself nor suffered others to take it, that my cheap contracts have been as usefully executed for the public service as the former extravagant ones, and that I most carefully avoided involving them in a war until the preservation of their honour and credit, and indeed the security of their existence in this country, rendered it absolutely necessary.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO SIR JOHN KENNAWAY, BART.

SIR, Camp 10 miles from Bangalore, Oct. 22, 1791.

. . . In order to overcome as much as possible the impressions which have been given to the Nizam and the Minister, relative to the probable distress of the army for grain and forage when it advances to Seringapatam, I have enclosed a copy of a

letter that I have written to Sir Charles Malet on that subject, which will apply equally to the apprehensions entertained by Azim ul Omrah and Nana Furnavese.

If the Minister should obstinately persevere in his intention of bringing Assud Ali with him to the army, and of suffering Teige Wunt to remain with it, I wish you to tell him that I shall not think it worth my while to protest formally to the Nizam against that resolution.

You will however repeat to him from me, that nothing could be more disagreeable to me than their presence with this army, as I look upon them to be unfaithful and treacherous servants to their own Master; and, after the infamous manner in which they behaved to me last season, they are men in whom I never can place the smallest confidence, and with whom I should wish in future to avoid all sort of intercourse.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

[Private.]

DEAR SIR, Camp between Bangalore and Oossore; Oct. 24, 1791.

I am very glad that you overruled the procrastinating disposition of the Court of Directors, as the paragraph which they proposed to send would have tended very much to damp the hopes that I have taken pains to encourage of the settlement being declared permanent.

This important point, in the midst of the cares which attend my present station, occupies much of my anxious thought, and I am *convinced that the interests* of Government and the happiness of the people, which generally go together, will be most essentially secured by the adoption of it.

I refer you to my letter of this date [1] to the Court of Directors for an account of the situation of the armies and of the late military occurrences, which, except in cases that require particular explanation, is the most convenient channel for us both. You will see that I have been particularly careful to remove the only obstacle that could have materially defeated the effect of our other preparations by the means I have taken to secure a constant supply of grain in our bazar for the maintenance of our followers, who cannot be supported from the public stores, and who are as necessary to the success of our operations as the fighting men, for

[1] See Appendix.

without their assistance we could neither move our artillery, stores, or camp equipage. When I joined the army there was not a single Binjarry belonging to it, and we have now above 40,000 Binjarry bullocks (of which number at least 15,000 served the last campaign with Tippoo in the Coimbatore country) constantly employed in collecting and transporting supplies for us.

I received Mr. Pitt's letter by the Bridgewater, and I was very happy to learn from it that the seals were to be put into such able hands. I shall write to him by the next opportunity.

Believe me, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE BISHOP OF LICHFIELD AND COVENTRY.

DEAR JAMES, Camp between Bangalore and Oossore, Oct. 26, 1791.

. . . The business of Culford House being now finally settled to your liking (and you may be assured it will be most perfectly to mine), if Mr. Henniker[1] would give up Eye you would be relieved from a great weight of cares; and I heartily wish that it were so. The debates in both Houses about our Indian war are provoking to the highest degree: when I see that selfish narrow-minded fellow, Lord Porchester, accusing the founder of the war of avarice, I cannot help lamenting that I am not within reach of his ears.

I have in a former letter expressed my satisfaction about Brome's good-humoured acquiescence in everything that was proposed, and I am certainly glad for his sake that he had not his father's unfortunate propensity to the military. I have not had an opportunity of recommending a captain for the purchase of a major's commission since I have been in India; the majors who have sold transacted their business at home, where the War Office is glad to catch at everything it can. There are however, so many very old captains in this army with strong pretensions and claims upon the justice of the Commander-in-chief, that I can see no probability of my being able to give Captain St. John[2] a step during my stay in this country. . . .

The preparations for our forward move are going on, and I

[1] John Henniker, afterwards, April 18, 1803, 2nd Lord Henniker, b. April 19, 1752, d. Dec. 5, 1821; m. April 1, 1791, Emily, dau. of Robert Jones, Esq., of Duffryn. M.P. for New Romney from 1785 to 1790, and for Stamford from 1812 to 1818.

[2] Captain, afterwards Colonel, Hon. George St. John, younger son of John 11th Lord St. John; b. Oct. 19, 1764; m. May 10, 1795, Lavinia, dau. of William Breton Wolstenholme, Esq. He, his wife, and four children, were lost in their passage home from Bombay in the Prince of Wales Indiaman in 1804.

trust we shall be able to proceed in less than a month. I have just taken a very strong fort of Tippoo's, the possession of which will be of great use in securing our communications and protecting our supplies. We have now as plentiful a grain market in camp as you would see in a country town in England, and I hope to ensure the continuance of it when the army shall be before Seringapatam. This war adds much to my expenses without giving any increase to my income, and as I from the first declined to take any share of prize-money, it is not likely that my avarice will be much gratified by it.

Yours, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR CUPPAGE.

SIR, Camp near Bangalore, Nov. 11, 1791.

Your account of the behaviour of the 5th and 16th Madras and of the 12th Bombay battalions, entitle them to my warmest acknowledgments, and I desire that you will please to communicate to the Officers and Soldiers of those corps the high sense which I entertain of their merit and gallantry.

Unacquainted as I am with the country, I cannot take upon myself to give an opinion in respect to the plan of your march; but it appears to me that the circumstances must have been very untoward that obliged you to come into the open country, and to encamp in a position so untenable, as to expose you to the distressing necessity of making an immediate retreat as soon as the enemy's army advanced against you, which must have had the infallible effect of elating the enemy and of discouraging the garrison of Coimbatore.

I have no doubt that in the execution of this critical and difficult operation, everything was done on your part that became a good and capable Officer, but I cannot help expressing the concern that I have felt on observing throughout the whole tenor of your letters to me since the enemy sat down before the place, a coldness and almost an unconcern about the fall of Coimbatore, instead of that spirit which seemed to have animated not only yourself but the southern provinces at the time of the former attack.

During the period between the 5th of last month, when you received certain accounts that the enemy were before Coimbatore, and the 22nd, when you marched to its relief, it does not appear that you applied either to Dindigul, Madura, Caroor, or Trichinoply for any assistance, although a proportion both of Europeans and

Natives might have been drawn without hazard from those places, and there was time, if necessary, to have obtained the sanction of the Government of Fort St. George for your being furnished with them; and it does not seem by your letters to have been your intention to detain, even for a few days, the 12th Bombay battalion, until that measure was in some degree forced upon you by the inability of bullocks to proceed upon their march to Tellicherry.

I have been taught by general report to consider you as an intelligent and zealous Officer; appearances may have deceived me; what I have taken for coldness may have proceeded only from a peculiarity of stile, and although you omitted to inform me of it, you may have endeavoured by every means and every application in your power to have increased the numbers of your regular force, and to have obtained, as on the late occasion from Mr. M'Leod, a body of Polygars to have opposed those of the enemy, whom you describe to have been the most troublesome to you of all their infantry. I have thought it right, however, in fairness to yourself, and as a duty I owe to the public, to take an early opportunity of stating my sentiments to you on the business, from the only information which your letters have afforded me.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO SIR JOHN KENNAWAY, BART.

SIR, Camp at Magri, Dec. 24, 1791.

I have the pleasure to acquaint you that Welsh, by his judicious and spirited conduct, obtained possession yesterday of Ramgheri, which, from its situation on the most direct road from Bangalore to Seringapatam, is a post of the greatest importance. And I have likewise to add that Lieut.-Colonel Stuart has just assaulted and carried Outradroog.

In a conversation that I had with Meer Allum on the 22nd, he intimated that the Minister would encamp near Nundidroog and join me by the route I recommended, if his infantry could be augmented by two battalions from this army.

It is a vain attempt, as experience must have taught you, as well as myself, to reason on Military subjects with persons who are utterly ignorant of geography, of what an enemy is capable of doing, and, indeed, of everything that relates to war; we must therefore request the Minister to place some confidence in the opinions of one who has served a long and active apprenticeship to

that difficult profession, and if he should allow that it is not probable that I should be guilty of gross errors, you will then gravely ask him whether he thinks it possible that a man of common sense in my situation, who has been honoured by so great a Prince as the Nizam with the distinction of his sending his own Son and Minister to join the army under his direction, would wish to expose persons of their rank, with the powerful reinforcement under their command, to any insult or misfortune before they could form a junction with the forces of the Allies.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE BISHOP OF LICHFIELD AND COVENTRY.

DEAR JAMES, Dec. 29, 1791.

In my last letter by the Queen Indiaman, I acknowledged the receipt of all your letters to the 9th of May, which is the latest that has reached me, and, as well as I recollect, took notice of everything material that they contained.

I have been fortunate in taking in a very few days and with very little loss, the important fortress of Sevendroog, the possession of which was absolutely necessary to enable us to maintain a secure communication with Bangalore, when we advance to the attack of Seringapatam.

The speedy reduction of this place which has been considered all over India as impregnable, has struck great terror into the enemy's other garrisons, for in the three days subsequent to the assault of Sevendroog, three other strong forts in its neighbourhood, each of them capable of making a good resistance, fell into our hands. By these successes we have now a frontier line, to which our supplies may with ease be brought forward within 50 miles of the enemy's capital. God send that we may soon see a happy termination of this war, of which I am most heartily tired. The Commodore has likewise had some share of trouble, for a wrong-headed captain of a French frigate fired two broadsides into the Phœnix, on Sir R. Strachan's[1] attempting to search two merchant-ships, which were supposed to be laden with military stores for Tippoo. This affair will perhaps make a great noise in Europe, but William is of

[1] Captain, afterwards Admiral, Sir Richard Strachan, b. Oct. 7, 1760, d. Feb. 3, 1828; m. April 28, 1812, Louisa, dau. of —— Dillon, Esq. This action took place in Nov. 1791, and the Resolute was compelled to strike after losing 25 killed and 40 wounded, the Phœnix 6 killed and 11 wounded. A long correspondence followed between M. de St. Felix, the French Commodore, and Commodore Cornwallis. The former was at last compelled to admit that the French had been to blame.

opinion that the French Commodore will not support the unjustifiable conduct of the Captain. It escaped my attention to mention one circumstance, relative to the planting out of the offices at Culford. It would be, I think, a pity to delay that business till I come home, as a year's growth is of consequence, and I can easily make any alteration in it when I arrive, as young plants are soon removed or cut down. . . . Yours, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO SIR JOHN KENNAWAY, BART.

SIR, Camp at Magri, Dec. 30, 1791.

The march of the Saheb Zada,[1] the capture of Hafezjee,[2] and defeat, or rather dissolution, of his army, the reduction of the lower fort of Gurrumconda, effected by a corps composed only of cavalry, and the consideration of all the discouraging and disgraceful consequences with which these events must be attended, have given me, as you will easily conceive, the most serious concern.

It is, however, now of no use to look back. This is the favourable season for the execution of the great object of the Campaign, on the issue of which the fate of the war must necessarily depend: and, whilst our preparations are in such forwardness, and our late important acquisitions have so completely paved the way for our success, we must on no account let the opportunity escape us by turning our attention to matters of far inferior moment.

It is undoubtedly essential, as well for the honour of the Nizam's Government as to his weight and consequence in the Confederacy, that his Son and his Minister should accompany the army to the attack of Seringapatam. It would have been desirable that they should have been attended by a considerable force, according to his Highness's first intention. Circumstances, however, have rendered the latter impossible; and I have too much reliance on the firmness and friendship of the Nizam, and the good disposition and zeal of the Minister for the interests of the Confederacy, to suppose for a moment that they would suffer considerations of punctilio, to interfere with the plan which has been so long agreed upon and approved by the three Powers in alliance respectively, and which alone can lead to a safe and honourable peace.

I shall not therefore hesitate to propose that the Prince and

[1] Saheb Zada, a title equivalent to Son of the Prince. In this instance it is applied to Futteh Hyder, Tippoo's eldest son.

[2] Hafiz Jee, or Hafiz Fereed-ud-Deen, already mentioned, was captured by surprise and cruelly put to death the following day.

Minister, with six or eight thousand of the best horse, or even a smaller number if more convenient, and the Company's two battalions, should proceed to join the army by the route of Chintomnipet and Bangalore, or any other which they may prefer, and that the remainder of the cavalry and infantry, with all the artillery except the four field-pieces attached to the two battalions, should be left in the neighbourhood of Gurrumconda, under the command of an officer, if such an one can be found, more trustworthy than Hafez Fereed-u-Deen. I conceive the road between Gurrumconda and the army to be perfectly safe, even for a single company of Sepoys; for if the Saheb Zada's force was not now required to attend his Father at Seringapatam, there could be no danger of his repeating an irruption, the apparent rashness of which nothing but the confidence that he unfortunately had too much reason to place in the Nizam's General, could have justified.

You will represent to the Minister, that we have guns and troops enough to encourage the most flattering hopes of success, and that, after having thrown open all the magazines of grain in the Carnatic to the Binjarries of the army, the loss of those which were following his Highness's troops, cannot be materially felt, especially when it is become necessary that so great a part of his force should remain behind.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

CHAPTER XIV.

Campaign of 1792 — Attack on the lines of Seringapatam — Attempt to assassinate Lord Cornwallis — Progress of the Siege — Censure of a Court Martial — Prospect of returning to England — Difficulty of finding a successor — Terms offered to Tippoo — Treaty of Peace — Lord Cornwallis returns to Madras — Discussions with the Nabob of the Carnatic — Unsatisfactory termination of negociations with the Marathas — Lord Cornwallis raised to the Marquisate — State of affairs in England — Disorders in Assam — Mission to Nepaul and to Assam.

THE campaign of 1792 opened under very favourable circumstances. Besides the other detachments which had been brought up, the corps attached to the Nizam had, after putting his troops in possession of the Pettah of Goorumconda, rejoined the army. The commissariat had been put upon a proper footing, and the Binjarries had collected upwards of 80,000 men, and provided an ample supply of grain. It was important that while food was plentifully furnished to the bazaars, the price should not be too low, or else the merchants would have little inducement to exert themselves in providing the necessary quantities of grain.

General Abercromby had moved in January from Bombay with 8400 men; Lord Cornwallis had a force of 22,000 men, with 44 field-guns, and a battering-train of 42 pieces. It was intended that Purseram Bhow should at once advance upon Sera; but he delayed, principally from political motives, in carrying out this plan. He had in fact vague hopes of gaining Chittledroog by treachery, and was occupied in plundering the country for his own benefit. His exertions during the last campaign had fallen very far short of his promises, and Lord Cornwallis was greatly disappointed. However the mere presence of his army, and that of the Nizam, prevented Tippoo from collecting his whole force against the English, and was thus productive of considerable advantage.

On the 25th of January, Lord Cornwallis, accompanied by Secunder Jah[1] at the head of a considerable force, and by Hurry Punt with a small corps of Marathas, commenced his march from the vicinity of Severndroog, where the various armies had united. In ten days they came within sight of Seringapatam, and encamped

[1] Secunder Jah, son of the Nizam, and his successor in 1803, d. 1829.

about six miles to the northward of that town, without having fired a shot.

The defences of Seringapatam, though unfinished, were formidable; there were three lines, the most advanced consisting of two, and the second of seven, strong redoubts. The third comprised the fort itself, and the lines on the island in the Caveri, a river fordable but in few places. These earthen works were further covered by a bound hedge, consisting of wide belts of thorny plants, almost impenetrable by man or beast, the whole being defended by 300 pieces of artillery. Undismayed by these difficulties, Lord Cornwallis, after reconnoitring the lines on the morning of February 6, determined to storm them that night. No orders were issued till sunset, lest some treachery might disclose them to the enemy; and about eight o'clock, under a brilliant moonlight, the three columns moved to the attack. Not the slightest intimation of the plan had been given to the Allies, who were in utter astonishment when they heard of a night attack without cannon; and, to use the words of Colonel Wilks, "in great consternation at what they called Lord Cornwallis's undignified arrangement of going out himself to fight like a common soldier."

The force employed was about 9000 men, and the details of the arrangements are given in Lord Cornwallis's General Orders. The right column under General Medows was, after carrying the positions in front of them, to join Lord Cornwallis who commanded the centre column in person. Misled by his guides, General Medows had diverged too far to the right, and thus Lord Cornwallis was left for some time unsupported, and exposed to considerable danger; for after the island had been carried by the English, the enemy rallied and made a vigorous attack upon the centre column, which had been weakened by sending reinforcements both to Colonel Stuart and Colonel Maxwell.[1] The firing was heavy, and Lord Cornwallis exclaimed, "If General Medows is above ground, this will bring him." But owing to the accident just mentioned, he was not able to join before daybreak; and by that time Lord Cornwallis, having repulsed the enemy, had fallen back with the remainder of his corps to the Carigat Hill, which had been carried by the left column, and where he could maintain his ground till he knew the extent of his success. This was indeed complete. The whole line of forts to the north of the river was taken; every gun had been abandoned; and the total loss to Tippoo, including those

[1] Lieut.-Colonel Hamilton Maxwell, 74th Regt., a younger son of Sir William Maxwell, Bart., of Monreith, and brother to Jane Duchess of Gordon, d. June 8, 1794, at Cuddalore; unm. He had previously served in America.

who quitted their colours from a conviction that further resistance was useless, exceeded 23,000. In the British army the casualties were,—

Right column	95
Centre	342
Left	98
	535

Among whom were 36 European officers.

From the casualties in the centre column the share which Lord Cornwallis had in the action is evident. The whole loss however was slight, considering the length of time the engagement lasted. The firing began about eleven at night on the 6th, and did not finally cease till five in the evening of the 7th, when a last unsuccessful attempt was made to dislodge the British forces from the island. In the course of the night Tippoo evacuated all his posts to the north of the Caveri, and the English without a moment's delay commenced the siege.

Just before Lord Cornwallis began his march, Tippoo had made a fresh proposal to send an envoy to his camp; but it was indignantly rejected, on the ground that no overtures could be received from a Prince who had so systematically disregarded capitulations, until the prisoners taken at Coimbatore should be liberated. To this intimation Tippoo at the time paid no attention; but, when his overthrow seemed imminent, he sent Lieutenant Chalmers and Lieutenant Nash, with most of the prisoners then in his possession, to the British camp, denying however that there had been any breach of capitulations, but expressing a wish to reopen negociations. Lord Cornwallis, while accepting the release of the prisoners as some proof of a wish to make atonement, stated in distinct terms that Tippoo's assertions had no foundation in truth.

Before the envoys whom Tippoo was allowed to send could reach the camp, he had made an attempt to relieve himself from his difficulties, by the assassination of Lord Cornwallis. A small number of his horsemen contrived to get access to the interior of the camp, where they were supposed to belong to the Nizam's army. While riding along, apparently in a careless manner, they inquired for the tent of the commander, and the native artillerymen, of whom the question was asked, pointed out that of their own officer, Colonel Duff. The horsemen immediately dashed at the tent, cutting down the few soldiers they met; but the pickets turning out and firing upon them, they were obliged to fly with some loss.[1]

[1] It was afterwards ascertained that they had been intoxicated with bang, a most deleterious liquid extracted from the leaf of the Cannabis sativa, a species of hemp.

Lord Cornwallis was prevailed upon after this occurrence, to allow a captain's guard of Europeans to do duty at his quarters; for previously, in accordance with his known dislike of form or ceremony, he had never permitted above one, or at the most two sentries of his body-guard to mount at his door.

Though the possibility of making peace was under discussion, Lord Cornwallis persevered in his hostile operations. General Abercromby advanced to Eratora, where he crossed the Caveri on February 11; on the 16th he was joined by Colonel Floyd, with the English and some of the allied cavalry. On the 22nd, General Abercromby, who operated to the northward, pushed his advanced posts very forward; and in the mean time Colonel Stuart occupied a position on the island, where the beautiful gardens of Lall Baugh had been destroyed to furnish materials for the works. It is unnecessary to enter into the minor details of the siege, which was carried on with great energy and with little serious opposition. By the 22nd the breaching batteries were so far advanced, that it became certain that they could be opened by the 1st of March within 500 yards of the wall.

The alarm in Seringapatam had now become excessive. On February 23 Tippoo assembled all his principal officers in the great mosque, and adjured them by the sacred contents of the Koran, which he laid before them, to say whether they would advise him to assent to the terms demanded by the Confederates as preliminaries to a treaty. These terms involved the cession of half his dominions, the payment of three crores and sixty lacs (3,600,000*l.*), the release of all prisoners, and the delivery of two of his sons as hostages. The unanimous opinion of the assembly was, that no further reliance could be placed on the troops, and that submission was inevitable.

The discussions between the Vakeels of Tippoo, Sir John Kennaway on the part of Lord Cornwallis, and deputies on the part of the Allies, when reduced to writing, extended to a most extraordinary length. They occupy upwards of 800 pages of close writing. Practically speaking the whole case of the Allies was left in the hands of Sir John Kennaway, as, though ministers were present both from the Nizam and the Peshwa, their Masters desired to leave the arrangements entirely to Lord Cornwallis, such confidence did they repose in the integrity of his character, the honesty of his policy, and the justice and moderation of his views. The only suggestion made by Hurry Punt was, that a sum should be demanded for bazar expenses, that is for gifts to the persons concerned in making the treaties. He proposed 60 lacs. The amount, but not

the justice of the claim, was resisted by Gholaum Ali, and it was reduced by one-half.

From papers found in Seringapatam on its capture in 1799, it is evident that although the Allies were really willing to leave the question of peace or war and the settlement of terms solely to Lord Cornwallis, their Ministers, while professing a similar readiness, were engaged in traitorous communication with Tippoo. But the firmness and decision of Lord Cornwallis baffled all their intrigues, and on February 23 the preliminaries were signed, and on the 25th the hostages were surrendered. Those who were present on this occasion described the scene as highly interesting.[1] The coolness and self-possession of the two boys, the eldest only ten years old, were most striking; and the more than paternal kindness of Lord Cornwallis, not only impressed his own European and native attendants with admiration, but produced in the minds of Tippoo's Vakeels, and the other Mysorean spectators, feelings of regard which were never effaced.

When the portions of territory which were to be ceded came under discussion, most vehement opposition was made by Tippoo. The conduct of the Raja of Coorg has already been mentioned, and Tippoo flattered himself that when peace with the English was concluded, he should have full leisure and power to punish a chief whom he called a refractory vassal. But Lord Cornwallis was determined not to abandon a faithful ally, and therefore claimed, as part of the Company's share, a belt of territory, the possession of which protected the Raja from Tippoo. The latter was so indignant, that although he had already paid a crore, and that his sons were in Lord Cornwallis' camp, he threatened to break off the negociations. Without an hour's hesitation Lord Cornwallis ordered the siege works to be resumed, and the hostages were actually on their march towards Bangalore, when Tippoo yielded and the definitive treaty was signed. Lord Cornwallis set out on his return to Madras as soon as possible, but the excessive number of the sick, especially among the Europeans, greatly retarded his march, and a considerable time elapsed before he had finally evacuated the Mysorean territories.

The policy of Lord Cornwallis was assailed by two very opposite parties—the one thinking that Tippoo had been too leniently dealt with, the other that he had been ill-treated and oppressed. The views of Lord Cornwallis, and the reasons which guided his conduct, are so distinctly given in his despatches, that it is unnecessary to mention them here.

[1] The Editor has often heard the details from his father General Ross, and from Sir John Kennaway, who were both present.

Lord Cornwallis had scarcely returned to Madras, when he found himself engaged in a discussion with the Nabob of the Carnatic. During the war, the Government of Fort St. George had assumed the management of his territories, but that interference necessarily ceased with the close of hostilities. Some definitive arrangement, however, was imperative, yet the Nabob was very reluctant to accede to the British propositions. This difficult question is the subject of several despatches, and was not finally settled at the departure of Lord Cornwallis from India. Nor was the conclusion of a permanent treaty with the Peshwa and the Nizam a less embarrassing matter. By the 13th article of the Offensive and Defensive Alliance, contracted with them in 1790, it was provided, that if Tippoo should (the existing war being terminated) attack any one of the three contracting Powers, that one should be entitled to call upon the other two for aid. But Lord Cornwallis insisted that the two Powers thus called upon, should have a right to decide whether the attack was unprovoked, as he was determined not to be again involved in a war which was not strictly justifiable in its commencement. A protracted negociation with the Marathas followed, which ended unsatisfactorily. Nor could any arrangement be made with the Nizam. He was most anxious for a close union, but the terms could not be agreed upon; and Lord Cornwallis, when he left India, went no further than to assure him that the British Government would respect existing treaties.

Sindia could lay no claim to any favour from the Company; not only had he not joined in the alliance against Tippoo, but he had even assumed a threatening attitude towards the Peshwa, and, had the war continued, would probably have undertaken active operations against that Prince, as it has since been ascertained that he was in close communication with Tippoo at the time he was professing the warmest attachment to the English. That attachment might perhaps have been secured had Lord Cornwallis favoured his designs against the Rajpoot States in the north of Hindustan, and given him a contingent with which he could have overawed the Court of Poonah.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

DEAR SIR, Camp near Ootradroog, Jan. 13, 1792.

Nothing very material has occurred in this quarter since I wrote to you on the 21st ultimo.

Our allies plague me not a little: I have however contrived to keep the ascendancy over those who have remained with our

army, but Purseram Bhow, who departed from us in July and went to Sera and Chittledroog, under the most positive promise of returning to this army whenever Hurry Punt and myself should require it, has entirely broke his engagements, and, notwithstanding our pressing requisition, has moved directly westward as far as the Tumbuddra, where he has engaged in desultory or rather predatory operations.

This unjustifiable conduct on the part of the Bhow will render it a matter of some difficulty to secure the communications in our rear, even with the assistance of all the forts that we have taken; but the greatest embarrassment that I apprehend from it regards the movements of General Abercromby, whose corps the Bhow had promised to join, and who cannot come forward with his battering-train on the south bank of the Caveri, unless he is reinforced by some battalions and a considerable corps of cavalry.

I hope and trust however that all these obstacles will be surmounted, and that I shall find some means of bringing the greatest part of General Abercromby's corps into action.

Colonel Duff with the battering-train from Bangalore will arrive in camp in two or three days, and I believe we shall be perfectly prepared to begin our march about the 22nd or 23rd, by which time I expect to be joined by the Nizam's Son and his Minister, and by many thousand binjarries, who are I hear on this side of the Ghauts; the latter, though not so high sounding, are at least as useful a reinforcement as the former.

I have already said much on the subject; but as Stuart will certainly go home next season, and as —— stands next to him in Council, I am convinced that in justice to yourself and to the public I cannot too strongly impress upon your mind, the fatal consequences that must ensue from the latter's having the supreme power in India even for a few weeks.

There is no hold whatever on a man so wonderfully eccentric, neither a regard for his interest and character, nor the public welfare and the honour and faith of Government, would weigh an instant against some absurd and pernicious caprice which interested men may have had art enough to work on his vanity to adopt. He never comes unprejudiced upon any question, but suffers himself to be influenced by the partial representations of the party which can get possession of his ear, and he would screen, or even promote, the greatest delinquent if he happened to be one of his old friends in the service; and, although I believe no man ever thought so totally wrong on any subject as he does upon the whole business of Bengal government, yet he has acuteness and information

enough to be capable of embarrassing many colleagues who might actually happen to differ widely in opinion from him; and you must also recollect that, in case of Stuart's and my departure, he would have an opportunity of calling in a third member, who in all probability would be the most improper man in the whole service for that situation.

In short, if —— was an acknowledged fool or a capable rogue, I think he would be a much safer Governor-General.

After what I have said I am sure you will see the necessity of having a new Governor-General on the spot before my departure. I must see an end of the war and settle the terms of peace, which, considering the character of our allies, will be no easy task, and I must return for a few months to Bengal. All this I hope will be effected by the beginning of the next year, so as to admit of my embarking by the middle of March at farthest. . . .

I cannot say too much in praise of the conduct of Mr. Stuart, who has acted a most honourable part towards me, and has shown more steadiness of character than I thought he was capable of.

Since writing the above, Hurry Punt has sent to inform me that he has just received an express from Purseram Bhow, to acquaint him that he had defeated a considerable corps of the enemy near Samoga, and had taken eight pieces of cannon.

This lucky event may render it more practicable for the Bhow to co-operate with us by the route that he has taken, than it would have otherwise been.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR WILLIAM FAWCETT TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Private.] Received Jan. 20, 1792.

MY DEAR LORD, Great George Street, July 26, 1791.

. . . Your Lordship's arrangement respecting the Hanoverians, in forming one useful battalion out of the two inefficient ones, speaks for itself, being an expedient not only advisable but even indispensably necessary upon the pressure of the occasion, and being considered by His Majesty in that light, met accordingly with his entire approbation. . . .

Your encomium upon Major-General Medows's generous and disinterested behaviour to you, on your taking the command of the army out of his hands, was particularly agreeable and well received here, where so many reports had been circulated to his disadvantage, and Mr. Dundas, on that account, made a point of insert-

ing it, amongst other matters of intelligence from your Lordship, in the public papers.

Your remonstrance against the manner in which the Field-Officers' commissions in the 52nd Regiment and the late Lieut.-Colonel Elphinstone's in the 71st, were disposed of, is but too well founded; and which I opposed, as far as I was able, at the time when those shameful jobs were in agitation, though to no purpose. The first of them was carried by the irresistible influence of the Treasury; and I believe I told your Lordship in a former letter[1] to whom Barry[2] was indebted for his succession to Colonel Elphinstone. Our Royal Master has been upon his guard against similar solicitations ever since, as you may have observed by his subsequent conduct; . . . and I have every reason to think that His Majesty will never be prevailed upon again to yield to any importunities whatever, for favours of the like nature to be conferred upon officers under your Lordship's command in India, which do not come recommended to him by your Lordship. . . .

I am, &c.,

WM. FAWCETT.

LORD SYDNEY TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Received Jan. 21, 1792.]

MY DEAR LORD, Grosvenor Square, June 16, 1791.

. . . The Rodney arrived just as the Parliament was rising, and various reports were circulated by a set of people who seem to act here as Tippoo's Vakeels, and are perhaps in his pay. The violent animosity between you and General Medows was among the most current. But your letters have given a fatal blow to that forgery. I have received one from Medows, in which he speaks of your Lordship in the strongest terms of affection and respect. We are impatient to hear the event of your campaign, and promise ourselves a happy one. Among all our differences here there is none upon your subject, but I cannot say that all the encomiums upon you seem equally sincere. Among the exceptions I shall always reckon those of an old acquaintance of ours at the bottom of Berkeley Square, who is at present in a state of great and extraordinary political violence. You will learn that Dundas has succeeded to the seals of the Home Department. The world says that he is only a *locum tenens*, and that his tenure will

[1] That letter has not been found.

[2] Lieut.-Colonel Henry Barry was made Lieut.-Colonel 39th Regt. Dec. 8, 1790. He left the service March 31, 1793.

determine on your arrival. I believe that no appointment can please more than that will do; and I do not think that you will find the office an unpleasant one. We are waiting with impatience for a courier from Russia, what he will bring I cannot pretend to foretell, but the stockholders seem to expect peace, as that political barometer continues high.

The affairs of France are still in the same confusion. There are appearances as if the proscribed party thought of an attempt to disturb the present governing powers, but I own I do not see a probability of their succeeding at present, or doing anything more than giving occasion to further persecutions.

I am going to Matson[1] to settle my affairs, which I find under every embarrassment that folly, inattention, and malevolence could have occasioned. My good uncle[2] has disposed of all that he had in his power in favour of Mlle. Fagnani[3] in the first place, then to Lord Carlisle's[4] children, with old Queensberry for his residuary Legatee. You may perhaps be more surprised than flattered to hear, that the last words which he said to me were to desire his compliments to your Lordship.

My family desire to be remembered to you in the kindest manner. They are, thank God, all well. My daughter-in-law adds much to our happiness, as she is one of the most pleasing and amiable creatures that ever was born. I am happy to tell you that Lord Brome is grown very stout and athletic. He preserves his natural openness and good nature. . . .

Yours most affectionately,

SYDNEY.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. W. PITT.

DEAR SIR, Camp near Outradroog, Jan. 23, 1792.

I enclose a duplicate of my letter dated the 3rd December. It has, however, since occurred to me that, although my detention

[1] Matson, in Gloucestershire, which he had lately inherited from George Selwyn.

[2] George Augustus Selwyn, b. Aug. 11, 1719, d. Jan. 25, 1791, unm.; M.P. for Ludgershall, Nov. 1747 to 1754, then for Gloucester city to 1780, and then again for Ludgershall till his death. He left Mdlle. Fagnani 33,000*l.*

[3] Mdlle. Maria Fagnani. Her reputed father was the Marchese Fagnani, a Milanese nobleman; but the scandal of the day assigned the paternity either to the Duke of Queensberry or to George Selwyn; b. Aug. 25, 1771, m. May 18, 1798, Francis Charles, 3rd Marquis of Hertford, K.G. The Duke of Queensberry also left her the greater proportion of his personal property, amounting to near 150,000*l.*, but the heirs-at-law contested the legacy, and recovered part of it.

[4] Frederick, 5th Earl of Carlisle, K.G., b. May 28, 1748, d. Sept. 4, 1825, m. March 22, 1770, Margaret Caroline, dau. of Granville Leveson, 1st Marquis of Stafford. Treasurer of the Household, June, 1777; sent to America to negotiate peace, 1778; First Lord of Trade, Nov. 1779; Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, Dec. 1780, to April, 1782, and Privy Seal, April to Dec. 1783.

in India must naturally do away the present question, I ought to have given my sentiments more explicitly on the subject at large, in order to prevent that favourable opinion, which is so highly flattering to me, from being the cause of trouble and embarrassment to you on a future occasion.

I will freely own to you that if anything could induce me to come forward in a station of business and responsibility at home, it would be the allurement that would be held out to my vanity by being enrolled as a member[1] of an administration, the uprightness of whose principles, and the wisdom and vigour of whose conduct, I so truly respect.

I have, however, always been of opinion that no man who has a regard for the consideration in which he is to stand with his country, should produce himself, even in the House of Lords, as an efficient member of Administration, without possessing such powers and habits of Parliamentary debate as would enable him to do justice to a good cause, and defend his measures as well as those of his colleagues.

This maxim of *orator fit*, which has produced so much bad speaking and so much *ennui* in this world, may be true in some instances, but he is not to be made *e quovis ligno*, and I should doubt whether the timber ought to undergo the seasoning of above half a century.

We can talk more fully upon this subject when we meet, and in any event you may be assured that I shall at all times be ready to communicate any local knowledge I may possess, and to give my opinions both of Indian men and measures, in the most unreserved manner to yourself and Mr. Dundas, and to those who act with you.

I think, notwithstanding all that has been said to the contrary, that the destruction of Tippoo's power would be very desirable, but peace upon safe and honourable terms is still the first and greatest object, and the most encouraging prospects shall not induce me to neglect an opportunity of obtaining it.

I am, with very great regard, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

[1] Mr. Pitt had offered the Seals of Secretary of State to Lord Cornwallis. The letter which conveyed the proposition cannot be found either in original or in draft.

GENERAL ORDERS. From the ORIGINAL DRAFT in LORD CORNWALLIS'S own Handwriting.

Camp before Seringapatam, Feb. 6, 1792.

The Army to march in three divisions:—

Right—

General MEDOWS.

36th and 76th Regts.—Lieut.-Colonel NESBITT.
3rd Brigade—Lieut.-Colonel COCKERELL.
1st Battalion 6th Brigade.
Lieutenant LENNAN'S Pioneers.—Engineers.—Scaling ladders.

Centre—

Lord CORNWALLIS.
Lieut.-Colonel STUART.

52nd, 71st, and 74th Regts.—Lieut.-Colonel KNOX.
4th Brigade.—Major RUSSELL.
2 Battalions 6th Brigade—Major LANGLEY.
Lieutenant DOWSE'S Pioneers.—Engineers.—Scaling ladders.

Left—

Lieut.-Colonel MAXWELL.

72nd Regt.
5th Brigade—Lieut.-Colonel BAIRD.
Ensign STOKOE'S Pioneers.—Engineers.—Scaling ladders.

—o—

ORDER OF MARCH.

Right—

Lieut.-Colonel NESBITT.

1 Battalion Company 36th Regt.
Pioneers.
4 European Flank Companies, with scaling ladders.
36th Regt.
2 Bengal Battalions.

General MEDOWS.
Lieut.-Colonel COCKERELL.

Engineers.
76th Regt.
2 Bengal Battalions.
1 Battalion 6th Brigade.

Centre—

Lieut.-Colonel KNOX.

1 Battalion Company, 52nd Regt
Pioneers.
6 European Flank Companies, with scaling ladders.
52nd Regt.
1 Bengal Battalion.

Lord CORNWALLIS.
Lieut.-Colonel STUART.
Engineers.
71st Regt.
2 Bengal Battalions.
74th Regt.
2 Battalions 6th Brigade.

Left—

Lieut.-Colonel BAIRD or Major FRASER.
1 Flank Company, 72nd Regt.
1 Flank Company, with scaling ladders.
Pioneers.
1 Battalion 5th Brigade.

Lieut.-Colonel MAXWELL.
72nd Regt.
2 Battalions 5th Brigade.

If the right attack is made to the westward of Sonarpet, the troops of that attack should, after entering the enemy's lines, turn to the left; but if the attack is made to the eastward of Sonarpet, the troops should turn to the right, to dislodge the enemy from all the posts on the left of their position.

The troops of the centre attack, after entering the enemy's lines, should turn to the left. The front divisions, however, of both the right and centre attacks should, after entering, advance nearly to the extent of the depth of the enemy's camp before they turn to either side, in order to make room for those that follow; and such parts of both divisions, as well as of the left division, as the Commanding Officer shall not think it necessary to keep in a compact body, will endeavour to mix with the fugitives, and pass over into the island with them.

Lieutenant Macleod will furnish guides.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO SIR CHARLES OAKELEY, BART.

SIR, Camp near Seringapatam, Feb. 8, 1792.

On the 5th instant I encamped about seven miles to the northward of Seringapatam, from whence I saw that Tippoo had, according to my information, taken a position on the north bank of the river, with its front and flanks covered by a bound hedge and a number of ravines, swamps, and watercourses, and likewise fortified by a chain of strong redoubts full of cannon, as well as by the artillery of the fort and of the works on the island.

It would have cost us a great many men to have attacked this

camp in the day, and perhaps the success might not have been quite certain. I determined therefore to make the attempt in the night, and for this purpose I marched on the 6th, as soon after sunset as the troops could be formed, in three divisions. The right division, commanded by General Medows, and the centre division, under my immediate direction, were destined for the attack of the enemy's camp, and the division on the left, consisting of four battalions under Lieut.-Colonel Maxwell, was ordered to attack the works that the enemy were constructing on the heights above the Karegat Pagoda.

The officers commanding the leading corps in the right and centre divisions were directed, after driving the enemy from their camp, to endeavour to pursue them through the river, and establish themselves on the island, and it was recommended to Lieut.-Colonel Maxwell to attempt to pass the river, if, after having possessed himself of the heights, he saw that our attack on the camp was successful.

The left and centre divisions were so fortunate as to accomplish completely the objects proposed. Lieut.-Colonel Maxwell gained the heights, and afterwards passed the river, and the first five corps of the centre division crossed over to the island, leaving me in possession of the camp which was standing, and of all the artillery of the enemy's right wing.

The division of the right, by some of those accidents to which all operations in the night must be liable, approached much too near to a very strong detached work which it was not my intention to assault that night, and which must have fallen into our hands without giving us any trouble, if we succeeded in forcing the enemy's camp.

The advanced guard engaged in the attack of this work before they could be prevented by the officers in the front of the column, and the latter, who had been used to carry forts with much facility, did not think it necessary or perhaps creditable to oblige them to desist; but the garrison of this redoubt conducted themselves very differently from those which we had lately met with, and their resistance was so obstinate that it was not carried without costing us several lives and a very considerable delay.

By this time the firing at the centre attack had entirely ceased, and General Medows, concluding from that circumstance that I was in complete possession of the whole of the enemy's camp, and apprehending that a part of his corps might be wanted to support the troops on the island, wished to communicate with me as speedily as possible.

Some guides who undertook to lead his division to join mine by a direct road, conducted him to the Karegat Pagoda without his meeting with me, and daylight was too near to admit of his undertaking any further operations.

These untoward circumstances did not deprive us of any of the solid advantages of our victory, for we are in possession of the whole of the enemy's redoubts, of all the ground on the north side of the river, and of great part of the island, but as the force with which I remained in the enemy's camp, did not much exceed three battalions, and as I found from parties that I sent out, that the left wing of Tippoo's army kept their ground all night, I could not bring off any trophies from the field except those that were very near to the spot where our impression was made.

I have not yet been able to ascertain with precision the number of guns that have fallen into our hands, but I understand that of brass and iron it amounts to upwards of sixty of different calibres.

I shall take up my ground to-morrow as near to the chain of redoubts as possible, without being exposed to the fire of the fort, and, as our posts upon the island are now nearly secured against any attempt of the enemy, I shall soon be ready to proceed with vigour upon the operations of the siege.

It has been hitherto impossible to collect the returns of the killed and wounded, but I have every reason to hope that our loss in Europeans will be under two hundred. I will send a list of the officers that were killed, in order to prevent the anxious alarm of the friends of the survivors.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

GENERAL ABSTRACT.

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
Europeans	68	213	21	302
Natives	40	168	23	231
General Total	108	381	44	533

Lieut.-Colonel Malcolm,[1] Adjutant-General of the Army, wounded, not included in the above.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO TIPPOO SULTAUN.

Feb. 11, 1792.

I have received your letter by the hands of Mahomed Ally, to whose verbal communication you refer for other particulars, and

[1] Lieut.-Colonel, afterwards Colonel, Henry Malcolm, d. March 31, 1834.

Lieutenant Chalmers, and four other persons who formed part of late garrison of Coimbatore, are arrived with me.

I have perfectly understood the contents of the papers bearing the seal of Cummur-ud-Deen,[1] which was brought by Lieutenant Chalmers, and which contains a reference for your approbation of its purport. But I was sorry to learn from that officer, who does not understand the Persian language, that another paper, written in Hindoo and English, signed by himself, and likewise under the seal of Cummur-ud-Deen, by which it was agreed that the garrison of Coimbatore should be permitted to march unmolested, with their private property, to Palgaucherry (without waiting for any reference to you), was taken from him by force a few days before he was released; and it gives me concern to add, that I have heard through various channels that the remainder of that garrison, which ought to have been set at liberty when they surrendered the fort, are not only at this time in confinement, but that many of them are actually in irons.

Notwithstanding these circumstances however, the release of Lieutenant Chalmers, &c., is considered by myself and other members of the Confederacy as an indication on your part of a disposition to make atonement for the breach of the capitulation of Coimbatore: it has, on account of the present critical situation of affairs, been resolved by the Allied Powers, not to insist upon a compleat execution of that capitulation previous to any negotiation, and we shall therefore be ready to receive a confidential person or persons deputed by you to communicate to Deputies that will be appointed on our part, the concessions and compensations that you are willing to make to the Confederates.

I request that whoever you may choose to send may come by the Derca-dowlut Baug Ford, and when you name the day and hour at which they are to come, I shall order the officer commanding in the redoubt opposite to it, to send a party of soldiers to receive them, and to conduct them in security to the neighbourhood of the Eed Gah Redoubt, where the deputies from the Allies will meet them to hear your propositions.

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO SIR CHARLES OAKELEY, BART.

SIR, Camp near Seringapatam, Feb. 20, 1792.

. . . I was too much fatigued when I got into my tent, which was very late in the day of the 7th, and had too many anxious

[1] Cummerr-ud-Dien was an officer of some distinction in Tippoo's army.

cares upon my mind, to be capable of giving an account of the action; and indeed I did not then perfectly know the extent of our advantage, the consequences of which have even proved more favourable to us, and more important, than I considered when I wrote my letter on the 8th.

A negotiation is now in some forwardness, and unless Tippoo's Vakeels have exceeded their Master's instructions, promises to be brought to a speedy conclusion,—the basis of which is the surrender of one-half of Tippoo's dominions, to be divided amongst the Allies according to the terms of the treaty, and to be chosen by them from the countries most contiguous or convenient for them. A large sum of money is likewise to be paid, and the Sultaun's two eldest sons to be given as hostages till the articles are fulfilled.

I confess that an arrangement of this kind, which effectually destroys the dangerous power of Tippoo, will be more beneficial to the public than the capture of Seringapatam, and it will render the final settlement with our Allies, who seem very partial to it, much more easy.

Those whose passions are heated, and who are not responsible for consequences, will probably exclaim against leaving the tyrant an inch of territory, but it is my duty to consult the real interest of the Company and the nation.

I return you many thanks for your kind congratulations, and am,

Yours, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

COPY OF THE PRELIMINARY ARTICLES AGREED UPON AND EXCHANGED.

Dated Feb. 22, 1792.

1. One-half of the dominions which were in possession of Tippoo Sultaun at the commencement of the present war shall be ceded to the Allies, adjacent to their respective boundaries, and agreeably to their selection.

2. Three crores and thirty lacs of Sicca rupees shall be paid to the Allies, agreeably to the following particulars, viz.:—

   1. One crore and sixty-five lacs shall be paid immediately in pagodas, or gold mohurs, or rupees, of full weight and standard, or in gold or silver bullion.
   2. The remainder, one crore and sixty-five lacs, at three instalments, not exceeding four months each, in the three coins before mentioned.

3. All subjects of the four several Powers, who may have been

prisoners from the time of the late Hyder Ally Khan to the present period, shall be fairly and unequivocally released.

4. Until the due performance of the three articles above mentioned, two of the three eldest sons of Tippoo Sultaun shall be given as hostages, on the arrival of whom a cessation of hostilities shall take place.

5. When an agreement containing the articles above written shall arrive, bearing the seal and signature of Tippoo Sultaun, counter agreements shall be sent from the three Powers, and after the cessation of hostilities such a definitive treaty of perpetual friendship, as shall be settled by the several parties, shall be adjusted and entered into.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO SIR CHARLES OAKELEY, BART.

SIR, Camp near Seringapatam, Feb. 26, 1792.

Tippoo's second[1] and third[2] sons did not arrive in our camp till this day. The former is about ten years old, and the latter, who is the son of Burramund Dien's[3] sister, and considered as the heir to the Sultanah, about eight. The delay in their arrival was not occasioned by any interruption of the Treaty, but by the difficulty and distress of their leaving the Zenana, and by Tippoo's anxiety that they should be properly received by me.

You will easily imagine that to children under their circumstances, I could not be deficient in showing every mark of kindness and respect, and I was happy to observe that the boys seemed to entertain no apprehensions of their new father.

Our deputies and Tippoo's Vakeels will now enter earnestly upon their business, and as soon as we can receive our first payment of money, I think we may retire a little from this dreary waste.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

[1] Prince Abdul Khalic, b. 1772, d. Sept. 1806, at the Sand Heads on his passage to Calcutta.

[2] Prince Moaz Addeen, b. 1774, d. March 30, 1818. He was implicated in the massacre of Vellore, Oct. 9, 1807, and was kept in strict confinement from that time to his death. They were both restored to their father, May 29, 1794, but after the capture of Seringapatam, they, with the rest of Tippoo's family, including four sons, were again made prisoners. One son only, Prince Gholam Mahommed, now survives (Dec. 1857). He visited England some years ago.

[3] Burramund Din, of a noble family in Mysore.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO SIR CHARLES OAKELEY, BART.

SIR, Camp near Seringapatam, March 2, 1792.

. . . In the course of yesterday and the day before, Tippoo has sent out a crore and ten lacs of rupees, and the Vakeels promise that in three or four days the first kists, amounting to one crore and sixty-five lacs, shall be discharged.

In consequence of his intention to execute the treaty faithfully, I have directed General Abercromby to fall back a few miles to-morrow, and encamp near the Kinnamhaddy Ford; and I have assured the Vakeels that if they deal fairly with us about the accounts of the revenues, I will in two or three days withdraw our troops from the Island.

I cannot yet tell what extent of country will fall to our share, but my first option will be the Barramaul and Salem districts, which will afford a secure frontier to the Carnatic. . . .

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

SIR, Camp before Seringapatam, March 4, 1792.

I have very great satisfaction in transmitting to you the enclosed copy of the Preliminaries of Peace, that were settled on the night of the 23rd February between the three confederate Powers and Tippoo Sultaun, to be laid before His Majesty.

Although some circumstances delayed the delivery of the hostages until the 26th, I was induced, by the earnest desire of Tippoo, to consent to a cessation of hostilities on the 24th ultimo; and I trust that not only the Preliminary Articles will soon be completely executed, but also that those of the Definitive Treaty will without much delay be adjusted and concluded.

Having given a detail of the military operations that preceded the cessation of arms, and of several particulars of the negotiation, in a letter of this date addressed to the Honourable Court of Directors, which will be officially communicated to you for His Majesty's information, it becomes unnecessary to trouble you with a repetition of the contents of that letter. But I request that you will be pleased to assure His Majesty, that although the formidable power of Tippoo has been so much reduced by the event of a war into which we were forced by the ungovernable ambition and violence of his character, as to render it improbable that he can be

able, for many years to come, to give any material disturbance to the British possessions in India; yet that in the selection of the countries that are to be ceded to us, my primary object shall be to fix upon those districts, to the extent of our rights by the present treaty, that may be from local situation best calculated for giving us a strong defensive frontier against the future attacks of any Power whatever from above the Ghauts.

I must beg that you will also inform the King, that, gallantly as His Majesty's troops on this service have behaved on all other occasions, their courage and discipline were never more eminent, or their services more valuable to their country, than in the attack of the enemy's fortified camp on the night of the 6th ultimo.

My warmest acknowledgments were therefore due to the officers and soldiers in general for their behaviour in that action; and I am persuaded, when proper opportunities offer, it will likewise prove the most effectual recommendation for them to His Majesty's favour. General Medows, who had some time ago resolved to return to Europe as soon as the war should be concluded, intends, with my entire approbation, to embark on the last ship of this season that sails from Madras; and I think it my duty on this occasion to declare that the zeal and ability which the General has constantly employed during this war, in promoting the interests of this country, have in my opinion done great honour to himself, and that the friendly support and assistance which he has uniformly afforded me, have laid me under the most lasting obligations.

It has at the same time been my singular good fortune to experience a co-operation and assistance no less zealous and friendly from General Abercromby, in his able conduct of the army that was formed on the Coast of Malabar, and I request that you will be pleased to communicate my sentiments on the behaviour and merits of both these officers to His Majesty.

This despatch will be delivered to you by Captain Maḍan, my A.D.C., whom I beg leave to recommend to His Majesty as a deserving officer; and as he has served in the field from the commencement of the war, he will, I trust, be able to give you satisfactory explanations of all the operations and transactions that he has witnessed.

I have the honour to enclose a list of the killed, wounded, and missing of the troops under my command, from the 6th ultimo to the day of the cessation of arms inclusive; with a return of the artillery that fell into our hands upon the defeat of the enemy's army.

I have the honour, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

[Private].

DEAR SIR, Camp near Seringapatam, March 4, 1792.

We have at length concluded our Indian war handsomely, and I think as advantageously as any reasonable person could expect. We have effectually crippled our enemy without making our friends too formidable. Indeed I am well convinced that the impression they have received of the power and superiority of our arms, will greatly overbalance any confidence with which their territorial acquisitions can possibly inspire them.

I have entered so fully into the details of the operations of the war and the negociations for peace in my public letter, that it is unnecessary to say anything further on those subjects. I shall therefore only express my hopes that the gentlemen who talked so much nonsense about the balance of power, and the barrier of Tippoo, will have the grace to be ashamed of themselves, and I assure you how sincerely I wished that those who so strenuously opposed the measure of sending out the King's regiments, had been with me on the night of the 6th of February.

I received your letter dated the 1st of August by the Canada packet, in which there are but few points that require notice. I have been too much occupied this last twelvemonth to spare time to think of the Andaman Island, but I shall probably meet my brother in May at Madras, when we will enter earnestly into that business. There can be no doubt of the propriety of our establishing ourselves in one of the harbours on that island, but my brother has seen one that he thinks far preferable to Port Cornwallis. . . .

I have a serious grievance in the Counsellor line. You will readily guess that I mean the appointment of Mr. ——.[1] This unexpected stroke has filled up the measure of our misfortunes in Bengal; and composed as that Council already is, will, I apprehend, render it difficult, if not impossible, for the best Governor to save that devoted country.

Of all the Company's servants, out of the degree of total inability, I really think ——, even independent of his bankruptcy, the most unfit for a seat in Council. He has no fixed or steady opinions on any points of the public business, and he is now a bankrupt by continuing his engagements in a commercial house, after he had, to save his seat at —— of ——, made a public declaration that he had quitted it; but what is worst of all, with a strong propensity to jobbing and intrigue, he has formed connexions with

[1] The appointment ultimately did not take place.

the worst black people in Bengal. You will easily conceive that what I have said does not proceed from any personal ill-will to ——, when I tell you that he is an exceedingly good-humoured fellow, and has always been remarkably so with me, and I am sure that he would readily, either in a public or private capacity, comply with any of my wishes. But I cannot help feeling for the future bad consequences that may arise from his becoming a member of Government.

I have other grievances which I must state to the Court of Directors, but I will not mix ill-humour with the present despatch. Their restoration of that rascal * *, who has no revenue abilities or merit whatever, and who behaved in the most insolent manner to the Board in return for our having been much too lenient to him—their approbation of * * *'s plan about the Sunderbunds, after the Board of Revenue had so clearly stated the folly and impracticability of it—and, lastly, their retracting the paragraph which left to me the nomination of the Advocate-General, are sufficient to shake the credit of the best-established Government in India; to which I may add the breach of their own regulations by the infamous job done for that very unworthy subject Colonel ——.

* * luckily ran away from the settlement before the order for reinstating him arrived, and * * * is removed from the collectorship of —— for malpractices.

If the Court of Directors cannot be controlled, I retract my opinion in favour of their continuance after the expiration of the Charter. But I must confess that I cannot help believing that those orders, so degrading to our Government, and some of them so slighting to myself, could not have found their way to India, if the Board of Control had not been too much occupied with other matters to have paid proper attention to them. . . . .

It was the intention of Medows to embark for England as soon as possible after the conclusion of the war, and he has determined to proceed to Madras as soon as his health will permit, and take his passage in the Dalton, which is the last ship of the season. His conduct in all the business has been so generous and noble, that I need hardly request that you will show him all possible attention, and procure for him a cordial reception at St. James's.

Anxious as I shall be to get to Bengal, I can hardly hope to be there before June, especially as I must devote some time, although I am afraid to very little purpose, for my conversations with the Nabob of Arcot, who appears to me to be violently hostile to the present Government of Fort St. George, and very little inclined to accede to any reasonable proposal.

I shall trust entirely to you to find a good successor for me at Bengal, and to contrive that he shall arrive there early in the year 1793.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO SIR CHARLES OAKELEY, BART.

SIR, Camp near Seringapatam, March 11, 1792.

I always expected that we should have a good deal of trouble in making Tippoo swallow so bitter a pill as the present treaty, and in that respect I have not been disappointed, for he has practised every species of chicane and every pretext for delay.

It is, however, necessary for us on all accounts that the business should be brought to a speedy issue, and if he should not in two or three days comply with our positive requisitions, I shall think it necessary to have recourse to coercive measures.

After giving up his two sons as hostages, and paying even by our account above eleven hundred thousand pounds, it is not easy to suppose that he can have an idea of renewing hostilities, yet he is a man that must not be trusted too far, especially as, besides all the difficulties he has started about the country and the money, he has, notwithstanding my daily remonstrances and his repeated promises to desist, constantly employed great numbers of men in strengthening the wall opposite to our approaches.

General Medows, who was at my tent this morning, intended setting out to-morrow for Madras, but he has postponed his journey for a few days on account of the rubs in the negotiation.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO SIR CHARLES OAKELEY, BART.

SIR, Camp near Seringapatam, March 13, 1792.

. . . I am sorry to say that things at present bear a much less pacific appearance than they did when I wrote to you on the 11th.

The enclosed copies of our requisition of what appeared to us to be our right according to the treaty, in a fair division of Tippoo's country, and of Sir John Kennaway's letter to the Vakeels on their communicating to him the Sultaun's answer to it, will explain fully the present state of affairs.

If Tippoo did from the first determine not to give us the Burramaul and Salem districts, nor the forts of Gooty and Belhary to our Allies, he certainly did not seriously intend to execute the conditions of the preliminary articles, nor could he expect to conclude a peace.

He began to work in the fort on the very night on which he sent in his sons, and he has very much strengthened the wall opposite to our attack; but I should doubt whether all he has done or can do, will be worth eleven hundred thousand pounds and two such hostages.

Purseram Bhow will march to-morrow to Caniambaddy Ford in order to join General Abercromby, and I intend that Tippoo's sons shall set out in the morning for Bangalore.

I have this night sent my despatches for Madan to take on board the Northumberland; but as they talk too confidently of peace, I would not have them sent to England unless appearances should alter very much, at all events it will be desirable to detain the ship a few days.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO SIR CHARLES OAKELEY, BART.

SIR, Camp near Seringapatam, March 15, 1792.

. . . The appearance of things is rather altered for the better since I wrote to you on the 13th, but I shall consider the business in a very uncertain state until the definitive treaty is signed, and the whole of the first kist is paid.

The Vakeels last night acquiesced in the surrender of Gooty and Belhary and the Burramaul and Salem Country, if the whole of the latter should not make our proportion too large, in which case we must be satisfied with a part of it; and after much altercation and difficulty, they said that their master would give the Coorga Country rather than quarrel with us. The dispute about the batta has likewise been settled this morning by Mr. Cherry and the Vakeels—the latter reserving an ultimate reference to Tippoo.

Thus far matters may be said to wear a promising aspect, but Tippoo's unremitting industry in working night and day would occasion doubt of the sincerity of a person of better character.

. . . As this important business must now be brought to a crisis in a few hours, I think no ship should sail for England till it is finally settled.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

THE SECRET COMMITTEE TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Received March 16, 1792.]

MY LORD, East India House, Sept. 21, 1791.

. . . The brilliant successes which by our last accounts have attended your Lordship's operations, give us great room to hope that an honourable and advantageous peace may have been concluded before this despatch can reach India. At all events, from the variety of circumstances of which it is impossible for us to be sufficiently informed beforehand, we do not feel it in our power to give any precise instructions for your Lordship's guidance with respect to the terms on which it may be proper to insist: we have the fullest confidence in your Lordship's discretion in the completion of this important work, and we know that you are impressed as deeply as ourselves with a sense how essential it is to the finances and interests of the Company, that the war should be brought to a speedy termination. We have, therefore, only to state in conformity to this idea, that although in the event of as successful an issue of the war as we have ground to expect, we certainly feel ourselves entitled to look to such advantageous conditions as may in some measure indemnify us for our expense, and give additional security in future,—we are nevertheless particularly desirous that we should rather forego even some portion of the advantages which we might justly expect, than risk the continuance of the war. The great object, therefore, to which we wish your Lordship's attention to be directed, and which we are persuaded you will have uniformly had in view, is that of embracing the first possible opportunity of concluding the war on reasonable and honourable terms for ourselves and our Allies.

We are, &c.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

DEAR SIR, Camp before Seringapatam, March 17, 1792.

I yesterday received your letter dated 21st September, and the letter from the Secret Committee by the Swan sloop of war, and am happy to find that my sentiments in regard to peace have corresponded so much with those of the Government at home.

Our acquisitions on the Malabar coast are inaccessible to any enemy that does not come by sea, except on the north frontier, and I am assured that from the rivers and creeks with which that

part of the country is intersected, it would be very difficult to attack us in that quarter.

The possession of the Coorga country and of Palacatcherry effectually secure the two passes by which only, Tippoo could possibly disturb us.

The Rajahs on that coast are not independent, but now become our subjects, and if we can put them in some degree on the footing of the Bengal Zemindars and prevent their oppressing the people under them, the commerce of that country in pepper, spices, &c., may become extremely advantageous to the Company. The nett revenue amounts to about 25 lacs of rupees, which will be a great help at present to Bombay; and Cananore will be a much better and safer place of arms than Tellichery.

The revenues of the Coimbatore country would have made our proportion too great, but if that had not been the case, as it is an open defenceless country, I should have preferred the districts I have chosen, viz. Barramaul, Salém, and Dindigul, which form a strong barrier to the Carnatic and to the southern provinces on the Coromandel coast, and contain several forts that no person in India can take from us.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

March 18, 1792.

P.S. The definitive treaty is this instant signed: you will receive a copy of it by the next opportunity.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO H. R. H. THE DUKE OF YORK.

Camp at Kunègul, on the march from Seringapatam to the Carnatic, April 6, 1792.

SIR,

I received a few days ago by the Swan sloop of war your Royal Highness's most obliging letter, dated the 30th of April. As it remained in England near five months after it was written, although several opportunities offered in the intermediate time for its being forwarded to India, I trust I shall stand acquitted before your Royal Highness, for not having sooner assured you of my earnest desire to pay every possible attention to your commands.

. . . I am at length happily relieved from the heaviest burthen that can oppress the mind of a man who has any feeling for his own character and the good of his country—the command of an army in a difficult and important war. My merits as a soldier and a negotiator must be decided by the judgment of my country: I shall only say that I have done my best, that I have

spared no pains, and that I would not live the last year over again for any reward that could be held out to me.

My responsibility was certainly increased by the circumstance of my being obliged to engage in the war, and to determine on the measure of forming alliances with the country powers, without being able to communicate with the Government at home. But I was so convinced of the absolute necessity of the war, and of the expediency of taking every means in my power to insure its success, that I felt myself prepared to answer for my conduct in these respects before the most rigid or even prejudiced tribunal.

Your Royal Highness's German expedition has ended very differently from what I should have been led to expect from your letter, and however desirous I might have been that you should have acquired military experience, I most sincerely rejoice in the different termination; being most firmly persuaded from the opinion which I formed of the Princess[1] of Prussia when I had the honour of attending you at Berlin, that the step you have taken is most likely to insure your future happiness.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

DEAR SIR, Camp at Kunegul, April 9, 1792.

We have halted some days at this place to take leave of our Allies, which has been effected with the strongest appearances of perfect cordiality on all sides.

Hurry Punt and Azeem ul Omrah[2] applied separately to me to request a friendly interference on our part, whenever any disputes might arise between the Governments of Poonah and Hydrabad. I gave a very guarded answer, promising my good offices in general to strengthen and promote the friendship that has so long subsisted between the Nizam and the Peshwa, declaring at the same time that if each party would write to me on the subject, I would be more explicit in regard to the stile and species of mediation that I thought our Government could with propriety adopt.

I have postponed the arrangement of a proper guarantee for our mutual acquisitions (which is a business of much delicacy and caution) till we shall have returned to our respective capitals, when

[1] Frederica Charlotte, dau. of Frederick William II., king of Prussia, b. May 7, 1767, d. Aug. 6, 1820, m. Sept. 29, 1791, the Duke of York.

[2] Azeem ul Omrah, a Minister of the Nizam.

we shall have leisure to reflect coolly on the subject, and when it may be put in a train to be finally adjusted by Sir C. Malet and Sir J. Kennaway.

Tippoo, by his Vakeels at least, appears to be disposed to cultivate us, and expresses much inveteracy against our Allies, especially the Marattas; but I here only speak from the mouth of the Vakeels, for on every occasion where they have been obliged to bring forward the letters or instructions that they received directly from him, he does not seem to be in any degree softened towards us, nor to be one jot less insolent than in the times of his greatest prosperity.

The rapid increase of the number of our European sick has so far exceeded all calculation, that we shall have the greatest difficulty in removing them from Bangalore and Ooscottah; and the army, notwithstanding the inconvenience and expense attending the delay, must, I apprehend, be detained above the Ghauts till the 20th of next month. It is likewise very vexatious to myself personally who have so much to do at Madras and Calcutta, but I do not think it prudent to leave the army whilst it continues in Tippoo's territories.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE REV. B. GRISDALE.

Camp on the march from Seringapatam towards the Carnatic, April 12, 1792.

DEAR GRISDALE,

No man will I am sure rejoice more sincerely than yourself at my having brought the Mysore war to an advantageous and creditable conclusion. You will see the best account I could give of the whole business in the Gazette; I shall therefore only tell you what you will be full as anxious to know, that I am perfectly well, and that I do not find that climate, fatigue, or sun, have as yet in any degree affected my constitution.

I am, with the most sincere good wishes for your health and domestic happiness,

Dear Grisdale,

Yours, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

H. R. H. THE PRINCE OF WALES TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Received April, 1792.]

MY DEAR LORD, Carlton House, May 11, 1791.

Allow me to return you my thanks for the Letter I last week received from you, we had about a fortnight before received the accounts of Colonel Floyd's affair and regretted much that so much bravery had not been crown'd with more success at least with a more signal victory. My Brother is gone upon the report of War to attend the Prussian Army in case there sh^d be any service to be seen and sh^d there not, then to return to England when the grand Reviews are over. As to Topics there are so few except the French Revolution and the prospect of a War with Russia with both of w^h you must be so much better inform'd about by other persons than I can pretend to do with mine y^t I will not even take up your time with mentioning the subject. I have had the pleasure of seeing lately a great deal of my old friend Singleton whom I had not seen hardly since he has had the honour of being related to your Lordship, and having taken a house in Hampshire about fifteen miles from mine, he now and then rides over in order to meet my Hounds when they throw off within a distance of ten or dozen miles from him, and all I can say is y^t I flatter myself when he has the honour to be as well known by your Lordship as he is by me, he will gain the same place in y^r esteem y^t I confess he long has done in mine. Before I conclude allow me to mention y^t the Young Man who will have the honour of delivering this Letter to Y^r L^dship is a young man whose Brother thro' the interest of my friend Lushington I have got the permission of the Company to be a Free Merchant. I formerly recommended him to You and his name is Coleman, and I flatter myself he will always merit y^r support and approbation by his industry and diligence, the young man himself is coming out as a Cadet, and I can only add y^t any attentions and assistance you are so good as to shew him on my account, I shall attribute to the source of that friendship w^h I hope I always shall experience from you.

I am, My Dear Lord,

Most Sincerely Yours,

G. P.

MARQUIS OF LANSDOWNE TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Received April, 1792.]

MY DEAR LORD, London, Dec. 14, 1791.

I just hear that a packet is making up for India, which does not leave me time to recollect whether, uninformed as I am, anything has by accident reached me which can be useful to you to know.

I wrote to you a long letter after the India debate in the House of Lords, which I hope you have received. I wrote to you again in the summer, but my letter was returned to me from the India House being too late for the post, and I cannot now lay my hand upon it. But I must not miss this opportunity of assuring you no one can be more devoted to you, or more anxious for your honor and credit. You are too wise and honourable to wish me to sacrifice principles on which I stand committed to all descriptions, but as far as I can consistently, you may depend upon it there is no length to which I am not ready to go in your service. Let me beseech you not to take too much upon yourself, but to remember that it belongs to Ministers to plan, to Governors and Generals only to execute. Ministers are responsible not only for what they plan, but what they omit, especially where a change of system was expedient, as I conceive was the case in India, where the interests of the Court and Bengal are so irreconcilable. You know how loose this country is, and it is becoming every day looser and more difficult to be governed. I am most apprehensive about your peace, for I do not see in your situation, all things considered, that it is in the wit of man to satisfy your allies, and meet the expectations at home. You know I had no allies to deal with.

As to France it is difficult to tell what may happen there, but I imagine things will settle. The Republican party are quiet for the present and determined to remain so, and the Emigrants are divided among themselves all manner of ways, interests, passions, habits, and connections of those that are at Coblentz, from those at Brussels, which last have the confidence of the Court.

What passed at Pilnitz remains as yet an impenetrable secret, but I am assured from what I conceive good authority that the alliance between Austria and Prussia is sincere, and calculated to produce an entire change of system upon the Continent.[1]

You will hear from others that a renewal of the India Charter

[1] There was no treaty, but a declaration was signed, Aug. 1791, by the Emperor and the King of Prussia that they would arm, and call on other nations to do the same, to support the King of France, and to enable him to establish a constitutional monarchy.

is meditated, but I cannot think it will take place this year, for whenever it does it will produce a great source of faction which it is the obvious interest of Ministers to defer.

I am, &c.,

LANSDOWNE.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

[Private.]

DEAR SIR, Camp near Kistnapore, April 28, 1792.

. . . My letter by the Swallow will have satisfied you that there is no danger of my deserting my post before the beginning of 1793; and however forcibly the situation of my private affairs, my own time of life, the critical age of my son, and the attack upon my Borough,[1] press my return to England, you may be assured that all these considerations could not at any time prevent my remaining a few months, when I should think such a sacrifice essential for the real interests of my country.

There is one passage in your letter which I must confess alarms me, where you say—"We of course cannot wish to make a new appointment of a Governor-General till the arrangement of India affairs and the settlement with the India Company takes place." This must naturally defer the appointment of a new Governor-General till after the next Session of Parliament, and I do not see any good reason why the appointment might not just as well take place as soon as you know the war to be concluded, as the new arrangement can make very little difference in the Governor-General's situation. But this letter will be too late to alter any resolution you may have taken, and I can only hope that my letter by the Swallow will have induced you to make the appointment immediately upon Madan's arrival.

I have no opinion to give about a successor, except to say that no such thing is to be found in Milar's list, nor indeed a tolerable Commander-in-Chief, amongst those who would probably consent to come out. You must select for the former, some man of ability and earnest application, who positively will not job, and who can say *no*, without an appearance of want of feeling. . . .

It is impossible for me to speak with precision of the costs of the war, and you will be able from the papers that will be transmitted to you from the different Governments, to form nearly as good an estimate as I can at present, when I have it in my power

[1] The attempt to interfere with Lord Cornwallis's interest at Eye totally failed. It was renewed at a subsequent period, but with as little success.

to give you one very substantial datum, viz., that except some extra allowances that part of the Bombay troops must receive for a few months, and those that must be continued to Lieut.-Colonel Cockerell's detachment till they reach Bengal, the whole expense will be actually issued in the course of next month, and that after the arrival of all the corps at their peace cantonments, not one single rupee, either in the shape of arrears for troops, or of demands for public purposes, will ever come against you.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE BISHOP OF LICHFIELD AND COVENTRY.

DEAR JAMES, Camp 16 miles west of Colar, May 4, 1792.

I sent a letter for you about three weeks ago to Madras, to be forwarded in the Manship, but as that ship has been detained on account of her cargo beyond all expectation, I cannot help adding a few words of a later date, the satisfaction of which to the receiver I well know by my own feelings on the like occasions.

I have made my march from Seringapatam very quickly, without any material cross or vexation, except the horrible sickness amongst the European troops, which began at Seringapatam, and which has attended us ever since without any abatement. We have lost many, although the deaths have not been in proportion to the number of sick; but the removal of so many men as I have been obliged to find conveyance for, is attended with infinite difficulty in this country, and has greatly retarded my movements. Our peace will no doubt be very popular in England, I see every day more reason to be satisfied with it. No termination of the war could in my opinion have been attended with more solid advantages to our interest, and the deference which was paid to us on the occasion both by friends and enemies, has placed the British name and consequence in a light never before known in India.

The next point for the gratification of my wishes is my return to England, but that cannot happen till my successor arrives; an overland express which I received the other day from Government, pressed the stay of Medows, but this is absolutely impossible, and indeed I would not purchase even a voyage to England at the price of sacrificing the future welfare and prosperity of this country, in which my reputation as well as my earnest wishes are so deeply interested.

"I wrote by the Swallow in September last to say that Medows

would go home as soon as the war was over, and that I would stay till the beginning of the year 1793, this letter will probably arrive in England and prepare Ministers to look out for a new Governor-General; the continued accounts by the subsequent ships of our preparations and our successes, will make them expect the termination of the war at an early period in the present year, and will I trust enable them to procure the appointment of a successor within a few weeks after Madan reaches London, which we have calculated for the middle of August. If that successor should sail in October, either in a frigate or the Swallow packet, he will get to Bengal in February, and I may embark in March next. On these reasonings and calculations my hopes are founded, if they should prove erroneous, I shall be under the mortifying necessity of devoting the year 1794 to misery and exile.

My war, notwithstanding Lord Porchester's assertion "that it was founded in avarice," has been a very losing concern to me,[1] and I believe I have added very little to my store since I have commanded the army. I have however the satisfaction to know that I have rendered substantial services to my country.

The Commodore is at Trincomale, but I expect to see him at Madras by the end of the month.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

GENERAL ORDERS.

May 9, 1792.

The Commander-in-Chief has perused the proceedings of the General Court Martial, of which Lieut.-Colonel Cockerell was President, as well as the sentences passed on the prisoners.

Lord Cornwallis is much concerned to be under the necessity of expressing his extreme dissatisfaction at the sentence passed on Mr. ——, who is convicted of neglecting to dress the wounds and to take proper care of the Europeans, who were sent from Seringapatam to the hospital under his charge at Outradroog; and for which heinous breach of his duty, and offence against the strongest and most affecting ties of humanity, which forcibly plead in every generous breast in favour of men who have shed their blood in the cause of their country, he is condemned only to be suspended from his rank and pay in the service for eight months, and to be reprimanded in public Orders.

It is incumbent upon Lord Cornwallis to show, that he sets a

[1] Both Lord Cornwallis and General Medows gave up their prize-money for the capture of Seringapatam. The share of the first was 47,244*l.*, of the second 14,997*l.*; and see letter from Lord Cornwallis, Sept. 8, 1792.

higher value upon the lives and limbs of the soldiers, than to expose them again to the hazard of falling under the charge of a man who has been guilty of such gross neglect. And he therefore declares to the army, that he shall recommend it to the Governor in Council at Fort St. George, to continue Mr. ——'s suspension until the pleasure of the Court of Directors shall be known, to whom he shall transmit the proceedings of the Court Martial with his own sentiments upon them; and that he shall order the pay-master to give no share to Mr. —— of that gratuity, which was obtained by the blood of those brave men, whom he afterwards suffered either to perish, or to languish miserably for several weeks, by an inhumanity which, by any person unacquainted with the evidence that was produced against him, would be scarcely credible.

The Commander-in-Chief must likewise express his strongest disapprobation of the sentence that acquits Lieutenant —— of His Majesty's 52nd regiment, of violently beating Perseram, a black man, and which appears to have been given, not only in direct opposition to the whole body of evidence that was produced, but even to Lieutenant ——'s own confession. The Commander-in-Chief is of opinion, that Lieutenant —— in beating Perseram the first time, when he came to ask him for the payment of a just debt which had been due seven months, acted in a manner highly unbecoming a gentleman and an officer; and that in beating him the second time, when he was sent back to him by the Commanding Officer of the regiment, accompanied by the Adjutant, Lieutenant —— was guilty of manifesting the greatest disrespect towards his Commanding Officer, and contempt of all military order and subordination.

Lieutenant —— admits in his defence, that the man, on his return to him from the Commanding Officer of the regiment, expressed the utmost apprehension at entering his tent, when he saw the money that was due to him and the stick that was prepared to beat him lying on the same table, and therefore the apology that he offers for having given him the second gentle beating (as he calls it) which divided the poor man's ear, by declaring that he did not otherwise intend to have made use of the stick, but that it only proceeded from his having been irritated to a violent degree by Perseram's abusing him in Malabar, a language in which probably Lieutenant —— is no great proficient, ought to have appeared too ridiculous to have had any weight with the Court Martial.

The Commander-in-Chief trusts that there are very few officers either in the King's or Company's service, who are capable of committing acts of the above nature, which he considers as partaking

both of ferocity and injustice, and no less unworthy of the manners of gentlemen than disgraceful to the characters of officers; and he warns Lieutenant ——, that if he should persevere in the shameful practice of beating his creditors instead of paying them, he shall not on a future occasion escape the punishment that such conduct deserves.

Lord Cornwallis directs that the Commanding Officer of the regiment shall see that the original debt is paid, and that ten pagodas shall be deducted from Lieutenant ——'s gratuity, to be given to Perseram, as a small compensation for the barbarous treatment that he has received.

It has given the Commander-in-Chief great pain to be obliged to pass so severe a censure on the conduct of the above General Court Martial, many of the members being, to his own personal knowledge, men of most respectable characters.

He is persuaded that the sentences could only have proceeded from mistaken ideas of lenity; and he therefore desires that not only those Members, but also that all other Officers who may hereafter compose General Courts Martial, will recollect when they take their seats as Judges, that true humanity consists, not in screening the guilty, but in protecting the innocent and redressing the injured.

MAJOR-GENERAL GRENVILLE TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Received May 12, 1792.]

MY DEAR LORD, New Burlington Street, Nov. 25, 1791.

. . . Our impatience and anxiety are at the utmost stretch, and though your Lordship's last letters to the Ministry do not allow us to be so sanguine in our expectations of good news as we might otherwise have been, we do not however by any means give up the hopes of receiving the joyful news of the capture of Seringapatam, and of your having reduced Tippoo to come into your own terms; there are however unpleasant reports circulating per viâ France, that your Lordship had been obliged to give up all thoughts of attacking Seringapatam, as the rains had set in earlier than were expected, and that you had retired to Bangalore. I do not find that much credit is given to this account, as no one can tell with certainty from what quarter it comes.

The whole town at present is taken up with the arrival of the Duke and Duchess of York; His Royal Highness went over in the spring to offer his services to the King of Prussia to act as volun-

teer with the army in case the war had taken place against Austria and Russia, who seemed determined at one time to refuse all mediation in regard of their making peace with the Turks. But as both powers have thought better of it, His Royal Highness laid aside all thoughts of war, and with equal ardour offered his services to the Princess Frederique, only daughter of the present King by his first wife. I believe your Lordship must recollect having seen her when you was at Berlin, she is little, but prettily made and very accomplished; the match has been concluded in a very great hurry, insomuch that they have been obliged to have a second marriage ceremony performed in private at the Queen's house, as I believe the nuptials were celebrated at Berlin before the King's consent *in form signed by our Chancellor* could arrive at Berlin. You will be surprised to hear that the King of Prussia has only given 13,000*l.* with this favourite daughter, which, considering the wretched state of our finances, is absolutely a nothing. I understand that Parliament mean to do handsomely;[1] it is proposed to give H. R. H. in addition to his present allowance of 12,000*l.*, 25,000*l.*, which with the emoluments of his regiment, which they reckon at 3000*l.*, will make his income a clear 40,000*l.* exclusive of Osnaburgh. This sum would and should be sufficient to enable us with economy to live as a Prince, but unfortunately our debts, if they are not cleared, will prove such an incumbrance, that I do not see how we shall be able to hold our heads above water. In short, my dear Lord, c'est une mer à boire, and we must make what sail we can. As to any political news, I have scarce any to communicate. The French affairs are still in great confusion, notwithstanding that they have got the King not only to accept the new constitution, but to make it His voluntary act and deed; in the mean time the Princes remain absent, and do not seem inclined to pay any obedience to His Majesty's late peremptory injunction to return to their native country. How it is to end God only knows; there is hardly any money in circulation, and the taxes not forthcoming, all or great part of their West India islands in a state of rebellion and warfare, and many plantations totally destroyed. The rest of Europe seems inclined to remain in peace and quiet, and I hope before this reaches you (if it ever does on the other side of the water), that you will have concluded a firm and lasting peace throughout all our Asiatic possessions; I need not say how happy such a piece of news would make the whole nation, and it would be an additional pleasure to your friends by giving them

[1] Parliament voted, March 7, 1792, 18,000*l.* additional income to the Duke of York, and 8000*l.* jointure to the Duchess.

hopes of seeing you soon amongst us, and for which event no one waits with greater anxiety and impatience than

Yours ever, most affectionately,

R. G.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

[Private.]

DEAR SIR, Madras, June 18, 1792.

I have now been about three weeks at this Presidency, and happy should I be to tell you that the situation of this great and important Government was much to my satisfaction; but I must confess that I do not observe any material improvement that has been made, and that I see no flattering prospect.

Sir Charles Oakeley, though not a very capable man, is I believe the best of all the Civil servants of this establishment that could have been selected to fill the station of Governor, and yet you may be assured that he never will possess sufficient authority, or make any radical reform.

It is very difficult for a man to divest himself of the prejudices which the habits of twenty years have confirmed, and to govern people who have lived with him so long on a footing of equality. But the Company's servants have still greater obstacles to encounter when they become Governors, for the wretched policy of the Company has, till the late alterations took place in Bengal, invariably driven all their servants to the alternative of starving or of taking what was not their own; and although some have been infinitely less guilty in this respect than others, the world will not tamely submit to be reformed by those who have practised it in the smallest degree.

It is not the intention of this letter to enter into the defects of the system that prevails from Ganjam to Cape Comorin, but I shall only repeat what I have so often said, as being the most important point of all, that unless you can find good Governors no system whatever can succeed. A man of upright intentions, with ability and application, that would undertake this Government for six or seven years, might do great things for the public and save a considerable fortune for himself. If you cannot tempt such a man with these prospects, I have no effectual remedy to propose.

What I have said about Governors is equally applicable to Bombay, and still more to the Supreme Government, which I hope never again to see in the hands of a Company's servant.

I enclose an extract of a letter which Ross received lately from

one of the most able and most honourable men in Bengal, who never was spoken to upon the subject, but who was led to turn his thoughts to it from the observations he had made on the conduct of the Council during my absence. As his opinion coincides perfectly with my own, and as he cannot have a private interest in circumscribing the limits of promotion for the Company's servants, it must give additional weight to what I have said.

I have purposely confined myself in this letter to the subject of Governors, and have given you opinions that you will perceive are pretty free, and consequently intended to be perfectly confidential between us; I mean always including Mr. Pitt. . . .

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER TO LIEUT.-COLONEL ROSS, FROM BENGAL.

Dated May 27, 1792.

I am very sensible how great a private sacrifice his Lordship has made by determining to continue in this country until the arrival of a successor from England, but as far as the public good is concerned it has afforded me the sincerest joy. It will insure to this country a long continuance of external tranquillity and internal prosperity. By remaining some time longer he will not only be able to give strength and durability to the happy political security in which we now seem to be placed, but also to insure the internal prosperity of the British possessions by completing his various arrangements both in Bengal and at the other Presidencies. These grand objects certainly could not have been so fully accomplished had his Lordship resolved to depart for Europe shortly after his return to Bengal, even supposing a successor to have arrived. As for leaving the Government in interim hands, it appears to me that it would have been attended with the most ruinous consequences. Matters have gone on quietly and conformably to the established regulations during the time he has been upon the coast, because, as it was known he would return, his influence has operated as powerfully as if he had been present upon the spot; but there are numerous animosities and jealousies subsisting, which would burst forth immediately were that restraining influence to be entirely withdrawn, and no other sufficiently powerful to be substituted in its place. Such is human nature that it does not readily brook the authority of persons suddenly raised from the level of their equals and invested with the reins of

power, especially if in the management of them they are influenced by passion and caprice. In such cases, individuals are too often apt to sacrifice the public interest without remorse to gratify private resentment, and by that means give rise to the most serious disorders. The Company's servants are certainly the most fit persons for Members of Council, but from what I have seen since his Lordship's departure, I am convinced that it could never answer to appoint any of them to the Government. Such is the present temper of the British part of the community in India, that it appears to me that nobody but a person who has never been in the service, and who is entirely unconnected with the individuals who compose it, who is of a rank far surpassing his associates in the Government, and has the full support of the Ministry at home, can be competent to govern our possessions with that energy and vigour which is essential to our political safety and internal prosperity.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO VISCOUNT BROME.

MY DEAREST CHARLES, Madras, July 10, 1792.

I have received your letters as late as the 31st of January, giving an account of your leaving Eton, your expedition into Suffolk, &c. &c., and I am glad you speak so stoutly about Eye. If you and I were there together, we should soon set all matters quite right. I shall not now, I am afraid, receive letters from you so frequently as before, which gives me great concern, for you are one of the pleasantest of my correspondents. If however you are well and happy where you are, I shall be perfectly satisfied.

I am going in a few days to Bengal, where I sincerely hope I shall only stay six months. It depends, as I believe I have already told you, upon the arrival of my successor, and you will hear of his leaving England from the Bishop.

Adieu, my dearest Charles. That every blessing may attend you is the sincere and earnest prayer of

Your most affectionate father,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

[Private.]

DEAR SIR, Madras, July 17, 1792.

I have at length settled everything with the Nabob, and I believe in the best manner that it could have been done, unless we

had kept possession of the country; but that point could only have been carried by force, without the least shadow of reason or justice, and consequently was not to be attempted.

You will see all the circumstances respecting the new treaty amply detailed in my public letter, and I have only to add that the Nabob expressed an earnest desire that the whole of the accounts between himself and the Company should be adjusted under my direction, and promised, if I consent to this, to withdraw immediately the suit that he instituted at the recommendation of Mr. Macpherson in England. In order to terminate this disagreeable business, and to prevent future quarrels, I have undertaken the troublesome task. . . .

William Burke has determined to go home, and has requested that I would mention him favourably to you. I do not however, when I desire you to be civil to him, advise you to follow General Conway's [1] example, and appoint him Under-Secretary of State.

Maitland and Fox could not have read my letter to the Nizam, when they represented it as the cause of the war, or an evasion of the Act of Parliament. It was certainly the duty of the Supreme Government to explain to his Highness, when he required it, what they conceived to be the purport of the conditions of the treaty concluded with him in 1768.

I shall embark to-morrow for Bengal, from whence I hope to send you a good account of the state of our affairs by the Ganges Indiaman, which will be despatched next month. I hear the eight per cent. certificates bear a discount only of two per cent.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS TO THE BISHOP OF LICHFIELD AND COVENTRY.

MY LORD, Wimbledon, July 30, 1792.

It is the wish of His Majesty in the most public manner to mark his approbation of the conduct of Lord Cornwallis, and with that view is desirous to promote him immediately to the honour of a Marquisate. I take it for granted there can be no objection to

[1] Field-Marshal Rt. Hon. Henry Conway, Colonel of the Blues, son of Francis, 1st Lord Conway, b. 1720, d. July 9, 1796, m. Dec. 19, 1747, Caroline, dau. of John, 4th Duke of Argyle, and widow of Charles, 3rd Earl of Ailesbury. Groom of the Bedchamber from 1760 to April, 1764, when he was dismissed for his vote about General Warrants; Secretary of State from July, 1765 to Jan. 1768; and Commander-in-Chief from March, 1782, to Dec. 1783; M.P. for Higham Ferrers, Penryn, St. Mawes, Thetford, and Bury St. Edmunds, from Dec. 1741 to March, 1784; and in Ireland, for the county of Antrim, from 1741 to 1768. He had seen some service, and had been second in command to Lord Granby in Germany.

its being done without the delay of a direct communication with Lord Cornwallis himself, but I thought it right to state the matter to your Lordship, in order to have the benefit of your information, that I may lay it before His Majesty.

I have the honour to be, with great respect, your Lordship's most obedient and grateful servant,

HENRY DUNDAS.

MAJOR-GENERAL GRENVILLE TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Received Aug. 14, 1792.]

MY DEAR LORD, New Burlington Street, *Feb. 28, 1792.*

. . . I have however the satisfaction to be able to assure you that these labours are not overlooked or forgotten by the *true* friends to this country; and your Lordship's character, both civil and military, is too well established to suffer the smallest depreciation from the misrepresentations and extravagant reports of Messrs. H[ippesle]y and Co. I have not words sufficiently strong to do justice to the sentiments of friendship and real esteem, which I have frequently heard both from Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville in regard to your Lordship. Your cause, and defence if necessary, cannot be placed in better hands. I must likewise do the Duke of York the justice to say, that, though upon almost all other points H. R. H. sides with the Opposition party, he differs very strongly with them in their Asiatic politics, and has assured me that he is determined to attend and to vote in favour of your Lordship, in case any motion should be made in the House of Lords, any ways tending to censure or to criminate your conduct regarding the measures which you have thought proper to pursue upon the subject of the war with Tippoo.

The Turks and Russians have concluded a peace, not quite according to the terms at first proposed through our mediation, thanks to a certain set of men[1] who put every obstacle in the way to embarrass the measures of Administration, and who have so far succeeded. Peace however is at present established, and likely to remain all over the Continent. France still continues in the same state of anarchy and confusion, God knows how it is to end. . . .

Believe me ever yours most affectionately,

R. G.

[1] Mr. Fox and the whole Whig party exerted themselves to the utmost, and not without success, in support of the Empress Catherine.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO SIR C. W. MALET, BART.

SIR, Fort William, Aug. 20, 1792.

Although there seems at present no reason to apprehend that Tippoo will for a considerable period be disposed to come to a rupture with any of the members of the late Confederacy, yet, as it is of great importance for preserving our reputation for good faith, as well as for the general interests of the British nation, that the grounds should be clearly explained on which the Allies can, in consequence of the 13th and 15th articles of the treaties of alliance that were formed at the commencement of the war, demand assistance and support from each other against any hostile attempt of their late common enemy, I look upon it as proper and desirable that the treaty of guarantee, which they are bound to enter into, should with all convenient despatch be put into a distinct form, and I therefore wish that you should take an early opportunity to confer fully with the Minister upon this subject.

Every consideration will induce me to examine and discuss any propositions that may be made by him in the most amicable manner, but the greatest care must be taken that no vague or ambiguous expression shall be admitted into this new instrument, and that the stipulations shall in no shape go beyond the spirit of the article upon which they will be founded.

I shall defer entering much into detail until you can inform me of Nana's sentiments and expectations, but it is proper that you should be acquainted with my ideas of the general principles which should form the basis of the agreement.

The Allies are bound to guarantee against Tippoo the territories that each of them might possess at the conclusion of the war, but it must always be adverted to that the stipulation is merely defensive, and cannot operate unless Tippoo should attack either of them without just provocation.

It must therefore be clearly expressed in the treaty of guarantee, that in case any difference should arise between one of the latter and Tippoo, the other Allies are to have a right to expect that the nature and circumstances of such difference shall be fully communicated to them, in order that they may give their opinion and advice, and endeavour to settle it by a temperate negotiation, and that they shall not be considered as bound to take up arms in his favour, until they are convinced that he has justice on his side, and all means of conciliation shall have proved fruitless.

Should a rupture become unavoidable, the interest and safety of the contracting Powers will be so evidently and deeply involved in

the event, that it would be highly injudicious in them to limit their exertions in endeavouring to bring it to a speedy and honourable conclusion, and it must consequently be stipulated that the whole force of each State is to be employed for that purpose.

The distress and danger of the party that may be attacked being entitled to the greatest attention from the other members of the Alliance, it ought to be understood and settled that, whilst no time should be lost in preparing their whole force to take the field, every immediate assistance that may be practicable should be afforded with such troops as may be in actual readiness for service.

The above are the fair principles for the treaty of guarantee, and to render any further treaty unnecessary, in the event that Tippoo's conduct should again force us into hostilities during the existence of the guarantee, it may be proper to insert in it, that a general plan of operations for the confederate forces is to be concerted as soon as possible after a rupture becomes certain, and that conformable to the terms of the alliance that was made at the commencement of last war, were if any of the parties shall enter into separate negotiations, but that (under the exclusion of unreasonable objections) all measures for concluding a peace shall be conducted with the knowledge and approbation of the whole.[1]

You will communicate to Sir J. Kennaway the particulars and result of your conferences upon this point, that you may act in entire conformity with each other. I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

HONOURABLE SIRS, Fort William, Aug. 26, 1792.

. . . The miserable situation of the northern Circars constituted one of those cases to which some relief could not be refused, and the Members of the Board had accordingly, in the course of the last nine or ten months, sent them considerable supplies. But as the Company's servants in those districts have continued to represent that, unless a much more extensive aid can be furnished, the greatest part of the wretched inhabitants must unavoidably perish, I have, I confess, more from the feelings of humanity than the rigid dictates of prudence, been encouraged by the prospect which the present season holds out to us of an uncommonly abundant

[1] This letter is copied from a transcript made by a native scribe. Many errors arose from these scribes being ignorant of the English language, and sometimes, as in the present instance, it is impossible to correct them.

crop in Bengal, not only to propose that several of the Company's ships shall be immediately despatched with cargoes of rice, but also that the embargo shall be so far taken off, as to allow all the other vessels in the river that can give sufficient security for their going to the Circars only, to load likewise with grain, in order that no means in our power may be left untried to save as many of these unfortunate people as may be practicable. . . .

The accounts of the death of Hyder Beg Khan had reached me at Madras, and, although it has been a general maxim with me to avoid as much as possible all interference in the details of the Vizier's Government, I was glad to find upon my arrival here, that his Excellency had been persuaded to show his respect for this Government by making only a temporary appointment of ministers to conduct his affairs, until he could consult with me on a proper permanent successor to his late Minister.

Having long clearly seen that Hyder Beg's talents for business were much superior to those of most men of his religion in this country (who are, in general, indolent and dissipated), and having had reason to believe that he was sincerely desirous to cement the connexion between his Excellency and the Company, his death gave me much concern, and I regretted him the more as I do not know any person that I could have, with propriety, recommended to the Vizier to succeed him, who is nearly equal to him in abilities. . . .

His Excellency had made a temporary nomination of Hussein Reza Khan to act as the efficient Minister, and of Rajah Ticket Roy to continue in the management of the revenue department; and although Hussein Reza does not possess all the qualifications that I could wish for a Minister, yet, as I have an exceedingly good opinion both of his principles and of his disposition to promote cordiality between his Master and the Company, and I have great confidence in the experience and ability of the Rajah in the line in which he was employed, I did not see that a better choice could be made, and accordingly I signified to the Vizier my entire approbation of their being permanently appointed. . . .

I lay my account with having occasion to combat much chicane and evasion on the part of Tippoo, but I trust that I shall be able in the end to bring these points to a satisfactory adjustment.

I have likewise been called upon, both by Tippoo and the Nizam, to interfere in exacting a full execution of some of the articles of the late treaty: by the former, to procure the release of Budder-ul-Zamaun Khan and the possession of the district of Soondoor, which, he says, the Mahrattas have not yet restored to

him, and by the Nizam, to require of Tippoo the surrender of the fortress of Balhari, which he had still retained; and I have little doubt that the representations which I have made to the Peshwa and to Tippoo will have the effect of removing all these different grounds of complaint.

A number of Mahrattas of different descriptions having presumed on several occasions during the last twelve months, to behave with great disrespect both to the Resident and the Court of Adawlut at Benares, I have thought it necessary to direct Sir Charles Malet and Major Palmer to signify my dissatisfaction on that head to the Court of Poona and to Scindia, and to declare my determination to punish in an exemplary manner, all persons (let their rank be what it may) who, during their visits in the Company's dominions, shall dare to disregard our laws and courts of justice, or to behave with impropriety towards any of the officers of this Government.

I have also been obliged to write in strong terms to Scindia concerning some late insulting conduct of his Aumil at Broach towards our Resident and factory, and a shocking murder that was committed by some Patan sepoys belonging to him, upon one of the Company's sepoys at that place, and I am inclined to believe that both the Peshwa and Scindia will be sufficiently disposed to make every reparation in their power for the injuries that I have mentioned. . . .

I have repeatedly expressed my high opinion of the gallant behaviour of the officers and soldiers who composed the army under my command in the late war, and whilst the officers who were particularly attached to my family have, in common with the others, a strong claim upon their country for the most distinguished notice, I feel myself under personal obligations to them for the able and zealous assistance that they afforded me during the whole course of that service. . . . .

The Nabob of Arcot has sent me a copy of the instructions that he has transmitted to his agent in England, to withdraw the suit in Chancery which he had instituted against the Company, and I at the same time received two letters from him, in one of which he desires that some agreement may be entered into for granting him remissions in seasons of drought, and in the other he brings forward a claim, which he never mentioned to me when I was at Madras, for a share of the countries that have been acquired from Tippoo by the late treaty of peace.

Copies of these letters and of my answers to them, will be enclosed to you in the despatch from the Board, and I trust that

his Highness will not again be persuaded to make such unreasonable propositions. . . . . I have, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

P.S. Since I wrote the above letter I have received information from Sir John Kennaway, that Tippoo has delivered up the fort of Belhari to his Highness the Nizam.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE BISHOP OF LICHFIELD AND COVENTRY.

DEAR JAMES, Calcutta, Sept. 8, 1792.

I omitted to mention to you in the letter which I wrote a few days ago, that poor Captain ——, who was formerly in my regiment, and was my aide-de-camp in the beginning of the American war, had informed me that he was totally ruined and obliged to go with his wife to France, and entreated me in the strongest terms to endeavour to do something for him. Nothing could be more inconvenient to myself, and less likely to be useful to him, than my soliciting favours for him from hence, which I tried to explain to him in as good-natured and feeling a manner as I could, and as a kind of plaister, on the pretext that his first settling in France must have been expensive to him, I sent him a draft on Hoare for 100*l.* I did not think it fair to draw on my agent, as, from my regiment being gone to Ireland, I may have no money in his hands, besides, it is very probable that —— is indebted to him.

You will judge from the savings of other years, that I must have been considerably out of pocket by the war, when I tell you that I spent 27,360*l.* (reckoning the current rupee at two shillings) between the 1st of December, 1790, and the 31st of July, 1792, besides the wine from England and two Arabian horses, for which I am to give English hunters. The immaculate * * * understood making war in India better, or he would not have paid off the mortgage on one estate in Scotland and bought another.

Matters here are going on well, Tippoo has made his first payment of the second moiety of the crore and ten lacs, and everything promises quiet and prosperity.

My love and best wishes to Mrs. Cornwallis and all your family. I am, dear James,

Your truly affectionate brother,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO ROBERT MORRIS,[1] ESQ., BENARES.

SIR, Calcutta, Oct. 8, 1792.

I have received your letter dated September 16th.

This Government has no right to interfere respecting the admission or rejection of barristers who wish to practise in the Supreme Court of Judicature, the discretion upon that point being solely vested with the Judges. But I shall think it my duty to take measures for investigating the complaints which you mention against Mr. Grand,[2] the Judge of Adawlet at Patna.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO VISCOUNT BROME.

MY DEAREST CHARLES, Calcutta, Oct. 14, 1792.

I have received your letter dated the 29th of March, but the Bishop sent me one that you had written to him of the 17th of April, all giving the best accounts of your health, and saying that you were pretty well reconciled to Yverdun. You do not however mention the trout, which I remember I thought excellent. I am surprised that anybody there should recollect me, as it is above thirty-four years since I passed a few days at that place, but I think it still more extraordinary that *de Roguin Colonel*[3] should be alive, as he was then an old man.

I am very glad to learn that you like fencing; it is a very wholesome exercise, strengthens the arms and forms the person. If you should have an opportunity, it would be desirable that you should learn to ride, although I am not very fond of the great

[1] Robert Morris d. in India early in 1794. In 1782 he contracted, under very disreputable circumstances, a marriage with Frances Harford, a natural daughter of Frederick, last Lord Baltimore. This marriage was dissolved, on her petition, May 21, 1784, and she m. July 21 following, William, son of Charles, 2nd Earl of Egremont. This letter alludes to the Judges of the Supreme Court at Calcutta having refused to allow Mr. Morris to practise before them, although he had been called to the bar in England.

[2] George Francis Grand, a Swiss, b. 1748, d. 1820. First in the Military, afterwards in the Civil service of the Company; m. July 10, 1777, Catherine, dau. of M. Werlée, Capitaine du Port at Chandernagore, and a Chev. de St. Louis. In little more than a year she was detected in an intrigue with Mr. afterwards Sir P. Francis, who was sentenced by Sir E. Impey to pay 50,000 rupees as damages—hence the hostile feelings entertained by the former towards the latter. She then lived with various persons, and ended by marrying the Prince de Talleyrand. Mr. Grand, after filling several offices, was appointed, Sept. 1788, Judge of Adawlut at Patna, by Lord Cornwallis, who however removed him April 4, 1793. He afterwards accepted from the Batavian Government an office at the Cape of Good Hope, which, it is said, he obtained by the intercession of his divorced wife with Bonaparte. He there, in 1814, published an account of his life, full of vituperation of Lord Cornwallis.

[3] See page 4, vol. i.

saddle. You have never told me what sort of a proficient you are in dancing. If the picture that Mr. Deane brought out is like you, I am convinced I should not know you, I am inclined to believe there must be some resemblance as I think it a little like your sister. How comical it would be if we were to meet unexpectedly and not to know each other!

I conclude you allot some time for reading, and do not quite throw Latin and Greek books aside. You are likely, I am sorry to say, to live in troublesome times, and it is some comfort to a man to be able to speak his mind and defend his principles if he pleases. Adieu, my dearest boy; God send us a happy and a speedy meeting.

Believe me ever your most truly affectionate Father,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

[Private.]

DEAR SIR, Calcutta, Oct. 15, 1792.

. . . I shall be very impatient for the arrival of the packet which I conclude you will have despatched in the course of last month, when I shall hope to hear that you have provided a good successor for my office, that you have got the better of the Associators and Reformers, and that the Indian peace meets with thorough approbation.

You will see by our letter to the Court of Directors, that I have had favourable opportunities of sending persons into Nepaul and Assam; and as I understand that the Rajah of Nepaul has just made peace with the Chinese, I am in good hopes that Kirkpatrick will open a communication with their chiefs, for whom he is provided with letters and presents.

I enclose, in the form of a minute, a rough outline of a plan for separating the judicial authority from the collection of the revenue, and for the improvement of the administration of justice, which, God knows, is much wanted. My reasons are so fully detailed in the Minute,[1] and the Minute is so long, that it would be equally useless and unreasonable to repeat them in this letter. I know that it would have been more regular to have referred this business in the first instance to the Court of Directors, but a considerable time must have elapsed before my successor could have formed a clear comprehension of the nature of it, and you might have felt

[1] See Appendix.

an unwillingness to have imposed so delicate a task upon him early in his administration. Mr. Pitt and yourself will therefore, I am sure, do me the justice to believe that if I had not considered this measure to be of the utmost importance for the honour of the British Government and for the future prosperity of this country, I would not have undertaken the labour and responsibility of carrying it into execution. . . . I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

CHARLES GRANT, ESQ., TO EARL CORNWALLIS.

[Received Nov. 6, 1792.]

MY LORD, London, May 24, 1792.

I have been waiting through the whole of the shipping season, now brought to a close, for the period in which Mr. Dundas should be able to sit down to the final consideration of the revenue system of Bengal. It has not come; I am persuaded from no want of inclination on his part, for he regards the subject with ardour, but from the multiplicity and importance of the other pressing affairs in which he is engaged at this crisis. These have been such, that I have abstained from troubling him for some time past until yesterday, when I found my call upon him had just prevented a message he was sending me, and the import of this was to give me some instructions relative to the revenue papers, preparatory to my attending him for a week at Wimbledon, where he means to settle this great business, so as to transmit the public orders upon it by the packet intended to be despatched in July.

I sincerely hope therefore, that your Lordship will still have the satisfaction of seeing the landed property of Bengal put on a permanent footing before you leave that country; for, from the whole tenor of Mr. Dundas's discourse with me, I cannot doubt that he means to adopt your Lordship's ideas.

The news by the Deptford have been very satisfactory, and I think with great reason, though their proper effect was in some sort alleviated by a most audacious imposition that had just before been played off upon the Court of Directors and the Ministry, purporting the arrival of the Vestal frigate with advices of a decisive defeat of Tippoo and the fall of Seringapatam; and such was the eager joy to embrace this intelligence, that it was given without suspicion to the public, and answered for a little the nefarious purpose either of gain or malice which the author may have intended. From the view which the last genuine advices

presented, people now in general seem to be more apprehensive of peace, than of the issue of prosecuting the war; but men of sober minds will entertain such a sentiment with very great admissions for circumstances not within their knowledge or judgment.

It may seem singular that with such hope of success as the temper I have now been mentioning indicates, the price of India Stock should be lower than at the beginning of the season, when many more difficulties lay in the way of that success, at any rate then more remote. But this is to be ascribed to other more general causes. The 3 per cents, which two months ago were at about par, are now at 88, and the same proportionate reduction has taken place in all the other funds. The Indian war has not contributed to, but I think rather retarded the fall. It is attributed chiefly to the wars and commotions on the Continent; to the spirit of commotion which begins to show itself in several ways at home, by seditious writings, associations, and the lately-announced project of Parliamentary reform; to the dissensions in the Cabinet issuing within these few days in the removal (actual or declared) of the Chancellor,[1] with a report which I understand to be, or at least to have been founded, of a summer camp at Hounslow; and to all these has just been added a proclamation by His Majesty against seditious writings and associations. But to these public causes there has been a private one the effect of which has been considerable. From the very flourishing state of the nation, as described by Mr. Pitt at the beginning of the session, and his declared intention of paying off the 4 per cents, the funds immediately rose; and many speculators, thinking this flood-tide long progressive, bought in upon time or with money borrowed on the security of stock, thus increasing the tide, but the war between France and Hungary breaking out in the mean time, with those unfavourable symptoms at home, the ebb began, and those speculators, afraid of waiting to the lowest of it, hastened to save themselves, so that there has been a rout in the Stock Exchange; and this fact ought, I imagine, to be regarded as operating considerably to the present depressed state of the funds, which after all can only be deemed temporary. With respect to our internal discontents, I humbly conceive that they spring chiefly from licentiousness, and that even where the matter of complaint may be founded, the spirit that brings it forward is not good. The

[1] The Chancellor, Lord Thurlow, was dismissed June, 1792, at the close of the session. He had repeatedly in the House of Lords opposed Mr. Pitt's measures, who at length early in May submitted to the King the necessity of his removal.

Dissenters of Dr. Priestly's [1] persuasion (now abetted by many of that denomination who do not hold his tenets) and the favourers of the French Revolution principles, have for some time been avowed malcontents; there are others, men of moody tempers and deep aims, who, saying less at present, would probably prove dangerous instruments in case of any open disturbance; but by far the greater part of the nation are firmly attached to our present establishment, which there is good reason to hope will remain unassailed during this reign,—but in looking beyond that, the prospect seems to be thought by many uncomfortable. It is pretty certain that the conduct of some branches of the Royal Family has given an unhappy edge to the writings of Paine and other publications of that sort; and had it not been for the liberties that parties have long taken with each other, and for the language of Opposition in particular, we should not now see Government itself comparatively so little reverenced.

The arrangements for the succession to the Bengal Government are not, I believe, at all known here, though they probably will be to your Lordship. It has seemed to me sometimes that a temporary local choice would be adopted until your Lordship's return to England.

The debate [2] on "the seizure of the Carnatic," as it is termed, was to have come on last night, but was postponed till next week, when also Mr. Dundas opens his India budget.

I have the honour to remain, &c.,

CHARLES GRANT.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

[Private.]

DEAR SIR, Calcutta, Dec. 10, 1792.

I received your letter dated the 24th of May, in which you promise to think seriously of finding a successor to this Government. I am well aware that it will be a most difficult task, and shall therefore make every reasonable allowance for delay, and wait patiently for his arrival.

Our domestic affairs go on as quietly and as prosperously as we could wish; the ceded country on the Madras side (thanks I

[1] Dr. Joseph Priestley, the well-known Unitarian divine, b. 1729, d. Feb. 6, 1804, in America, to which country he had fled in 1794; m. a dau. of — Wilkinson, Esq., 1762.

[2] No debate about the Carnatic took place between the date of this letter and the close of the session. The East India budget was brought forward June 5, when Mr. Francis made a violent speech on Indian affairs in general. The prorogation took place a few days after.

believe, to my military collectors) turns out much more productive than we expected, and the Madras Government have been successful in recovering the valuable manufactures of Salem, of which the Company have been so many years deprived, and which, under the discouragement shown by Tippoo towards all goods that were calculated for the European market, was almost entirely lost. . . .

The situation of politics at Poona (although it cannot I think ultimately much affect us) is not altogether so pleasing. Scindia seems to have had ability and art enough to get the better even of the Brahmin cunning, and to obtain the favour and confidence of the young Peshwa;[1] so that there appears to be at least a probability that Nana, Hurry Punt, and their adherents must soon be obliged to retire. It is reported that the partisans of the different factions are assembling their forces in the neighbourhood of Poona, but the respectable army that Scindia has with him, and the success of his General against Holkar in Hindostan, joined to the natural timidity of Nana's character, give the former great advantage if they should have recourse to the decision of the sword.

However I may personally lament the fall of Nana Furnavese, with whom I have so long and so successfully transacted the business of our respective states, I shall not on that account forget the advantage which we derive from being connected with the Poona Government, or neglect to cultivate the friendship of the new Administration, who will, I dare say, be sufficiently anxious to secure our countenance and support.

Tippoo is no doubt in hopes to derive some benefit from the distracted state of the Marattas, and he has not yet sent the first khist either to them or to the Nizam. But as he cannot hope to recover the young hostages without making good all his payments, unless some serious difference should arise between the confederate Powers, I trust that when matters are settled at Poona, and he sees no prospect of creating disunion amongst us, his delusive hopes will vanish, and he will lose no time in fulfilling the terms of the treaty. In the mean time, that we may afford no cause of jealousy, I have directed Sir Charles Oakeley, in the event of Tippoo's offering us a second khist, to decline the acceptance of it until he hears that the first khist has been paid to our allies.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

[1] Nana Furnavese endeavoured, but in vain, to check personal communication between Sindia and Mahdoo Rao. The latter, though much pleased with Sindia's manners and conduct, did not give up the confidence he felt in his Minister.

P.S. As Mr. Francis, or some such candid person, may represent our interference in the affairs of Assam as a continuation of our spirit of ambition and conquest, and as a cruel interruption of the tranquillity which that happy nation has hitherto enjoyed, I send you a copy of a letter which I have received from Captain Welsh,[1] containing a plain narrative of what has passed, and of the state of the country as far as it has come to his knowledge.

Our information respecting Assam is as yet too imperfect to enable us to send a satisfactory account in a public letter to the Court of Directors, but I hope to be able to write fully on the subject in the course of next month.

Welsh is an honourable and worthy fellow, and will do no wrong.

The letter from Captain Welsh is long and not worth inserting. The substance of it is to describe the wretched state of the country, torn to pieces by contending factions, which gave full scope to the horrors which barbarians always inflict upon the inhabitants of the state which is the scene of their struggles for power.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO CAPTAIN WELSH.

SIR, Fort William, Dec. 28, 1792.

Having seriously reflected on the situation of the Assam[2] Government, of which we have till now been totally ignorant, I do not see how we can reconcile it to any principle of justice or humanity, to establish by force the authority of the wretched Rajah and his worthless and cruel ministers in that country.

It was no doubt incumbent upon us to endeavour to prevent our own subjects from continuing to commit the horrid outrages and excesses which they have lately practised in Assam, and it was principally with that view that the measure of sending you to the Rajah was adopted.

[1] Colonel Thomas Welsh, d. April 11, 1822.

[2] The Assamese were a most warlike nation, and had for a length of time successfully resisted all foreign invaders. Even Aurungzebe had failed. They never prospered more than when governed by females, as was the case in the earlier part of the 18th century. About 1775, the then sovereign, Lakshmi, became so obnoxious to his people that an insurrection broke out, which he repressed with great difficulty, and his son, Gaurinath, who succeeded about 1780, was driven from his throne. Bharat Sougha, nephew of Pitambar, the leader of the rebels, was made King, but Gaurinath threw himself on the protection of Lord Cornwallis, and Captain Welsh, with about 1100 Sepoys, went to his assistance, and reinstated him. When Captain Welsh quitted Assam, Bara Gokaing, one of the principal chiefs, made himself practically master of the whole country, though only nominally Prime Minister. He put Bharat Sougha to death in 1796, and Gaurinath, who had become a mere cypher, did not long survive.

At the same time however, whilst it was hoped by this Government that the character with which you was invested, and the force that attended you, would awe the Bengal Burkandasses, and induce them to desist from their depredations and return to their own country, it was likewise expected that you might be able by friendly mediation to reconcile the contending parties and relieve the miseries of that distracted state.

I mentioned in a former letter my readiness, on certain conditions, to acknowledge Kistnarain in the Raje of Deringh;[1] but the whole country of Assam seems to be so completely convulsed, that I doubt much whether an accommodation with Kistravera alone, would restore order and tranquillity. I wish, therefore, that you would invite him and the Berge Rajah,[2] and all the Chiefs who have any power or followers, to meet you, in order to concert the best means to prevent the country from being totally ruined, assuring them that it is not the wish of our Government to subdue any part of Assam, and that the objects of your deputation were only to free the country from the Bengal plunderers, and to endeavour to compose the civil feuds in Assam by the amicable interposition of our good offices.

I cannot at present tell, nor perhaps may you have yet been able to judge, what stipulations it would be proper to make in favour of Surga Deo,[3] but at all events, he must previously be required to dismiss the ministers, whose misconduct and treachery have brought upon him the misfortunes which he at present suffers.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

[1] Deringh, or Doring, is one of the most considerable Rajes in Assam.

[2] Sic in orig. Probably Bara Raja, a title; Guarinath was then the Raja.

[3] Swerga Deva, or "King of Paradise." The hereditary designation of the Raja of Assam.

CHAPTER XV.

British mission to Nepaul — Declaration of war with France — Final Regulations respecting the Land Settlement — State of the Revenue under previous Governors — Comparative advantages of a decennial and a permanent settlement — Judicial Regulations — European principles applied to the Criminal law — Obstacles to the due administration of justice — Police Regulations — Lord Cornwallis proceeds to Madras — Sails thence for England.

VARIOUS attempts had been made to open commercial intercourse with Nepaul, but they had all failed. At length a dispute having arisen between the Nepaulese and the Lama of Thibet, the latter, whose troops had been repulsed, called in the Chinese, who before long advanced to within a short distance of Catmandoo. The Nepaulese then invoked British military assistance, which Lord Cornwallis declined affording, but tendered his good offices to reconcile the two hostile powers. Before, however, any reply could be given, the Nepaulese made peace, not on favourable terms, with China. But the British envoy, Captain Kirkpatrick, was still requested to visit Nayakote, where the Raja was residing, from whence he proceeded to Catmandoo, the capital of the country. The mission left Calcutta in September, 1792; but did not enter the Nepaul country till January, 1793. They returned in the beginning of March, having been received with great cordiality by the Raja, his uncle the Regent, and all the authorities of the state, but no immediate benefit arose from this visit.

The idea of the British Government assisting the Nepaulese had excited considerable alarm in Thibet. In July, 1792, a letter was addressed by the Lama to Lord Cornwallis, which no one in Calcutta could translate, or even read the character. It was accompanied by a paper in Persian, supposed to be, as it afterwards proved, a translation of the inclosure. A reply was returned by Lord Cornwallis in October, stating his readiness to interfere in an amicable manner between the contending parties, adding that Captain Kirkpatrick would soon proceed to Nepaul. Copies of this letter, *mutatis mutandis*, were sent to the Delai Lama, Teshoo Lama, the Chinese Vizier, and the Raja of Teshoo Lumboo, but no further communications were received.

The early history of Nepaul is very obscure. Tradition gives a long nominal list of rulers: the accuracy of the statement may be

judged of by one fact; seven are said to have reigned upwards of eighty years each, and forty-five more upwards of fifty each. When the transactions above mentioned took place, the reigning dynasty was called Goorkha. Ran Behauder Shah,[1] born in 1774, was on the throne, but his uncle Behauder Shah was Regent, and seemed to exercise the principal authority. The limits of their territories, which late acquisitions had largely increased, appear to have been nearly conterminous with those now existing. At one time the Nepaulese possessed complete independence, but after the close of the war with Thibet they acknowledged the Emperor of China as their lord paramount.

The events which occurred in 1793, previous to the departure of Lord Cornwallis from India, were few, and generally of no importance. Indeed, the declaration of war with France was almost the only incident which interfered with the routine business of the country. Lord Cornwallis hastened to Madras as soon as he heard that hostilities had commenced, but they had already been terminated by the capture of Pondicherry, almost without resistance. He did not return to Bengal, but sailed from Madras to England in October, 1793.

In the early part of the year, besides opening a communication with Nepaul, he had revised his opinion about the Tanjore succession, and had endeavoured to press upon Tippoo the necessity of an honourable and peaceful conduct. But the great subject which engaged his attention, was the promulgation of the regulations respecting the land settlement, the judicial establishments, and the police of the country; all of which, having been several years under discussion, were now finally completed.

Of these the first, by far the most important, was the one to which he had devoted most time and labour. His attention had been called to it before he left England, and so anxious was he to arrive at a proper conclusion, that he had delayed till now to issue the final regulations. In the mean time he had continued to make annual settlements, which were avowedly only provisional.

Almost universally in the East, and nowhere more generally than in Hindustan, from the Himalaya to Cape Comorin, (except in a few districts, such as Canara,) the soil is held to be vested in the Sovereign, who allots to the inhabitants such portions as he may think advisable, clogged with any conditions he may choose to impose. Such at least is the opinion of a large majority of the most competent judges, though Colonel Wilks and some others

[1] He was deposed by the nobles of the country in 1800.

take a different view.[1] Under what tenure the occupiers held is a problem even more difficult to solve. In fact, it is evident that the laws and usages in force in one province were often totally unknown in another.

In 1765, the Nabob of Bengal made the Company his Dewan. The collection of the revenue in the provinces of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, to which districts alone the following observations are intended to apply, was entrusted solely to their hands. Of course they at first adopted the system they found existing, and under which the produce of the land was divided in about equal proportions between the Government and the occupier, whether head or subordinate. Out of the Government share, about one-tenth came to the Zemindar. The village authorities, the mokuddims, and the patwari, were paid by the cultivator. The canongoe also received a salary, or an allotment of land. To this latter officer, or to one of his gomeshtas, was entrusted the charge of inspecting the accounts of the patwari, and he was to report upon the quantity of land in cultivation, the nature of the produce, the amounts of rent paid, and any other circumstances which could enable the Government to make a proper assessment. A certain number of villages formed a Pergunnah. Several pergunnahs, amounting in size to one or two large English counties, were called a Circar. Two or three circars formed the last grand division, a Soubah. Bengal was one of these Soubahs; Bahar and part of Orissa formed another.

The Zemindaries were sometimes of great extent. Burdwan, Khurukpoor, and Beerbhoom, each contained nearly 4000 square miles—upwards of 2,500,000 acres. Under such Zemindars, who somewhat resembled great feudatories, were many smaller but almost independent holders of land: but the very large majority of Zemindaries were far inferior in size to those above mentioned. Subordinate to the Zemindars were Talookdars, and Ryots, the actual tillers of the soil. Amid these various clashing interests, when every one was desirous of obtaining as much as possible for himself, without regard to the means, it cannot be matter of surprise that oppression existed in every form, and that when the Government did obtain the sum due to them, it was almost universally only a portion of the amount exacted from the landholders. At first it was not thought advisable to entrust the collection of the revenue to Europeans, and though in 1766 Lord Clive, then President of

[1] It is endeavoured to reconcile these different views by alleging that the original Hindoo sovereigns claimed no property in the land, but that the Mogul established the Moslem law, which then became general, that the soil belonged to the state.

the Council, took his seat as Dewan in concert with the Nawab who sat as Nazim, he left all the details in the hands of native collectors, who under various names remained in authority.

The energy of Lord Clive enforced an appearance at least of justice and moderation, and he returned to Calcutta for the third time, solely with the view of remedying the evils caused by the corrupt and weak conduct of preceding Governors. "I do declare," he said in a private letter, "by that great Being who is the searcher of all hearts, and to whom we must be accountable, if there be an hereafter, that I am come out with a mind superior to all corruption, and that I am determined to destroy those great and growing evils, or perish in the attempt." Before such a man, the spirit of every native quailed, and when they saw him boldly encounter and defeat the conspiracy which had been formed against him by a large majority of the Company's European Officers, they felt quite certain he would never pardon any violation of the rules he had laid down for the honest collection of the revenue. But to him succeeded men, as bad if not worse than his predecessors. The abuses he had suppressed began to revive, and the Court of Directors, compelled to take some steps, nominated in 1769 supervisors to overlook the immediate collectors. In 1770, local Councils, to whom considerable powers were entrusted, were established at Moorshadabad and Patna. Their inquiries brought to light a mass of iniquity. They stated that the Nazims exacted what they could from the Zemindars and great farmers of the revenue, to whom they left full liberty to plunder to any extent, subject however to be in their turn plundered, when they had enriched themselves sufficiently to make their spoil valuable. Thus the whole system resolved itself into habitual extortion and injustice on the part of the officers of Government, with the necessary concomitants—habitual evasion and concealment on the part of the cultivators, involving a serious loss of revenue.

In 1772, Mr. Hastings was appointed Governor-General of Bengal. The Company, by his advice, determined to collect the revenue through the agency of their own servants. The President and his Council were to become, for revenue matters, a new department, under the title of the Board of Revenue, with proper officers attached. The Khalsa, or Exchequer, was removed from Moorshadabad to Calcutta, the supervisors were made collectors, and four Members of Council were sent into the provinces, to institute the necessary inquiries, before an assessment, to last for five years, was fixed.

The regulations framed for the guidance of the various officers

were published in the languages of the country, many of the injurious practices formerly existing were prohibited, and the first step was thus taken towards the introduction of an equitable Government. But the results did not correspond with the intentions.

The various districts, generally one Pergunnah in each, had been put up to auction, and the highest bidder, often a mere adventurer, was entrusted with the collection. Perhaps the excitement of competition had produced offers unreasonably high—perhaps the capabilities of the country had been overrated; but, practically, the farmers could seldom fulfil their contracts, and great loss of revenue ensued. To any one who has read with attention the history of Mr. Hastings' administration, the fact is patent, that the Court of Directors thought only of income, and were not very sedulous in their inquiries as to how it was raised. Hastings, whose talents as a financier rank very high, might possibly have found means to increase the revenue equitably. But he was hampered by circumstances, and the only remedy he could devise in 1774 was to recall the European collectors, substitute native aumils, and establish Councils in each of the six districts into which the country was divided.

Towards the close of the five years during which the settlement was to last, fresh attempts were made to obtain accurate information, and Hastings was then able to carry his own plans into execution. In the new settlement of 1777, the Zemindar had the preference in tendering for the collection, and the power retained over the lands in his own possession was held to be sufficient security for the performance of his contract. Annual settlements on this principle were made in 1778, 1779, and 1780.

Yet the revenue still fell short of its previous amount, and in 1781 another scheme was adopted. A Committee of Revenue, totally distinct from the Council, was formed; the six provincial Councils were abolished, and, in addition to the established salaries, a percentage was given to the collectors. What was the result of this arrangement, may be conjectured from the instance mentioned by Lord Cornwallis in his despatch of August 14, 1787, where he states, that one collector with a salary of only 1000 rupees a month (about 1200*l.* a year) had an income of at least 40,000*l.*! This new Board but little altered the plan of their predecessors; some of the previous errors were detected, and a few abuses corrected. All persons in the service, of every rank, were strictly forbidden to receive nuzzers—a regulation little attended to by the large majority of the Company's servants, whose unavowed emoluments still con-

tinued enormous. Several Committees of the House of Commons meantime sat on Indian affairs, and various bills were founded on their reports.

In 1784 an Act was passed, by which the Company were specially directed "to inquire into the alleged grievances of the landholders, and, if founded in truth, to afford them redress, and to establish permanent rules for the settlement and collection of the revenue, and for the administration of justice founded on the ancient laws and local usages of the country." The party disputes on the affairs of India having been brought to a conclusion by the decisive triumph of Mr. Pitt at the general election of 1784, he was able, without fear of serious opposition, to turn his mind to the affairs of that country. Extensive powers were conferred on the Governor-General, and Lord Cornwallis was the first to whom they were entrusted. He went to India determined to use them to the fullest extent in order to put down peculation and extortion, and to restore, if possible, to Europeans that good fame which for many years they had ceased to enjoy. He did both, and in the words of one well competent to judge, "his measures, and above all the spirit with which he inoculated administration, eventually purified it—he was the first honest and incorruptible Governor India ever saw, and after his example, hardly any Governor has dared to contemplate corruption. Other men were conquerors, so was he; but his victories in the field, and they were brilliant, are dim beside his victory over corruption." . . .

Lord Cornwallis well knew that nowhere did greater abuses exist than in the Revenue Department, but he felt that the introduction of premature reforms might be productive of more injury than benefit, and therefore on his first arrival he determined to continue the existing system of an annual assessment, very slightly modified, until he could make himself thoroughly acquainted with the subject; and it was not until 1793, a few months before his departure for England, that he put the last stroke to his work, by embodying into codes of regulations, the administrative reforms which he had introduced, after mature and careful revision of the whole system. His inquiries were directed to the past history of each district, and of its landholders; to the rights of the different orders among the latter—the Zemindars, Talookdars, Chowdrys, Munduls, and Mokuddims, as recognised by the native Governments; to the existing rules for collecting the revenue; to the ancient usages; to the amount which could properly be demanded; and to the regulations to be enforced for the protection of the under-tenants and cultivators.

On a full consideration of the answers made to these inquiries, it was evident, that although when the Company succeeded to the Dewanny, gross abuses prevailed, yet in the best times of the Mogul Government, the rights and privileges of the people were secured by institutions mainly derived from the original Hindoo possessors of the country; and it was thought advisable by some of the most intelligent servants of the Company to continue that system under certain modifications. Lord Cornwallis however, and those in whom he principally confided—Mr. Shore (Lord Teignmouth), Mr. Duncan, Mr. (Sir George) Barlow, and others, were convinced that it was best to consider the Zemindar as the owner of the soil—whether or not such had before been his admitted position.

The next question was, the amount of the assessment. As both the Court of Directors and Lord Cornwallis had from the first been of opinion, "that a moderate Jumma punctually collected was more likely to unite the happiness of the natives, the security of the landholders, and the interests of the Company, than any collection of an unreasonable assessment, which could only be levied by severity and exaction," it was thought that the average of former years might be a fair guide in making this new assessment. But as a preliminary, it was necessary to ascertain what had been the rights and privileges of the Zemindars, under either Mogul or Hindoo rule, and what services they were bound to perform.

An accurate and laborious investigation elicited much information. It appeared that the system adopted by the Moguls, if fairly carried out, was calculated to afford substantial justice to both parties. In Bahar, there was sufficient evidence to show what the old system had been, but in Bengal various causes had occasioned great alterations, and those alterations had opened a door to much falsification of revenue accounts, and had placed the Zemindar in a position more nearly resembling an English proprietor of the soil than in the other provinces.

Notwithstanding the uncertainty which still remained as to rights and usages in regard to the various classes from whom the revenue was to be collected, and although it was evident that in different districts different rights existed, the industry and exertions of Mr. Shore collected such a mass of information, that towards the end of 1789 temporary directions were given to the collectors in Bengal and Orissa, and in 1790 to those in Bahar; but it was not till March 22, 1793, that the regulations were completely framed, and finally issued to every province. By these it was declared, that the settlements were to be perpetual and irrevocable; and that

all Zemindars, independent Talookdars, and other actual proprietors of land, and their heirs and lawful successors, were to hold their estates subject only to the fixed amount of tax then settled. To this there were but two exceptions. Uncultivated land, when brought into cultivation, was to become subject to a charge then to be fixed, and if any Zemindary was sold or forfeited for non-payment of rent, the Government were not to be bound by the previously existing arrangement. If it was escheated by the failure of issue of a Zemindar, the Government held the land only on the same terms as the last possessor.

In making these arrangements, there was little or no difference of opinion among all the persons consulted, except on one point. By all it was admitted, that, unless in cases of gross incapacity, or occasionally of nonage, the Zemindar was the only person with whom the settlement, under certain well-defined terms, could be made. It was as universally agreed, that a moderate tax only should be imposed. But the application of this latter principle was open to debate. What was a moderate tax? Mr. James Grant, a civil servant of great experience and talent, who was in charge of the Khalsa, endeavoured from ancient records in that department, to show that great frauds had been committed against the Government, and that the lands were fairly capable of rendering a much increased revenue.

From this view Mr. Shore entirely dissented, and after a very minute examination into the resources of each district, the final assessment was settled, mainly on the average income received by Government in several preceding years. The whole land revenue obtained in the year 1790-1 (corresponding with the year 1197 Fussily) from Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, was Sicca Rupees 2,68,00,000 or 3,109,000*l.* and from Benares, S. R. 34,53,000 or 400,000*l.*

One point gave rise to serious discussion: whether the settlement should be decennial or perpetual. Mr. Shore strongly advocated the first proposition. He thought that even after all the investigation that had been entered into, many questions had been decided on imperfect grounds; that, in some cases, injustice might have been done, by ignoring rights which had not been fully explained; and that in others the Government might have suffered through concealment or fraud. For these, and many other reasons, he urged the advantage of leaving everything open to revision, after ten years' experience should have thrown fresh light on many obscure questions. On the other hand, Lord Cornwallis was deeply impressed with the iniquitous conduct of a vast number of the

European collectors, and with the oppression which had been exercised. He anticipated that great evils would arise, if an arrangement should be fixed for ten years only, as at the expiration of that time, fresh discussions must have arisen. Even during its continuance one party would have endeavoured to show he had been over-assessed, while the other would be equally anxious to prove the reverse. He therefore resolved, with the full and deliberate concurrence of Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas, to establish a permanent assessment. This was the only material point of difference between Lord Cornwallis and Mr. Shore, who stood almost alone, among all the civil servants who were consulted, in his opinion on this branch of the question.

The arguments on both sides are most ably stated by Lord Cornwallis and Mr. Shore, in their Minutes.[1]

Whether this system was the one best adapted to obtain the greatest income with the least pressure — whether in some respects it has not proved injurious to the Zemindars, whose interests it was intended to protect — and whether a temporary instead of a permanent settlement would not have been more advantageous to all parties,—are questions which have given rise to much discussion. That it received the unqualified approbation of Lord Wellesley is notorious, and as long as the system was administered by the same persons who had framed the regulations on which it was based, it appears to have worked with regularity and advantage.

It must be recollected that when this settlement was made, the evils which existed in the collection of the revenue were enormous, and anything was preferable to a continuance of such abuses. Even if some injustice had been committed, some irregularities created, the happiness and prosperity of the mass, and therefore the real advantage of the country, were daily perilled by hesitation and delay.

At that time Lord Cornwallis possessed no instruments to enable him to make a scientific and accurate survey of every village, and of all the holdings in each village, as has subsequently been done in the North-west Provinces, at an enormous expenditure of time and money, and by an efficient staff almost unlimited in numbers, of Civil and Military officers. The Civil servants in his time had not sufficient acquaintance with the country, nor were they numerous enough, to do it; and trust could not be placed in the natives. It thus became necessary to adopt a scheme upon an extensive plan, and therefore on the Zemindars

[1] See Appendix.

was thrown the onus of paying the revenue. It was considered that they were persons of property, and if an occasional bad season prevented them from collecting for a time the under-payments from the ryots, they could afford to grant that delay.

The punctuality of payment from the Zemindars was enforced by the penalty of confiscation of their estates in case of delay. Of course powers were given to the Zemindar to collect from the ryot, but Lord Cornwallis directed the Courts in each province to settle details, which he necessarily left open, according to the law and usages of the country, meaning that in no case should the ryot pay more than the pergunnah rate. He could not anticipate that the business of these Courts would increase so rapidly, nor that they would, as they certainly did, neglect to discharge their duties. He meant to protect all parties from the oppression exercised by former collectors; to encourage the Zemindar to promote cultivation, by claiming only a fixed tax; and to enable the Courts to see justice done to the ryots. But in too many cases the rigid exactions of the tax-gatherer, unmodified by any of the propositions introduced by Lord Cornwallis, were carried out; and it undoubtedly happened, that the sales of estates for non-payment of revenue were much more frequent than had been anticipated. Some portion of this evil must in justice be attributed to the Zemindars themselves, who often indulged in reckless extravagance, and largely exceeded their incomes. In other instances, certainly, large properties were sacrificed and families ruined, from not allowing sufficient time for the Zemindar to make arrangements with the ryot.

These evils were of course not felt for some time after the departure of Lord Cornwallis from India. There can be no doubt that, had he remained there, he would have taken care that his plans should have been executed according to the spirit, and not the letter of the regulations. But his successors were rigid in their application of the rules, and the distress which this occasioned brought undeserved blame on the system.[1]

[1] The following account of the effects of the permanent settlement is extracted from a pamphlet published by a very able Civil servant, now deceased, who was a member of the Board of Revenue.

"The effect of the permanent settlement has been a wonderful extension of cultivation. Though the original settlement was not at the time a light settlement, yet the saving principle of the permanent certainty of the assessment, brought the settlement through. So that, from the protection from foreign invasion, the increase of population, and the consequent increase of the demand for land, a great increase of cultivation, and a great rise in the rent of land, have taken place, and the estates have become most valuable property. The greater part of the land had, at the period of settlement, become waste from misgovernment; not only has the lost cultivation been recovered, but vast tracts where the plough had never passed have been reclaimed. . . .

"The result of the Parliamentary inquiry

The objections to a permanent system are very plausible, but the reasons which induced Lord Cornwallis to adopt this course will best be understood by a perusal of his Minutes.

Some modern writers, who have taken a very superficial view both of England and of India, have asserted that any European statesman would be thought mad, who imposed a permanent land-tax. They forget that the Zemindar settlement closely resembles the land-tax in England, which was originally fixed at 4*s.* in the pound on the then value of land, and is invariable in its gross amount. The result is, that no impediment has been thrown in the way of improvement, and in those districts where buildings, or great agricultural improvements have augmented the annual value of the land, the tax is hardly felt. For instance, in the parish of St. Marylebone, a fraction of ¼*d.* in the pound is the limit, while in some other places, it reaches 2*s.* 6*d.* or 3*s.* in the pound.

Other systems have been adopted in other parts of India. Up to 1802, when the Carnatic was annexed, the land revenues of the Madras Presidency were farmed. Then an attempt was made to put it on a different footing; but all the schemes, and several were tried, failed. When Sir Thomas Munro became Governor, he introduced the Ryotwar system, which as yet has not been replaced by any other. Under it, an annual valuation is made of every parcel of land held by an occupier, and he is assessed for an assumed portion of the revenue to be raised in his district. But the assessors who discharge this duty are natives, and it has long been known that hardly in a single instance have they shown themselves inaccessible to temptations to assess the tax unduly, and thus great expense is incurred and no proportional income obtained. The revenue also is gradually diminishing.

In the North-western Provinces the Village system is pursued, which in one respect at least closely resembles the Zemindar system, since in each instance a fixed sum is raised, but that sum is assessed in one case upon the village, in the other on the Zemindar; in both the property may be sold to make up any deficiency. Under the Village system, the share of the Government is between one-half and two-thirds of the produce. Latterly, this system has been made almost perpetual, as it has been fixed for 30 years. In

seems to demonstrate that the permanency of the Bengal settlement has not been a bad bargain. That, in addition to giving Government a fair revenue, it has increased very much the wealth of the country. That the blot on the system is not so much the *permanency* of the system as the neglect to administer effectually that part of the settlement which declared, in terms unfortunately not sufficiently clear and defined, that the cultivator should be maintained in his ancient right not to pay more than a limited and moderate rent, and that he should be kept in possession of his fields so long as he did so."

all these arrangements there are many details; modes of increasing or diminishing assessments, &c., &c., into which it would be superfluous here to enter.

The Judicial regulations, promulgated about the same time, come next in importance.

The first real authority acquired by the Company in Bengal was, as has been already stated, in 1765, when Shah Alem conferred on them in perpetuity the Dewanny authority, and arrangements were made with the Nabob, Nazim ud Dowlah, the son of Meer Jaffier, for intrusting the administration of the Subahdari to a Naib, or Deputy, appointed by the advice of the Governor in Council. Under this power all the persons concerned in administering justice, except in Calcutta, were natives.

In 1772, some alterations were made. Two Courts were established in each collectorate: the Dewanny for the cognizance of Civil cases, presided over by the collector as acting for the Dewan; and the Foujdarry, or criminal courts, where natives presided, while the collector attended, to see that justice was done to all parties. Appeals lay from these to two Superior Courts at Calcutta—the Dewanny Sudder Adawlut, and the Nizamut Sudder Adawlut.

Mr. Hastings, finding the duties press too heavily upon him, removed the latter Court to Moorshadabad, where Mahomed Reza Khan, already mentioned, presided as Naib Nazim. For police purposes, native officers called Foujedars, with a proper establishment of armed men, were appointed to each of the fourteen districts into which Bengal was divided.

No material alterations were made until 1780, when a judge (Sir E. Impey) was permanently put at the head of the Sudder Dewanny. In 1781, the Foujedars were abolished, and police authority conferred on the judges of the Dewanny Adawlut, and in some cases on the Zemindar and the collector, as well as upon the darogah of the Nizamut Adawlut.

Such was the state of the judicial department when Lord Cornwallis arrived in India in 1786. The evils which arose from this system are easy to conceive. In those days few Europeans had sufficient knowledge of the language or the habits of the natives to be competent judges; and when natives were the sole judges corruption generally prevailed to an unlimited extent. It was easier to perceive the objections to this system than to obviate them, and it was not till Lord Cornwallis had been some time in India, that he attempted to remodel the whole. The establishment of a new system of police for Calcutta itself was his first

step. His next was the abolition, in 1790, of the office of Naib Nazim, and the Company then assumed the criminal, as they had previously done the civil, jurisdiction over the whole country.

Lord Cornwallis's plans were matured before the commencement of 1790, and promulgated early in that year.

First, in regard to the Civil Courts, he began by depriving all persons engaged in collecting the revenue of any judicial authority; considering that, in questions where the Government was concerned, they could never be looked upon as impartial, and that the discharge of judicial functions must occupy much of the time which ought to be devoted to revenue affairs. The Courts of the lowest class were those of native commissioners; these were exceedingly numerous, but though they might hear cases under 50 rupees, they could enforce no decree without the authority of a Superior Court.[1] Next above these were the Zillah Courts, in which a European presided, assisted by a European registrar and by a Hindoo and a Mahommedan assessor, who advised on questions of succession, marriages, caste, and other institutions affecting the law of their respective religions.

This Court heard all civil suits of a local nature, as well as those in which the defendant resided within the limits of the zillah or city. From these lay an appeal to the Provincial Courts, which were also Courts of primary jurisdiction. Three covenanted servants sat in each; their business was to hear appeals, to try all causes remitted to them by Government, or by the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut; to receive such complaints of corruption, &c., as might be brought against the inferior judges, and to report upon them to the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut. This was the Supreme Court, and consisted of the Governor-General and Members of Council, and to them lay the final appeal, but only when the amount exceeded 1000 rupees. An ultimate appeal lay to the King in Council, but the limit of the amount was not settled. In 1797 it was fixed at 50,000 rupees.

The Criminal Courts were composed practically of the same persons: the Governor-General and Council, for the Sudder Nizamut Adawlut; the provincial courts made two annual circuits, within their jurisdictions; and the zillah and city judges acted as magistrates, both in inflicting punishment for trifling offences, and in taking preliminary proceedings in criminal cases.

But the greatest alteration in the administration of criminal justice was effected by discarding and abrogating several Mahommedan laws hitherto acted upon.

[1] The Registrar might decide cases under 200 rupees.

The Koran is understood to be the basis of the Mahommedan law, but any deficiencies are supplied by commentators, and the traditional accounts of the precepts, actions, and decisions of the Prophet. Even these rules are differently interpreted by the Shias and the Soonies—the latter sect being predominant in India. When the office of Naib Nazim was abolished, it was necessary that the criminal law, administered by Europeans, should be more in accordance with European principles, and Lord Cornwallis therefore determined—

1st. That in cases of homicide, the intention of the offender, as far as it could be ascertained, and not the weapon used, should be the test of criminality.

2nd. That the heirs of a murdered party should not be allowed to prevent the punishment of the murderer.

3rd. That the punishment of mutilation should be abolished.

4th. That the crimes of forgery, perjury, or subornation of perjury, should be punished by branding on the forehead, added to other penalties.

Whatever might be the religion of the accused, the Mahommedan law was to be applied in all criminal cases; but if the penalty awarded by the Mahommedan assessor was at variance with the rules thus laid down, the judge directed some other punishment more consonant to European principles. If the assessor announced, for instance, that, as the heir would not prosecute, no further steps could be taken, he was compelled to state what penalty would have been decreed had the heir taken a different course, and the punishment thus named was inflicted accordingly. Nor were these the only changes. The law of evidence, in native hands, was much at variance with English habits. Religious disabilities, and circumstances connected with caste and other causes, were held to render witnesses incapable of giving evidence. Such difficulties were now disregarded; the witnesses were obliged to attend, and the assessor was called upon to say what the decision would have been, if no objection to receiving their evidence had existed.

Many minor regulations were made, to avoid offending, as far as possible, the feelings and prejudices of the natives, especially in cases concerning females; and the whole plan showed an anxious desire to remove all the evils of the former systems, and to substitute for them only such portions of the European law as might be absolutely necessary.

At this time no Europeans, except military officers and covenanted servants, were allowed to reside out of Calcutta, without a special license. All natives and foreigners were amenable to the Zillah and other Courts, and British subjects themselves were

bound, under heavy penalties, to submit to these courts of judicature, in cases under 500 rupees. In criminal cases, Europeans were always sent for trial to Calcutta. Calcutta, and a small surrounding district, had a jurisdiction of its own, both civil and criminal; and all cases, whether Europeans or natives were concerned, were tried in the Supreme Court, before judges nominated by the Crown.

The strong objections which Lord Cornwallis entertained to the administration of India by natives of influence and rank made him anxious to extend to the Zemindary of Benares the system introduced in Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa. But it was first necessary that the Rajah of Benares should relinquish certain functions (almost regal) which the Company had allowed him to exercise, although they denied that he had any right to claim them. The task of obtaining this renunciation was confided to Mr. Duncan, who, after a long and difficult negociation, succeeded in his object, but the arrangement was not finally concluded till October 27, 1794.

Such is a brief outline of the judicial system organised by Lord Cornwallis, and which, with slight modifications, still exists. No people are more litigious than the inhabitants of India, and the facility afforded to all persons to apply at very trifling expense to the Courts, in support of claims real or imaginary, occasioned such an enormous number of suits, that the judges were overwhelmed with labour. In a single district, 30,000 cases were in 1795 brought before one judge, and the delay in giving judgment was in fact almost a denial of justice. An increase of the number, especially of native judges, has mitigated this evil; but it is to be feared, that, considering the character and disposition of the Hindoos, the system may have encouraged chicane and false claims, and thus have in fact rather impeded the course of real justice; but no better plan has ever been proposed.

Similar remarks, but in a minor degree, may be applied to the criminal Courts. There the delay occurs mainly in the preliminary stage of investigation, and arises from the difficulty of giving any credence to witnesses, in a country where events stated as facts will be supported by the most direct and positive testimony, though no such events have ever occurred, and the whole testimony is therefore utterly false. Under such circumstances, no regulations can be perfectly efficacious for securing the due administration of justice.

The state of the police[1] is closely connected with the administration of justice.

[1] The police regulations, and most of the judicial regulations, were framed by Sir E. Impey, altered, perhaps not much improved, by Sir George Barlow.

Under the native rule, and for many years after the Company had become the Dewan of the Nabob, the police of the country was entrusted mostly to the Zemindars, who, by means of a large number of inferior officers maintained in the different villages, more or less protected the inhabitants. They were bound to apprehend all offenders, and if they could neither recover the property stolen, nor seize the robber, they were liable to make pecuniary satisfaction to the sufferer. This system was very plausible, and at first perhaps efficacious; but like most Oriental institutions, it had fallen into decay and disorder.

With a view to restore efficacy to the police, Lord Cornwallis divided the whole country into districts of about twenty miles square. In each was a Darogah, with an establishment of armed men, appointed by the magistrate of the Zillah. The Darogah had power to accept bail in certain cases, and in some classes of petty offences he was empowered to decide at once; but, as a general rule, he sent all prisoners to the magistrates.

The pasbans, pykes, and other village guards, were placed under his authority, but vacancies in their numbers were to be filled up by the Zemindars. In large towns such as Patna, Dacca, and Moorshadabad, a similar plan was adopted, with modifications suited to the difference between rural and town populations. In Benares, Mr. Duncan believed that he could maintain a more efficient police through the assistance of the Zemindar, and accordingly that province was exempted from the general arrangement, which extended only to Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa.

This system lasted till 1807, when it was found advisable to call for more assistance from the Zemindars. The village guards had been all dismissed, and it does appear that the officers of police, appointed in their room, were not only very inferior in number to those they had superseded, but were quite unequal to the task imposed upon them. Other changes have from time to time been introduced, but the police of Bengal even now is far from being in a satisfactory state.

Minute of the Governor-General.

Fort William, Jan. 11, 1793.

I have the satisfaction to inform the Board, that I have received information that deputies from the Rajah of Nepaul have arrived at Patna with an invitation from their Master to Captain Kirkpatrick to proceed on his intended deputation to Catmandu, and that a letter may be expected from those deputies in the

course of a day or two, requesting my permission to Captain Kirkpatrick to accept of the invitation.

Although there has been a considerable change in affairs in Nepaul since Captain Kirkpatrick's deputation was first proposed, I think it is still advisable to allow him to proceed, and as the differences between the Rajah of Nepaul and the Chinese appear to be compromised, his instructions upon that head may now be limited to his endeavouring to ascertain what were the causes of the war, in order that we may be able to judge of the best mode of acting as mediators in case of a revival of the quarrel on any future occasion.

The other objects of the deputation I think should be:— 1st, to assure the Rajah of the friendly disposition of this Government towards him, and of our desire to encourage a free commercial intercourse between the two countries; 2ndly, to induce the Government of Nepaul to pay the strictest attention to the late commercial treaty; 3rdly, to effect, if possible, a final settlement of all boundary disputes; 4thly, to make general observations on the form of Government, and on the religion, manners, and customs of the inhabitants; 5thly, to inquire into the nature of the trade which the people of Nepaul carry on with Thibet and Tartary, and whether any articles of British export could find a vent in these channels; 6thly, to endeavour to ascertain what articles of British or Bengal manufacture are most suitable to the consumption of Nepaul, and to obtain a knowledge of the manufactures and the internal productions of that country; 7thly, to acquire as much information as may be practicable of the roads and geography of Nepaul and the neighbouring countries.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

[Private.]

DEAR SIR, Calcutta, Jan. 25, 1793.

. . . Affairs at Poonah still continue in an unsettled state; but the report of Nana's intending to relinquish his station and retire to Benares loses ground, and it seems probable that Scindia will content himself with empty promises of support, and the more substantial permission to squeeze some money from the Nizam and Guicowar.

Tippoo's vakeels have notified to the Nizam that his share of the first khist was on the borders of the Cuddapa country, and desired him to send an order for the receipt of it; and an hircarrah who arrived lately at Madras from Seringapatam reports that the Maratta khist left the latter place three days before he

began his journey; so that I hope Tippoo will at length complete his payments and liberate the hostages. But before they leave Madras, we must receive a much more satisfactory account of our prisoners than we have hitherto been able to obtain; and this is the more necessary since, strange and unaccountable as it appears, we are assured by persons who have lately escaped, that Tippoo still detains some of our unfortunate countrymen.

We have begun to sell our paper, and have found a considerable demand for it at a premium of 1 per cent., by which means, if we can exchange the amount of our debt into new paper within the year, we shall only in reality pay an interest of 7 per cent., without hazarding the inconvenient consequences that attended the hasty reduction of the interest previous to the war; and by taking advantage of the high state of our credit at this period, to put the bonds upon the register, we shall in the course of a twelvemonth have only one species of debt. . . .

Captain Welsh has succeeded in driving the Bengal Berkendosses[1] out of Assam, and I have now directed him to desist from all further military operations, and to invite the Rajah of Deringh and all the principal malcontents to meet him, and to offer our friendly mediation to terminate the civil feuds that have desolated that fine country.

The Rajah of Nepaul, notwithstanding the peace that he has concluded with the Lama and the Chinese, has sent his Dewan to invite Captain Kirkpatrick to proceed to Catmandu, his capital, and I have great hopes that we shall establish an intercourse with that country that will prove highly beneficial to us.

This letter will be delivered to you by my friend Mr. Stuart, whose steady and honourable behaviour during my absence will, I have no doubt, ensure to him a kind reception from yourself as well as from Mr. Pitt, to whom I request that you will have the goodness to introduce him, you will, however, easily discover that no very deep or useful information is to be obtained from that quarter. . . .

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

REV. C. F. SWARTZ TO SIR CHARLES OAKELEY, BART., PRESIDENT AND GOVERNOR, &c.

HONOURABLE SIR AND SIRS, Madras, Jan. 27, 1793.

When I heard that the Honourable Board was resolved to proclaim Serfojee, the adopted son of the late Rajah of Tanjore,

[1] Berkendosses were little else than bands of plunderers, with some military organization.

presumptive heir of the present Rajah, and that he was to succeed him in case the present Rajah should die without having a son born of his lawfully married wife (for that seems to be the meaning of the word presumptive heir), the following thoughts occurred to my mind, which I beg leave to disclose to your Honour.

I thought if Serfojee is proclaimed presumptive successor or heir to the throne of Tanjore, then he stands a poor, or perhaps no chance at all, of inheriting the country, for—

His Excellency the present Rajah is but 43 years old, and is now marrying one, or as some say two wives—he may therefore have a son.

But if he does not have a son, he may take an infant, declaring him to be his own son, born of his wife: his hatred and jealousy of Serfojee makes this conjecture very probable. The same has been done at Tanjore by Aperoop, the lawful but barren wife of Serfojee Rajah.

Or the present Rajah may adopt another man's son. This is more than a conjecture; he has already declared it to be his intention, being resolved to adopt Nanah Saheb's son. This Nanah Saheb is the son of a concubine.

Moreover I thought that the present Rajah, having, as many people well versed in the Shaster of the Hindoos think, and as some of those very pundits who formerly gave their opinion in favour of the present Rajah allow, no legal right to the throne of Tanjore, he could not lawfully make it over to his son (if he had a son), as long as the lawful heir was alive. Can he give away that which is not his own? and shall an error once committed to the prejudice of the lawful heir be continued, so as to supersede the true and lawful heir for ever, or annihilate his right?

It may be said that it would reflect on the decision formerly made in favour of the present Rajah; but in my humble opinion that decision was conditional, supposing the justice of the opinions given by the pundits; but as their opinion is found to be ill-grounded, the decision built upon it, one might think, would cease to be valid.

These few thoughts I beg leave to submit to your mature consideration.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

C. F. SWARTZ.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN COUNCIL TO THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

HONOURABLE SIRS, Fort William, Jan. 29, 1793.

. . . You were acquainted in our letter by the Pitt that we should inform you in our next despatches of our answer to those from Madras, in which they gave us notice of their intention to delay the execution of the treaty with the Rajah of Tanjore, and the delivery of the Rajah's country to him, until they should receive our further authority for that purpose. It appeared to us that his conduct towards Serfojee and the widows of the late Rajah, as well as the orders he gave for putting to death the Parcarry[1] on the strange suspicions that he stated, might be in some measure attributed to profligacy and barbarity of disposition, but principally to derangement of mind; and, under these impressions, we thought that it would at present be highly unadvisable to entrust him with the management of so valuable a country, even if the season had not been so far advanced, and he had acceded to the terms of the new agreement proposed to him by the Government of Madras.

We therefore approved of their retaining the management of the country of Tanjore in the hands of their officers to the end of the current revenue-year; and we observed that, before its expiration, the Rajah and his advisers would not only have time to reconsider the grounds upon which he refused to agree to the terms of the treaty, but the Government would be able to judge whether he had so far recovered a proper temper of mind as to render it safe, in the event of his acquiescing in the conditions that were offered to him, to put the affairs of his country under his own control and authority.

The humane attention and assistance that Mr. Swartz had given to the distresses of Serfojee and the widows, afforded us the greatest satisfaction, and we requested that our sentiments of his conduct might be communicated to him.

We have the pleasure to acquaint you that Serfojee and the widows, accompanied by Mr. Swartz, are arrived at Madras.

We are, &c.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO TIPPOO SULTAUN.

Calcutta, Feb. 10, 1793.

I have received your letter explaining the subject of the French claims in the vicinity of Mahé, on which I wrote to you;

[1] Parcarry, properly Pansari, a druggist.

I have accordingly notified to the Chief of that nation at Mahé the reply which you have made to my application, and have desired the Government of Bombay not to molest the three villages which you have named in your letter.

On the subject of the Talooks, which you represent to be still detained by the Peshwa and by the Nizam, I am compelled to observe that the accounts which I receive from those Powers on the situation of the Talooks, many of which they state still to be in the possession of your officers, notwithstanding that they are particularly expressed in the schedule to the Treaty of Seringapatam as ceded to them, differ so widely from the representations which I receive from you, that I cannot pretend to form any decision on the subject. It is my earnest wish, as I am confident it is the desire of the Peshwa, the Nizam, and yourself, that these boundary arrangements should be settled in an amicable manner; and as it can answer no useful purpose to continue a correspondence replete with unpleasant altercations, on subjects which in many instances owe their rise to the litigious disposition of aumils and subordinate officers on both sides, and which until the boundaries are finally settled must occur, I recommend, as the most likely mode by which these uncertain Talooks can be decided on, that in your correspondence with either of those powers on such subjects, you adopt the measure which I have suggested in my former letters to you relative to the boundaries at Cauveripoor, of deputing intelligent and experienced aumeens to the spot, who will make the necessary investigations, and will conform to the article of the Treaty of Seringapatam expressly inserted to answer the end of deciding the claims of the respective powers to the Talooks on the boundaries.

I am surprised at the request contained in your letter relative to the garrison stationed in the fort of Sudaseoghur, on the part of the people of Goa; you are doubtless well informed that the English Governments have no authority over the Government of Goa, which is a settlement belonging to the Portuguese (and the fort of Sudaseoghur was not taken by either of the powers in alliance). It is therefore a subject in which I cannot interfere, and I can only observe that your application for the particulars of this transaction should be made to the Government of Goa, on whose part you state that the garrison is placed in that fort.

With respect to the subject contained in your letter relative to the peshcush from Kurnool, I have already communicated my sentiments to Sir John Kennaway for the Nizam's information; and I have no doubt that this matter will be adjusted in a manner that

shall be consistent with the justice due to all parties, and conformably to the friendly system existing between each other.

I trust that Golaum Ally Khan[1] and Ally Reza[2] have transmitted to you the copy of a letter which I directed should be written to them, stating the intelligence which I have received of prisoners still detained within your dominions, contrary to the treaty which stipulates that they shall be released. I have not yet received any reply to it, but should consider myself deficient on my part if I did not inform you of such accounts as I have received of prisoners still detained, and of some that are even at Seringapatam. A person named Beecher was taken prisoner on the sea-coast, and was sent to Bednore near three years ago, and from thence to Seringapatam, from whence he made his escape in November last, and arrived at Tellicherry, where he informed General Abercromby that there are still several Englishmen and some women, as well as native tradesmen, who were taken prisoners with General Mathews. I will not trouble you with the examination of the names of the people who have made their escape, after the repeated assurances which were made to me on your part that there were no persons detained within your dominions, but their escape tends to confirm the apprehension in my mind that this article of the Treaty of Seringapatam has not been executed. I request that you will give immediate orders on this subject, that the doubts which from these circumstances must arise in the mind of the Peshwa, the Nizam, and in my own, of your intentions to execute the treaty in this respect, may be removed.

The conduct of the Aumildar of Ave-acomchy, who has, as he represents, by your orders, taken possession of villages belonging for fifty years and upwards to the Poligar of Verepatchee, a subject of the Company, has been communicated to me, and has been made known to your Vakeels at Madras. It is not possible that his conduct in this respect can have been in consequence of your orders; for while friendship subsists between us, how can such hostile measures be adopted in pursuance of the orders of either Government. I have that confidence in your friendly disposition as to hope that you will apply the necessary remedy to this evil,

[1] Gholam Ali Khan had been a confidential friend of Hyder, and had been sent by Tippoo on a mission to Constantinople in 1785. After a long absence he returned with only 68 out of more than 1100 attendants and escort who had proceeded on the expedition. He was disgraced for having failed in the mission, and for having embezzled the money entrusted to him, and was not released from confinement till he was employed in 1792 to negociate with Lord Cornwallis.

[2] Ali Reza Khan commanded at Goorumcoonda when Hafiz Jee was so inhumanly executed. He was a cousin of Tippoo's, and often employed by him.

so that the property in the villages in dispute may be ascertained by amicable intercourse. While I am confident that the declaration of the Aumil of Ave-acomchy is void of truth, I think it will appear to you, as it does to me, that this is an instance where the disinclined temper of the Aumil to adjust matters in an amicable manner as they occur, is so evident as to strengthen my recommendation that Aumeens be deputed to inquire into the respective claims of each party in disputed places, and I must regret that my letters on this subject, which is for the mutual good of both parties, have not yet been answered.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN COUNCIL TO THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL AT FORT ST. GEORGE.

HONOURABLE SIR, Fort William, Feb. 11, 1793.

We have received your letter dated the 22nd ultimo, and we have taken the subject of it under our very serious consideration.

We must confess that Mr. Swartz's sentiments, in addition to other circumstances, have created great doubts in our minds of the just right of the present Rajah of Tanjore to the succession to the Raje, and we are entirely persuaded that he is personally very unworthy of that station; but it is necessary to proceed with great circumspection and delicacy in impeaching a right, that has been sanctioned by a solemn decision passed in consequence of the answers that were made by fifteen pundits to the questions that were referred to them.

We therefore can only recommend to you at present to proclaim Serfojee presumptive heir to the Raje, but we shall in the mean time, without mentioning the names of the parties, call upon learned pundits in this place and at Benares for answers to the substance of the questions that were put to the pundits at Tanjore after the death of the late Rajah, and it will also be proper in you to endeavour to establish, in a clear and authentic manner, whether the opinions of any of the Tanjore pundits were obtained by the means of bribery and corruption.

We highly approve of the caution that has been given to the Rajah by your president, against the adoption of a son at the present period, with the view of depriving Serfojee of rights which may, upon deliberate inquiry, appear to be incontrovertible.

We have, &c.

Feb. 18, 1793.

Ordered that the following questions be put to the most respectable pundits here and at Benares:

Whether by the laws of the Shaster, or any other Hindoo laws or customs, an Hindoo Rajah has a legal right to adopt a distant relation, to the prejudice of an illegitimate brother living at the time of the adoption?

Whether a boy may be legally adopted from a family which has no other son, but where there are daughters older than the boy?

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO SIR CHARLES OAKELEY, BART.

[Private.]

SIR, Calcutta, March 1, 1793.

I have received your letter dated the 13th instant, inclosing the letters from Colonel Braithwaite and Colonel Bruce[1] and the answer from the Board; and I will most readily, at your request, give you my sentiments freely on the line which Government ought to observe in the transmission of military orders.

In all cases where secrecy and dispatch are not requisite, they should be sent through the Commanding Officer of the army, both because men accustomed to military business will arrange the details necessary for their execution with more precision, and because it will tend to support the consequence and authority of the Commander-in-Chief.

In circumstances where dispatch alone is required, Government should in the first instance transmit the orders to the officer who is to execute them; but should lose no time in forwarding copies of them to the Commanding Officer, that he may not be exposed to the ridicule and consequent contempt which must attend his appearing ignorant of what is passing in the army which he is supposed to command, and that he may have an opportunity of suggesting any addition or improvement in the final execution. But, if the service should likewise be of a secret nature, the communication should be limited to a bare notification that orders have been sent to certain officers or corps, until Government are of opinion that more full information may with propriety be given to him.

The subdivision of the troops, under officers commanding separate districts, must tend to simplify the public business, and to render the management of so unwieldy a machine as an army much less complicated, when orders are conveyed in the manner I have recommended; and it has besides the additional advantage,

[1] Lieut.-Colonel Robert Bruce, b. 1754, d. Nov. 4, 1796.

that an officer of rank, and who is charged with a considerable degree of responsibility, is constantly at hand to stop the beginnings of any disturbances that might arise either amongst the troops, or in the country. The authority of Government and of the Commander-in-Chief, will easily prevent those officers from embarrassing, instead of promoting, the public service, by their troublesome and ill-founded jealousies, or by mistaken ideas of their own importance.

What I have said is particularly applicable to the case of your having only a temporary Commanding Officer of the troops. But the forms that I have recommended should be invariably observed even when the Commander-in-Chief is a Member of Council; and Government, by avoiding details in that department, will be in its proper place as a superintending and general controlling power, in the same manner as is practised with regard to the departments of Revenue and Commerce.

It may be considered as a general truth, that all armies have a propensity to relaxation; and that strict habits of subordination, which constitute the essence of military discipline, can only be maintained in any army by the strong and experienced hand of a military commander.

The Governments in this country should always keep a watchful eye upon their respective Commanders-in-Chief, and exercise a complete authority over them. And when they see reason to disapprove of their conduct, it will be their duty to endeavour by representation to effect their removal. But until they can be removed, and particularly in cases where Commanders-in-Chief are evidently deserving of confidence, their consequence with the troops under their command should, in order to render them useful in their stations, be decidedly supported. . . .

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Private.] Received March 2, 1793.

MY DEAR LORD, London, Sept. 17, 1792.

In your letter you allude to the important question of the perpetuity of the Decennial Settlement, and I have the very great satisfaction to inform you that the same conveyance which carries this, carries out an approbation and confirmation of your sentiments on that subject. It has been longer delayed than I expected, but the delay was unavoidable. Knowing that the Directors would not

be induced to take it up so as to consider it with any degree of attention, and knowing that some of the most leading ones among them held an opinion different both from your Lordship and me on the question of perpetuity, and feeling that there was much respect due to the opinion and authority of Mr. Shore, I thought it indispensably necessary both that the measure must originate with the Board of Control, and likewise that I should induce Mr. Pitt to become my partner in the final consideration of so important and controverted a measure. He accordingly agreed to shut himself up with me for ten days at Wimbledon, and attend to that business only. Charles Grant staid with us a great part of the time. After a most minute and attentive consideration of the whole subject, I had the satisfaction to find Mr. Pitt entirely of the same opinion with us. We therefore settled a despatch upon the ideas we had formed, and sent it down to the Court of Directors. What I expected, happened; the subject was too large for the consideration of the Directors in general, and the few who knew anything concerning it, understanding from me that Mr. Pitt and I were decided in our opinions, thought it best to acquiesce, so that they came to a resolution to adopt entirely the despatch as transmitted by me.

The subject I have just wrote upon, naturally leads me to advert to what your Lordship has so often urged me upon—the finding a proper successor to you. I can assure your Lordship, you have never imposed any task upon me that I have found more difficult to accomplish. The truth is, that I had almost despaired of it, and it is not a month since I had determined to write to you entreating you to remain a few months more, and promising that, if we did not find a successor in the course of the winter to our mind, I would come out to India myself, the moment the charter of the East India Company should be settled, sooner than which time it was impossible for me to leave this country. I trust, however, that what we have now resolved upon, will, under all circumstances, meet with your approbation. In considering the proceedings of your Government on the Decennial Settlement, although Mr. Shore differed from you on the question of perpetuity, it was impossible to consider the whole of that subject without admiring his talents, industry, and candour. Mr. Pitt and I therefore agreed to recommend him to the Court of Directors as provisional successor to you. He had some difficulties on account of domestic circumstances—Mrs. Shore,[1] to whom he is much attached, not being in a condition to attend him immediately. He is willing either to remain for a few years at the head of the Government, or to become second in

[1] Mrs. Shore, b. 1761, d. July 13, 1834.

Council, if we think it right, upon further inquiry, to send out any other person from this country, or to come home again, if that suits our arrangements best. We have got great credit by recommending him for this appointment, and from the high opinion you entertain of him, I trust you will be satisfied with it.

I wrote to the King, who is at Weymouth, giving him my reasons for adopting this measure, and I send you a copy [1] of the letter he wrote in answer to mine. He is in perfect health, and delighted beyond description with all the recent events of India. I know not which he admires most, your conduct of the war, or the peace by which you have concluded it. The King wishes Abercrombie to succeed you as Commander-in-Chief, with a seat in the Supreme Council. I have recommended it, and I suppose the Directors will do it next Wednesday. You see therefore that you will be relieved from your apprehensions of Mr. —— taking his seat at the Council board immediately, and some means must be taken to prevent his ever doing it. I think it right, however, for my own sake, to say to you that I do not acquiesce in the strictures you make in your letter. All you say may be perfectly true, but your Lordship will recollect that I have no means of knowing these private anecdotes, or the opinions you entertain of individual characters, except from what your Lordship from time to time may communicate to me. Nothing has ever dropt from you adverse to the character and pretensions of Mr. ——. I saw him standing at the head of the —— Board, and therefore, as the Court of Directors did not choose to give up their ideas of seniority, or to go down so low as Duncan, which, upon your authority, I urged, I very readily acquiesced in Mr. ——, in preference of several others that were mentioned. . . .

I suppose we shall see Medows very soon. His conduct to you has been highly honourable, and is everywhere felt as such: you need be under no apprehension of his being well received at St. James's. The King feels on all that subject exactly as you wish. He had purposely reserved for him and Abercrombie, two Red Ribbons, that they might be bestowed upon them at the end of the war in India; and that mark of the King's approbation of their services was announced in the Gazette, immediately after the receipt of your letter communicating the termination of hostilities.

In conferring the Marquisate on your Lordship, we went on your brother the Bishop's authority, both as to the thing itself, and not changing the title of *Cornwallis*. I trust your Lordship will give me full credit when I assure you that amongst many other

[1] Mr. Dundas transmitted the original holograph, instead of the copy.

circumstances of satisfaction, which, both on public and private grounds, I derived from the happy termination of the war, none has given me more sincere pleasure than the very high and exalted situation in which your Lordship stands in the public opinion, and the love that is borne to you by every man in the kingdom whose opinion you can have any value for.

I propose the beginning of next month to go to Scotland, and be idle for six weeks or two months, and upon my return I shall set immediately to work with the arrangement of the new Charter. I have already pretty much formed my opinions, and I trust we shall carry through all that business with a high hand, and, I should hope, without any serious dispute with the Court of Directors.* Before I go to Scotland I shall explain to Mr. Shore all my ideas, that he may communicate them to you.

I remain, &c.,

HENRY DUNDAS.

THE KING TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

[Holograph.]

Weymouth, Sept. 5, 1792, 4 P.M.

Unless a very proper man of distinction could have been (found) to be Governor-General at Bengal, no one could have been so properly thought of as Mr. Shore, who will certainly more explicitly follow the Civil plan Lord Cornwallis has laid down than any other person; I trust at the same time a seat at the Supreme Council will be conferred on M.-Gen. Abercrombie, and the Commission of Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in the East Indies; and a fit person entrusted with the command of the Forces in the Carnatic.

G. R.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

HONOURABLE SIRS, Fort William, March 7, 1793.

I request that you will be persuaded that I feel myself highly gratified and honoured by the flattering expressions of approbation which you have been pleased, in your letter to this Government dated the 19th of September, 1792, to bestow upon my conduct during the late war, and upon the conditions of the peace by which it was terminated; and I beg that you will accept of my warmest thanks for the sanction that you have given to the issue of the gratuity which I had taken upon myself to make to the officers and soldiers under my command, as well as for the

additional bounty which you have so liberally ordered for them, as a public testimony of the sense that you entertain of their merit and valour.

The notification that you have given of the appointment of Mr. Shore to succeed me in this Government has likewise afforded me very great satisfaction; but as there were many objections to my preparing the minds of the Native Powers for my resignation of the Government, until I knew with certainty that a successor had been appointed, and might soon be expected in India, and as the season is now so far advanced that, even if Mr. Shore should arrive to-morrow, I must either depart in so abrupt a manner as to hazard very material inconvenience to the public interests, or remain a few months longer in Bengal, I have felt it as a duty which I owe to you and to my country to sacrifice my own private wishes and all personal considerations, and postpone my departure from hence till the month of August next.

I have accordingly given notice to all the Native Powers of my intended resignation at that period, and I trust that in the interval, every political arrangement will be completed that can tend to strengthen the prospect of a long continuance of the present general tranquillity.

I shall likewise have time to explain fully to Mr. Shore the principles of the plan which has been adopted by this Government, at my recommendation, for the future collection of the revenues, and for a regular and efficient administration of justice in the Bengal Provinces, and to avail myself of the suggestions which his zeal and ability may enable him to give me for establishing the system upon a solid and permanent foundation.

The plan being described in the letter in the Revenue Department, and particularly detailed in my Minute which will be transmitted with it as an enclosure, it is unnecessary in this place to enter into any explanation of it; but I think it incumbent upon me to say that the radical defects which have long prevailed in your dominions, in the administration of civil and criminal justice to your native subjects, have been no less unworthy of the British character than injurious to your interests. And as the plans that I have introduced for remedying those evils have been the result of my most deliberate consideration for several years, I indulge myself in very sanguine hopes that they will be found worthy of your entire approbation, as being well calculated for giving additional security to the lives and properties, and for increasing the happiness, of many millions of people.

I have, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

DEAR SIR, Calcutta, March 7, 1793.

I received on the 2nd instant your letter dated the 17th of September, and was very happy to find that the mode of terminating the war had given such general satisfaction in England.

Having promised in my letter to you by the Manship that I would not leave India before a successor arrived, and being so deeply interested in the success of our affairs in this country, that I would suffer anything rather than contribute to put ——— into the Chair even for a month, I was unwilling to give any notice of my intended resignation to the country Powers, or to make any public preparations for it, previous to the arrival of the packet. The very long passage which the Tartar made, has now reduced me to the necessity of deciding whether I would hazard the ill consequences to the public affairs of a sudden and abrupt departure, or continue some months longer in Bengal; and, although the climate of the approaching season is not very inviting, I have not hesitated to prefer the latter. . . .

I shall be very anxious to hear how you have settled the business of the Charter, of which I think the military part the most difficult, although perhaps it may not be so immediately troublesome to you as that which relates to the Court of Directors. I have never yet been able to form any satisfactory plan for the Indian army, but I am fully persuaded that it cannot go on long on its present footing. . . .

I transmit to the Court of Directors by this opportunity a copy of my Minute on the subject of the separation of the collection of the revenue from the judicial authority, which has obtained the sanction of the Board; you will perceive that I have made a few alterations since I sent it to you, they were suggested by some of the most able men in this settlement, and when I have completely carried the plan into execution, I shall feel not only that I have secured the most important advantages to the natives, but that I have struck at the root of the abuses which so long disgraced the British administration in India.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE BISHOP OF LICHFIELD AND COVENTRY.

DEAR JAMES, Calcutta, March 9, 1793.

. . . If I had no thought but for my own comfort and gratification, I should not hesitate a moment about my immediate

departure from this country, but a Governor-General, and especially one who has been engaged in such important scenes as myself, cannot take an abrupt leave without great inconvenience and injury to the public service. I have therefore determined to retain the Government till August, by which time everything will be so arranged that no mischief or confusion is likely to arise from my resignation. Shore is not yet arrived, but we expect him hourly.

The Commodore, who promised to be in the mouth of the river by the latter end of last month, when he hoped to carry me home, has not made his appearance, but I trust I shall have the satisfaction of seeing him in a few days, and of concerting matters with him for our August voyage.

I was glad to find that Brome had got safe home, when the whole Continent was in so great a combustion, and I am perfectly well pleased with the idea of his remaining at Cambridge till my return. The papers are filled with nothing but the horrors of those butchers and cannibals at Paris; I trust that my friend the Duke of Brunswic will long since have inflicted upon them severe and exemplary chastisement.

Your affectionate brother,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

HONOURABLE SIRS, Fort William, March 21, 1793.

I have read with peculiar gratification the resolutions passed by the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Common Council of the City of London, on the 4th of October last, communicated by your public general letter, dated the 10th of that month, and I beg leave to request that you will be pleased to convey to that respectable body, my warmest assurances that I put a very high value on the approbation that they have expressed of my conduct during the late war with Tippoo Sultan, and that I shall ever feel it as a most distinguished honour to have been enrolled in so flattering a manner in the list of the Citizens of London.

I have, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

[Private.]

DEAR SIR, Calcutta, March 24, 1793.

I have had the pleasure since I wrote last of receiving my friend Shore, whose mind is become much more enlarged and

firm, and whose sentiments are greatly improved by his visit to England.

He has been perfectly fair and good-humoured about the permanent settlement, and his declaration that he will persevere in the present system of external management, and, above all, his approbation and resolution to support and enforce the late domestic arrangements, have afforded me the greatest satisfaction, and induce me to hope that I shall have grounds to retract the opinion I before gave, and to admit him as an exception to my general rule. He did not appear to be in the least disappointed by my resolution to retain the Government till August, but offered me his most cordial assistance whenever I might wish to employ him.

The Commissioners on the Malabar coast are going on vastly well, and my friend Duncan, who is worth all the rest, is of opinion that, when the country has recovered a little from the late distractions, the revenue will be nearly equal to the amount at which it was stated in Tippoo's schedules.

Indian politics continue much the same: Scindia is still at Poona, and there is at present no appearance of his leaving that place; the Nizam's Government is as feeble and disjointed as ever. Tippoo's first khist is paid to both those Powers, and his Vakeels have notified that a second may be soon expected. Captain Kirkpatrick has been received with great civility by the Rajah of Nepaul; and Welsh remains at Gwahatty, where he is endeavouring (but hitherto without success) to bring about a reconciliation between the Rajah of Assam and the discontented chiefs.

I observe that the consideration of the military establishment of India is postponed, and I shall in the mean time apply my most serious thoughts, and obtain the best information and opinions that I can, on that difficult subject. I must however premise that I foresee great danger for our Asiatic possessions from a separate provincial army of Europeans, and I shall therefore certainly not recommend that principle in the arrangement.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE REV. MR. SWARTZ.

SIR, Fort William, May 9, 1793.

I have received your letter, dated the 12th ultimo, and am much obliged to you for the candid manner in which you have communicated your sentiments to me respecting the adoption of Serfojee and the succession to the Raje of Tanjore.

From the respectable character which you have always borne, I entertain no doubt of your having recalled the attention of our Government to the claims of Serfojee from your perfect conviction of their being founded on justice, and you may be assured that in order to guide the judgment of the Supreme Government, I shall call upon the pundits of the highest reputation in Bengal and Benares for their opinions upon this important question.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

[Private.]

DEAR SIR, Calcutta, May 10, 1793.

. . . Our domestic affairs go on smoothly and prosperously, and it is at Poona only that there is any cloud in the political hemisphere, but on the footing we at present stand, even if things should take the most unfavourable turn, we cannot, I think, be materially affected by them.

Scindia has lately obtained a considerable advantage by his successful interference for the release of a Brahmin of high rank whom Nana had injudiciously confined, and has on this occasion extorted such humiliating concessions from the latter, as must considerably lessen his weight and consequence in the Maratta state, and in addition to this circumstance the march of the Nizam to Bider, and the report of his intention to proceed to Poona, has caused great alarm to the Peshwa's Ministers, towards whom his Highness, or at least his Minister Azeem al Omrah, is by no means supposed to bear any friendly disposition.

It is difficult to guess how the contest between Nana and Scindia will terminate, but where cunning and procrastination are the favourite weapons, there is always a chance that it will not come to extremity. With respect however to Azeem al Omrah, I think I can venture to pronounce, that, after the declaration which he made to Sir J. Kennaway, and the remonstrance that Sir John will have communicated to him from me, he will not engage deeply in a business that must be attended with so much danger as well to his Master's interests as his own.

Tippoo's second Khist has arrived at Kistnagerry, and I am sanguine in the hope that the terms of the treaty will be completely executed before the period of my departure.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO TIPPOO SULTAUN.

May 29, 1793.

. . . . Some time ago I communicated to you my intention of returning to Europe at the expiration of a few months, and I represented the chief motive for deferring my departure, which in consideration of the assurances that I made to you at Seringapatam on receiving charge from you of the young Princes, is almost wholly confined to the expectation that before the time which I have fixed for my departure shall arrive, I shall be enabled to return them to you. After the repeated declarations which I have received from you that there are no prisoners confined within your dominions, and after the solemn attestation of Heaven to all acts and in particular to this of releasing all that shall be alive, which was purposely inserted in the treaty relative to the prisoners, I cannot but be surprised at the frequent information which I have received under many corroborating circumstances, of several Europeans being still detained within your territories, and which I have regularly transmitted to you. It cannot now be necessary for me to assure you that my earnest desire to live in harmony and to cultivate a sincere friendship with your state, will never permit me to attend to the designing conduct of interested persons, who may be desirous to disturb the tranquillity and goodwill that prevails, nor am I ready to pay attention to the reports which men who may have made their escape, may make to me under the impulse of revenge for the sufferings which they may have undergone, unless I may be induced to give them credit from the circumstantial detail of corroborating facts; and it has been with the view of defeating the pernicious tendency of too easy a belief, that I have informed you of every point which has come to my knowledge, that you might direct the release of those who on enquiry you might have found to be in confinement, and that you might by means of the same enquiry have obtained a knowledge of the fate of those who once your prisoners may be no more, particularly of the fate of two officers of cavalry who were taken at Canveripatam, and of a surgeon who was taken in the vicinity of Bangalore. I can therefore only repeat my earnest requests on this point, and my reliance on your friendship and on the personal regard subsisting between us, that you will renew your positive orders for a minute report on the fate of all who may be dead, and for the release of those who may be still alive.

Impressed by the earnestness which you display in your letter to accommodate all matters still unadjusted, it will afford me an

inexpressible happiness to meet your wishes, and those which the Princes have notified in their letters to me, that I will call at Madras on my way to Europe and see them set out, in a manner consistent with our cordial intimacy, to return to you. But independent of this motive, the personal regard which I have imbibed for them in discovering their good manners and disposition during the period that I had the happiness of being in their company, will always make me anxious to see them, and to be personally present at the happy time when, in pursuance to the engagements subsisting with the Allied Powers, they shall commence their journey to you. As this, however, will in a great measure depend on the season when I shall embark from Bengal, for I can scarcely suppose that their return will be delayed by anything that rests with you, I can only for the present assure you that such an opportunity will afford me very great happiness.

I will not now occupy you with any further remarks, than that I trust you will ever find me and my successor, Sir John Shore, desirous of meeting your wishes, that henceforward a cordiality and permanent friendship should subsist on the firm basis of sincerity and good faith between the two Governments.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN COUNCIL TO THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL AT FORT ST. GEORGE.

HONOURABLE SIR, Fort William, June 20, 1793.

. . . The Governor-General in a letter to Sir Charles Oakeley, dated the 8th instant, recommended that a corps of observation should be immediately formed under the command of Colonel Floyd, for the purpose of intercepting supplies and cutting off all communication between Pondicherry and the country, and he likewise desired that all previous arrangements should be made for assembling a sufficient force, and for being prepared in every respect to besiege the place, doubting at the same time whether it would be prudent actually to engage in the attack before we could rely on a naval co-operation, and expressing his intention of going to Madras as soon as the season and other circumstances should admit of it.

As, however, it may be very uncertain whether Lord Cornwallis can possibly arrive on the coast before the middle of August, we do not wish that the commencement of the operations should be delayed on his account, if it should appear to the satisfaction of your Board and of the Military men of most experience, that the siege may be undertaken with a reasonable prospect of success.

The French regular troops, to the eastward of the Cape of Good Hope, consist of two regiments of an establishment of about 1000 each, with some artillery, and as nearly half of that number are now at Pondicherry, it is not probable that more than 300 or 400 men can be sent from the Isle of France, and although with that reinforcement, and the sea open to them for supplies of provisions, the garrison might make a long and vigorous defence, yet we conceive that an army might be assembled of strength enough to reduce the place, provided there were means of conveying by land a powerful and well supplied artillery. And in order to be prepared for these disadvantageous circumstances, we wish you to turn your thoughts seriously to this object, lest we may ultimately be under the necessity of adopting it, and it will at all events be proper that you should engage a number of Brinjarries to attend the army, as they will be very useful in supplying the followers, even if the communication by sea should be perfectly open for us.

. . . We can at present have nothing to apprehend from Tippoo, or any of the other country powers, but if it were otherwise the more our force is assembled the more formidable we should be. In regard to the Poligars, we have already expressed our sentiments against your having recourse to arms except in cases of very serious extremity, and if your servants employed in the collections act with temper, moderation, and integrity, we trust it will be rarely necessary; but if such a case should occur at this critical period, and any Polygar should be weak enough to take advantage of the temporary absence of our troops to throw off his allegiance, there could be no great mischief in postponing his chastisement for a few months. . . .

We have, &c.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN COUNCIL TO THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

HONOURABLE SIRS, Fort William, Aug. 1, 1793.

. . . On the 11th June we received from the Governor in Council at Fort St. George copies of despatches dated the 10th April, from His Majesty's Consul at Alexandria, with a detail of intelligence from Europe, notifying in positive terms that the French had declared war against England and Holland on the 1st of February, 1793; he held himself responsible for the truth of this intelligence, and we determined to consider it, under the sanction he had given to it, as sufficiently authentic to warrant us in adopting those measures that must have followed a regular official communication of the war. We therefore issued orders,

which were effected without resistance, for taking possession of Chandernagore and the several French Factories in this country, and seizing the vessels here that carried the French flag. We either confined or put the subjects of France on their parole, and we issued such commissions as were authorised by the Company's Charter, in the form necessary to warrant the commanders of the country ships in acting against the enemy at sea.

The Government of Madras immediately commenced the necessary preparations for the siege of Pondicherry, where Colonel Floyd with a large detachment arrived on the 11th of July to blockade it on the land side, while the Commodore, with His Majesty's frigate the "Minerva," and three of your China ships, the "Triton," "Warley," and "Royal Charlotte," are engaged to prevent supplies from being imported by sea, and the French Factories of Karical and Yanam have been taken possession of by the officers of the Madras Government. . . .

Lord Cornwallis is in hopes of being able to proceed to the coast in ten or twelve days; and we are embarking five companies of artillery and twelve of Lascars to assist at the siege, with a battering train and other stores in ships freighted to transport them.

We are, &c.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

HONOURABLE SIRS, Fort St. George, Sept. 18, 1793.

I have great satisfaction in congratulating your Honourable Court on the reduction of the fortress of Pondicherry, and of all the other French settlements and factories on the continent of India. . . .

As it was of great consequence for the public interest, that Pondicherry should be reduced before the setting in of the north-east monsoon, I thought it prudent to adopt every means in my power to insure our success, and with that view I recommended that, in addition to the vigorous exertions of the Government of Fort St. George, five companies of artillery and twelve companies of lascars should be sent from Bengal, to be ready to assist in the operations of the siege in case their services should prove to be necessary. I likewise resolved to repair to the Carnatic in person, as soon as I could procure a safe conveyance, not only to take a share in the last piece of service, which was likely to occur during the short remainder of my intended stay in India, but in order that I might be at hand to give the utmost energy that might be possible to our efforts in case Pondicherry should be reinforced, or other

circumstances should arise to enable it to make a formidable resistance. . . .

A large supply of rice and military stores of different kinds having been applied for by this Presidency, considerable quantities of both articles were embarked with the artillery and lascars on board the "Woodcote" and three country ships that had been engaged for this service, and the whole of these vessels, after much delay and difficulty in dropping down the river at that season of the year, at last quitted the Pilots in safety. I arrived at this place on the 7th instant, having left Calcutta on the 13th ultimo.

Upon coming into the roads, I was happy to find the meritorious exertions of Government in assembling the army, and in transporting the ordnance and stores for the siege, supported by the firm and public-spirited co-operation of Admiral Cornwallis, and the good conduct of Colonel Brathwaite and the troops under his command, had been attended with every good effect that could have been expected from them, and that the licentiousness and insubordination of the soldiers of the garrison had forced the Governor of Pondicherry, after a fire of only a few hours from our first batteries, and before the works had suffered any material damage, to surrender, by capitulation on the 23rd ultimo.

The particulars of the transactions of the siege, and the terms of the capitulation, will be fully detailed in the despatches of this Government. . . .

It was confidently reported that a 40-gun frigate called the "Sybile" with three other frigates, and a convoy of troops and stores, were daily expected at Pondicherry from the Isle of France, and the master of a privateer that was taken declared that he sailed in company with them. The "Sybile," however, alone made its appearance during the siege with a detachment of artillerymen on board which were intended to have been landed, but stood out to sea upon being chased by the Admiral, and after touching for a few hours next day at Tranquebar, left the coast and has not since been heard of. . . .

I shall not enter into any details of the state of your affairs in this country, but it is highly gratifying to me to know that you will be informed by the despatches from all the Presidencies, that they are in every respect in a most flourishing condition.

As a ship of war cannot be spared to carry me to England, and no public reason renders it necessary to postpone any longer my resignation of the Supreme Government, it is my intention to

take my passage in the "Swallow" packet, and to sail from hence early in the next month. I have, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO SIR C. W. MALET, BART.

SIR, Madras, Oct. 3, 1793.

I have received your letter dated the 15th ultimo, but as the question of our interference in favour of the Guicowar family is of an important nature and may involve very serious consequences, I can by no means give any decision upon it on the eve of my departure for England, and have therefore referred it to the consideration of Sir John Shore and the succeeding Government.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO SIR JOHN SHORE.

DEAR SIR, Madras, Oct. 9, 1793.

I cannot leave this country, without repeating my anxious wishes for the continuance of your health and the success of your Government. As I shall certainly be upon the watch about every thing respecting India, as well as probably in the habit of seeing Ministers, I beg you will not scruple to write to me on any point either public or private in which you are interested, and in the mean time that you will be assured that as far as I know your sentiments, I will endeavour to counteract any plan or resolution at home that militates against them. . . . I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

Although there is no system here in revenue or commerce, and in fact everything is still to be begun, yet I must in justice say that the ordinary business of Government is carried on with purity and economy, and that Sir Charles Oakeley's character, though not calculated for great reformation, has a considerable claim to esteem and respect.

RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Private.]

MY DEAR LORD, Whitehall, Oct. 23, 1793.

. . . The appointment of a successor to your Lordship has been already made, and the motive for that appointment so

fully explained to your Lordship, that it will be totally unnecessary to say more on the subject.

Your Lordship's sentiments with respect to the appointment of Governors for India, I trust have been duly attended to, with respect to the appointment of Lord Hobart to the Government of Madras. A similar attention, as far as circumstances will admit, will be paid to your Lordship's sentiments with respect to future appointments. And though I have already fully stated the reasons which led to the appointment of Sir John Shore, I must observe that your Lordship's letter on the subject of Governors for India, was not received till several months after that appointment took place, and I could not, of course, avail myself of your Lordship's sentiments on that subject. . . .

Your letter on the tax on spirituous liquors being likely to prove a full compensation for the abolition of the Sayer duties, cannot but be satisfactory, more especially as we have already given our sanction to that measure. . . .

I have not had time to attend with that accuracy I wished to the papers relative to your Lordship's plan for "separating the judicial authority from the collection of the revenue," and though I have the highest confidence in the propriety of all your Lordship's measures, yet as legal objections may arise on a subject of such infinite importance, I have thought it right, as the several papers with your Lordship's last corrections are now officially before us, to submit them to the consideration of our Standing Counsel, previous to giving any directions thereon. . . .

The arrangements for the renewal of the Company's Charter have been made, and received the sanction of the legislature with an unanimity almost unexampled. My private and confidential sentiments on that subject were conveyed to your Lordship through Sir John Shore, and, as therein intimated, the arrangement of the Indian army has been left till your Lordship's return, and on that important subject your sentiments and recommendations will have that due weight and attention which they must necessarily merit.

I am, &c.,

HENRY DUNDAS.

Lord Cornwallis had sailed for England before this despatch reached India, and he did not receive it till after his return home. The proceedings against the Messrs. Hollond, repeatedly alluded to in this correspondence, appear to have been dropped before the close of 1793, in consequence, probably, of the brothers having previously sailed for America, where it is believed they both died.

CHAPTER XVI.

Lord Cornwallis returns to England — State of affairs on the Continent — The War in Flanders — Jealousies of the Austrians and Prussians — Lord Cornwallis proceeds to the seat of war — Conduct of the Emperor — His motives in leaving the army — Interview with Marshal Müllendorf — Lord Cornwallis returns home — His plan for new-modelling the Indian army — Proposal to confer on him the chief command of the Allied Armies — His explanation to the Duke of York — Disgraceful conduct of the Austrians.

ON his return to England, Lord Cornwallis found that a considerable English army, under the command of the Duke of York, was engaged, in conjunction with the Austrians, Prussians, and Dutch, in the defence of Flanders. Their conjoint operations in 1793 had been successful, but the jealousy felt by the two great German powers towards each other, threatened to mar the prospects of 1794.

The Duke of Brunswick had thrown up the command, and Prussia had employed the Comte de Kalkreuth [1] to carry on secret negociations with France. To remedy this evil in some degree, it was settled that the Emperor of Germany should have the nominal command, the Duke of York and the Prince of Saxe Coburg [2] acting under him at the head of their respective contingents. For a short time success attended their exertions, but the scale soon turned, and though the Duke of York defeated Pichegru [3] on the 10th of May with heavy loss, the Austrians, under Generals Clerfait [4] and Kaunitz,[5] received a most severe check a few days later. On the 22nd, however, the Allies, principally owing to the efforts of the English, succeeded in compelling the French to relinquish the siege of Tournay, and to fall back upon Lisle.

[1] Adolphe Frederick, Comte de Kalkreuth, a Field-Marshal, b. 1737, d. June 18, 1818. He was always adverse to the war with France, and uniformly urged the Prussian Government to withdraw from the contest. He advised the retreat of the Duke of Brunswick in 1792; and framed the capitulation of Mayence in 1793, under which the garrison was allowed to act against the Vendeans, thus deciding that war.

[2] Frederick Josias, younger son of Francis Josias, Prince of Saxe Coburg Saalfield, b. Dec. 26, 1737, d. unm. 1815. He commanded against the Turks in 1787, and, with the assistance of the Russians, won the battle of Martinisti, Sept. 22, 1789. He retired into private life after 1794.

[3] Charles Pichegru, b. Feb. 16, 1761, d. unmarried, April 7, 1804, not without suspicion of having been murdered in prison.

[4] François Sebastien Charles Joseph de Croix, Comte de Clerfait, a Field-Marshal, b. Oct. 14, 1733, d. July 18, 1798. He had served in the Seven Years' War.

[5] Francis Wenzeslaus, Comte de Kaunitz, b. July 2, 1742, d. Dec. 20, 1825.

The Prussians meantime had taken no part in these movements. When they had been assured that their alleged want of provisions, ammunition, waggons, &c., would be supplied by the English commissariat, the real reason of their inactivity became apparent. Lord Malmesbury, in the beginning of June, wrote to Lord Elgin,[1] "they serve for ready money only." In fact there can be no doubt that the Prussian Cabinet was not inclined to act cordially with the other Allies, and that, as it expected to obtain some great advantage by concluding a separate treaty with France, frivolous excuses were made, with a view to mask the real intentions of the Government. The withdrawal of Prussia from the coalition would have been a disastrous event, and every exertion was made by the other allied powers to avert this calamity. Unity of action was essential to success, but unity could not exist if each army acted independently. Yet the objections to assigning an undivided command to any one General were almost insuperable. The Prussians were ready so far to submit to a superintending authority as to consent to serve under the Emperor of Germany, whenever he should be actually present; but should he withdraw from the camp, they would not obey an Austrian General. The Austrians, on the other hand, would not serve under a Prussian General. Reciprocal communications as to their intended operations, with mutual requests for assistance, were, it is true, interchanged between the Prussians, the Austrians, and the English, especially by the two latter powers, the Duke of York being at all times the most ready to act cordially with the other Allies. But no plan of operations was settled, and the heartburnings and jealousies daily augmented. Under these circumstances it was thought advisable to send to the Continent some person of high reputation and eminent character, who might ascertain the real position of affairs, and whose advice would be listened to with respect. Lord Cornwallis was selected to fulfil this mission. He had been for some time in close communication with the Government on all matters connected with the Low Countries, and it was finally arranged that he should proceed to Flanders without any ostensible command, and there discuss all matters with the Duke of York, with Marshal Müllendorf[2] for the Prussians, and

[1] Thomas, 7th Earl of Elgin and 11th of Kincardine, a General, b. July 20, 1766, d. Nov. 14, 1841; m. 1st, March 11, 1799, Mary, sole heir of William Hamilton Nisbet, Esq., of Dirleton; 2nd, Sept. 21, 1810, Elizabeth, dau. of James Townshend Oswald, Esq., of Dunnikier. Minister at Berlin, Aug. 1795 to March, 1799, and then ambassador at Constantinople to Jan. 1803, during which time he formed his celebrated collection of marbles.

[2] Richard Joachim Henri, Comte de Müllendorf, a Field-Marshal, b. 1724, d. Jan. 28, 1816. He had warmly promoted the treaty of Basle, and was always adverse to hostilities with France.

with the Emperor or his Generals (the Prince of Coburg and General Clerfait) for the Austrians. The necessity for his immediate departure was the more urgent, because the Emperor, acting under secret and probably treacherous advice, had intimated an intention of returning to Vienna.

Lord Cornwallis landed at Ostend June 2nd, and proceeded on his mission, the details of which will be found in his despatches. He failed to induce the Emperor to remain in Flanders, and before his return to England he had the mortification of hearing of the battle of Fleurus, and the fall of Charleroi and Ypres. A series of similar events followed, and the increasing bad feeling between the Duke of York and the Austrian Generals (especially General Clerfait) diminished the hope of the Allies redeeming their misfortunes by some bold and united movement. The Austrians themselves began to feel the incapacity of their Generals for conducting operations on a large scale, and to be sensible that their military skill was insufficient to cope with the talents of the French Commanders and the enthusiasm of their troops. A hint was therefore thrown out from Vienna, that if the local rank of Field Marshal, which would place him above all the German Generals in the Low Countries, were conferred upon Lord Cornwallis, the Emperor would not be indisposed to place his armies under his command, and hopes were entertained that the Prussians might follow the example. Comte Mercy d'Argenteau[1] was to be sent to England with some definite proposition of this nature, and Lord Spencer[2] and Mr. Thomas Grenville[3] were appointed to proceed on a similar mission to Vienna. Colonel Ross accompanied them, in the double capacity of an intimate friend of Lord Cornwallis, and of an officer well able to advise them on military subjects.

Their principal objects, as stated in their instructions, dated July 19th, were to stop the further progress of the French by some

[1] Florimonde Claude, Comte Mercy d'Argenteau, b. 1722, d. Aug. 26, 1794, unm. Ambassador in Paris from Vienna from 1766 to 1790. For many interesting letters of his, see Correspondence between Mirabeau and the Comte de la Marc (Prince d'Aremburg), lately published.

[2] George John, 2nd Earl Spencer, K.G., b. Sept. 1, 1758, d. Nov. 10, 1834; m. March 6, 1781, Lavinia, dau. of Charles, 1st Earl of Lucan. Lord of the Treasury, March to July, 1782; Privy Seal, July to Dec. 1794; then First Lord of the Admiralty to Feb. 1801, and Secretary of State from Feb. 1806 to March, 1807. M.P. for Northampton, Oct. 1780 to March, 1782, and then for Surrey till he became a peer, Oct. 31, 1783.

[3] Right Hon. Thomas Grenville, 2nd son of the Right Hon. George Grenville, b. Dec. 31, 1755, d. Dec. 17, 1846, unmarried. M.P. for the County of Bucks from Oct. 1779 to March, 1784; for Aldborough from Nov. 1790 to May, 1796; for the Borough of Buckingham to Jan. 1810; and again for the County of Buckingham from March, 1813, to 1818. In early life he had a commission in the Guards, but left the army Feb. 1780. He was employed on a special mission to France in 1782; to Vienna, 1794; to Berlin, 1799. President of the Board of Control from July to Sept. 1806, and then First Lord of the Admiralty to March, 1807. Chief Justice in Eyre from 1800 till his death.

vigorous and well-concerted united movement; and, as the first step, to relieve Valenciennes and the other towns, which were then about to be besieged by the French.

Affairs in the Low Countries were meantime becoming worse and worse. The Duke of York repeatedly remonstrated, both in public and private letters, about the conduct of the Austrian Generals, especially on the 21st and 22nd July, when he complained in most bitter terms that the Prince of Coburg had retreated without giving the slightest intimation of his plans, either to him or to the commanders of any of the other corps, and that he was thus compelled to fall back on Antwerp, which he was obliged to evacuate on the 23rd. The British Government, incensed at such conduct, and convinced of the incapacity of the Prince of Coburg, then insisted, as a *sine quâ non*, that he should forthwith be removed from his command. No great difficulty was made in dismissing both him and the Prince de Waldeck,[1] but it was impossible to prevail upon the Court of Vienna to name a successor. Negociations proceeded for some time, and in the course of them it appeared that Austria claimed an indemnity[2] from France for her expenses in the war for the defence of Flanders, which M. de Thugut[3] declared had never produced 200*l.* a-year net income.

The English Government had in the mean time felt so confident that Austria would assent to Lord Cornwallis being placed in command, that they determined to submit the subject to the King—a matter of considerable delicacy, as it involved the supercession of the Duke of York. Accordingly a long Minute of Cabinet was prepared, reciting in detail what had passed between the English and Austrian Governments, and stating that it was clear that neither the Duke of York nor General Clerfait would be cordially accepted by the two armies as Commander-in-Chief, and that it was therefore necessary to appoint without delay some person who would have the entire confidence of the Allies. That in conformity with the suggestion of Comte Mercy and Comte Stahremburg,[4] it would seem expedient to give the local rank of Field Marshal to

[1] Christian August, Prince de Waldeck, b. Dec. 6, 1744, d. Sept. 25, 1798, in Lisbon, unmarried. Field-Marshal in Austria, 1797, and Captain-General in Portugal in 1798, where he was Commander-in-Chief.

[2] The sum which the Austrians intended to claim does not appear. On this, as on other occasions, they seem to have expected that their expenses should be repaid. In 1815 they even suggested that an indemnity should be paid by France for the injuries inflicted on the Palatinate by Turenne in 1674.

[3] François, Baron de Thugut, b. March 30, 1736, d. May 28, 1818; m. 1803, a Belgian lady. He first distinguished himself by his knowledge of Eastern languages. On the death of Prince Kaunitz in 1794 he became Prime Minister, the duties of which office he had practically executed for some time.

[4] Louis Joseph Comte de Stahremburg, b. in Paris March 12, 1762, d. Sept. 2, 1833; m. Sept. 21, 1781, Maria Louise, dau. of the Duc Charles D'Arenburg, Ambassador in London from Aug. 1792 to 1796.

Lord Cornwallis, stipulating that he should have the virtual (if not the nominal) command of all the Allied Armies. The position of the Duke of York was commented upon at length, and a hope was expressed, that, for the various reasons assigned, he would not object to serve under Lord Cornwallis, though in their existing ranks the Duke of York[1] was the senior officer. The Minute concluded by declaring that, in the opinion of the Cabinet, this was the only step which afforded any chance of repairing the calamities sustained by the Allies during the present campaign.

This Minute was on the same day transmitted to the King by Mr. Pitt, who accompanied it with a letter[2] suggesting that Mr. Windham[3] should be sent to Holland to explain the position of affairs to the Duke of York. The King acceded to the proposition, but with great reluctance, and the result was communicated to Lord Spencer and Mr. Grenville in a despatch dated August 29.[4]

Mr. Windham accordingly went to Holland, and at Bois le Duc joined the Duke of York, who was very unwilling to give up the command, or to act under Lord Cornwallis; but if it were considered absolutely necessary that Lord Cornwallis's proposed appointment should take place, he said he was disposed to serve as a volunteer. Mr. Windham, on the 4th September, communicated to Mr. Pitt the substance of the several conversations he had had with the Duke of York, evidently himself inclining to the Duke's views, though admitting that if Lord Cornwallis could have the real command it would be of immense value. He considered, however, that there was no hope of such an arrangement, as he was convinced of "the dreadful duplicity of the Austrians, and the unfeeling and unprincipled indifference with which they sacrifice the greatest public interests to their private emoluments and animosities"—an opinion in which the Duke of York fully coincided.

The conduct of affairs at Vienna was meantime most unsatisfactory. To retract all that had been promised or proposed—to advance claims which it was evident were inadmissible—were events of daily occurrence; and the arrival of Lucchessini[5] from

[1] The Duke of York was a General of April 12, 1792; Lord Cornwallis of Oct. 12 in the same year. The latter obtained the rank of Colonel 16 years before the former.

[2] The draft of this letter cannot be found.

[3] Right Hon. William Windham, b. March, 1750, d. June 4, 1810; m. July 10, 1798, Cecilia, dau. of Admiral Forrest. M.P. for Norwich from May, 1784, to 1802; St. Mawes, to 1806; Romney, to 1807; Higham Ferrers, till his death. Chief Secretary in Ireland for a few months under Lord Northington in 1783; Secretary at War, July, 1794, to March, 1801; Secretary of State, Feb. 1806 to March, 1807.

[4] See Appendix.

[5] Marquis Jerome de Lucchessini, of a Patrician family at Lucca, b. 1752, d. Oct. 19, 1825; m. a sister of Madame Bishopswerder. He was one of the many adventurers whom Frederick the Great had collected around him. A man of talent but destitute of principle.

the Prussian camp at Wola boded no good. There is now little doubt that he was in the pay of France, and that his object at Vienna was to watch and thwart the plans of England, and to make as much mischief as possible. Lord Spencer was shortly afterwards informed that Austria would not accede to the conditions proposed by Great Britain. Not many days later arrived the news of the surrender of Valenciennes, almost without resistance. Great indignation was felt in England at this event, the more so, as the Austrian General had assented to an article in the Capitulation, under which all the emigrants in the garrison were to be given up to the French, an act notoriously equivalent to a sentence of instant death.

Although the strong remonstrances of the English Government could not be entirely disregarded, they were but coldly received; and as the complete ascendancy gained by M. de Thugut over the Emperor's mind had by this time become apparent, by the withdrawal of Comte Mercy's proposals and the evident disinclination to act any longer in concert with England, Lord Spencer and Mr. Grenville solicited their recall. Their request was immediately complied with, and all further idea of conferring the command on Lord Cornwallis was abandoned.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

DEAR SIR, Torbay, Feb. 3, 1794.

I am just coming to an anchor in this bay, in the Swallow packet, and transmit duplicates of the despatches that were sent by the Scorpion, giving an account of the capture of Pondicherry. My fingers are so cold that I can only tell you that I left Madras on the 10th October, and that our affairs in India were in a most prosperous state.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

THE KING TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

Windsor, Feb. 10, 1794, 46 m. past 7, A.M.

Mr. Secretary Dundas has judged very properly in notifying to me what drop'd from the Marquess Cornwallis on the subject of Lieutenant Col. Ross. I know how much on all occasions the latter has been in his confidence, and I shall certainly in a proper manner arrange his wishes of giving the rank of Colonel to Ross.

G. R.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO HIS HIGHNESS THE NABOB OMDAT UL OMRAH.

Feb. 3, 1794.

This letter will be delivered to your Highness by Lord Hobart,[1] who carries with him to India the same sentiments of regard which I trust that I always manifested towards the Nabob your Father, yourself, and all your Family, and who will ever consider your interest and that of the British nation as inseparable.

I mentioned to Lord Hobart the conversations that I have had personally with yourself, as well as through Mr. Cherry,[2] respecting the line which it would be most for your dignity and the peace of your mind to adopt, in the event of your Father's decease, in order to provide against the impositions and intrusions of interested men, who might, as they have done in the instance of your Father, attempt to render your good and generous qualities subservient to the views of their private advantage.

If you should have the misfortune to lose your Father during the Government of Lord Hobart, he will I am convinced be desirous of meeting your wishes, and of joining with you in establishing such a plan as may appear to be best calculated to secure the future happiness of your Highness, and the prosperity of your country.

I am, with the most sincere regard and attachment,

Your Highness's

Most obedient and faithful friend,

CORNWALLIS.

[1] Robert Lord Hobart, afterwards (Nov. 14, 1804) 4th Earl of Buckinghamshire, b. May 6, 1760, d. Feb. 4, 1816; m. 1st, Jan. 4, 1792, Margaretta, dau. and coheir of Edmund Burke, Esq., of Nerey, and widow of Thomas Adderley, Esq., of Innishannon. Chief Secretary in Ireland, April, 1789, to 1793; Governor of Madras, Sept. 1794 to Feb. 1798; Secretary of State, March, 1801, to May, 1804; Postmaster-General, Feb. 1806 to May, 1807; and President of the Board of Control, April, 1812, to June, 1816. M.P. for Bramber, Dec. 1788 to 1790; for Lincoln City to May, 1796; for Portarlington from 1785 to 1790; and for Armagh to 1797. Called up to the House of Lords, 1798.

[2] George Frederick Cherry, Resident at Benares, killed Jan. 14, 1799; m. Maria Martha, dau. of Henry Paul, Esq. On the death of the Nabob of Oude, in 1797, his reputed son, Mirza or Vizier Ali, was permitted to succeed him, but Sir John Shore, being soon afterwards convinced that he was a suppositious child, deposed him. He was sent to Benares, but having been detected in carrying on intrigues with some discontented Zemindars, orders were issued for his removal further from Lucknow. Irritated at this, he invited himself to breakfast with Mr. Cherry, and murdered him and four other Europeans. He fled to Jeypore, but the Rajah of that state was compelled to give him up, stipulating, however, that his life should be spared. He was kept a close prisoner in Fort William, where he died in 1823.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO SIR JOHN SHORE.

DEAR SIR, Brome, March 12, 1794.

I intended to defer writing to you till my return to town, but on a report that the fleet is to sail immediately, I cannot run the risk of their not carrying a line from me.

I have been so much indisposed since my arrival by a troublesome complaint, that I have been able to see very little of Ministerial people, especially Pitt and Dundas, the latter of whom has likewise been in a bad state of health.

You will, I think, be pleased at Lord Hobart's going out to Madras, with the provisional appointment to succeed you in Bengal, which leaves you at perfect liberty to stay or to come home according to the state of your health, or your inclination, or convenience in other respects. I have had much conversation with Lord H., who professes the most determined resolution to be perfectly correct, and who, from his abilities and habits of business, will I trust render important services, especially if he should remain long enough at Madras, where improvement is, to my knowledge, much wanted. I have pointed out some persons there on whom I thought he could rely, and I have advised him to visit the Circars in person, which is, I think, the only means of obtaining complete information. The judicial regulations are universally approved, and I am assured that it will be recommended by these ships to extend them to Benares if possible. Duncan will, I believe, be made Governor of Bombay, but he must first lay the foundation of the judicial system at Benares. As however I am not sure of Duncan's appointment to Bombay, I should not wish it to be talked of.

I have given to Ministers my ideas on the future plan for the military establishment in India, but I have not yet had an opportunity of talking to them about it, and I conclude it cannot be taken up this Session.

I have not time to enter on domestic affairs, our success has hitherto not been answerable to the exertions of Ministers. However, the Portland Party, and indeed everybody but Fox, Lord Lansdowne, and the thorough-paced Jacobins, are strenuous in supporting the war.

I wish myself to remain quiet, but do not feel quite confident that it will be so. . . .

My disorder (which is now nearly removed) prevented my attending as an evidence on Hastings's trial, and he has now very

handsomely let me off, to my no small satisfaction.[1] I am, with very sincere good wishes for your health and success, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO SIR JOHN SHORE.

DEAR SIR, London, April 17, 1794.

. . . . This country is far from enjoying the tranquil state which now happily pervades all our Asiatic dominions. It is very difficult to make war, at least upon the Continent, with any prospect of success, but it is impossible to make peace without fraternizing with the gang of murderers on the other side of the water, and following their bloody example. Three powerful factions have been guillotined within these last three months, those of Brissot,[2] Hebert,[3] and Danton;[4] the rage for blood however seems insatiable, and the people see that of their former demagogues flow with as much pleasure as they did that of the Royalists.

If Robertspierre[5] possessed the power and temporary inclination to make peace, and to suffer the other nations of Europe to live quietly under the governments of their own choice, his life can hardly be expected to last another month, and indeed it is astonishing, considering the prodigious number that he has put to death, that it has continued so long. My wish would lead me to retire quietly into Suffolk, but this is not a time for a man who really loves his country, to indulge selfish inclinations, and I am afraid that I shall be compelled to take the field under much less promising auspices than I did in 1791. My plan for new modelling the Indian Army cannot be taken up till the next Session of Parliament, but it will then certainly be brought forward, and I really flatter myself that it will give as much satisfaction to my brother officers in India, as an arrangement of so general and complicated a nature can afford. . . .

I was very averse to the measure of trusting the temporary management at Benares to Treves, and gave way to Duncan's solicitation contrary to my own conviction; Treves has however turned

[1] Lord Cornwallis did, however, give evidence on April 9, 1794.

[2] Jean Pierre Brissot, b. Jan. 14, 1754, guillotined Oct. 31, 1793; m. 1783 Mdlle. Dupont, lectrice to Mdlle. Adelaide D'Orleans. He began life as an homme de lettres.

[3] Jacques René Hebert, b. 1755, guillotined March 24, 1794; m. Marie Marguerite Françoise Goupile, an ex-religieuse, whom he introduced to the National Assembly. He was among the worst of the Jacobins, and had been from early life a mere *escroc*. He was editor of the Père Duchêne, and had the infamous notoriety of having invented charges against Marie Antoinette, too gross to be even alluded to.

[4] George Jacques Danton, b. Oct. 28, 1759, guillotined April 5, 1794. Originally an avocat.

[5] Maximilien Isidore Robespierre, b. April 6, 1759, guillotined July 28, 1794 (10 Thermidor).

out on the whole much better than I expected when I first arrived in Bengal, and I trust for the sake of his poor wife, who is a most amiable woman, that he has not been guilty in so great a degree as to affect his future gradual promotion in the service; I told her that so far from recommending him to you to be Resident at Benares, if I was myself Governor-General, I should not give him that appointment. . . . I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS TO MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

MY LORD, Whitehall, May 29, 1794.

His Majesty having been pleased to destine your Lordship to serve with the body of troops in His Majesty's pay which it is His Majesty's intention to join to the Prussian army, to be furnished in virtue of the late subsidiary treaty between the Maritime Powers and His Prussian Majesty, and it appearing extremely desirable that your Lordship should proceed to the Continent without delay, in order finally to arrange the precise point where that army is to act, to accelerate its march to the point of its destination, and to arrange such other points of military detail as may be necessary to be settled before it can be brought into effectual service, I am now to transmit to your Lordship His Majesty's commands on these subjects.

Your Lordship will, in the first instance, proceed to Flanders, to the head-quarters of his Royal Highness the Duke of York, by whose communications your Lordship will be fully informed of the actual state of affairs as they may stand at the period of your arrival, of the present disposition of the allied forces on the frontier of France, of the intentions of the Emperor with respect to future military operations, and of his Royal Highness's sentiments with respect to the best plans that can now be adopted for the general prosecution of the campaign, and particularly for the application of the additional force to be derived from the subsidiary treaty. With respect to the latter of these points, the Austrian Government has lately made a proposal here for employing the Prussian force on the Rhine, and nearly in their present position. But this proposal is so evidently the result of that unhappy jealousy which exists between the Courts of Vienna and Berlin, and the use to be made of the Prussian force by such a plan would be so inadequate to the King's just expectations, that His Majesty did not hesitate to give it an immediate and decisive

negative. And it is the more material that the language of all His Majesty's officers and ministers on this subject should be uniform and steady, as some leaning has lately appeared towards the same plan on the part of some of the persons employed by the King of Prussia, although this plan is entirely opposite to the former expressions of the King of Prussia's wishes. This disposition is probably founded on motives very different from those in which the proposal of Austria originated, and the existence of which seems to furnish additional reasons to His Majesty against acquiescing in this idea. Lord Malmesbury, who has already set out on his journey to join M. Haugwitz[1] and Marshal Möllendorff, was therefore instructed to prepare them for your Lordship's arrival, and in the mean time to express, in the most unequivocal terms, the King's determination not to consent to the Prussian troops remaining on the Rhine, but to urge as much as possible that those troops should immediately begin their march towards Liege and Namur, from whence they can with equal facility be drawn either towards West Flanders, or towards the country of the Meuse, which appear to be the two most advantageous points for their being employed.

Since Lord Malmesbury's leaving this country, Lord Grenville has received a letter addressed to Lord Malmesbury by Count Haugwitz, appointing Maestricht as the most convenient place for holding such conferences as may be necessary finally to arrange this business, and mentioning his intention of being there on the 30th of this month. His Majesty's servants do not think it possible, previous to these conferences, and without a more precise knowledge of the Emperor's future plans than is now possessed here, to fix decidedly between the two points which I have already mentioned, as appearing to be the most advantageous for the employment of the Prussian force. But this preference depends so much on the Austrian plans, that I should imagine that, with the knowledge of those plans, the question may be immediately and easily settled; and if, on discussing the subject fully, the ideas of his Royal Highness and those of your Lordship should concur, as I have no doubt they will, His Majesty would in such case, in order to avoid any further delay, consent on his part to the employment of the Prussian troops on any point within the line before pointed out, which should be settled in consequence of any general plan of operations concerted with

[1] Gratien Henri Charles Comte de Haugwitz, b. June 11, 1752, d. Feb. 9, 1832, in Venice; m. April 11, 1777, Johanna Catherine, dau. of General Tauenzien. M. de Haugwitz was an Illuminé, and thoroughly profligate in public as well as in private life.

the Austrian Generals. The presence of the Emperor at Tournai affords every facility in that respect, and it is extremely to be wished that, previous to your Lordship's setting out for Maestricht, the plan of operations and distribution of force should be so far settled with the Austrians, as to leave nothing to be done at Maestricht, except to intimate to Count Haugwitz and to Marshal Möllendorff the decision of the Maritime Powers in this respect, in whom, as your Lordship will observe, that decision is vested by the treaty, and to concert the most immediate measures for carrying that decision into execution without a moment's delay. If, unfortunately, any difference of opinion should still exist on the part of Austria, reference must be made here upon the subject, but, even in that case, it would be expedient that your Lordship should proceed without delay to Maestricht, in order to press the bringing the Prussian army down towards the Meuse as a position equally convenient for all the plans of subsequent operations which are in view.

Your Lordship will observe that the concurrence of the Dutch Government will be necessary with respect to the final distribution of this force; but so much disposition has appeared on their part to coincide with His Majesty's views, and the interests of the Maritime Powers in this respect are so much the same, that there appears every reason to believe that they will readily concur in such plan as the King shall finally adopt. It is probable that on your Lordship's arrival at Maestricht you will find there the hereditary Prince of Orange, or some other person duly authorised by their High Mightinesses to arrange this business; and Lord Malmesbury will also be ready to give to your Lordship every necessary assistance in that respect, as well as in the future progress of all such points as may arise to be settled with Marshal Möllendorff or the Prussian Government. . . .

I have, &c.,

HENRY DUNDAS.

LORD MALMESBURY TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

MY LORD, Maestricht, June 2, 1794.

. . . I arrived here last night, and have had my first conversation with Count Haugwitz; the delay on our part in paying the subsidy at the periods mentioned in the treaty, is alleged by him as a motive for retarding the march of the Prussian army towards those parts. He, however, makes no objection to its coming here, and as the payments are now made, I trust it will begin to move

as soon as the magazines, &c., can be formed. He assures me it is completely effective, but in want of artillery, horses, and pontoons, which they cannot supply themselves with but through our money. Lord Elgin, who is at this moment with me, will enter very fully with your Lordship into these details, as I have given him an extract of my official letter of this date; as I am in anxious hopes of seeing you here in a day or two, I shall reserve till then the many other very material points to be discussed. I have written to the Prince Stadtholder to request him to be here on Thursday; he will be attended by General Bentinck,[1] in order to assist at the conferences to be held here as to the employment of the Prussian army.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

MALMESBURY.

RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Received June 3rd.]

MY LORD, Whitehall, June 1, 1794.

I send for your Lordship's information a copy of a despatch I have just received from the Duke of York, together with a copy of my letter to his Royal Highness. Your Lordship will easily conceive how embarrassing such a measure as the Emperor proposes must be if persevered in, and in a peculiar manner so in the present moment, when your Lordship, under the direction of the Duke of York was about to concert with him the ulterior operations of the campaign. I hope I am mistaken in my apprehensions, but I cannot help suspecting that there is something behind that is not spoken out by the Emperor. If he is from any circumstance induced to abandon the cause in which he is engaged, the sooner that is discovered the better. I will not, however, at present allow myself to indulge any speculations of that nature. I trust the Duke of York and your Lordship will be enabled to give me accurate information on the subject. Till that is received, and it is known what is the true motive, and the final result of the Emperor's conduct, we must be in a state of very embarrassing suspense. I trust therefore to receive very speedily some further lights to enable His Majesty to form his final determination. . . .

I have, &c.,

HENRY DUNDAS.

[1] General Bentinck. There were several of that family on active service at that time. The one mentioned in the text is probably Guillaume Gustave Frederick Comte Bentinck, b. July, 1762, d. Oct. 23, 1835; m. 1st, Comtesse Ottoline Frederique Louise de Rheede; 2nd, Mdlle. Sara Marguerite Gerdes.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

SIR, Tournay, June 5, 1794.

I received on the 3rd instant, at Ostend, your letter dated the 1st, and I proceeded immediately to this place in order to receive H. R. H. the Duke of York's commands, both in respect to the march of the Prussian troops, and the extraordinary determination of His Imperial Majesty to return to Vienna.

I shall carry to-morrow to Brussels a letter from His Royal Highness to the Emperor on the subject of his leaving the Low Countries, and I shall at the same time represent in the strongest terms the injury which the common cause must sustain by His Majesty's perseverance in his present resolution.

I am not, however, so sanguine as to hope that the Emperor will relinquish the prosecution of the measure that he has adopted, but I shall endeavour to obtain from him the most full and satisfactory explanation of his future intentions.

In regard to the Prussian troops, there appears by a letter that I have received from Lord Malmesbury (a copy of which I enclose) to be no objection on the part of the Prussian Minister to the march of the Marshal Möllendorff from the Rhine into Flanders, and I have, by the Duke of York's directions, taken such measures for the supply of provisions, artillery, horses, &c., on their march, as will obviate the few difficulties which were offered by M. de Haugwitz to their immediate movement.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

H. R. H. THE DUKE OF YORK TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

SIR, Tournay, June 6, 1794.

The Marquis Cornwallis arrived here the night before last, and set off this morning for Brussels on his road to Maestricht.

In the various conversations which I had with his Lordship, we thoroughly agreed in the great advantage which would arise from the Prussian army being employed in West Flanders in preference to every other operation that has been pointed out for it; his Lordship is gone with the intention of proposing this measure both to the Emperor and to Monsieur de Haugwitz. As by a letter which Lord Cornwallis received from Lord Malmesbury, we were informed of the difficulties which will be made to the immediate march of the Prussians, we have taken every measure in our power

to obviate them, and I have ordered Mr. Watson[1] to go himself to Maestricht, in order to give every assistance to Lord Cornwallis, and to furnish his Lordship with the information which may enable him to convince the Prussian Minister of our ability to supply all his wants. From what the Emperor said to me the day before he left this place, and which has been confirmed by Monsieur de Thugut to Lord Yarmouth,[2] it appears that his Imperial Majesty would prefer that the Prussian army should act in West Flanders rather than upon the Meuse, as was at one time proposed, so that it is to be hoped that no difficulty will arise from that quarter.

Lord Cornwallis joins with me in anxiety for the success of this proposal, with respect to the destination of the Prussian army, as being equally convinced with myself that the siege of Lille is indispensably necessary to the favourable issue of the war. This will not only require a very considerable force, but such a one as from circumstances is not likely to be called away for any other occasion, which would probably be the case should an Austrian army be employed, to whom the necessity of defending the Sambre and covering Brussels must ever be the first object.

I am, &c.,

FREDERICK.

H. R. H. THE DUKE OF YORK TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

SIR, Tournay, June 6, 1794.

On Wednesday morning I received your despatch dated the 1st of this month, signifying His Majesty's orders that I should remonstrate in the strongest manner against His Imperial Majesty's intended return to Vienna.

As the Emperor had already left this place last Friday, I lost no time in writing to His Majesty, and I send enclosed a copy of

[1] Mr., afterwards Sir Brook Watson, Bart., so created Nov. 20, 1803; b. Feb. 7, 1735, d. Oct. 2, 1807; m. 1760, Helen, dau. of Colin Campbell, Esq., of Edinburgh. Commissary General in America in 1781; an Alderman of London, and M.P. for the City, Jan. 1784 to Feb. 1793. In early life he had been in the navy, and lost a leg by the bite of a shark while bathing. To this the Rolliad alludes:—

"Oh had the monster, who for breakfast eat
That luckless limb, his nobler noddle met,
The best of workmen and the best of wood
Had scarce supplied him with a head so good."

[2] Francis, Earl of Yarmouth, afterwards, June 14, 1794, 2nd Marquis of Hertford, K.G., b. Feb. 12, 1743, d. June 17, 1822; m. 1st, Feb. 1, 1768, Alice Elizabeth, dau. and coheir of Herbert, 2nd and last Viscount Windsor; 2nd, April 19, 1776, Isabella Anne, dau. and coheir of Charles, 9th and last Viscount Irvine. M.P. for Lostwithiel, March, 1766, to 1768, and then for Orford until he became a peer; for Lisburn from 1761 to 1768, and then for the county of Antrim to 1776. Secretary in Ireland 1765 to 1766. A Lord of the Treasury from March, 1774, to Sept. 1780. Master of the Horse, June, 1804, to Feb. 1806, and Lord Chamberlain from March, 1812, to Dec. 1821.

my letter, which Lord Cornwallis, who left this place this morning, has taken charge of, as it may furnish him the opportunity of personally enforcing it.

With regard to the real motives which induced His Imperial Majesty to alter his intention of staying with the army the whole campaign, it is difficult for me to know them exactly, particularly as all the persons attached to the Emperor, and with whom I am acquainted, have already quitted the army and followed him to Brussels, but from what I could discover in a very long conference which I had with General Mack,[1] before he left the army, as well as in a subsequent one which I had with the Prince of Waldeck, it appears to me to have been wholly contrived by M. de Thugut and General Rollin, who has the greatest weight with the Emperor and is a tool of Thugut's.

General Mack acquainted me that the very day before his Majesty declared his intention of returning to Vienna, he sent for him and ordered him to explain in the presence of Count Merci and Monsieur de Thugut the whole of his plan for the campaign, as well as what he thought most advisable to be done in the present situation of affairs. General Mack added that, during this conference, there had been a very warm dispute between Monsieur de Thugut and himself concerning the number of troops which are necessary for carrying on offensive operations in this country, in which the Emperor agreed thoroughly with him, and declared with some degree of warmth to Monsieur de Thugut that he was now convinced from his own knowledge of what General Mack said, and which had been denied by all the Ministers, that he had not sufficient troops in this country, and that, therefore, he meant to bring part of the troops now acting on the Rhine to join him.

This unexpected declaration of His Imperial Majesty completely silenced Monsieur de Thugut for the moment, but at the same time showed him that it was not *his interest* that the Emperor should continue any longer with his army, as he was able to judge for himself, and would not listen so implicitly to his advice as he had done till then.

What makes me think that this surmise of General Mack may be founded, is, that the Prince of Waldeck repeated to me two or three times, that there were certainly people who had great weight

[1] Charles, Baron Mack de Labarrick, b. Aug. 25, 1752, d. Oct. 22, 1828. His military career is well known. His Neapolitan campaigns did him no credit, but his surrender at Ulm gave rise to a suspicion of treason. He was tried by a Court-martial, and condemned to death. The punishment was mitigated to imprisonment for life, but after some years' confinement he was liberated, and spent the remainder of his life in obscurity.

with the Emperor, and who were exceedingly anxious for His Majesty to give up the whole of Flanders as being a country which had ever been of more incumbrance and expense to the House of Austria than of any real benefit; that he himself had entreated His Majesty never to believe such bad advice, which the Emperor promised him most [faithfully], but the Prince of Waldeck added, God knows what they may make him do now that they have got him away from the army.

I am likewise credibly informed, though I cannot assert it upon my own knowledge, that M. de Thugut has declared openly that he has done everything in his power to persuade the Emperor to give up this country.

I am, &c.,

FREDERICK.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. WILLIAM PITT.

[Private.]

DEAR SIR, Brussells, June 8, 1794.

I last night received your letter, and shall refer you for information of all that has passed, respecting the Emperor's departure and the march of the Prussian troops, to my correspondence with Mr. Dundas.

Previous to the arrival of the Prussians at Namur, a plan must be concerted for attacking the posts of Menin and Courtrai, which must be a preliminary measure to any operation that may be afterwards adopted. If after the event of that undertaking, we find ourselves in sufficient force to attack Lisle, we must proceed immediately to the investiture of that place. But if that enterprise, either from the advanced season of the year or want of sufficient force, should appear too hazardous, my idea at present is, that we must direct our operations against Maubeuge, Avesnes, Cambrai, &c., after providing better means than were formerly taken for the security of West Flanders.

I can say nothing at present on the question about myself, and indeed I trust that the Austrian force will not be so far reduced as to place us in the very confined circumstances that you suppose, but at all events you may be assured that I shall ever have the public welfare uppermost in my view. The Austrians express the strongest dislike to the employment of the Prussians on the Meuse, and give the preference to their going to West Flanders, which will be very convenient if we can attack Lisle, but may be otherwise rather embarrassing, as it would place them on the defensive.

All this however we will endeavour to arrange in the best manner, when the occasions shall arise.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO H. R. H. THE DUKE OF YORK.

SIR, Brussells, June 8, 1794.

I have no information to give your R. H. respecting my negotiations at this place that is worth your notice, except what you will see in the enclosed copy of my letter to Mr. Dundas, as I do not think that a recital of my long expostulations with M. de Thugut and Count Merci would be either useful or entertaining.

. . . I think Möllendorff's want of 6000 horses rather extraordinary, and I shall take no notice of his request to be allowed time to give up the posts which he has taken, to the Prince of Saxe Teschen,[1] as that may soon be arranged if all parties are inclined to expedite the service; but I shall adhere to my plain requisition that the Prussian troops shall march immediately into Flanders. I shall set out this afternoon for Maestricht, from whence I shall communicate to you my further progress in the business of the Prussians.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

SIR, Brussells, June 8, 1794.

According to the intentions expressed in my letter of the 5th instant from Tournay, I arrived here on the 6th, and was honoured yesterday with an audience of His Imperial Majesty, to whom I delivered His Royal Highness's letter, and had some long conversations with his Ministers; but I am sorry to add that neither the contents of that letter, nor the earnest representations which I made in person to His Imperial Majesty, as well as to his Ministers, of the mischievous effects which his departure at this critical period must have upon the general interests of the alliance, appeared to make any material impression, nor to afford me any hopes that he would alter his determination.

[1] Albert, Duke of Saxe Teschin, son of Augustus II., King of Poland and Elector of Saxony, b. July 11, 1738, d. Feb. 10, 1822; m. April 8, 1766, Marie Christine, dau. of Francis I., and sister of Marie Antoinette. A monument to her memory was executed by Canova.

I received, however, the strongest assurances from all, that His Majesty's zeal for the common cause was by no means abated, of which the object of his journey was a convincing proof, being to convene a meeting of the States of Hungary in order to obtain supplies of men and money for the purpose of carrying on the war.

The march of the 62,000 Prussians from the Rhine was objected to, in the strongest terms by the Ministers, who maintained that 32,000 of those troops actually belonged to the Empire, that by the sudden removal of that army all Germany would be exposed to the ravages of the French, and that the Emperor would be obliged to provide for the safety of his Austrian dominions by detaching a part of his army from this country. I represented on the contrary that he had no right to suppose that the King of Prussia had not taken the means to fulfil his engagements to all parties, that by the treaty we were assured that the stipulated force would be ready to act on the 24th of May in whatever quarter the maritime powers should require their services, and that the present situation of our affairs in Flanders rendered their immediate march into this country indispensably necessary. After very long altercations, and warm remonstrances on their part, it was at last agreed (as I declared that we could on no account admit of a moment's delay in the march of the Prussians) that they would endeavour to accommodate them on their march, and that I should state to the British Ministers their earnest desire, that in the event of the deficiency of 32,000 Prussians, which they apprehended, upon the Rhine, all the powers in alliance would join in insisting that His Prussian Majesty should immediately make good his engagements to the Emperor.

I shall set out this afternoon for Maestricht, where I hope, with the assistance of Lord Malmesbury, to arrange all matters with M. de Haugwitz.

I have, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

COLONEL CRAIG[1] TO COLONEL ROSS.

MY DEAR SIR, Tournay, June 8, 1794.

Upon looking over your memorandum of the officers of Lord Cornwallis's staff, who were to be put in orders, it occurred to me that it might be necessary to say something relative to his Lord-

[1] Colonel, afterwards General, Sir James Craig, K.B., Colonel 78th Regt., and Governor of North America; d. Jan. 12, 1812. He had originally been a private in the Household troops, probably the Horse Grenadier Guards.

ship's own appointment, at the same time that that of his staff was noticed, and upon submitting it to H. R. H. the Duke of York, he was pleased to direct that I should write to you to request, that you would ask his Lordship in what manner he would wish that it should be inserted.

The Duke at the same time observed that he did not really see how he could put two persons in orders *Adjutant General* to the same army, and wished that I should ask you if you have a commission as such—mine is to be Adjutant General to the force serving under H. R. H. the Duke of York. This remark really proceeded from the Duke himself. If you have a commission, the words in which it runs will of course determine those in which it should be announced. If you have no commission, can it be otherwise than to act as Adjutant General? or indeed we may adopt the foreign custom and say, Adjutant General *to Lord Cornwallis*, thus making it an office attached to the person of the Commander, &c., not to his army. Remember, that this observation is not made with the smallest view to cavil on my part, but really to prevent an error.

We are still quiet here—with our ears however every moment annoyed with the thundering upon our friends at Ypres, and it is very uncertain whether Clairfait will attempt their relief or not. As to us, *we are sick*—that is our guide and director the Prince of Waldeck is so, and without a director I fear we shall remain fast tied to our tent-poles. Indeed, my good friend, I begin myself to be heartily sick. I believe in my conscience that with above 50,000 men in this country, we shall suffer the disgrace of losing one of the only two garrisons which we have to look after. It will not however be our fault, for H. R. H. is urging day and night that something may be done.

I inclose you a copy of the order which has been issued here relative to the decree of the National Convention, that their troops should give no quarter to the British and Hanoverians. It will not, I am sure, escape you, that the purport of it is as much addressed to the French as to the English—the truth is that it was intended to be so. We have accounts that they are much dissatisfied with the decree; and the object has been to put the matter in that light which was thought most likely to increase that discontent. It is translated and printing, and we propose to have them scattered over the whole country. It was thought that it would have a better effect in the shape of orders to the army here than in that of an address to that of the enemy.[1]

[1] See Annual Register for 1794, p. 168, for this General Order, which was dated June 7.

I beg you will be so good as to present my best respects to Lord Cornwallis and to Lord Malmesbury, and that you will believe me with great truth,

My dear Sir, your most faithful and obedient humble servant,

J. H. CRAIG.

We have accounts that 170 pieces of cannon have left Lisle for the attack of Ypres. What a prize!

Don't think us very savage for including wives and children in the denunciation of vengeance. It is surely right to point out the advantage which we have over them in that respect, though it may be doubtful whether it would be so to use it.

Colonel Ross in reply stated, that it was understood in England that all commissions should be given by the Duke of York, and that Lord Cornwallis considered that the orders appointing his staff might be prefaced with an extract from the instructions from the Secretary of State to the Duke of York, to the effect that Lord Cornwallis was to command a corps detached from the main army and intended to act with the Prussians. As Lord Cornwallis's formal appointment never took place, the question about the staff fell to the ground.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO H. R. H. THE DUKE OF YORK.

SIR, Mayence, June 18, 1794.

I am most truly concerned at the failure of General Clerfayt's attempt to relieve Ipres,[1] from which I think the most serious mischief is to be apprehended.

It would afford me great satisfaction to be able to give hopes of any speedy assistance from this quarter, but your Royal Highness will see by the enclosed copy of a letter which I have just received from Marshal Möllendorf, that he is exceedingly averse to the march, and as the vicinity of the enemy's forces and the unwillingness of the Austrians to suffer the Prussian army to quit the Rhine will afford ample opportunity for chicane and delay, as well in the troops of the former taking up the position of the latter, as in the arrangements to put the Prussian army in motion, I am much afraid that we cannot expect any service from it in Flanders in time to enable us to undertake any material offensive operations in the course of the present campaign.

[1] The action lasted from the 13th to the 17th of June, both inclusive, and the Allies were repulsed with great loss.

Your Royal Highness will see, by the copy of my answer to Marshal Möllendorf, that I have appointed the morning of the 20th for my meeting with him at Kirkheim-Poland, and you may rely upon it that nothing shall be wanting on my part to impress him with the necessity of his losing no time in commencing his march, as well on account of the honour of his master, as of the critical and dangerous situation of the affairs of the Allies in the Low Countries, where it was long since agreed by all parties, that the most vigorous exertions should be made, and where alone we are prepared with magazines and stores that would be sufficient for arduous and important undertakings.

I have the honour, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARSHAL MÖLLENDORF TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Received June 18.]

MILORD, Ottenberg, ce 15 Juin, 1794.

Je viens de recevoir à l'heure même avec un plaisir réel, l'honneur de votre lettre datée du 11me courant, et je me hâte d'y répondre incessament, pour me procurer le plutôt possible l'avantage de vous revoir, Milord, et de vous renouveller en personne, les sentimens de la parfaite estime, et de l'attachement que vous me connoissez pour vous. C'est en conséquence de cela que je vous envoye un courier pour vous proposer très humblement, de vous acheminer pour Kercheim-Poland, où le porteur de la présente aura l'honneur de vous conduire, Milord, et où d'abord j'ai tout fait préparer pour votre réception. Je ne manquerai pas aussi de m'y rendre tout de suite, dès que vous aurez eu la bonté de me marquer quelle sera l'heure où vous comptez vous y rendre, pour ne pas vous faire attendre; et je n'aurai pas même manqué non plus d'aller à votre rencontre à Mayence, si j'osois hazarder de m'éloigner beaucoup de mon poste actuel, menacé à chaque instant d'être attaqué par l'ennemi. D'avance cependant, Milord, je dois vous annoncer avec cette franchise que vous me connoissez, et qui m'a merité votre confiance, que je suis en embarras pour un des contenus de votre lettre, où vous me parlez des opérations offensives à entreprendre après l'arrivée des troupes Prussiennes dans les Pays Bas. Comment voulez-vous de grace effectuer leur marche, au moment où je me vois chaque jour aux mains avec l'ennemi, qui s'assemble en force, pour tomber sur moi, et pour me donner la revanche sur la grande déroute que j'ai mise à son armée, en l'attaquant avec vigueur centralement à Kayserslautern,

et crevassant par là sa forte jonction de son armée du Rhin et celle de la Moselle. Ce sont les journées du 23 et du 28 qui ont décidé contre lui, et quoique je manquerois de tout, car n'ayant pas d'argent je n'ai pu pourvoir encore ni aux magazins, ni au chevaux, canons, et pontons, mais ayant toujours la bonne cause générale à cœur, j'ai cru sauver la Flandres en perçant ici, ce qui devoit nécessiter l'ennemi de se retirer des Pays Bas, de veiller ici, et son propre pays et ses forteresses. J'ai très bien calculé aussi, car tout ces renforts pour me faire face viennent des Pays Bas, pour qu'il puisse reprendre ses anciennes positions très considérables.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

MÖLLENDORF.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE MARÉCHAL MÖLLENDORF.

MON CHER MARÉCHAL, A Mayence, midi, le 18e Juin, 1794.

En arrivant ici ce moment, j'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre que V. Ex. m'a adressée en date du 15e de ce mois.

Je me trouve extrèmement obligé par la proposition que vous avez eu la bonté de me faire, de m'épargner une grande partie du voyage en me rencontrant à Kercheim-Poland, et comme il seroit un peu tard ce soir avant que cette lettre puisse parvenir à votre Quartier Général, j'ai cru qu'il vous conviendroit mieux que je nomme le 20me (le jour après demain) pour notre entretien. Je partirai donc d'ici ce jour là de très bon matin, mais comme Votre Excellence n'est pas également comme moi maître de son temps, je la prie de régler son départ de la manière qui lui sera la plus convenable.

Les Alliés ayant fait leurs arrangemens avant l'ouverture de la campagne pour une défensive sur le Rhin et une vigoureuse offensive du quartier des Pays Bas, et les Puissances Maritimes ayant, pour assurer le succès de ce plan, fait un Traité pour se procurer des services importans de l'armée sous les ordres de Votre Excellence, moyennant un subside de près de deux millions sterling, Votre Excellence verra, je suis persuadé, l'impossibilité de changer à présent le projet de campagne, aussi bien que les cas fâcheux dans lesquels les Gouvernemens de ces deux Nations seroient placés si la campagne des Pays Bas étoit reduite à une malheureuse défensive, et si en même tems les Troupes de S. M. Prussienne étoient employées à une distance à ne pouvoir porter aucun secours, et d'un côté, faute de magazins et de grosse artillerie, il n'est pas possible de faire cette année-ci une impression sérieuse sur la France.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

SIR, Mayence, June 21, 1794.

In pursuance of the resolution which I communicated to you in my letter dated the 11th instant, I proceeded to this place, and yesterday Lord Malmesbury, Baron Kinkel[1] (the Dutch Minister), and myself, met Field Marshal Möllendorf by appointment about ten leagues from hence on the road to his head-quarters.

I had reason, by a letter from the Marshal, which I found here on my arrival, to expect a strong opposition on his part to the requisition for the march of the Prussian troops into Flanders, and I was well aware how much he would be able to strengthen his arguments against the proposed movement, from the circumstance of his being actually engaged in military operations in this quarter, and was therefore not sanguine in my hopes that anything that I could say would induce him to relinquish the plan of operations in which he had already engaged.

He began by stating that the enemy opposed to him consisted of 110,000 men, and that he expected every day to be attacked by them. That if he should evacuate the posts he now held, the force under the Prince of Saxe Teschen would not be strong enough to occupy them, nor even to remain on the western bank of the Rhine, and that, consequently, as soon as he began his march, the enemy would harass and attack his rear; he said that nothing should make him alter his present plan and proceed to Flanders, but a positive order from the King of Prussia to that effect; that if his Prussian Majesty should order his army to march through the Duchy of Luxemberg, he saw so much difficulty and danger in effecting it, from the numerous enemy which he should certainly have in his rear and his flanks, and perhaps in his front, that he should be under the necessity of requesting his Majesty to send some General who was able to conduct it, for that he felt himself totally unequal to such an undertaking; but that, if the King ordered him, he would move down the Rhine to Cologne, and proceed to Liege, or Maestricht, although he foresaw that, even by that route, his rear-guard would suffer considerably; he added at the same time that he could not possibly be in a condition to begin his march in less than six weeks, and that it would take at least four weeks more before he could reach Liege, or Maestricht. He

[1] Baron Kinkel was of German descent, and entered the Dutch navy, in which he rose to the rank of Vice-Admiral. He was Minister at Berlin in 1792, and was afterwards repeatedly employed. From 1815 to 1821 he was Dutch Minister at Stutgard; d. Nov. 10, 1821, at Manheim.

stated that the corps of Prussians which His Majesty had agreed to furnish to be employed for the interests of the Maritime Powers, was complete at the time of the signature of the treaty, and then amounted to 51,000 fighting men, that they were now reduced by sickness, desertion, and other casualties to 39,000, and that by the time of his arrival at Maestricht they probably would not exceed 35,000; and that he was certain that the horses of his cavalry, artillery, and other equipments of his army would be reduced to the most wretched condition.

The Marshal then represented how much the objects of this campaign would suffer by so large a body of troops being withdrawn for such a length of time from any service either offensive or defensive, and he then insisted much on the powerful diversion he had already made and should still make in favour of our army in Flanders, by continuing to act in this quarter upon the plan which he had commenced. He dwelt much on the danger to which the empire would be exposed by the removal of the Prussians, who had hitherto been able, not only to afford complete protection, but to act with credit and advantage to the common cause, and insisted that, when he arrived in the Low Countries, there would neither be time, nor should he be in a condition, to undertake anything of sufficient importance to compensate for the immediate mischief with which the proposed measure would certainly be attended.

He then enlarged on several points, such as the force of the enemy, the difficulty of quitting his present situation, &c., &c., which we were not, either by information or local knowledge, prepared to controvert, nor, circumstanced as we were, could we perhaps properly have entered into a minute discussion of them with a Commander-in-Chief of a much cooler disposition than Marshal Möllendorf; and after a very long conversation on his part to the above effect he delivered two papers,[1] of which the enclosed are copies, as containing his sentiments fully on the whole subject.

Nothing that the Marshal said had the least influence to convince my mind that any services, which it would be possible for the Prussian troops to perform for the benefit of the Allies in this quarter, could for a moment be put in competition with the urgent necessity of their immediate aid in the Low Countries, but in the temper in which we found the Marshal we were desirous to avoid all expressions which might occasion further irritation.

We therefore confined ourselves to state in moderate language, on one hand, the ground that we had to complain of his engaging

[1] These papers are not worth printing.

in offensive operations without concert with England and Holland, the necessity of the present case, the danger to which our affairs in the Low Countries and even Holland itself was exposed, and the claim which the late treaty gave to the Maritime Powers for the services of the army under the Marshal's command in that quarter where they conceived they would best promote their interests; and on the other in answer to the flattering prospect which he held out, we denied that without a considerable battering-train he could possibly undertake any offensive operations of consequence, or even give any real alarm to the enemy, who knew that, whilst their fortified places were secure, any transitory irruption which he might make into their country would have no influence on the general state of the war, and we suggested our doubts whether he could even keep his present position, if the enemy should make any progress between the Moselle and the Meuse.

The Marshal's opinion was however not to be changed, and we could only obtain a promise from him that he would not engage himself any further in offensive operations, but make the preparations necessary for his retrograde march, in case his Master, after receiving his representations, shall ultimately decide in favour of that measure.

I refer you to Lord Malmesbury's correspondence with Lord Grenville for an account of the steps which his Lordship has thought proper to take, and as I do not see that my continuance in this neighbourhood can be of any further benefit to the public service, I propose to return immediately to the Duke of York's quarters.

I have, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

MY LORD, Whitehall, June 30, 1794.

I have had the honour of receiving and laying before the King your Lordship's despatch of the 21st instant, inclosing copies of the memorials delivered to your Lordship by Field-Marshal Möllendorff, relative to the Prussian troops which have lately been taken into the pay of Great Britain.

Under all the existing circumstances, it appears to His Majesty's Ministers to be extremely desirable that they should, as soon as possible, have a personal communication with your Lordship, in order to consider the various important points connected with that subject; and with that view I have it in charge

from His Majesty to desire that your Lordship will take the earliest opportunity of returning to England, unless circumstances should occur which, in your Lordship's opinion, would render your further continuance on the Continent of advantage to the public service.

I shall make immediate application to the Lords of the Admiralty that a frigate may be despatched to Sluys for the purpose of receiving your Lordship on board, if, under the conditions I have stated, your Lordship should judge it right to return to England. . . . On your passing through the head-quarters of the combined armies, it will be right that your Lordship should endeavour if possible to obtain the most accurate information of the strength of the forces on the different stations, as such information will be of material use to His Majesty's Ministers in the consideration of the various points which must, on your Lordship's arrival, become the subject of their particular attention. If your Lordship should not require the service of the frigate, you will, of course, order her return to the Downs as speedily as possible.

I have, &c.,

HENRY DUNDAS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE BISHOP OF LICHFIELD AND COVENTRY.

DEAR JAMES, London, July 26, 1794.

I have as usual been so occupied and teased with everybody's affairs but my own since I came to town, that I have had no time to write to you. I have indeed been much with Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas, who certainly do not deserve the reverse of fortune that we have experienced on the Continent. They have adopted the only measure in their power by the mission of Lord Spencer and Mr. T. Grenville, but I own I am not sanguine in the expectation that it will produce much good effect. Ross went very unwillingly, as it was exceedingly inconvenient for his private affairs. It will, however, be lucky for Brome, and render his residence at Vienna much pleasanter. I have taken Lord Hertford's house in Lower Grosvenor Street, completely furnished, for one year at six hundred guineas, which gives me time to look about me. My expedition has not been a profitable one, but my baggage, horses, and wine are returned, and I shall keep everything in readiness till the end of the war, that I may not be subject to another expensive equipment.

Yours, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

On their arrival at Vienna, Lord Spencer and Mr. Grenville found that M. de Thugut held out no prospect of any forward movement, unless England, either as an actual subsidy, or by guaranteeing a loan, would provide Austria with a large sum—3,000,000*l.* at least. His language was very different from that of M. Desandrouin,[1] who had admitted that a large part of the loan ought to be, and would be, assigned towards augmenting the numbers of the army. M. de Thugut also seemed disposed to consider that Austria was not bound by her convention with England to defend the Low Countries, the value of which he rated low, but considered she was at liberty to employ her forces wherever she thought most advantageous. Lord Spencer and Mr. Grenville expressed their entire dissent from such views.

EARL SPENCER AND MR. GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

MY LORD, Vienna, Aug. 12, 1794.

. . . With respect to a change in the command of the army, which we stated to be a necessary step towards insuring the success of a more active system of operations in the Netherlands, we did not meet with any great difficulty in obtaining a promise that the Prince of Coburg should be removed, and the Austrian Government agreed that on his removal the Prince of Waldeck must of course retire. We were not so successful in prevailing upon M. de Thugut to name to us his intended successor, and indeed it was a point on which we were under considerable difficulties. Of those who were named in our instructions, General Brown[2] happens unfortunately to be in so very bad a state of health as to be out of the question; and on our suggesting the appointment of the Arch Duke Charles,[3] with Gen. Mack to assist him, we were first reminded of the objections which were formerly made by H. M. Ministers to the Arch Duke's appointment, and it was afterwards urged that this would so evidently be giving the command to Gen. Mack, that it would be running the hazard of offending all the Generals senior to him in the Austrian army.

We observe in Baron Thugut's conversation a fixed opinion of the inutility of the Low Countries to the House of Austria, no appearance of any forward zeal in the leading principles of the prosecution of the war, nor any prospect of vigorous operations in

[1] M. Desandrouin was the Treasurer of the Belgian Provinces, and he came to England to negociate a loan.

[2] General Brown, d. 1794. He was son of a General Brown in the Russian service.

[3] The Archduke Charles, son of Leopold II., b. Sept. 5, 1771, d. April 30, 1847; m. Sept. 17, 1815, Henriette Alexandrine Frederique Wilhelmine, dau. of Frederick Guillaume, Prince of Nassau Weilbourg.

it, unless purchased by a loan in this year and a subsidy in the next. We have likewise to fear an extended claim to indemnification from the Court of Vienna, and much loss of time where little can be spared, by protracting the attempt to succour the fortresses during the discussions on the means of obtaining money, notwithstanding our pressing solicitations on the urgency of that service.

We have, &c.,

SPENCER.

T. GRENVILLE.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO COLONEL ROSS, VIENNA.

DEAR ROSS, London, Aug. 15, 1794.

I have been detained in town, to my utmost mortification and misery, at the earnest request of Mr. Pitt, these last thirteen days, in expectation of Count Merci, who is not yet arrived, and who I believe was so frightened at being obliged to put back in the bad weather last week, that he has now no great inclination to put to sea. The wind has been easterly yesterday and to-day, and if he does not arrive in the course of this night I must make my escape.

You know as much about Möllendorf, Saxe Teschen, and Coburg, and their proposed defensive plans, as I do; it may be the best thing for the moment; but if the French are determined to push on, their position will not, in my opinion, be long maintained. Indeed I have no confidence in any defensive line of considerable extent, without the support of very strong corps that are moveable and active; and that, from what I have seen, does not appear to be more the system of the Prussians than the Austrians. We know but little of what has passed at Paris, but it seems certain that Roberspierre and his party[1] are destroyed. It is impossible to foresee the consequences of this event, but it cannot change matters for the worse. By all accounts the French army in the Low Countries is so separated, and in such a state of riot and disorder, that a good General with our present force would soon recover Flanders.

I suggested to Mr. Pitt the expediency of having an active body of troops, principally afloat, for the additional security of Zealand, about which province we were for some days under great apprehensions. I will write again as soon as I have seen Merci, although

[1] The revolution of 10 Thermidor, when Robespierre and his immediate associates were guillotined.

I do not expect to have much more to say, as the great object, viz. the change of a Commander, must depend upon our friends at Vienna.

Give my love to Brome, and present my best respects to Lord Spencer and Mr. Grenville. The Ministers appear to go on with great union and cordiality.[1]

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

RIGHT HON. W. PITT TO MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Private and Confidential.]

MY DEAR LORD, Hollwood, Aug. 24, 1794.

Comte Mercy still continuing very ill, we had last night a conference with Comte Starhemburg, to whom he had made over his instructions, and to-day we have received a despatch from Lord Spencer and Mr. Grenville, with an account of what had passed between them and the Austrian Ministers at Vienna. The general result is, that they express a great desire to conclude the alliance, a readiness to prepare for the next campaign, and to give immediate orders to make a forward movement to save the conquered fortresses, provided we supply them with an advance of money to relieve their present necessities, and secure to them large pecuniary assistance for next campaign. They also agree to remove the Prince of Coburg and the Prince of Waldeck, and we understand the former has himself sent his resignation, but they have fixed no successor. General Brown is so ill as to be out of the question. They state objections to the Arch Duke or Mack; and in the mean time, till they name some one else, they say the command must devolve upon Clairfait. This is all that has passed at Vienna; but Comte Starhemburg, in concert with Comte Mercy, has within these few days repeatedly suggested an idea, which is the point I more particularly wish to mention to your Lordship, with the freedom with which you have allowed me to use in all our communications. He says there is no Austrian General whom his Court can name in whom it would have entire confidence, and he is persuaded that if *you* had the command of our army, with the local rank of Field Marshal, there would be no difficulty in so arranging it that you might have the virtual command of the whole army, Austrian as well as British. He has recurred to this

[1] This letter was written shortly after the junction of the Duke of Portland and a section of the Whig party with Mr. Pitt, and it had been feared that the union might not have been cordial.

idea in such a way, as to persuade me and Lord Grenville that, as far as Austria is concerned, the measure is probably practicable. I need not say how advantageous we should think it to the cause. It is in truth of more importance than I could easily express to any one, and than I can attempt to express to you.

I am fully aware of the apparent difficulty of superseding the Duke of York's command. But on thinking over the subject, I think that difficulty not insuperable. He has, I believe, good sense enough to feel that his having the command of the whole combined army is out of the question. His being under the command of Clairfait, or the two armies remaining independent of each other, I think he must feel to be equally inconsistent with any plan that can be useful; and I do not at all despair that by stating those circumstances to him distinctly, and calling his attention to the nature of the crisis, he may be brought freely to acquiesce in such an arrangement, and to continue to serve under you.

If therefore your Lordship felt, as I trust you would, inclined to undertake a task on which perhaps everything depends, I should in that case write fully to the Duke of York on the subject, and also lay the proposal before the King.

I hardly know how to desire, in the uncertainty of the result, that you should take the trouble of another journey, and yet I know that it is hardly possible to discuss a subject of this sort sufficiently by letter, and I know too that you take too warm an interest in what is passing to attend to personal inconvenience.

The suggestion is certainly not one which one should consider as easy to execute in ordinary times, but it is I believe the only probable chance of putting things into a good train, and therefore hardly any difficulty ought to stand in the way of it. Let me only add again that I hope to see you before you determine.

Believe me, &c.,

W. PITT.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO COLONEL ROSS, VIENNA.

DEAR ROSS, Culford, Aug. 25, 1794.

After I had waited above a fortnight in and about town, Count Merci arrived, with a fever, but without any military proposition, or indeed an idea of doing anything on the Continent for the remainder of the campaign. The Count was confined to his bed, and could not be seen; but as soon as Mr. Pitt had ascertained from the Imperial Minister, that the sole objects of his mission

were an absurd plan for the government of Flanders, after it should be reconquered, and a scheme about the Prussian subsidy,[1] which seemed to be little more or less than to get it into their own hands, he allowed me to return into Suffolk. After giving a decided opinion against the Flanders plan,[2] which appeared to be equally weak and wicked, cautioning our friends not to give too much into the second, and exhorting them to try every possible means to save Valenciennes, I returned to the peaceful shades of Culford.

The fall of Roberspierre is certainly a great and extraordinary event, and must convince every thinking man in France (if such man there be) that it is impossible for them to form a Government upon anything like the present system; but I do not see the probability of its producing any immediate effects in our favour, and I must confess that I think our present prospect is gloomy. The coast of France is almost our only resource in respect to any offensive military operations; but the difficulties are so great that, however well disposed *our friends* are, it is doubtful whether anything can be undertaken.

I conclude that despatches from Vienna must have been received since your arrival at that Court, and I am inclined to believe that I should have had a line from P. or D. if they had any good news to impart.

I was sorry to find by a letter from Brome that he would have left Vienna previous to your arrival. He had just heard a report of Lord Spencer and Mr. Grenville being to come, but did not believe it.

I am, dear Ross, most heartily wishing you a speedy return,

Your most faithful and sincere friend,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. W. PITT.

[Private.]

DEAR SIR, Culford, Aug. 25, 1794.

Although the difficulty of the proposed arrangement appears to me absolutely insurmountable, and even if, contrary to my expectations, the promise of hearty confidence and support from the Court of Vienna and the acquiescence of the Duke of York could be obtained, the station in which I should be placed would

[1] The English Government did not altogether repudiate this idea, as appears from Lord Grenville's despatches.

[2] The Government completely coincided with Lord Cornwallis on this point.

be the most arduous and invidious in which a man could possibly find himself, I have too great a personal regard for you, and too much deference for your sentiments, to hesitate about going to town.

I shall set off very early on Wednesday morning, and shall be at Lord Hertford's house before four o'clock, when I shall be ready to obey any commands with which you may honour me. If Wednesday should be a Cabinet dinner, as I believe is the case, I had rather see you anywhere after that is over than meet you there, and can, if it should be more convenient to you, meet you at Wimbledon either on Wednesday night or Thursday morning.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

LORD GRENVILLE TO EARL SPENCER AND MR. GRENVILLE.

[Secret.]

MY LORD AND SIR, Downing Street, Aug. 26, 1794.

. . . . It appears that Comte Mercy was instructed to urge in the strongest manner, the three following points, forming the requests which the Emperor was desirous of bringing forward at this crisis, in order to enable H. I. M. to act with vigour against the common enemy.

1st. That some immediate pecuniary advance should be made, without which it was strongly urged that the Austrian army could not be kept on the Meuse, in a state of preparation for active measures.

2nd. That means should be adopted for assisting the Austrian loan of which no more than 300,000*l.* had yet been paid.[1]

3rd. That H. M. would enter into the discussion of future arrangements of pecuniary aid, which might remove the difficulties arising from the exhausted state of the Emperor's finances.

I have, &c.,

GRENVILLE.

The English Government agreed to advance 150,000*l.* as a loan, on condition that the Austrian troops should maintain their position. But they would not, during the prorogation of Parliament, make any further loan, or give any guarantee to the existing contractors. And Lord Spencer was informed, that nothing would

[1] The loan was for 3,000,000*l.*; the contractors, Boyd and Benfield, had only paid 2500*l.* of the second instalment of 300,000*l.* then some days overdue.

be proposed to Parliament with that view, unless it were distinctly shown that Austria would act with vigour. Lord Spencer was further directed to take care that the command of the army was not irrevocably settled without the consent of England, who had, it was considered, a strong claim to nominate the Commander-in-Chief.

The following is the King's answer to the Minute of Cabinet proposing to give Lord Cornwallis the command of the allied armies:—

THE KING TO THE RIGHT HON. WILLIAM PITT.

Weymouth, Aug. 27, 1794, 35 m. past 1, P.M.

I have this instant received Mr. Pitt's letter accompanying the Paper of Considerations which I undoubtedly should wish to keep, but not knowing whether Mr. Pitt has a fair Copy of it, I have thought it safest to return. Whatever can give vigour to the remains of the Campaign, I shall certainly as a duty think right not to withhold my consent: but I own, in my Son's place, I should beg my being allowed to return home, if the Command is given to Lord Cornwallis, though I should not object to the Command being intrusted to Gen. Clairfait: from feeling this I certainly will not write, but approve of Mr. Wyndham's going to the army, and shall be happy if my Son views this in a different light than I should. I will not delay the messenger, as I think no time ought to be lost in forming some fixed plan, and that the measure of sending Mr. Wyndham is every way advantageous.

GEORGE R.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO COLONEL ROSS, VIENNA.

DEAR ROSS, Lower Grosvenor Street, Aug. 28, 1794.

After having been kept the whole summer in town, I had flattered myself with a little quiet, when I received a letter from Mr. Pitt, saying that the Austrians had no General to send in the room of the Prince of Coburg, and that they have proposed that, for the present at least, the command should devolve upon Clairfait; but that Merci, who is just dead, and Staremburg, had proposed that I should have the command with the local rank of Field Marshal. The Ministers had an idea of the Duke of York's acquiescence in my taking the command, and serving under me, and Windham had undertaken to go over to the D. of Y. and procure his approbation of this plan.

On seeing Mr. Pitt yesterday as soon as I came to town, I told him in the first place how very unwillingly I should embark, on any terms, in so arduous and desperate a business; but that my going to take the command of the army, and to be Commander-in-Chief of the British troops, which was a point of the utmost necessity, while the Duke remained was absolutely impossible; and that even if he could be brought to consent to it, which I hardly thought, that I must decline it. I admitted with Mr. P. that little good could be expected from Clairfait and the D. of Y.; but I said that if it was the wish of His Majesty's confidential servants that I should have the task imposed upon me, that I thought the only way in which it could be done, was to state to the D. of Y. the disagreeable situation in which he would himself be placed under the command of Clairfait, and how disadvantageous such an arrangement would be to the public service, and to propose to him, as there was little prospect, especially under such a plan, of any active service for the remainder of the campaign, to ask a temporary leave of absence, and mention their wish that I should, for the present, take the command.

I am so convinced of the impossibility of going on according to the first proposition, that nothing shall make me accede to it. You will easily conceive how much I lament that you are at such a distance from me. I am just going to Wimbledon, but shall pass through London to-morrow in my way to Suffolk, when I will write you another line if anything new has been started.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO COLONEL ROSS, VIENNA.

DEAR ROSS, London, Aug. 29, 1794.

Windham sets out this day for the Duke of York's quarters. Nothing has been received from H. R. H. since he received from Lord Spencer the communication of Clairfait's appointment, and of the orders from Vienna to attempt the relief of the fortresses. Lord Grenville said he would write this day to desire that you should return immediately. You will easily conceive how much I feel the arduous task that is soon likely to be imposed upon me, and how anxious I must be for your arrival. The forward movement, if practicable and in time, is a matter of no small difficulty, and will require a great deal of detail. I conceive it must be made by the Meuse.

The K. and many others will attribute the sacrifice I make, and the great hazard that I run, to excess of ambition, instead of giving me credit for feeling the duty I owe to my country.

I am in great haste; for God's sake lose no time in coming.

Yours, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

MY LORD, Horse Guards, Sept. 1, 1794.

Having had the honour to communicate to His Majesty the information I have received from your Lordship, that on your passage from India to Europe, you had attentively considered the state of His Majesty's and the Company's troops in that part of the world, and had reduced into writing your sentiments as to the plan which it may be advisable to adopt: I am commanded by His Majesty to request that your Lordship will furnish me with that plan in detail, as His Majesty is desirous of knowing your opinion on the best mode of new-modelling the army in India, with a view to give safety and permanence to our Indian Empire, and to prevent the continuance or revival of those discontents and jealousies, which have so often manifested themselves between the King's and the Company's troops, as well as between the Company's troops belonging to the different presidencies.

I have, &c.,

HENRY DUNDAS.

The paper which Lord Cornwallis transmitted in reply to this letter is of great length. The substance of it will be found in the Appendix.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO SIR JOHN SHORE.

DEAR SIR, Brome, Sept. 7, 1794.

I have within these few days only, received your letter dated the 14th January, which has been pretty long on its passage. The death of Scindia,[1] of which we have received accounts overland, will nearly remove every political difficulty of your Government, and the rectitude of your measures will insure success in all the internal business of the country.

The French, although they have neither security of person or

[1] Sindia died Feb. 12, 1794.

property, although the streets of Paris and all their principal towns are daily streaming with blood, and their Government, if such it can be called, is the most tyrannical and cruel that ever existed, still carry on the war with a vigour and energy that is scarcely to be conceived; and when one set of butchers are themselves slaughtered at Paris, the army pays the same deference to their murderers, as they had before done to the villains whose heads they had cut off.

Our success however has been almost complete everywhere, except on the Continent, where nothing but disgrace has attended us, but I think our misfortunes there have been more owing to the incapacity and misconduct of our leaders, than to any peculiar merit or good behaviour of the enemy. How we are to get out of the war, and what effect the continuance of it, and the consequent increase of taxes, may have upon the temper of this country, it is difficult to foresee; but the present Opposition in both Houses is truly contemptible both as to numbers and character, and I believe I may safely say, that nine-tenths of the nation at large are more heartily disposed to support the British constitution.

Mr. Dundas first mentioned to me on my arrival in England, his intention that Duncan should be Governor of Bombay, and you will easily conceive that, knowing as I did the importance of a good Government in our new acquisitions on the Malabar coast, I warmly encouraged and cultivated this favourable disposition in the Board of Control. A party however in the Court of Directors have hitherto contrived to defeat Mr. Dundas's plan, wishing I suppose to get a Governor who would be more attentive to their private recommendations and jobs, than to the measures that would be most likely to promote and secure the happiness of the inhabitants, and the permanent interests of the Company and of Great Britain.

Mr. Dundas declares that if any person shall be appointed (for they talked of Seton), he will positively recall him, so that I suppose in the end Duncan must prevail.

I am well aware of the importance of paying immediate attention to the military establishment of India. I believe I before told you that I had collected all the information I could on the subject, previous to my departure from India. On my passage home, I drew out a plan for new-modelling the Indian army, which is to be brought forward as soon as Parliament meets, and which will, I trust, prove advantageous to the public service, and give as general satisfaction to the officers as can be expected from a measure of that kind, where so many different interests are concerned.

I am, most sincerely yours,

CORNWALLIS.

Each succeeding month only increased the difficulties of the Allies, and rendered their position more precarious, and the inefficiency of the British and Austrian commanders more apparent. Though at one time Mr. Windham had been induced to recommend Mr. Pitt not to remove the Duke of York from his command, yet his better judgment convinced him that when danger was imminent, the advice not to employ Lord Cornwallis had been most injudicious.

RIGHT HON. W. WINDHAM TO EARL SPENCER.

MY DEAR LORD, Head Quarters near Bois le Duc, Sept. 13, 1794.

Whatever your anxieties may be, mine, I dare say, are still greater; nor will you wonder that I should be so, when I tell you that of the evils that threaten us, I cannot forbear to consider part as owing, by possibility, to my own wrong judgment. You saw the letter written on the instant of my first conference with the Duke of York on the subject for which I came over. To gain him to assent to what was proposed was probably utterly out of my power, though I had pressed the matter with greater pertinacity than I can ever bring myself to use; but I certainly yielded more in my own opinion to the difficulties and risks of sending over Lord C.[1] immediately than I now wish I had done, or than I should have done, could I have known at that instant all that subsequent inquiry and observation has enabled me to know. A crisis such as that which we are now in, sets aside all considerations but that of the means fitted to carry into effect the end one has in view. We are here with an army of 30,000 men, and menaced with an immediate attack of an army of 50,000, in a position by no means advantageous, and where the fruits of victory seem by no means likely to compensate the consequences of defeat. If by my way of stating the objections to sending Lord C., I have been the cause of preventing his coming, and that the event of the action with which we are threatened should be unfortunate—God forgive me. It will be better that I should be among the number of those who will lose all sense and being upon that occasion, than live to the suspicion of having contributed to an event so fatal.

I will not enlarge upon the reasons which have made me change my opinion, so far as I had then an opinion to change, which was to be collected, I fear, from my letter to Mr. Pitt. One reason was, that in the plan of operations supposed at that moment, a great deal of connection was to have subsisted with the Austrian army.

[1] Lord Cornwallis.

At present, from the nature of the circumstances, and still more perhaps from the character of one of the parties, that co-operation becomes nothing. We are here, as I said, with an army of 30,000 British, Hessian, and Hanoverian, left to act by themselves. Without disparagement to the D. of Y., I cannot [but] wish at a moment when strong immediate interest forces away every other consideration, that a person of more experience and authority had the command, first to decide whether the battle ought to be fought, and then to conduct the fighting it. This wish, however, is now I fear too late; and what adds to the distress is, that two mails are now due from England, one of them since the 8th, which may possibly certain instructions affecting the decision of the first of these points. Should it be determined that no attacks are to be made for the recovery of the Scheldt, then will this action be unnecessary.

I blame myself for not having written to you before, but from the beginning it seemed that I had nothing to say that could arrive in time, could it otherwise have been of consequence. I now write, as I said, to relieve my own mind, very much oppressed with the prospect before us. I have continued here, partly, I suspect, from a desire of seeing some military operations, though not such as the present; partly, however, from the wish of hearing from England, which I have not yet done.

My best remembrances to Grenville, and believe me, &c.,

W. W.

A good comfortable present I shall have made you, till you shall hear the result of these proceedings.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

[Private.]

DEAR SIR, Brome, Sept. 14, 1794.

Your letter of yesterday's date has relieved me from much anxiety of mind, as I was very apprehensive from the summary mode of proceeding to which Lord Grenville seemed to incline by what he said after dinner at Wimbledon, that I should have been hurried into the most embarrassing and dangerous situation possible, with every prospect of ruin to myself, and very little probability of rendering any essential service to my country.

I trust that the Duke of York was apprised that nothing could be more repugnant to my inclination and wishes than to assume the command of the army, and that I saw as strongly as himself, the

impossibility of his serving, or even remaining, with the army under me.

I conclude I am now completely ruined at St. James's, indeed I could not be much worse than I was before, but that is a circumstance that will not disturb my rest, nor abate in the smallest degree, my attachment and affection for the great personage from whom I have formerly received much favour and kindness.

I cannot judge without much more circumstantial information, whether our army will be able to maintain a more forward position during the next winter. I suppose it must depend, as well as the recapture of Antwerp, upon our gaining some very decided advantage over the enemy soon after our troops are put into motion. I always conceived the two measures of a forward movement and the exchange of Lord Moira's corps, to be absolutely incompatible.

I perfectly agree with Lord Moira in thinking that, if our account of the strength of the Royalists is correct, and not exaggerated, that it would require at least 20,000 good British troops to undertake any solid operations in France, and indeed a much larger body would be required to afford any very sanguine hopes of success.

As to myself, I can only repeat, that whilst I am able, I shall ever be ready to serve my country; but you must remember that Lord M. will no more serve under me than H. R. H. would, and I think you should not lightly deprive yourselves of the services of the former, who, as a soldier, is, in my opinion, of the two the most worth retaining.

I return you all the papers, except the printed paper from India, which I have not had time to read. It is more unjust than unusual to abuse a man for his measures before it is known what they are to be, but I think the author too contemptible to make it worth your while to trouble yourself about him.[1]

I will come to you to talk over the arrangement of the Indian army whenever you please, after the end of this month, but I should be sorry to be absent from Suffolk for more than three or four days at a time, unless it was absolutely necessary. I have however not only declared, but shown my readiness to attend, whenever Mr. Pitt and yourself have wished to see me.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

[1] An attack upon Lord Cornwallis for his supposed views on the Indian army.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE BISHOP OF LICHFIELD AND COVENTRY.

DEAR JAMES, Brome, Sept. 16, 1794.

You will have seen much in the papers, and perhaps have heard various reports, about my being employed upon the Continent. An arrangement has been in agitation (to which nothing but my love and duty to my country would have made me consent) to have placed me in one of the most arduous and invidious situations possible. The plan is now at an end without any difficulty having been thrown in its way on my part, so that I have a prospect of remaining at peace at least for this year, and at the same time of feeling the satisfaction of not having sacrificed the public service to any selfish consideration.

Everything here is quiet and goes on smoothly, thanks to your care and good management. Brome is now on his return, but I should hardly suppose that he will arrive in the course of this month.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL SPENCER TO MARQUIS CORNWALLIS. (BY COLONEL ROSS.)

[Received Sept. 27.]

MY LORD, Vienna, Sept. 15, 1794.

In pursuance of Lord Grenville's desire, I take the liberty of writing a few lines to your Lordship on the state of our negotiations at this Court; and I am very happy that Colonel Ross will deliver this letter to you, as he will be able from the knowledge he has of what has been passing here, to give your Lordship a much better idea of it than I could do in the short time allowed me for writing. We are sorry to find that the Ministers here do not afford us any reason to hope that the conditions which we have been instructed to annex to the guarantee of the loan and grant of the subsidy from Great Britain, will be thought admissible by the Emperor. They seem pretty decidedly of opinion that H. I. M. will not be brought to consent either to the keeping so large a force as has been required in the Netherlands, or to intrusting the command of that force to an officer not in the Austrian service; and they state as absolutely impossible, the expedient proposed of drawing from the Empire an equivalent to Prussia for the subsidy when transferred to Austria.

Though we had failed in this part of our proposal, we thought it our duty to endeavour to provide against any misunderstanding

that might arise on the subject of the command for the remainder of the present campaign; and on this point we received general assurances both from the Prince de Rosenberg[1] and Mons. de Thugut, that measures should be taken to secure a good understanding between the two armies, though Mons. de Thugut took a distinction between the concert to be entered into for the plan of operations, which he contended should be on a footing of more perfect equality than what regards the execution of the plan when agreed upon, in which he admitted that a preference must necessarily be given to your Lordship's superior rank. It is necessary at the same time to observe that, though they agreed in the necessity of taking proper measures for this purpose, they seemed to be of opinion, from the present circumstances of the campaign, that there would very probably be but little occasion for the two armies to act together during the remainder of it.

I lose no time in apprising your Lordship of what has passed on this subject, in order not to delay Colonel Ross's departure, whom we know you will be very glad to see.

With the sincerest wishes that you may meet with every possible success, I have the honour, &c.,

SPENCER.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO COLONEL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Culford, Oct. 10, 1794.

I have just received your letter, and propose being in town this day sennight, the 17th.

The accounts from the Continent are truly disastrous, and I think past remedy; and I sincerely hope that I shall be able to keep clear of the business, but with my feelings there must still be some danger of my being involved. Balfour writes that the army is very sickly. Yours ever,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL SPENCER AND MR. GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[Received about Oct. 19.]

MY LORD, Vienna, Oct. 7, 1794.

. . . Upon the general subject of the negotiation it is evident that this Minister (Mons. de Thugut) retains his expecta-

[1] François Seraphique, Prince de Rosenberg, b. Oct. 18, 1762, d. Aug. 4, 1832; m. Dec. 27, 1786, Marie Caroline, dau. of Comte François Antoine de Khevenhalter-Mertch.

tions of obtaining from Great Britain the guarantee of a loan of 6 millions; and that his wishes for the next campaign lead to see 40,000 Prussians and 35,000 Austrians added to the British army in Flanders, making one combined force under British command for the protection of Holland, while a large Austrian army might act upon the Rhine, supplying there the place of the Prussians.

We have, &c.,

SPENCER.
T. GRENVILLE.

The idea of placing Lord Cornwallis in command being now almost entirely relinquished, he was very anxious to explain what had really passed on the subject to the Duke of York, to whom therefore he addressed the following letter:—

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO H. R. H. THE DUKE OF YORK.

SIR, Culford, Nov. 8, 1794.

Although I am very unwilling to intrude upon your Royal Highness on a business personally concerning myself, at a time when you are so much occupied with matters of more importance, yet as some circumstances have not long since occurred, which have been misapprehended on this side of the water, I am very desirous to state them to you in a clear and true light, as they really happened.

Upon my return from the Continent, I represented in the strongest terms, agreeably to your instructions, and indeed as my duty required, the absolute necessity of removing the Prince of Coburg and Prince of Waldeck from their situations, and the importance of making an attempt to relieve the fortresses in French Flanders. The Cabinet, in consequence of your Royal Highness's letters and message delivered by me, resolved, that as the business was of a most pressing nature, a person should be immediately sent to Vienna for the purpose of carrying these two points at the Imperial Court, and as the Minister was known to be averse to Lascy[1] (who was besides thought too infirm for so active and sudden an appointment), to hasten as much as possible the departure of General Brown to take the command of the army in Flanders. It was at first proposed that I should be charged with this mission; but on the reflection that some altercations of no very

[1] Joseph François, Comte de Lascy, a Field-Marshal, b. Oct. 21, 1725, d. Nov. 24, 1801. He was descended from an old Norman family which came to England with William I., and quitted it with James II. His father was Peter, Comte de Lascy, a celebrated Russian General.

pleasant nature had passed between the Austrian Ministers and myself, on the subject of the march of the Prussians, and that it would be unreasonable that I should, after so long an absence from my domestic concerns, be again requested to take a journey to the Continent to execute a commission which might probably be as well performed by another person,—Mr. Grenville was named to go to Vienna, and Lord Spencer was afterwards prevailed upon to accompany him, as it was conceived that the presence of a member of the Cabinet would give more weight to our propositions and induce the Court of Vienna to use more than ordinary despatch. Of this I was informed by Mr. Pitt when Colonel Ross and myself dined with him on his return from the Cabinet; and he then added, that Lord Spencer had desired that a military man should go with him, to assist him in combating any military objections which might be started by the Austrians, and that it had been agreed by his Majesty's Ministers, and warmly approved by Lord Spencer, that, from the knowledge which he must have acquired of the temper and disposition of our Allies, by having attended me to the Continent, as well as from his general character and habits of business, Colonel Ross would be a very proper person to be employed upon this occasion.

Colonel Ross, who was on the point of setting out for Scotland, remonstrated most vehemently against this nomination, and urged his want of fluency in speaking French, and every other argument that could be suggested; but as Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas stated the ruinous consequences of delay, and pressed his going in the strongest terms, he was at length so far overruled as to consent to go, if no other expedient could be adopted in eight-and-forty hours, which he most earnestly requested Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas to attempt. The mission proceeded in a few days, as you know, accompanied by Colonel Ross, and from that time no change whatever took place in the resolutions of the Cabinet, respecting the affairs of the Continent—as far at least as any communication was made to me—till the arrival of the first despatches from Lord Spencer and Mr. Grenville, when I received an express from town on the part of Administration, acquainting me that General Brown was so ill as to be out of the question, and that it had been proposed by the Court of Vienna that the command for the present should devolve upon Clairfait. It was then stated to me that our Government could have no hopes of success in so hazardous and difficult an enterprise as was then in agitation, if it was to be conducted by a man who had so little exertion, and who had been so unfortunate in all his undertakings as Clairfait, and who had on a

former occasion shown no goodwill to co-operate with your Royal Highness; and the expedient was then proposed to me, which was communicated to you by Mr. Windham, and which was said to have originated with Count Merci, and to have been suggested at his request, during his illness, by the Imperial Minister in London.

In answer to a proposal of so embarrassing a nature, I said that the idea of my commanding your Royal Highness by means of a temporary rank was absurd and preposterous, and what I never would agree to, even if you were to ask it; that I did not believe that the Court of Vienna would consent to have their army commanded by a foreigner, notwithstanding Count Merci's opinion, or that Clairfait would acquiesce in the authority of that kind of local commission, which was, I believed, unknown in the Austrian service, and that if all those difficulties were removed, it was not probable that I could arrive at the head-quarters of the army, and make my arrangements for moving, in time to save the fortresses. But as I had ever maintained that it was highly disgraceful for an officer to refuse his services in the line of his profession, whenever he should be called upon, I did not, even in this case, feel myself at liberty to decline the most arduous and invidious situation in which perhaps a General had ever been placed, in the event of Clairfait's expressing his willingness to acknowledge my command, and of your Royal Highness being disposed to ask a temporary leave of absence from the army.

Conscious as I am that I was actuated by no motives but a strict sense of the duty which I owe to my King and country, and that, at so critical a period, when a little exertion on our part might have averted those evils which have since come upon us, and which will, I am afraid, nearly overwhelm this country, it was meritorious to consent to encounter the dangers which so imminently threatened me, and which men of more selfish principles would have avoided, I certainly do not think that my conduct requires any apology, and I have too much respect for your Royal Highness to suppose for a moment that you would expect it; and I should not now have troubled you upon the subject, if I had not known that it had been suggested to the first personages in this country, that the plan of my obtaining the command of the army had been preconcerted, and that Colonel Ross's journey to Vienna was connected with it.

I hardly conceive that your Royal Highness can think me base enough to have endeavoured to supplant you in the command of the army, by a dirty intrigue, or fool enough to have wished to place myself in a station which was so likely to ruin my reputation

and destroy my future peace of mind. But as reports may have some weight until they are contradicted, and as this suggestion did unfortunately make an impression in a quarter where it gives me the greatest concern that it should have found any credit, I have presumed to trouble your Royal Highness with a plain statement of facts, and to assure you upon my honour, that there did not exist the most distant idea of my being employed on the Continent, when Colonel Ross went to Vienna.

I have the honour, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO COLONEL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Culford, Nov. 21, 1794.

I inclose a copy of a letter which I yesterday received from the person[1] who sometimes wrote to me from the army before we went to the Continent. You will easily conceive how desirous he is that his name should not be brought forward. I communicated the paragraphs marked by inverted commas to Dundas, with the strictest injunctions not to guess at the author. Unless I had done something of that kind, my friend's letter could have answered no purpose. My own situation is however delicate, and I am not without serious apprehensions of being sent for and pressed to undertake what no other person will attempt, and what I am afraid cannot now possibly succeed, for discipline and confidence are not plants that will grow in a day, and it seems too certain that many days cannot pass before all remedy will be too late.

I do not know the cause of the prorogation[2] of Parliament; it is perhaps better that it should not meet now, if money is not immediately necessary, but it is unlucky that more notice could not be given, as all sudden measures create alarm, and naturally make people suspect the worst.

The Duke of Grafton very gravely says, he is afraid of the effect it may have in the country, wishing at the same time that it may blow it into a flame.

I have postponed my going to town in consequence of the prorogation, but that will not save me hours of misery on account of the state of public affairs, and of anxiety with regard to my own situation.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

[1] There is no trace who this person was.

[2] Parliament was prorogued to Dec. 30.

[COPY.]

Arnheim, Nov. 11.

I have not troubled you with letters, as you too well know there has not been anything pleasant to communicate. But now we really are come to such a critical situation, that unless some determined, decisive, and immediate steps are taken, God knows what may happen. "Despised by our enemies, without discipline, confidence, or exertion among ourselves, hated and more dreaded than the enemy, even by the well-disposed inhabitants of the country, every disgrace and misfortune is to be expected. You must thoroughly feel how painful it must be for me to acknowledge this, even to your Lordship, but no honest man who has any regard for his country can avoid seeing it. Whatever measures are adopted at home, either removing us from the Continent or remaining, something must be done to restore discipline, and the confidence that always attends it. The sortie from Nimeguen[1] on the 4th was made entirely by the British, and executed with their usual spirit, they ran into the French without firing a single shot, and consequently lost very few men; their loss was when they afterwards were ordered to retire. Yet from what I have mentioned in the first part of my letter, I assure you I dread the thought of these very troops being attacked or harassed in a retreat."

I have never ventured to open myself to any one on this subject, nor would I to any one but yourself; but however grateful I am, and hope always shall be for the constant kindness and friendship I have experienced from him, and well knowing the many really valuable qualities of heart and mind that the person in question[2] possesses, yet things are in such a state that I cannot avoid giving my opinion to the only one I know whose high character, reputation, and love of his country could save us. I conclude you know that the Duke of Brunswick has refused the command.

RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS TO MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Private and Confidential.]

MY DEAR LORD, London, Nov. 27, 1794.

I delayed answering your letter, because Mr. Pitt and I had lately so many serious communications on the subject of it, that I was certain some decided measure must come out of it. It so happened, and on Sunday last Mr. Pitt wrote a very long and dutiful letter, but at the same time a very honest and firm one, to the King, stating the necessity of putting an end to the Duke of

[1] Nimeguen surrendered on Nov. 5.

[2] The Duke of York.

York's command of the army on the Continent. The letter was felt as a very severe blow, and as such received, but acquiesced in as what could not be avoided. Yesterday in the Closet, he did not say a word on the subject either to Mr. Pitt, or to any other person. I therefore late last night wrote to him again, and I send this day a despatch to the Duke of York, of which I send you a copy. We are in hopes, but by no means certain, that the campaign will now end by the enemy going into winter-quarters, and *if the Dutch do not make a separate peace in the mean time*, we will then have a little breathing to think what is to be done. We propose as fast as possible to let the command into General Abercrombie's hands, but there being senior officers, it requires a little management.

I expect Lord Moira to call upon me immediately. I shall have occasion to write to you again soon. I would wish much to see you, and would desire you to come up, or I would come down to you, but in the present moment if I was to do either, I would not be surprised that it should be suspected the late step with regard to the Duke of York was taken in concert with you. Perhaps the arrangement of the India army may afford such an opportunity. The King has had your paper this fortnight. If he does not return it to-day or to-morrow, I intend to write to him about it.

Yours very sincerely,

HENRY DUNDAS.

RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS TO H. R. H. THE DUKE OF YORK.

SIR, Horse Guards, Nov. 27, 1794.

The present very extraordinary and critical situation of Holland, and the state of the combined forces employed for the protection of that republic, render it extremely desirable that His Majesty's confidential servants should as soon as possible have a personal communication with Your Royal Highness upon those important subjects, and I am commanded to signify to Your Royal Highness, His Majesty's pleasure that you should take the earliest opportunity of returning to England, leaving the command of His Majesty's British forces in the hands of such British officer as may be next in seniority to Your Royal Highness, after furnishing him with such information and instructions as Your Royal Highness may judge to be necessary for his guidance.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

HENRY DUNDAS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO COLONEL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Culford, Nov. 28, 1794.

I had a letter this morning from the *person* to whom I communicated my information. I find the important measure of recalling ——[1] has been adopted with an honest firmness, though with every degree of duty and propriety. It is intended that the command of the British should for the present devolve on A., and as it is supposed that the enemy are going into winter-quarters, there will be time for arrangements if the Dutch will persevere in the war.

The *person* told me that Lord M. was to come to him immediately, and that he wished much to see me, but was afraid either to ask me to come to town, or to come hither, for fear of creating suspicions of a similar nature with those which we have before heard of.[2]

The papers say that the Irish affairs are settled, which I hope is true, but if our friend Lord Milton[3] is intended for the secretary, I should a little doubt the propriety of that nomination.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO COLONEL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Culford, Dec. 5, 1794.

I have received an answer to my letter,[4] expressing perfect satisfaction at my statement, and full of civility and kindness; this will remove all awkwardness at our meeting.

I have heard nothing more from Mr. D., but it is strongly reported that Lord M. is going immediately on some expedition. The Bishop writes that he does not himself deny it.

Believe me, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

H. R. H. THE DUKE OF YORK TO MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Received Dec. 5.]

MY DEAR LORD, Head Quarters at Arnheim, Nov. 24, 1794.

I take the earliest opportunity to acknowledge the receipt of your very friendly letter of the 8th, which reached me only on

[1] Blank in original, meant for the Duke of York.

[2] The King was reported to have believed that Lord Cornwallis was desirous of superseding the Duke of York, which these letters evidently show he was not.

[3] George, 2nd Earl of Dorchester.

[4] Lord Cornwallis to the Duke of York, dated Culford, Nov. 8.

Friday, and beg you will accept my most sincere thanks for the frank and open manner with which you have explained to me the transaction concerning Colonel Ross's journey to Vienna, and which, even if I had ever had any doubts, would have fully cleared them up.

I need not, I trust, assure you that I am not of a suspicious disposition, and at the same time I have too high an opinion of your character to think that you are capable of any low or dirty intrigue. It was natural for His Majesty's Ministers in the very critical situation in which we have been for some time, to be anxious that a person of your Lordship's military talents and reputation should not remain unemployed.

I am however equally sensible of this fresh instance of your friendship towards me, and beg you will believe me ever with great truth,

My dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

FREDERICK.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO COLONEL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Culford, Dec. 15, 1794.

Balfour is come over, and his letters—for I have not seen him—are very desponding. He tells us what cannot be done, but does not say what can. The Marquis de Bouillé[1] on the contrary writes on the 4th December, "Je crois que la Hollande est sauvée pour cet hiver, si ceux qui commandent ont la moindre connaissance du métier, et ne font pas quelques nouvelles bévues; elle le sera la campagne prochaine, si l'on met à la tête de l'armée destinée à la défendre, un Général qui ait de la capacité, et qu'on lui donne des moyens suffisans, ce qui me paroit très facile."

I have heard nothing from Ministers since I wrote to you last; I shall go up at the meeting of Parliament, but hope to get down again, as I have much business here on my hands.

I have agreed for a manor and estate adjoining Lord Bristol's park, which is more than an equivalent for Wordwell, and which costs me 12,000*l.*, so that I can change Saxham for Stowe without

[1] François Claude Amour, Marquis de Bouillé, b. Nov. 19, 1729, d. Nov. 14, 1800, in London. He had served with distinction in the Seven Years' War, and in the West Indies. At the time of the flight to Varennes he commanded the troops on the North-Eastern frontier of France, whom he had succeeded in retaining to their duty, and had his orders been punctually followed, Louis XVI. would probably have escaped. The Comte de Damas, who commanded a small detachment of cavalry at Varennes, told the Editor that he requested leave of the King to charge with the men he had the mob who intercepted them. The Queen urged him to do it, but Louis would take no responsibility, and would give no order till it was too late. M. de Damas added, he had ever since regretted not acting without orders.

any expense of ready money, except the 5000*l.* which I agreed to pay extra, and without remorse, as I am sure of Wordwell whenever there is a reasonable Lord Bristol.

My correspondent with the army seems a little frightened at the consequences of his letter, but I do not see how I could have acted otherwise.

Lady Waldegrave[1] and her children are come to spend some days with us; this circumstance will confirm Miss Vanneck[2] in her report.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO COLONEL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Culford, Dec. 19, 1794.

I yesterday received your letter dated the 14th, and felt glad to have got once more into correspondence with you. You had not then received my letter about the recall.

I have heard nothing more from Administration, who, I suppose, as usual have their hands too full, but when I go up to town for the meeting of Parliament I shall know all. From an account I received from Balfour of a conversation with Mr. Pitt, I have no doubt that the continental business is to go on, though B. is very desponding, and says he gave very discouraging answers. The 20,000 men which the K. of P. is bound to furnish to the Emperor, and which had been withdrawn, have, I see by the papers, been ordered back to the Mayne on the success in Poland;[3] and our guarantee of payment of the interest of the loan of six millions[4] to the Emperor, looks as if the Austrians had agreed to take their share in the ensuing campaign. I trust they will do it more effectually than in the last.

Adieu, my dear Ross, my letters will be more interesting when I get to London.

Yours, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

[1] Elizabeth Laura, dau. of James, 2nd Earl of Waldegrave, b. March 24, 1760, d. Jan. 29, 1816; m. May 5, 1782, George, 4th Earl Waldegrave. Her eldest son, George, 5th Earl, had been drowned at Eton in the June preceding, at the age of 10.

[2] Gertrude Vanneck, dau. of Sir Joshua Vanneck, 1st Bart., b. about 1734, d. March 14, 1798. She was Privy Purse to the Princess of Wales. The report alluded to, was a supposed marriage between Lord Cornwallis and Lady Waldegrave,—an unfounded story, but often repeated.

[3] Praga was stormed by Suwarrow Nov. 4, and Warsaw surrendered Nov. 6.

[4] This arrangement was not completed.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO COLONEL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, London, Dec. 30, 1794.

I have received your letters dated the 26th and 27th, and have now only a moment to tell you the Continent is out of the question, as the greatest part if not the whole of our troops are to be withdrawn, to be replaced by Austrians, unless the Dutch make a separate peace.

The Ordnance[1] with the Cabinet is to be offered to me, but as the P. to whom I wrote the letter of explanation is I believe to be Commander-in-Chief, and to have a seat in the Cabinet, the situation of an inferior military man in the Cabinet will be very unpleasant. My wishes are to decline, but as that might greatly add to the present sufficiently embarrassed state of affairs, I have not perfectly made up my mind about it. Pray give me your sentiments. If I should be induced to accept, I must call upon you to take part with me.

Pierrepont[2] was totally mistaken, as far at least as regards Lord Chatham.[3]

Yours ever, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO COLONEL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, London, Dec. 31, 1794.

I think upon the whole that everything went off yesterday as well as could reasonably be expected (for we had no right to be very sanguine), excepting only the defection of Wilberforce,[4] which must be felt as a cruel stroke by Pitt. The Thorntons[5] went

[1] Lord Cornwallis was appointed Master-General, Feb. 13, 1795, *vice* the Duke of Richmond, who had held that office since Jan. 1, 1784. The Duke of York became Commander-in-Chief Feb. 11, 1795, but he was not then, nor was he at any future time, in the Cabinet.

[2] Hon. Evelyn Henry Frederick Pierrepont, eldest son of Charles, 1st Lord Manvers, b. Jan. 18, 1775, d. Oct. 22, 1801, before his father was raised to the Earldom. M.P. for Bossiney, April to May, 1796, and then for Nottinghamshire till his death.

[3] Lord Chatham was not made Master-General till June, 1801, on the resignation of Lord Cornwallis.

[4] William Wilberforce, b. Aug. 24, 1759, d. July 29, 1833; m. May 30, 1797, Barbara Ann, dau. of Isaac Spooner, Esq., of Elmden Hall. M.P. for Hull from Nov. 1780 to March, 1784; for Yorkshire, to 1812; and for Bramber, to March, 1825. On this occasion he moved an amendment to the address, expressing a desire for peace almost on any terms, to the great satisfaction of the Foxites, and to the equal displeasure of nearly all his private and political friends. In a letter given in his Life, he states that he had much hesitation, and that his speech was quite incoherent, as his doubts about his course were so great.

[5] Robert Thornton, b. Jan. 9, 1759, d. March 12, 1826; m. Sept. 12, 1786, Maria, dau. of Francis Eyre, Esq. M.P. for Bridgewater July, 1785, to June, 1790, and Colchester to March, 1817. Henry Thornton, b. March 10, 1760, d. Jan. 16, 1815; m. March 1, 1796, Mary Anne, dau. of Joseph Sykes, Esq., of West Ella. M.P. for Southwark from Sept. 1782 to his death.

with him, and Sir Richard Hill,[1] member for Shropshire—so far was the Methodist connexion. But his colleague Mr. Duncombe,[2] and Mr. Burdon,[3] member for Durham, likewise were in the minority. In point of numbers this is no great matter, but the example is dangerous, and four county members make some noise. I have not seen any of the Ministers this morning. Pitt was not well yesterday, but they say he spoke admirably.

Yours, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

[1] Sir Richard Hill, 2nd Bart., b. June 6, 1732, d. Nov. 28, 1809, unmarried. M.P. for Shropshire from Oct. 1780 to Oct. 1806. He is commemorated in the Rolliad:—

"Shall these for petty merits be renowned,
And no proud phrase with panegyric sound
Swell thy short name, great Hill? here take thy due,
And hence be called the Scriptural Killegrew."

[2] Henry Duncombe, uncle to Charles, 1st Lord Feversham, b. 1728, d. April 10, 1818, unmarried. M.P. for Yorkshire from Oct. 1780 to May, 1796. He seconded the amendment.

[3] Rowland Burdon, b. 1756, d. Sept. 17, 1838; m. 1st, June 27, 1780, Margaret, dau. of Charles Brandling, Esq., of Gosforth; 2nd, 1794, Cotsford, dau. and sole heir of General Richard Matthews. M.P. for the County of Durham from Nov. 1790 to Oct. 1806. Very few others of Mr. Pitt's supporters voted in the minority, but among them was Mr. Bankes. The numbers were 246 to 73.

CHAPTER XVII.

Lord Cornwallis Master-General of the Ordnance — Threatened invasion of England by the French — Celebrated retreat of Admiral Cornwallis — Military arrangement for India — State of the Indian army — Court Martial on Admiral Cornwallis — The Nabob of Arcot — Discontent of officers of the Bengal army — Judicial regulations in India.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO COLONEL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Lower Grosvenor Street, Jan. 19, 1795.

I have just time to acquaint you that all is over in Holland. The Dutch sent terms of capitulation to Pichegru, but he scratched them all out, except that which asked the free exercise of their religion, which was not probably the article that they had most at heart.

The D. of Y. told me in the drawing-room, that the enemy attacked the Guards at Rhenen[1] on the 14th, who repulsed them, and that they themselves suffered very little loss, and that our army had retreated unmolested to Deventer, leaving only two or three hundred sick, who were too bad to be moved.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO COLONEL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Lower Grosvenor Street, Jan. 26, 1795.

The die is at length cast respecting the Ordnance, and the new part of the Administration (and I believe particularly your friend Lord Spencer) have forced Mr. Pitt to turn out the D. of R. notwithstanding his voluntary return to his duty in the Cabinet, and, as I understand, his promise to behave better in future. Lord Amherst[2] is to quit, and the D. of Y. is either to be Commander-in-

[1] The French attacked the whole line from Arnheim to Amerengen, but without success. The Guards drove them back at Rhenen, losing only 2 officers and 20 rank and file wounded. Lieut.-General Harcourt commanded the English, and Comte Walmoden the whole army, which consisted mainly of Hanoverians.

[2] Jeffrey, Lord Amherst, so created May 20, 1776, K.B., b. 1716, d. Aug. 3, 1797; m. 1st, Jane, dau. of Thomas Dalison, Esq., of Hampton; 2nd, March 26, 1767, Elizabeth, dau. of General the Hon. George Cary. A Field-Marshal and Colonel 2nd Life Guards; Commander-in-Chief in America from 1758 to 1764, during which time he subdued

Chief, or the official channel of transacting military business with the King, but to have no seat in the Cabinet. By what fell from Dundas last night, it is, I believe, the intention to give Sir W. Howe the Tower, and make Abercromby Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance.[1]

You will easily conceive how ill it suits with my opinion of the times and of the prudence of *some people*, and with my ardent wish for quiet and retirement, to exchange the Tower for the Ordnance, but I yield to the pressure of the moment and to my determined devotion to the public service.

I do not think in your present military rank and situation, in every respect as to fortune and character, that the office of private secretary to the Master General would be suitable and proper for you, but still I am very desirous to avail myself somehow of your assistance in the arduous task which I am about to undertake; I hope at any rate you will come soon to town; you must agree with me in thinking that this country never was in greater danger of a serious and formidable invasion, and consequently feel the comfort that it would be to me to talk over the most effectual means of resisting it, just as I am taking upon myself almost the whole military responsibility in Council, with a person whom I love so much, and for whose talents and judgment I have so great a veneration.

The Committee of Company's officers have passed severe strictures on my plan, and pertinaciously adhered to the insolent demands of the Bengal Committees. The Court of Directors not knowing what to do, partly led by Baring and others who wish to thwart the measures of Government, and partly from not caring for the trouble of reading the paper, and from despair of being able to understand it, have come to a short vote, "that they will on no account consent to the transfer of the Company's army to the King's service," and Dundas does not think it wise at this time to attempt to force the measure down their throats, so that our arrangement falls to the ground, and there is great reason to apprehend that next year the Bengal army will be in a state of mutiny. The Cape, Trincomalé, Cochin, &c., &c., are all subjects of important and speedy consideration.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

Canada; and General Commanding-in-Chief in England from March, 1778, to March, 1782, and again from Jan. 1793 to Feb. 1795. He was also Lieut.-General of the Ordnance from 1772 to 1782.

[1] No change was made. Lord Cornwallis remained Constable of the Tower, and Sir William Howe Lieut.-General of the Ordnance.

The plan proposed by Lord Cornwallis, to amalgamate the Company's European troops with the King's army, was, as may be seen, not approved of by the Company or their officers. The latter made many complaints, some of real, some of imaginary grievances, and their demands were couched in very improper language. They appointed one committee in India, and another in London, with whom the Government communicated. The question gradually became very serious, and in 1796 assumed a formidable aspect. Some details will be given in 1797, when Lord Cornwallis was nominated Governor General in order to put down what had then become a mutiny.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO COLONEL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Lower Grosvenor Street, Jan. 27, 1795.

I received your letter congratulating me on my having no share of responsibility, a few hours after I had informed you how deeply I am to be engaged.

I cannot entertain a doubt of this country being invaded; indeed I do not see what the French can do else, for they will give themselves very little concern about an Austrian army on the Rhine, if such an army should exist, of which we too well know that we cannot insure the certainty by paying for it.

I hope and trust you will come up soon, and indeed I think the King will soon be looking about for his Aides-de-Camp; but I do not at present see why you should not be Surveyor General. As the House of Commons sat till six this morning, I have had no opportunity of seeing any Ministers since I wrote last.

I must confess that I feel an alarm and anxiety about public affairs, that entirely destroys the comfort that I hoped to derive from the happy circumstances of my family and fortune.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

Lord and Lady Sydney are in great joy at Harriet's[1] marriage with Lord Dalkeith.[2]

[1] Harriet Catherine, dau. of Thomas, 1st Viscount Sydney, b. Nov. 27, 1773, d. Aug. 24, 1814; m. March 23, 1795, Charles William, Earl of Dalkeith.

[2] Lord Dalkeith, afterwards, Jan. 11, 1812, 4th Duke of Buccleugh, K.T., b. May 24, 1772, d. April 20, 1819.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO COLONEL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Lower Grosvenor Street, Jan. 31, 1795.

I franked a letter to you from Lady Spencer on the subject of your coming south; she says she shall not be diverted from the attempt to bring you up, by one or two failures.

I have not seen either Pitt or Dundas since I wrote last, and am now confined by a most shocking cold and cough, but I understand the D. of R. received his dismission on Sunday last. The D. of Y. is to be a Field Marshal, and to conduct the military business as senior officer on the staff. Whether we shall get any good by this, God only knows, but I think things cannot change for the worse in that department.

If the French land, I should not like to trust to the new Field Marshal for the defence of Culford.

My situation is not enviable, yet I trust you will make up your mind to take a share with me, and I do not see why you should not be Surveyor General. I know you do not want a place, but I must have a capable friend in one of the efficient offices.

The military arrangement for India is in a bad way, the Directors and the officers equally reprobate my plan, and the former scout the demands of the latter: Mr. Dundas says he will enter *seriously* into the business. During this flattering prospect of the business being satisfactorily settled, the Committee in Fort William are daily printing and circulating papers, which are little short of high treason.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

[Private.]

DEAR SIR, Grosvenor Street, Feb. 2, 1795.

I do not mean that anything I said last night should convey an idea that I have the smallest objection to Sir Charles Grey. From what I have heard of Abercromby, I should conceive he was the man of the soundest understanding, but Grey and myself have been acquainted near eight-and-thirty years, and although we have not lived much together, unless when we have met in our professional duties, we have always been good friends, and have, I believe, in a certain degree had a respect for each other.

I trust that Mr. Pitt will heartily enter into the measure of

finding some office for G. Berkeley,[1] whom on his wife's[2] account I should wish to treat with the greatest attention. You will easily conceive what an object it must be to me to get Ross into that station, and what benefit the country must derive from his abilities and experience in every species of business. Ross himself does not wish it, but if you are right in compelling me, I am very sure that it will be wise to extend the compulsion to him.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

DEAR SIR, Lower Grosvenor Street, Feb. 12, 1795.

I believe you will recollect that in several discussions at Wimbledon, I was of opinion that our passions should not operate in points of political expediency, and that after I had the strongest reasons to be dissatisfied with the Prussians, I always maintained that we should still endeavour to get them, if there was any prospect of deriving any essential support from them.

If a corps of Prussians under the Duke of Brunswick could be produced, with any hopes of their acting with energy, it would greatly tend to dispel the gloom which I confess at present depresses my mind to a degree that I can hardly describe, and with a reasonable security that we should not be egregiously duped, I think we can hardly pay too dear for them.

The station of a body of troops with transports, and every equipment for service on the East Coast, is certainly a most advisable measure, with a view either to offensive or defensive operations.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO COLONEL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, London, Feb. 18, 1795.

You will easily conceive that when discussions are held in the Cabinet, involving measures on which the existence of everything that is dear to us may depend, the only military member of that Cabinet would have great satisfaction, at this most critical and

[1] Hon. George Cranfield Berkeley, afterwards Admiral of the Red, G.C.B., son of Augustus, 4th Earl of Berkeley, b. Sept. 2, 1753, d. Feb. 25, 1818; m. Aug. 23, 1784, Emily Charlotte, dau. of Lord George Lenox. M.P. for Gloucester county from April, 1783, to April, 1810.

[2] Lady Emily Berkeley, b. 1762, d. Oct. 19, 1832.

dangerous period, in opening himself freely to a friend whose judgment he so highly values. At the same time I can hardly ask you to come up without passing by Castlemilk.[1] I write in the greatest haste.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

G. A. ROBINSON, ESQ., TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Received Feb. 1795.]

MY LORD, Calcutta, Aug. 20, 1794.

A memorial has been received from the officers of the army, which will be transmitted by the Nancy. There are some exceptional expressions in it, I think, and some promises which they assume without sufficient grounds. It proves, however, more moderate than, from report, I had expected. The ferment they are in will certainly not subside until they know what arrangements are finally to be made, but as I have no doubt something materially beneficial is intended with regard to quickening promotion, and opening a door both for temporary retreats to Europe, and for retirement from the service without loss of everything, I feel no apprehension but that they will soon be composed and quiet again.

I am, &c.,

G. A. ROBINSON.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO SIR JOHN SHORE.

DEAR SIR, London, March 13, 1795.

. . . The critical situation of this country, and indeed of all Europe, occupies the full attention of our Ministers, who have little time to think of India, which, thank God, presents no pressing dangers. The military discontents alone seem to require immediate notice, and some arrangement is now under the consideration of the Court of Directors.

The very illiberal treatment which I met with in some of the Bengal publications, and the want of confidence, and indeed the indisposition towards me, which appeared in the Committees of Officers in London, where persons were allowed to take the lead who had no claim whatever to be re-admitted into the Company's service, made me most eagerly embrace the opportunity of the rejection of my plan by the Court of Directors to withdraw myself

[1] An estate in Dumfriesshire, near Annan, which Colonel Ross had recently bought.

entirely from taking any further concern. Copies of my proposition will be sent out, and I feel pretty confident that the sensible and candid officers in the Company's service will not consider me as their enemy. . . .

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

DEAR SIR, Lower Grosvenor Street, May 14, 1795.

I inclose to you a copy of a letter which I have received from the Majors and Senior Captains of H. M. regiments serving on the coast of Coromandel, and as I understand that the measure of appointing second Lieut.-Colonels and second Majors is likely to be considerably extended at home, and that the young regiments which are going to India are all on that establishment, I think it absolutely necessary that some attention should be paid to the officers who have served long in India, and who have so strong a claim to favour from their meritorious conduct during the late war in Mysore.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Lower Grosvenor Street, May 23, 1795.

The same idea about the cavalry occurred to me, and I mentioned it yesterday at the meeting of the Cabinet. The subject is very delicate as well as important. If the Elector of Hanover adopts the neutrality under the wings of Prussian protection, he will set a bad example to the other Princes of Germany, offend Austria, and discourage the whole business, and he will necessarily be obliged to withdraw his contingent from the army of the Empire, as the Landgrave of Hesse has done. If he does not take shelter behind the line of demarcation, 3000 British cavalry, joined to his Hanoverian troops, will not protect the Electorate from falling under the yoke and requisitions of France. In such a case it may not be easy to make ——[1] hear cool and dispassionate reason, but still Ministers must do their duty. Singleton[2] is appointed, and as Lord Spencer told me that Mr. Pitt had undertaken to speak to Berkeley about the other change in the

[1] Sic in orig.—the King.

[2] Storekeeper of the Ordnance, which office he held (except from Feb. 1806 to March 1807), to June 1829.

Board, I wrote to Mr. Pitt to put him on his guard against giving any option to Berkeley, but to mention it as a matter decided at my request. I shall still endeavour to come to Warley for two days before the birthday, but Lord Lauderdale's[1] motion will keep me in town till Friday morning, and I am very desirous of passing two days at Culford.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

P.S. The King gave the 17th Dragoons to Delancey[2] spontaneously, to the great surprise of the said Delancey, and I believe of every other person.

RIGHT HON. WILLIAM PITT TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Private.]

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, Saturday, May 23, 1795.

I am happy to take the first opportunity of telling you that Lord Berkeley[3] has been with me for the purpose of requesting that his brother might be appointed Colonel of Marines on resigning the office of Surveyor-General. This business will therefore be settled in the most satisfactory manner.

I am, &c.,

W. PITT.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Monday Morning, May 25, 1795.

I write early this morning, as I am going to pass the day and dine with the mess at Woolwich. Macleod seemed to wish much that I should do so, and by his manner of speaking of it, I thought that he was of opinion that my neglect of Woolwich began rather to be seen in an unfavourable light.

Some fools by the bye, put it into his head that nothing would be so easy as my getting him the rank of Lieut.-Colonel; in short,

[1] Lord Lauderdale moved, on June 5, an address of great length, urging immediate peace in strong language—it was negatived by 53 to 8.

[2] Major-General, afterwards General Oliver De Lancy, was an American Loyalist, and had commanded a corps of Provincials at New York; Colonel 17th Dragoons, d. Sept. 1822. He was Barrack-Master-General for many years, but was removed from his office in consequence of defalcations in his accounts.

[3] Frederick Augustus, 5th Earl of Berkeley, b. May 24, 1745, d. Aug. 8, 1810; m. May 16, 1796, Mary Cole. After Lord Berkeley's death, his eldest son, afterwards created Lord Fitzhardinge, claimed the title, alleging that a previous marriage between the same parties had taken place March 30, 1785; but the House of Lords decided, July 2, 1811, that the first marriage had not been proved.

according to the old idea, that I had nothing to do but to intimate my wishes, that King, Ministers, &c., &c., might eagerly run before them. I satisfied him, however, very easily that all this was nonsense, and that if I could bring myself, in contradiction to my own sentiments and professions, to ask for it, I had not the smallest chance of obtaining it.

Berkeley called on me yesterday, and by his conversation any person would have concluded that he had no idea of quitting the Ordnance these twenty years; but I suspect that this was to try me. I did not, however, let him see that I had the smallest knowledge of his brother's request to Mr. Pitt. It would not have been fair to the latter not to give him the full advantage of granting a favour.

Windham told me that the Corsicans were so jealous of the French, and hated them so much, that it was determined to send no corps of Emigrants thither; I therefore returned the papers with Windham's answer to Sir Robert Gunning.[1] I cannot leave town till after Lord Lauderdale's motion on Thursday, and then, if business and Cabinets do not interfere, I propose to go to Culford on Friday, stay Saturday and Sunday, come to Warley[2] on Monday, and return to town for the birthday on Thursday morning, but all this is hitherto uncertain. I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

Thank God there is a fine wind for the outward-bound fleet. My brother is going out with a cruising squadron. They say Lord Titchfield[3] is to marry Miss Scott.[4]

[1] Sir Robert Gunning, Bart. K.B., so created Oct. 17, 1778; b. June 8, 1731, d. Sept. 22, 1816; m. 1st, April, 1752, Elizabeth, dau. of John Harrison, Esq., of Grantham (she died April 14, 1752); 2nd, Feb. 14, 1757, Anne, dau. of Robert Sutton, Esq. of Scofton. Minister in Denmark from Nov. 1765 to Feb. 1771; in Prussia to Dec. 1772; and then in Russia to 1776.

[2] Lord Cornwallis had been appointed, April 23, to command in Essex and Hertfordshire, with two Lieut.-Generals and five Major-Generals (among whom was Major-General Ross) under him. His headquarters were at Warley Camp.

[3] William Henry, Marquis of Titchfield, afterwards, Oct. 30, 1809, 4th Duke of Portland, b. June 24, 1768, d. March 27, 1854; m. Aug. 4, 1795, Henrietta, dau. of General John Scott of Balcomie. M.P. for Buckinghamshire from April, 1791, till he became a Peer. Lord of the Treasury from March to Sept. 1807; Privy Seal, April to August, 1827; President of the Council to Jan. 1828.

[4] Born April, 1775, d. April 28, 1844. Under General Scott's will her large fortune was to be divided between her sisters, afterwards Countess of Moray and Viscountess Canning, if she married a Peer, a Peer's eldest son, or if her husband did not take the name of Scott. Lord Titchfield always prefixed the name of Scott to his signature, and the sisters waived enforcing the penalty, upon receiving 100,000*l.* each.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Grosvenor Street, June 4, 1795.

The promotion has at length taken place, but there were great difficulties about Berkeley on account of Sir A. Douglas[1] and several men of strong pretensions. The King told me yesterday that now Berkeley had vacated his place in the Ordnance, he should appoint a successor without waiting for my recommendation, and very graciously named you.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. WILLIAM WINDHAM.

DEAR SIR, Warley Camp, June 28, 1795.

I have assembled the Militia Colonels and stated to them the mischief which the service must sustain, unless they will consent to supply an efficient force to recruit the corps of Artillery, and throwing myself afterwards entirely on their liberality and public spirit, I trust I have softened them, and hope to get the proportion of serviceable men from them immediately.

I wish you would recommend it to the Generals commanding in the different districts, to take the most conciliatory means of prevailing upon the Colonels of Militia to act with liberality on this occasion, and to forward the object which the Legislature undoubtedly had in view, of rendering the corps of Artillery equal to the services which may be required from it. An erroneous notion prevails amongst the Colonels (which I assured them was perfectly groundless), that after they had replaced the one man in fifty that was now required from them, the Artillery would, under the present Act, have a right to call upon them for another supply. No time should be lost in contradicting any such intention or power in the Act, as I remember Lord Grenville did in the House of Lords when called upon by Lord Radnor,[2] for under the idea of its existing, the Militia Colonels actually consider themselves merely as recruiting officers for the Artillery.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

[1] Captain Sir Andrew Snape Douglas, R.N., b. 1762, d. June 4, 1797; m. Anne, dau. of — Burgess, Esq., of New York.

[2] Jacob, 2nd Earl of Radnor, b. March 15, 1750, d. Jan. 27, 1828; m. Jan. 24, 1777, Anne, dau. and coheir of Antony, last Lord Feversham of that creation.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Warley Camp, June 28, 1795.

I have received your letters dated the 26th and 27th, and am glad to find that people see the Admiral's conduct in the light it deserves.[1] To make a handsome retreat before a very superior force must ever, either by sea or land, be a most difficult operation, and put the firmness and capacity of the Admiral or General to the severest trial.

We are to have a *feu de joie* this evening, and as I am in great haste I shall inclose a copy of what I have said to Windham on the subject of the Militia drafts for the Artillery.

Windham is a very good fellow with all his eccentricity, and it would be convenient that you should be in the habit of seeing him often. . . . Yours ever most sincerely,

CORNWALLIS.

SIR ROBERT ABERCROMBY TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Received Aug. 21, 1795.]

MY LORD, Camp near Rampore, in Rohilcund, Dec. 18, 1794.

I was in hopes that your Lordship's plan for new-modelling the Indian army would have been brought forward in the last Session of Parliament, as I should have been happy to have seen it carried into effect before my departure from this country. Your Lordship is well aware of the violence of many of the officers on this establishment, and how difficult it will be to satisfy them. But a State is not to give way to the unreasonable demands of its servants. And I have no doubt that the arrangement to be formed at your Lordship's recommendation will give satisfaction to all moderate men.

Some time after my departure from Calcutta, the death of Fyzullah Khan,[2] Jaghindar of Rampore, gave rise to a most daring

[1] The celebrated retreat of Admiral Cornwallis. He was overtaken on June 16 by a fleet consisting of 12 sail of the line, 12 frigates, and 7 smaller vessels. His force consisted of 5 sail of the line and 1 frigate. After two days' distant fighting, as the French never ventured to close, he reached Plymouth without losing a single ship, and only 12 men killed and wounded. Few victories ever deserved more approbation.

[2] Fyzulla Khan was chosen to be chief of the Rohillas after the death of Hafiz Rehmut, killed April 23, 1774, in action against Suja ul Dowla, whom Mr. Hastings had reinforced with 7000 Company's troops. Fyzulla, unable to retain the possessions of his predecessors, settled at Rampore, and died July 18, 1794. His eldest son, Mahommed Ullee Khan, succeeded him, but was deposed by his younger brother, Gholam Mahommed, Aug. 18, 1794, and died a few days after of the wounds received in the struggle. In the battle near Bareilly, two battalions of Sepoys and the whole of the Native Cavalry (then for the first time brought into action) were cut to pieces, owing to some injudicious move-

usurpation and rebellion against the Vizier's government and authority by Golam Mahomed Khan; when a younger son of Fyzullah Khan, who, after having murdered his elder brother, Mahomed Ally Khan, usurped the Jaghire, and assembled a very considerable army of Affgans. The Governor-General resolved to support the Nabob, and to punish Golam Mahomed. As I happened to be near the scene of action, Sir John Shore expressed a wish that I would take upon myself the immediate command of the two brigades stationed at Cawnpore and Futtyghur, in order to bring the matter to a speedy conclusion, and, if possible, without the effusion of blood.

I accordingly lost no time in assembling the troops, and crossing the Ganges near Futtyghur, proceeded towards Barilly, which town and country were threatened by the army of Golam Mahomed.

Early in the morning of the 22nd Oct. I reached Barilly, and on the 23rd I took a position seven miles in front in order to cover it.

I was extremely anxious to bring the Rohillas to a sense of their duty; but after every endeavour to avoid hostilities, I was forced to engage the army of Golam Mahomed (consisting of about 25,000 men), who advanced to attack me on the morning of the 26th. The result was as honourable to the British name as I could have wished, though not without a very considerable loss on our side, as your Lordship will perceive from the public accounts transmitted by Government, to which I beg leave to refer for particulars. The slaughter made by the enemy on our right was principally owing to a most disgraceful retrograde movement of the Company's two regiments of cavalry led by Captain Ramsay, who was posted on that flank. Captain Ramsay has since resigned the command of the 2nd regiment, and has solicited the permission of Government to resign the service rather than stand a court martial.

After the action Golam Mahomed Khan and his adherents fled with the greatest precipitation to Rampore, and from thence, with their families, treasure, and effects, to the fort of the Tangly Mountains, ten miles beyond Rhaer. We pursued, and on the 5th ult. took a position near the Jangh. On the 6th Golam Mahomed came into my camp upon no other condition than that of personal safety. I was in great hopes that the Rohillas would have sub-

ments of Sir R. Abercromby, who, however, ultimately was completely victorious. He then made terms with Gholam Khan, very contrary to the wishes of Sir J. Shore, whose orders arrived too late. Captain Ramsay fled to America.

mitted on their chiefs leaving them. I was, however, disappointed; they did not choose to lay down their arms unconditionally.

I knew too most certainly that the result of attack on them must have been the massacre of an indiscriminate multitude of men, women, and children, pent up within a small space, perfectly accessible to us, but from whence there was no retreat for them, and where no bounds could have been prescribed to the licentiousness of the undisciplined rabble of the Nabob (who joined us three days after the action of the 26th Oct.), whetted as it must have been by the temptation of the treasure, jewels, &c., of all the Rohilla families.

I was convinced at the same time that the Rohillas would have submitted to their fate rather than have lost all hold of Rampore, the only place of refuge left to them in Hindostan.

I therefore, from motives of humanity, proposed that the Nabob should grant a jaghire to the son of the late Mahomed Ally Khan as a provision for him and the family, old servants and adherents of Fynallet Khan, excluding Golam Mahomed Khan from all concern with or residence in the country. The Nabob consented, and a jaghire, limited to ten lacs, has been gratefully accepted by the Rohillas, under the guarantee of the Company. I am of opinion that their power has been so far reduced that it is not likely that they will ever again aim at independence.

Fyzullah Khan, by prudent management and economy, had accumulated a large sum of money, which has been dissipated on this occasion. The Nabob has received between forty and fifty lacs of it.

Knowing your Lordship's anxiety to be informed of every circumstance that materially concerns our affairs in India, I have troubled you with this long letter, and I trust that the very unpleasant service in which I have been engaged will not be classed with former Rohilla wars, nor the conductor of it be charged with mean, selfish, or interested motives.

Most earnestly wishing your Lordship success in the arduous war in which you are now engaged,

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ROBT. ABERCROMBY.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Warley Camp, Aug. 22, 1795.

I received yesterday letters from Sir R. Abercromby, Scott,[1] and Barlow. Scott justifies the whole of Sir R.'s conduct, both in the field and the negotiation; but he says more in support of the necessity of attacking the enemy than in defence of the manner of doing it.

Barlow, to my great concern, appears out of spirits, thinks that the present Government in Bengal have no energy, and that Shore is not hearty in supporting the system. I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Culford, Sept. 20, 1795.

The same dry and hot weather still persecutes us, and is equally hostile to shooting and to the turnips, and there never was a year so universally bad for partridges. I cannot help being uneasy about the fleet, as the scurvy, when it gets any head, makes rapid progress. D'Yvernois's[2] pamphlet affords some consolation in these dangerous times, but I cannot quite agree with him about the difference of the situation and resources of France and America, nor have I any hope that he will persuade the Empire to continue the war, and if the Emperor himself should be prevailed upon to do so, it will be more owing to the rhetoric of our guineas than of his writings. If you should hear anything of the D. of York, I should be obliged to you if you would communicate it to me, as I rather feel disposed to stay here till the end of the week.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO SIR JOHN SHORE.

DEAR SIR, London, Oct. 12, 1795.

. . . The events in Europe have been so interesting, and the situation of this country so critical, that Government have had no time to turn their thoughts to the East, at least not further than

[1] Colonel William Scott, afterwards Resident at Oude, d. Sept. 27, 1804, at Agra.

[2] Sir Francis D'Yvernois, knighted May 11, 1796, b. 1757; d. March 16, 1842. He took an active part in the affairs of his native country, Geneva, and was driven out by the Republican party, and condemned to death *par contumace* in 1791. He was employed diplomatically at the Congress of Vienna. He had a pension of 300*l.* on the Irish Establishment.

it is connected with the operations of the war; all attention to internal matters is out of the question, and if ever I open on the subject, I find a disposition to get clear of it as soon as possible. An arrangement for the military is, I understand, going out, but I have not seen it, and from what I hear, it is in a very imperfect and undigested state. The most essential points are however founded upon my proposition, but I hope my friends in India will feel that it is not fair to judge of any plan from a partial adoption.

It gave me great satisfaction to learn that everything was arranged respecting Benares, and that the removal of Duncan to Bombay (where I am sure he must be much wanted) will not affect the welfare and prosperity of that favourite province, which was always the object of my most anxious care.

That we must soon get out of this war is certain, but how it is to be done I have at present no conception. My thoughts on the state of public affairs, ever since my return, have been most gloomy, and nothing has yet occurred to brighten the prospect.

Believe me, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Warley Camp, Oct. 18, 1795.

It is now time that I should wish you and Mrs. Ross joy,[1] and I do most truly assure you that no person can more sincerely wish you both a long enjoyment of health and happiness than myself. I desire that you will tell Mrs. Ross, that although I have had the pleasure of seeing her but once, I trust that we shall henceforward be considered as intimate friends.

I received a volume of queries on the military arrangement yesterday from David Scott, requesting immediate answers. I wrote my hasty opinions after the review, but I wish you could see him for half an hour before the meeting of the Court of Directors on Thursday next. He is at present out of town.

What a sad disaster this blow of the Mediterranean convoy![2] and how it will vex our friends the Spencers!

Believe me, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

[1] General Ross had married on Oct. 15 Barbara Evelyn Isabella, dau. of Sir Robert Gunning, Bart., K.B.

[2] Sixty-three transports and merchantmen had sailed from Gibraltar Sept. 25, under convoy of three sail of the line and three frigates. They separated, and 32 with the Argo reached England in safety. The others fell in with Admiral Richery, who had sailed from Brest, Sept. 14, with six sail of the line and three frigates, and the Censeur and 30 merchantmen were captured, Oct. 7.

G. A. ROBINSON, ESQ., TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Received Dec., 1795.]

MY LORD, Calcutta, May 14, 1795.

The prevailing opinion now is that the Swallow is kept to bring out the new military arrangements, and in this I hope we shall not be disappointed, for until they arrive the leaven of discontent that exists in this army will be constantly fermenting. A late cause of great jealousy and discontent has arisen in the intelligence received of the late large promotion of King's Major-Generals, which is industriously represented, and in the present temper of men's minds easily credited, as a manœuvre calculated to bring in Harris in Bengal, Floyd at Madras, and Balfour at Bombay, over the heads of all the Company's Colonels; nor can it be denied I think, that the number of King's officers serving in India who obtain at the same time brevets in the ranks of Field Officers, produces as injurious a preference to the Company's officers as the grievance formerly complained of, arising from their local rank; but I have still that confidence in the united operation of your Lordship's influence and just sense of the fair pretensions of the Company's armies, that enables me to look forward to the expected arrangements for a complete refutation of those impressions which the late promotion has given birth to.

I am, &c.,

G. A. ROBINSON.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Culford, Dec. 30, 1795.

By a letter which I have just received from Nightingall,[1] dated Falmouth the 26th, I apprehend the total dispersion and return of the West India fleet.[2]

He says that his transport was separated from the fleet in the night of the 21st, that the gale had lasted, with very little intermission, for twelve days, and that the troops were getting very sickly. He saw only sixty sail on the evening of the 21st, and they were much scattered.

[1] Lieut.-Colonel, afterwards Lieut.-General Sir Miles Nightingall, K.C.B., Colonel 49th regiment, b. Dec. 25, 1768, d. Sept. 17, 1829; m. Aug. 13, 1800, Flora, dau. of Sir Lionel Darrell, Bart. Served in India 1790; in the West Indies, Holland, and India again from 1796 to 1801, when he went with Lord Cornwallis to Amiens. Served a third time in India to 1807; commanded a brigade at Vimiera, and a division in 1811; was on the staff in the expedition against Java, and was Commander-in-Chief at Bombay 1816. M.P. for Eye from 1820 to his death.

[2] Admiral Christian sailed with a large squadron, Dec. 8, having to convoy upwards of 200 sail. He encountered a succession of violent gales, and was obliged to return to Portsmouth, Jan. 20, 1796, with only six sail-of-the-line and 45 transports. Most of the remainder, however, escaped into different ports, but the object of the expedition of course failed.

I shall at all events come up for two or three days next week, as it will probably be to be considered what can now be done.

I write in the greatest haste. Yours, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Whitehall, Jan. 28, 1796.

Having been detained at Lord Spencer's till near twelve last night, I had no opportunity of making inquiries about you, but I hear this morning that you are arrived. As I wish to talk over several things with you, I will call on you about half an hour past eleven, and we can walk down hither by one, when I appointed Macleod to meet me here.

The melancholy accounts of the West Indian armament, and the certainty that Admiral Christian,[1] with the shattered remains of his fleet, is now on his return, have deranged all our plans. I am myself inclined to think that it will be better to give up all further attempts of offensive operations for this year, to send troops enough to secure what we have, with active naval assistance, and endeavour to put the remainder of the unfortunate troops into a serviceable state against next autumn, which I am sure was not the case when they were embarked.

My best compliments to Mrs. Ross. Yours, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Culford, March 18, 1796.

Your letter, as well as one which I have just received from the Admiral, has given me the greatest concern.[2] I have just written to him, but despair, even if my letter should be in time, to alter his resolution. I need not explain to you what little weight I

[1] Vice-Admiral Sir Hugh Cloberry Christian, K.B., d. Nov. 1798. Commander-in-Chief at the Cape of Good Hope.

[2] Admiral Cornwallis had sailed for the West Indies with a considerable fleet. On his voyage, his own ship, the Royal Sovereign, was disabled in a gale of wind; and, instead of shifting his flag, he returned to England, leaving the command to the next senior officer. When he arrived in port he was ordered to hoist his flag aboard a frigate, and proceed to his original destination, but he refused on the plea of bad health. The real fact was, he would not sail except with his old flag-captain, Captain Whitby, to whom he ultimately left his fortune. He was tried, April 7, by a Court Martial on three charges: 1st. That he returned, contrary to orders, having sailed some way from England for the West Indies; 2nd. That the Royal Sovereign being disabled, he did not shift his flag to some other vessel, but gave up the charge of the convoy to another officer. On these charges the sentence was, that blame was imputable to him for not shifting his flag to the Mars or Minotaur. The 3rd charge, That he had disobeyed the orders of the Admiralty by not hoisting his flag aboard the Astrea frigate. On this charge he was acquitted.

have with him. He says, talking of the order to go out in a frigate, "Indeed I think they could not have been in earnest, but I fear it has been intended to affront me, and put me on shore." After all that has passed, can such suspicions be combated by any rational argument? I have said all that I thought could work upon him, and I shall most truly lament the issue which I too clearly foresee, on his account and on the account of my country.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MAJOR-GENERAL HARRIS[1] TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Received March, 1796.]

MY DEAR LORD, Fort William, Aug. 17, 1795.

. . . I do not like to take up your Lordship's time with more than an acknowledgement of yours, but I cannot bring myself to conclude without begging you will accept my warm thanks for your Lordship's kind attention to the interest of His Majesty's Colonels, who had the honour of serving under you in the Mysore war. Although the Directors have unwisely rejected your liberal and excellent plans for new-modelling what is not now an army, we are surely equally bound by gratitude to your Lordship.

It is no doubt difficult for one evidently interested in the subject to speak on it without suspicion that he will lean to his own side in giving his opinion, but I trust to your Lordship's knowledge of me that self-interest could not influence me to advance anything I conceived could make against my country; and I therefore affirm without hesitation, that His Majesty's officers should be as much as possible mingled in the European corps with the Company's, and that the proposed relief from England should never be given up.

Climate and distance from home appear to have erased all memory of their native land from most of these violent—*Petitioners*, I can scarcely call them,—and in my opinion the listening to and being led by a set of hot-headed young men to sign such memorials as the seniors have joined in, sufficiently authorises their being put aside as unequal to command, or at best their being pensioned as worn out.

I did not conceive from the armies of the other two Presidencies, or indeed from Colonel Cockerel's detachment, that they could be, to use a French term, so totally disorganised here, but the Subalterns are all become Generals since meetings and con-

[1] Lieut.-General, afterwards General, George Harris, G.C.B., Colonel 73rd regiment; created Lord Harris Aug. 11, 1815; b. March 18, 1746, d. May 19, 1829: m. Dec. 9, 1779, Anne Carteret, dau. and coheir of Charles Dixon, Esq., of Bath.

ventions have taken place, and never think of attending a parade; and in this garrison, until the other day that a Captain Grant wanted to relieve himself on the main guard, and exchanges of duty stopped in consequence, there was scarcely any one put in orders in his own turn. In short, every circumstance I am witness to so strongly points out the necessity of taking the army from hands which can no longer manage it, that, instead of apologising for thus detaining your Lordship, I think I should be culpable to my country in not mentioning to you that I see no other chance of its being made serviceable to Old England. The whole must be King's, or India and it, will not long be our country's.

Allow me to beg your Lordship to make my kindest remembrance to my brother General, Ross, and that you will believe me ever most sincerely, &c.,

GEO. HARRIS.

SIR ROBERT ABERCROMBY TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Received March, 1796.]

MY LORD, Calcutta, Aug. 25, 1795.

Your Lordship's letter of the 9th September has afforded me great satisfaction, and I would fain hope that your repeated representations, with regard to recruiting our European army, will speedily have the desired effect; the most fatal consequences may otherwise ensue: we now want 7000 men to complete.

I am greatly mortified and disappointed at not receiving the much wanted arrangement for the Indian army.

Mr. Dundas has favoured me with a copy of your Lordship's letter to him, conveying your sentiments on that subject; and he informs me that the Court of Directors have given a decided opinion against the transfer of the army from the Company to the King, the basis of your Lordship's plan, which is liberal, removes more difficulties and affords greater security to the British interests in this country, than any other that has yet been suggested.

It is full time that the army should be taken out of the hands of a set of men in no way qualified for the management of such a machine.

I am so thoroughly convinced that your Lordship's plan ought to give satisfaction to every reasonable man, that I immediately directed it to be printed here, in order that the whole army might know your real sentiments, which have been grossly and wickedly misrepresented.

In my letter of the 18th March, I mentioned to your Lordship that the native battalions on this establishment were dispersed all

over the country, to the utter ruin of their discipline; and that I was going to consult with Sir John Shore about a Residency. It has since been resolved that the establishment of peons, pikes, burkindosses, &c., now under the magistrates, collectors, residents, &c., should be converted into a better-armed militia, equal to all the internal duties, and thereby relieve the regular Sepoys from that destructive service. There is also to be a militia corps for the duties of the town of Calcutta, which are extremely harassing. The men being on guard for a month at a time, without being relieved, get, consequently, a habit of slovenness and carelessness on duty, which they do not easily get rid of.

It has been found that the native troops stationed at Fort Malbro', Prince of Wales's Island, and the Andamans, particularly at the two former places, from not being relieved, become planters, and have little of the soldier left in them. Your Lordship knows that there would be considerable difficulty in procuring regular reliefs from the battalions, which are chiefly composed of high-cast Hindoos. It therefore struck me that a marine corps of Mussulmans from Chittagong and the adjacent districts would answer the purposes above mentioned. The corps to consist of twelve companies of 100 men each. Its head-quarters to be at Fort William, and the companies not on duty in the Islands will make part of the garrison, and will take many duties on the river, for which the Sepoys of the line are but ill calculated.

These arrangements will, undoubtedly, be attended with some extra expense, but as the object is of great importance, I would fain hope that your Lordship will approve of them. . . . .

Lord Hobart and the Commodore fitted out an expedition against Malacca: the force consisted of four European flank companies and a battalion of Sepoys, under Major Brown, but the Nizam having, on account of the revolt of his son Ali Jah, redemanded the two battalions, lately dismissed from Hydrabad, Lord Hobart withdrew the battalion from the Malacca expedition, and applied to us for one from here.

I had little hope of getting a whole battalion to embark cheerfully, particularly at this boisterous season of the year; but the zeal and popularity of Captain Ludowick Grant[1] of the 15th battalion overcame prejudices and difficulties which have never before been surmounted in the same handsome manner. The whole corps, to a man, have expressed their readiness to proceed by sea to any part of India where their services may be required, and they will embark in a few days. The transports are to rendezvous at Prince of Wales's Island.

[1] Captain, afterwards Lieut.-Colonel, Ludowick Grant, b. 1749, d. June 23, 1830.

I have mentioned the circumstance of the 15th battalion, as I thought it would not be unpleasing to your Lordship to hear this of Captain Grant, who, though a junior Captain, had been selected by you for the command of a battalion.

His highly meritorious conduct proves him worthy of the confidence your Lordship placed in him.

I am ever, with the warmest attachment, &c.,

ROBT. ABERCROMBY.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO EARL SPENCER.

MY DEAR LORD, Culford, March 22, 1796.

I am convinced that you will make allowance for my feelings on the present distressing occasion, and forgive my endeavouring, if the thing should be possible, to avert the evils of a Court Martial. If any concession on my brother's part could produce that desirable object, I would go down to him, and, from a communication which I have received, I should not despair of obtaining it.

I propose being in town to-morrow about four o'clock, and if there is no Cabinet dinner, I would wait on you for five minutes between four and six o'clock.

If you should think that there are any hopes that this affair can be terminated without a Court Martial, by such means as I may devise and have influence to effect, I flatter myself, if the order is not already issued, that you might contrive a delay of a day or two in that business, without appearing to depart from your purpose.

Believe me, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Culford, March 22, 1796.

A person has just been with me from the Admiral, and although I must confess that my hopes of any adequate concessions are not great, yet the object of avoiding a Court Martial is so great, that everything is to be attempted.

I inclose a copy of my letter to Lord Spencer, and if you could contrive to see him to-morrow morning pretty early, you may perhaps afford some assistance, especially in regard to the delay.

Yours ever,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Whitehall, April 15, 1796.

I have nothing material to communicate by way of European news; Mr. Pitt thinks that he shall soon get over the distress occasioned by the scarcity of money, which is at present so great that the subsistence of the army is in part issued in Exchequer Bills.

I cannot however help entertaining the most gloomy thoughts on the prospect of our campaign. How are we to enable the Austrians to act? and what figure shall we make if they do not act?[1] You will see by the papers that the Nonsuch is arrived with rice from Bengal. Robinson who was employed to purchase the rice informs me that 8 or 10 more ships will follow immediately, and that they shall send in all from 14,000 to 15,000[2] tons.

R. says that Mr. Dundas's speech[3] has had no effect on the Bengal officers, who are growing every day more intemperate. He suspects that the Bengal Government think Lord Hobart's proceedings with the Nabob strong,[4] and not altogether directed by justice, or consonant to former treaties.

Mrs. Ross dined with us yesterday, and appeared very well.

Yours, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE NABOB OF ARCOT.

Whitehall, April 27, 1796.

I received a short time ago your Highness's letter dated on the [5] conveying information of the melancholy event of the

[1] The respective armies had not yet commenced operations, but Bonaparte was on the eve of entering upon his Italian campaign. To enable the Emperor of Austria to meet his expenses, England guaranteed a loan to him of 4,600,000*l.* The resolution on which the bill for this object was founded was carried, May 28, by 77 to 45, and the bill passed through the other stages with similar majorities.

[2] The price of corn was at this time extremely high, 5*l.* 0*s.* 2*d.* a quarter, and fears of famine were entertained.

[3] In a debate, June 16, 1795, Mr. Dundas admitted that the officers of the Indian armies had some grievances to complain of. He said he should therefore propose, 1st, to give the rank of General, and increase the number of Field Officers; 2nd, augment the retiring allowances; 3rd, give leave of absence on medical grounds; and 4th, allow furloughs to Europe in rotation.

[4] On the death of Mahomet Ali, Oct. 13, 1795, Sir John Shore was desirous of reviving a proposition made by Lord Cornwallis in 1792, by which the entire revenue of the State should be ceded to the Company, who should defray all the expenses, civil as well as military. Lord Hobart adopted a different line. He demanded the cession of a considerable district, the revenues of which were mortgaged to the British Government, and threatened hostilities if compliance were declined. The new Nabob without hesitation refused, grounding his decision upon previous treaties, and Lord Hobart was obliged to submit.

[5] Sic in orig.

death of His Highness, your father; and I participate as a friend ought to do of the feelings of sorrow which your Highness must experience on the loss of a beloved parent.

During my stay in India it was my constant study and endeavour to promote that harmony and good understanding between your Highness's family and the Government of the Company, which alone can secure their mutual prosperity; and in proportion to my anxiety for that desirable object, do I experience disappointment and regret that any cause of misunderstanding should have arisen between your Highness and Lord Hobart.

From his Lordship's character in this country, I can but be persuaded of his good intentions, and assured as I am of the favourable disposition towards you, both of the King of England and His Majesty's Ministers, I trust that by friendly explanations all cause of dissatisfaction may be removed.

I have received the rice and coffee which your Highness's late father had the kindness to send to me by the ship General Goddard, and I have also been favoured with a further quantity, which as a token of remembrance and friendship you were pleased to dispatch for me in the ships named the Queen and the Mary. The young elephant, notwithstanding that I believe every care and attention was given to it by Captain Craig, died on the voyage to England; but I must be equally sensible of your Highness's friendly intention as if it had arrived in safety.

With every wish for the prosperity of your country, and your Highness's health and happiness, I remain,

Your sincere friend,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO GEORGE GOLDING,[1] ESQ.

SIR, Whitehall, May 12, 1796.

The very friendly and open manner in which you have behaved towards myself and my son on the subject of the ensuing election, induces me to trouble you with a few lines to explain to you and the gentlemen connected with you in the county, the circumstances in which I at present stand respecting that business, and my feelings on the occasion.

When upon Mr. Broke's[2] refusing to stand I acquiesced in my

[1] George Golding of Poslingford, b. 1723, d. Dec. 21, 1803; m. Jan. 17, 1762, Anne, dau. of Alexander Bence, Esq.

[2] Philip Broke of Nacton, b. May 18, 1749, d. Aug. 22, 1801; m. Nov. 18, 1771, Elizabeth, dau. and sole heir of the Rev. Charles Beaumont of Witnesham. Sir Philip Broke, the captor of the Chesapeake, was his eldest son.

son's becoming a candidate, I thought that I was doing what would be agreeable to that particular description of gentlemen, who, by acting together, have maintained the great country interest against any attempt which money or influence could make to subvert it.

I have however since found that, although some very respectable gentlemen of the old country interest warmly encourage Lord Brome to stand, others, from the opinion that a Peer's son should not represent the county, have started serious objections.

I therefore, as a sincere friend to the independence of the county, most earnestly recommend to the gentlemen of the old country interest, not to hazard the loss of their weight and consequence by manifesting a difference of opinion on a point of so much importance, but to use every argument in their power to prevail on Mr. Broke, or some other respectable gentleman of that description, to come forward, and prevent the county from falling into the hands of persons of whose political principles they do not approve; and wherever their nomination falls, they may be assured of my most active and zealous support.

As the contents of this letter will be communicated only to your friends, I think it necessary to state, that Lord Brome will find himself under the necessity of *declining* before the day of the nomination, unless (after your attempt to procure another candidate shall have failed) he is assured that he shall be proposed at the county meeting by Mr. Broke, and some other respectable gentleman of the country interest, and that the general voice of the gentlemen of that interest will be decidedly in his favour.

I have, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Whitehall, June 4, 8 A.M., 1796.

Brome was chosen yesterday most triumphantly, never was there a greater or more respectable show of freeholders than appeared in his favour.

I received a letter from George Robinson [1] this day, dated the 25th of January, containing the most alarming accounts respecting the state of the Bengal army, and saying that Government, having come to the knowledge of a regular plan for superseding their powers, had determined at last to resist it, and that he feels no apprehension that they would not do it effectually, provided their

[1] This letter does not exist among Lord Cornwallis's papers, nor has the draft been found among Sir George Robinson's.

measures are vigorous, strong, and decisive; but if they discover any symptom of concession, of wavering, or of weakness, the stake, in his opinion, will be lost for ever. He speaks of Popham[1] and Forbes[2] as deeply implicated, and thinks there are very few who have not at some time or in some degree given into it, although some now see the folly of it and would be glad to withdraw. And he thinks if a junction of these latter with the few who always opposed these measures, would rally round the Commander-in-Chief (Abercromby), who is gone to the upper stations, all may be settled without any bad consequence. . . .

God send that the additional calamity of losing Bengal may not fall upon us.

Yours ever, most sincerely,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Whitehall, June 4, 1796.

I have just received another letter from Robinson dated four days later, giving an account of a complete triumph of the moderate party at a meeting at Cawnpore, by which all further meetings and appointments of delegates are put an end to. This second letter is written in much better spirits.

Yours sincerely,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO SIR J. SHORE.

DEAR SIR, Whitehall, June 10, 1796.

I beg leave to introduce to you Colonel Wesley,[3] who is Lieutenant-Colonel of my regiment. He is a sensible man and a good officer, and will, I have no doubt, conduct himself in a manner to merit your approbation.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO LORD HOBART.

MY DEAR LORD, Warley Camp, June 26, 1796.

I have so long deferred answering the letters which I have received from you on the subject of the measures which have been adopted since the death of the Nabob Walaw Jah, in the hopes of having an opportunity of talking the matter fully over with Mr.

[1] Major William Popham, afterwards a Lieut.-General, d. Feb. 20, 1821.

[2] Lieut.-Colonel, afterwards Major-General, John Forbes, d. Oct. 3, 1808.

[3] The Duke of Wellington.

Dundas, which would have rendered what I could say more satisfactory to you.

But the business of Parliament, the conduct of this difficult and disastrous war, and lastly the dissolution of Parliament, have so totally engrossed his time, that I have never had more than two or three minutes' conversation with him on Indian affairs, which was always suddenly broken up by some unexpected interruption, and the further explanation adjourned to some future period, which has not yet occurred; I can now therefore only speak for myself, and to past transactions which cannot be of much avail, and which I had rather let alone, if I was not apprehensive that my silence might offend you more than anything which my great esteem for your character, and my approbation of your general conduct in India, could possibly permit me to say.

The folly and weakness (to say no more) of Omdat, the villany of his counsellors, the ruinous and most inhuman management of the Carnatic and Tanjore country, are evils which have been long since known to me, even to the most minute detail of them, and to which it was the most earnest wish of my heart to apply an efficient remedy. It may at first sight appear to betray a want of feeling to talk coolly of a distant remedy, whilst the wretched inhabitants are actually suffering; but if the voice of humanity alone is to be heard, and the policy of the measure, and the effect of it on the other Princes and Powers of the East is to be entirely put out of the question, why not take the Province of Oude? The Nabob's Government of the Carnatic, with all its vices and horrors, is at least as good as that of the Vizier. When the Nizam deputed Meer Allum to Calcutta, he mentioned in his letter that he had never before sent a Vakeel to Bengal, but that he was now induced to do it by our honourable treatment of the Nabob Vizier.

To have waited patiently till the Nabob of Arcot forfeited the management of his country by the failure of his payments, which would not have happened until the country was utterly exhausted and ruined, would have been a most melancholy and shocking consideration, but perhaps if the first strong line to be taken on his accession, had been to press him to keep his promise of going to live at Arcot, other points might at that distance from the seat of corruption have been more easily carried, and I am sure you will forgive me for saying that I think it would have been more prudent not to have attempted anything further, unless you had first secured the support of the Bengal Government.

I now, my dear Lord, as you in some measure called upon me to do, have laid my sentiments fairly and honestly before you, but

I have given them nowhere else either as a public man, or in private conversation, and I am by no means sure, if I had been on the spot at the time that I might not have seen cause to alter them.

The coolness which has unfortunately taken place between Sir John Shore and yourself gives me the greatest concern; as I cannot accommodate matters, and am not officially called upon to interfere, I wish to decline entering on the subject. I know not whether Mr. Dundas has taken any, or what steps he may mean to take, but I think I may safely affirm that you may rely upon his friendship and justice.

Nothing can in my opinion be more gloomy than the prospect of things here, we have neither army, nor specie, and can barely say that we have an Ally; whilst the plunder of Italy will furnish the enemy with the means of carrying on the war.

I am with the most sincere good wishes for your health and prosperity, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO LORD HOBART.

[Private.]

MY DEAR LORD, Warley Camp, Aug. 1, 1796.

Since I had last the honour of writing to your Lordship, I received your letter, in which you declare your intention of returning to England in January next, if you find that Sir John is to continue for another year Governor-General, and you intimate that you shall not think yourself well treated by Mr. Dundas.

It is a delicate point for me to give an opinion where your personal feelings are concerned, but as you have put it a little strongly to me and seem to expect my concurrence, I think it my duty, from my personal esteem for your Lordship and my earnest concern for the public welfare, not to be perfectly silent.

It really then appears to me that in forming your resolution you have fully considered all the disagreeable circumstances of your own situation, without paying the smallest attention to the difficulties under which you wished to place Mr. Dundas.

I know not what answer he means to make to you, or what step he intends to take, but I am very certain that in his place I should feel exceedingly embarrassed. He must either abruptly and, consequently disgracefully, recal a man from a station which he has himself forced upon him, and whose conduct in his Government has undoubtedly, on this side of the globe at least, appeared more

deserving of praise than of censure, only because he wishes to put another, and in his opinion, a better man in his room, and to justify this step he can only plead a predilection, but cannot excuse himself by having given any positive engagement; or he must entirely lose the services of another man to whom he has confidently looked forward for an able, upright, and permanent direction of the British affairs in India.

If you would consider the situation of all parties dispassionately, and reflect how much your own honour and character, and the essential interests of your country are concerned in your retaining your station, and if you would examine without passion or prejudice the acts of Sir John Shore, who to my knowledge has many amiable qualities and virtues, I am much mistaken in your disposition and goodness of heart, if you was to hesitate a moment in forming your decision.

I may perhaps have written to you too freely, but I have given you the sentiments of a real friend, and I assure you upon my honour, that I have done it without communication with Mr. Dundas or any other person in this country.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

HIS HIGHNESS THE NABOB OF THE CARNATIC TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

I have just sent by Mr. Porcher seven horses, two of which he will deliver to Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas. The other five I beg your Lordship will have the goodness to present with my humble respects, three to His Majesty, and two to the Prince of Wales.

RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

MY DEAR LORD, Wimbledon, Aug. 19, 1796.

. . . As to the Nabob's horses, I am really as much embarrassed as your Lordship, what it is right to do. The sending the presents is perfectly absurd, and none of us can wish to receive them, but the delicacy I feel about it is how far we can decline them, without indirectly throwing a blame in a quarter where, as you suppose, I think it is likely they may be accepted.[1] I shall see Mr. Pitt to-day, and mention the subject to him.

The news from Italy are very bad indeed.[2] You ask me how

[1] The Prince of Wales.

[2] The battle of Castiglione was fought Aug. 5, and Mantua was immediately invested.

it is to end? I answer—by a universal peace on the Continent, and us at war with France and Spain, and an attempt to invade Great Britain and Ireland. You say you must have peace, I ask —how are you to get it.

Yours very sincerely,

HENRY DUNDAS.

SIR ROBERT ABERCROMBY TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Received Aug. 1796.]

MY LORD, Calcutta, March 10, 1796.

. . . Your Lordship will have heard that there is a good deal of dissatisfaction among the officers of the Bengal army, and that they have appointed some of their number agents to represent them in England. The slowness of promotion is their principal grievance.

They have, without a shadow of reason, taken the alarm at the queries[1] which your Lordship wisely put (confidentially) to the best informed officers of the army; one of whom has shamefully betrayed the trust reposed in him and has published the queries: who he is I know not. But surely the queries would not give any just cause of alarm; for good and not evil is intended by them. The most sensible part of the army think so, and wait the result with patience, being convinced that the plan will be well digested and calculated so as to give satisfaction to all reasonable men.

The Malabar Commissioners have finished their report, and their conduct has been highly approved of by Government.

Mr. Duncan returned a few days ago to Benares, quite happy at having got such a load well off his shoulders.

I shall now and then trouble your Lordship with a letter, being ever, with the warmest attachment, &c.,

ROBERT ABERCROMBY.

G. A. ROBINSON, ESQ., TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Received Aug. 1796.]

MY LORD, Calcutta, April 7, 1796.

Several ships have sailed from hence since I last wrote to you, but as I forwarded to you by the Prince William Henry, a

[1] These were queries submitted by Lord Cornwallis to thirteen of the most distinguished officers in India (almost all in the Company's service), whose opinions he requested on the points afterwards discussed in his report of Nov. 7, 1794. Among these officers were Sir John Brathwaite, Colonel Bruce, Colonel Hartley, Colonel Collins, and Sir Barry Close, and their opinions in general coincided so closely with those of Lord Cornwallis, that he had every reason to believe his scheme would have satisfied the whole of the Indian army.

letter from Scott, whose information no doubt would be full, and to whose opinions I am willing to allow more weight than to my own, the omission is of less consequence. Perhaps if I were to look for other motives for my silence, I should find them in part, in a dissatisfaction with the general measures pursued here—for when I look to the course the contest between Government and the army has taken, I see on one side the most daring avowals of mutinous combinations, not only made but defended; a Government required to assume to itself the power of new regulating the army, while a superior authority is known to be occupied on the very subject, and, in some instances, a period even named when it is expected this power shall be assumed; and, on the other side, I have seen the Government setting out with a positive declaration that they should not be justified in making new regulations, and this hardly had time to circulate through the army before that principle is abandoned, before their other demands and declarations are answered by an unqualified promise of oblivion of all past irregular proceedings (some of which comprised a plan for the subversion of the Government), and a pledge and promise given to comply with the demands of men who had threatened to extort that compliance. In short the only point of concession in which Government has not been committed, is with respect to the time when the new arrangement is to be undertaken, and that I believe they are on the eve of fixing at no very distant date; thus you will find that unless the expected arrangements shall arrive immediately they will come to no purpose, for it is hardly to be expected that a Government, whose weakness has been so evident, will either attempt, or succeed in enforcing them, when they do so apparently in preference to those which will in all likelihood be so much more acceptable to the army in general.

I am, &c.,

G. A. ROBINSON.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Friday morning, Oct. 28, 1796.

You see that the Spaniards have declared war, the Neapolitans made peace,[1] and that Moreau has effected his retreat in a manner that would have done honour to the greatest General that ever lived.[2] Several of our friends, besides Lord L.,

[1] Spain declared war Oct. 5, and a peace between Naples and France was signed at Paris, Oct. 10.

[2] The retreat of Moreau through the Hellenthal. Jean Victor Moreau, son of an avocat at Morlaix, b. 1763, d. Sept. 2, 1813,

agreed on Wednesday night that this retreat was absolutely impossible.

All accounts from France seem to consider the intention of invading the country as absolutely certain, but our intelligence respecting the local preparations is unfortunately exceedingly vague.

I have not decided on the mode of defeating most effectually the nonsensical requests of Sir W. P., for nonsense, especially in military matters, is too powerful to be despised. I have thought of sending a Committee of Engineers, and have desired Twiss[1] to make some observations on what Sir W. proposes, from which I could frame such instructions for the committee as might drive them to make an explicit statement of the absurdity of the business, and the expense with which it would be attended. Brome is doing well, but it will be some time before he can recover his strength and former health. I attribute the foundation of his illness to a foolish ride which he and Singleton took on last Sunday fortnight, from the Bald Stag on Epping Forest to Cavenham (60 miles), on one of the worst and wettest days that I remember.

Most sincerely yours,

CORNWALLIS.

I settled everything with the Duke of Y. in the most satisfactory manner, and in talking of the disposition of the Generals, he mentioned you as precluded from your situation in the Ordnance from taking a part of the winter duty.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Whitehall, Nov. 1, 1796.

Advices have been received from Calais that the troops and gun-boats in readiness at and near Dunkirk, are intended to make a descent on the coast of Essex at Fillingham Marshes, near Bradwel, Mersey Island, and St. Osyth Bay.

At all events the public declaration of the intention to invade this country, and the preparations for carrying it into execution, make it necessary for us to be serious on our part. I propose going to Colchester on Thursday next, and I think it will be better that you should return to town. The business of the nego-

of wounds received at the battle of Dresden, Aug. 26 preceding; m. 1801, Mlle. Hulot, on whom Louis XVIII., after the restoration, conferred the rank of Maréchale.

[1] Colonel, afterwards General, William Twiss, R.E., b. 1745, d. March 14, 1827.

tiation[1] has gone on as well as I expected, although I confess, I am not yet sanguine on that score.

Dundas has been very ill, I have not yet seen him.

Yours very sincerely,

CORNWALLIS.

DAVID SCOTT, ESQ, TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

MY LORD, London, Nov. 7, 1796.

I take the liberty of enclosing to your Lordship the substance of the proposed Charters of Justice for Madras and Bombay, and have to beg as a particular favour that you will be so kind as to oblige me with your remarks upon it, which shall of course be private if you so desire it. I wish to bring it before the Court on Thursday, and therefore if your Lordship could give me an audience before that day, or your remarks, it would be very convenient.

I have the honour, &c.,

D. SCOTT.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO DAVID SCOTT, ESQ.

[Private.]

DEAR SIR, Whitehall, Nov. 9, 1796.

The severe illness of my son has prevented my giving all the attention I could have wished, to the paper which you transmitted to me. I have, however, made some remarks upon the points which appeared to me to be most essential, and I have dwelt upon the circumstance of the natives not being by any means made amenable to the King's Courts, in order to strengthen your hands, in case you should find it at any time expedient to try a question which is of so much importance to the security and happiness of our Asiatic possessions.

I wish much to prevent appeals from the Court of Requests to the Supreme Court, which would open a noble door of plunder for the attornies, and to my knowledge, the continuation of the same deputy sheriff from year to year, and the payment of money to the attornies for permission to practise in their names, have been attended with great abuse.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

[1] Lord Malmesbury had been sent to Paris to negociate peace. He sailed for Calais Oct. 18.

Native Courts to be appointed by the respective Governments on the model of those in Bengal.

Granting Letters of Marque. Whether the power ought not to be confined to the Governor-General.

Respecting the jurisdiction of the Court.

From having been a witness of the very great abuses and cruel oppressions to which the natives of India have been subjected, by their having been made amenable to laws which they do not understand, and which are administered in a language of which they are ignorant, I must ever give my decided opinion, that no native should be rendered amenable to the King's Courts of Justice either with or without their own consent.

There can be no objection to such witnesses being compelled to attend the King's Courts, as would be liable (consistent with the religion and customs of the natives) to be obliged to attend the native Courts. N.B. Women in certain stations of life ought not to be called upon to quit their own apartments.

The Courts of Request at the different Presidencies should be constituted by the respective Governments, and no suit from thence should be removeable to the King's Courts. N.B. I consider this as a most material point.

I cannot help most earnestly recommending that you should take the opportunity of this application to Parliament, to propose that the 41st Article of the Judicial Regulations of Bengal of 1793, should be part of this Act.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Discontent of the Officers of the Bengal Army — Dislike of Lord Cornwallis's plan of amalgamation — Objects and proceedings of the Discontented — Alarm of the Indian Government — Delay in the news reaching England — The New Regulations — Lord Cornwallis sworn in as Governor General — Concessions to the Bengal Officers — They return to their duty — Lord Cornwallis resigns his appointment — Bad effect of the concessions.

IN several preceding letters, allusion has been made to the discontent existing among the officers of the Bengal army. The plan suggested by Lord Cornwallis for amalgamating all the European troops in India,[1] had not met with approbation, either from the Court of Directors or the Company's officers. The latter held meetings, named Delegates to confer with the Government, and urged their pretensions with great pertinacity and much intemperance. But it was not till the close of 1795, that the full extent of their machinations became known to Sir John Shore. A meeting of the Supreme Council was suddenly called on Christmas-day, and the Governor-General laid before them most important information, which had reached him, and the Commander-in-Chief, that day, and the day before.[2] It was a communication from an officer, whose name, though known to them, they would not mention in the Minutes, nor is it given in Sir John Shore's despatches to the Secret Committee. He detailed the steps taken by the discontented officers, and disclosed the names of those most deeply involved. It appeared that the officers had formed the Delegates into an Executive Board, for the inviolability of whose persons the whole army became responsible, and whose pecuniary losses, if any, were to be made good by a general subscription. This Executive Board was authorised to treat in the name of the whole army with the Government, and not only were their own proceedings not to be divulged, but every officer who attended any meeting for the election of Delegates, or for the transaction of any other business, was bound to profound secrecy. One determination the Board however avowed—that if the new Regulations did not speedily arrive from Europe, they were resolved to judge for themselves, and enforce their own decision at any hazard.

[1] See Appendix.

[2] All these details are in the despatches, 1795-6, from Calcutta to the Secret Committee.

The principal points upon which the Executive Board insisted were:—

1st. That the Company's regiments should not be reduced in number, by consolidating two or three battalions into one regiment.

2nd. That the King's troops in India should, by law, be fixed at a small number.

3rd. That all promotions should go by seniority, and that no General officer should be *selected* for a command.

4th. That no King's Generals should have staff appointments.

5th. That no distinction should be made between the European and native corps in the Company's service, as regarded employment, pay, or emoluments.

6th. That all allowances, at any time granted, including double batta, should be continued.

7th. That a brevet, retrospective to 1783, should be issued.

Alarmed at this state of affairs, it was settled that Sir Robert Abercromby should proceed to the Upper Provinces, and try what his personal influence could effect. Accordingly he went with hardly a day's delay to Cawnpore, and to other of the large cantonments, where his unexpected presence produced some impression, but did not put an end to the conspiracy. So great were the apprehensions of the Government, that Sir John Shore requested General Craig at the Cape of Good Hope, and Lord Hobart at Madras, to hold troops in readiness to send to Bengal, and he called upon Sir George Elphinstone [1] (Lord Keith), to bring, if required, his whole squadron to Calcutta. He even accepted from M. de Boigne,[2] who was in the service of Sindia, an offer of cavalry commanded by European officers.

A great length of time elapsed before the knowledge of these events reached England, and with them came the intelligence that the exertions of the Moderates, as the loyal officers were called, had checked, though not stemmed, the torrent of sedition. Hopes were also entertained that the new Regulations, already sent out,

[1] Hon. George Elphinstone, K.B., younger son of Charles, 10th Lord Elphinstone, created Lord Keith in Ireland March 7, 1797, in England Dec. 15, 1801, and Viscount Keith June 1, 1814; b. Jan. 12, 1746, d. March 10, 1833; m. 1st, Aug. 9, 1787, Jane, dau. and sole heir of William Mercer, of Aldie; 2nd, Jan. 10, 1808, Hester Maria, dau. of Henry Thrale, Esq., of Streatham. M.P. for the county of Dumbarton from Oct. 1780 to June 1790, and for the county of Stirling from Sept. 1796 till he was made a British Peer.

[2] Comte de Boigne, b. March 8, 1741, at Chambery, d. June 21, 1830, at the same place; m. Anne Elizabeth Rose Josephine, dau. of Charles Eustache, Marquis d'Osmond, and widow of the Comte d'Argout. He had served in several European armies, and last on the Madras establishment, which he quitted for Sindia's service, under whom he organized a well-disciplined army (with many European officers) of nearly 50,000 men and 500 guns, but was always attached to the English interest. He returned home with a very large fortune early in this century, and settled near his native town, at Villa Buisson, where the Editor once dined with him.

would prove satisfactory, and the home Government therefore delayed taking any active steps. These regulations fixed the European regiments in Bengal at three, with 5 field officers, 8 captains, 29 subalterns, and 950 rank and file in each, besides 3 battalions of artillery. The native regiments were to be consolidated into 12, 1800 strong each, with one subaltern more per regiment than in the European regiments; and there were also to be, for the first time, 4 regiments of native cavalry. Ten colonels were to be made major-generals: half batta in all cases, whole batta in some, was to be given, but all bazaar allowances to be done away with. Some new advantages as to furlough were granted. These orders, which did not reach Calcutta till nearly the close of 1796, though in some respects they gratified the officers, did not meet with approbation from the Indian Government. On the contrary, in a minute dated December 1, 1796, the Governor-General in Council states, that they do not consider them "founded on solid principles, or framed with any knowledge of the country." As an instance of the delay in the transmission of despatches, it may be mentioned that this minute was not received in England till December 15, 1797.

Meantime Sir John Shore had found his difficulties increase. Early in 1796, a Brevet which had been made in England reached Calcutta, with directions to put it in Orders. By this several King's officers would have been promoted over the heads of Company's officers of older standing, and so afraid was the Bengal Government of doing anything which might offend the officers, that they protested, January 19, against this Brevet being made public, and Sir R. Abercromby agreed to suppress it. On February 1, the Governor-General wrote to say, that if the Regulations did not arrive soon, he must frame some himself. Some portion of these despatches reached England overland, August 13, but the whole did not arrive till December 5. Five days later, another letter, dated June 30, came to hand. In it Sir J. Shore said that the pressure upon him was so great, that he must, partially at least, give way, and in a minute (which he had made public), forwarded by the same ship, he expressed a hope that the General Orders then lately issued would be acceptable to the officers. The English Government upon the receipt of this intelligence, were greatly alarmed both at what the Bengal officers had done, and at what the Bengal Government seemed inclined to do. They conceived that Sir John Shore had not shown sufficient firmness and decision, and they determined to replace him by Lord Cornwallis, who was sworn into office on the 1st of February. But for the reasons assigned in his letters, his departure was postponed.

The Board of Control and the Court of Directors were in the mean time discussing the matter with a committee of Bengal officers sitting in London, and though they did not accede to all the demands made, they, contrary to the opinion of Lord Cornwallis, made such concessions,[1] that he considered it unnecessary to proceed on his voyage, and accordingly resigned his appointment on the 2nd of August, 1797.

These concessions were so far successful, that the officers of the Bengal army returned to their duty, but there can be no doubt that the encouragement thus given to mutinous proceedings was the primary cause of the Madras disturbances in 1809.

RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Private.]

MY DEAR LORD, Somerset House, Jan. 19, 1797.

Our meeting with the Chairman and Deputy Chairman at Mr. Pitt's I have fixed for to-morrow at 12 o'clock. I hope you have attentively considered Sir R. Abercromby's Minute upon the arrangements, in order to decide whether there is any substantial objection, such as he states, to any part of it. As I am totally adverse to any concessions, or any other than a decided line of conduct, it is necessary to be satisfied that there is nothing objectionable, for when one is to be firm we must be so on solid grounds. Indeed, my dear Lord, for want of proper instruments to conduct the government of India during the next twelve months, it is impossible not to be very uneasy upon the whole subject; and yet with a firm, and at the same time a conciliatory, man at the different settlements, all the difficulties that exist would vanish in a moment. If the army arrangement was carried into execution in Bengal, and something done to prevent matters getting into a wrong train at Oude, all would be well there, and if the unfortunate jumble which the two Governments have got into respecting the Nabob of Arcot and the Rajah of Tanjore,[2] was arranged upon an equitable footing and in a conciliatory manner, and if the judicial and land-revenue system of Bengal were put into the proper train at Madras, I could then look to the future state of

[1] One of the most prominent among these officers was soon after appointed to a very confidential post in the India House.

[2] The Government of Oude was in a most disorganised state. Asoph ul Doulah was totally incapable of ruling, and no decisive measures were taken to rectify the existing evils. The dispute between the Governments of Calcutta and Madras about the Nabob of the Carnatic has already been mentioned. Lord Hobart had pursued a similar line with the Rajah of Tanjore, and had by threats extorted from him a considerable tract of country. In this instance the difficulties were much increased by its having been ascertained that Serfojee, and not Ameer Sing, was the rightful ruler.

India with comfort and confidence; but at present I really see not the means of putting in motion, far less of concluding, these great arrangements. Allow me to say to your Lordship, that if you could bring yourself to forego the comforts of home for one year more of your life, and to spend three months at Bengal and as much at Madras, your would do the greatest service to your country that ever any man had it in his power to do. I can assure your Lordship I would not have allowed myself to have ever entertained any wish of breaking in upon your well-earned repose, if I could have found a remedy in any personal exertion of my own. I have endeavoured to satisfy Mr. Pitt and Lord Spencer (the only two Ministers I have talked to on the subject) that there is no solid objection to my going; that any service I may be supposed capable of doing at home is of real insignificance compared with what I might have it in my power to accomplish at this critical moment in India. I certainly have not been successful in those endeavours, and if they remain in that opinion, I have no right to form any decision upon a subject where either my anxiety or my ambition may be disposed to mislead me. I therefore can only entreat your Lordship either to alter their opinions, or to convince yourself that the real interests of your country call for another year's exertion from yourself. Take out your successors with you, teach them the road they should pursue, and, having done that duty, and settled all India by your presence and authority, you may return, after six months, in the same ship of war that would carry you out. And you will have the satisfaction of reflecting (and of transmitting the sentiment to your posterity) that you have twice been the instrument in the hands of Providence to save to the British Empire in India that stake, in which no rational man can doubt that its permanent prosperity and stability do, above all others, truly rest.

I am, &c.,

HENRY DUNDAS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

[Private.]

DEAR SIR, Whitehall, Jan. 19, 1797.

I shall say nothing on the subject of the military arrangements till our meeting takes place, which will I suppose be deferred, as a Cabinet is summoned for to-morrow at half an hour past eleven.

I think on every account that you would succeed better than myself, especially as great pains have been taken, from the moment

of my leaving India, to impress on the minds of the Bengal officers that my sentiments were not favourable towards them, and that I was partial to the King's troops.

If however you cannot go yourself, which I shall think very unfortunate for our Indian possessions, and if you and Mr. Pitt should be of opinion, that by once more doubling the Cape of Good Hope, I can render essential service to my country, I shall not depart from the line of conduct which I have invariably pursued through life, of sacrificing all private considerations of comfort and happiness to the service of the public. I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Private.]

MY DEAR LORD, Somerset Place, Jan. 20, 1797.

I have this instant received your Lordship's answer to my letter of yesterday. In an age when so few are disposed to consider anything but their own accommodation and self-interest, it is impossible for me to postpone a moment to express the heartfelt satisfaction your letter gives to me. It relieves me from an oppression of mind which has hung upon me for some time past beyond what I can express to you. The particular difficulty you mention, I do not feel; I am positive that, and every other, will instantaneously die away the moment your name is announced. Allow me again to assure your Lordship that I did not address you on this subject without great reluctance, and if Mr. Pitt can still be persuaded to feel that he greatly overrates the necessity of my remaining at home, I will with infinite pleasure come forward to relieve your Lordship from the necessity of executing the task which, with so much benefit to the public, and infinite honour to yourself, you are otherwise ready to undertake.

Believe me, &c.,

HENRY DUNDAS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Whitehall, Jan. 21, 1797.

The die is cast, and I am to go to India: how sorry I feel that your domestic circumstances put it out of my power to ask you to accompany me! Yours in the greatest haste,

Most sincerely,

CORNWALLIS.

SIR ROBERT ABERCROMBY TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Received Jan. 1797.]

MY LORD, Calcutta, July 5, 1796.

I have been obliged, contrary to my intention, to remain another year in this country. The state of the Bengal army has been so critical that I could not, consistently with my duty, quit my post without being relieved. The Regulations, with some modifications thought advisable, have been carried into effect; and the minds of the officers appear to have been quieted. But a transfer of the whole army to the King's service is the only measure that can radically cure the evil. To this, I believe, the Company's officers would now have no objection; for they loudly blame their masters, whom they accuse of coldness and indifference to their interests. I have recommended to Mr. Dundas that the Company's European regiments should be immediately taken into His Majesty's service, as a preparatory step to the general transfer.

I am, &c.,

ROBT. ABERCROMBY.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Whitehall, Jan. 24, 1797.

By your letter of yesterday's date, which I received this morning, it does not appear that the letter which I wrote to you on Saturday night has ever reached you.

You will know however by the letter which I sent last night, that my evil stars have destined that I should again double the Cape of Good Hope. Would to God you could be of the party; but Mrs. Ross, your rank in the army, and your official situation, all oppose insuperable barriers. Colonel Duncan[1] goes out with me, and I have written to Kennaway to propose that he should be of the party. Apsley's delicate health makes him (and I think very wisely) decline it. I feel that I shall be called a fool by all the selfish part of mankind, but the dictates of my own mind tell me that I am acting an honourable and a grateful part.

There is no Cabinet dinner to-morrow, but I shall probably see both the Duke of Portland and Lord Grenville at St. James's, where I must stay some hours to carry in returns and commissions.

You are to understand, if you have not received my former letter, that I retain my situation in the Ordnance.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

[1] Lieut.-Col. William Duncan, b. 1747, d. March 4, 1830.

GEORGE ABERCROMBIE ROBINSON, ESQ., TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Received Feb. 1797.]

MY LORD, Calcutta, Sept. 3, 1796.

Since my last letters to you I have had the satisfaction to receive two letters from your Lordship, and feel much gratified by these proofs of your remembrance and regard. My last closed, I believe, with the intelligence of the heads of the intended Military Regulations having been received from the Committee in England, and shortly after an overland despatch brought an official copy of them to Government. Although the propositions originally given in by you might seem to be the basis of them, it was obvious to every military man that the superstructure, which others had raised upon it, had no connexion with your plan. In short it proved to be an imperfect, undigested code, worthy of its parents, and such as might have been expected from the joint efforts of Mr. Dundas, the Committee of Officers, and the Court of Directors, all of whom appear to have had different objects, and neither of them understanding the subject. The Directors, jealous of their own patronage, but ready to grant rank, provided they could get it accepted without the pay usually attached to it. The Officers driving to extort rank with the pay annexed, and Mr. Dundas trimming between the two parties.

The promulgation of the Regulations no sooner took place in Bengal, than remonstrances poured in from every station. Of the style, as well as of the grounds of them, you will be able to judge from the enclosed specimen, which I assure you, compared with one from Dinapore, is a pattern of moderation and submission, and the upshot of the business has been exactly of a piece with the weakness which the Government has shown throughout. In short they have surrendered everything up to a factious army, and by the mode in which the arrangements have been carried into effect here, I see no feature of the Regulations preserved, except as to the number and strength of the corps, which I am afraid will be found too unwieldy for service, and are certainly of an inconvenient establishment for the ordinary duties of detachment in Bengal, unless the battalions are again divided. The *arrears* of batta, of brevet rank, which came, I believe, as unthought of by the Officers, as they will be matters of surprise to the Court of Directors, proved a sop of such powerful influence, and so extensive in its operations, that the ferment in all ranks from the Captains upwards seemed all at once to subside, and this being followed up by the extra allowances to the Colonels, superior batta to Com-

manding Officers, full pay and allowances to the second Lieutenant-Colonels and Majors, batta to be drawn according to brevet for all ranks, and a determination to suspend the operation of regimental rank, with many other deviations too tedious to mention, the discontent which before prevailed seems generally dispelled, and I question whether Sir Robert Abercromby will not believe he has restored discipline and subordination to this army, though in my opinion he has only, at the expense of seven lacs of rupees paid in arrears of batta, and a permanent annual increase of six or seven lacs additional allowances, purchased a temporary submission, which, from the encouragement and success a conduct approaching to mutiny has now met with, will break out again into threatening and dangerous combinations in this or the other armies. . . .

That your Lordship may judge of the correspondence between the Regulations as sent out, and as carried into effect, I shall enclose a copy of all the resolutions of Government that have yet passed on them. I shall ever regret, that one resolution did not take the place of the whole of them, namely, to carry the Regulations literally into effect, referring and recommending to Government at home such alterations as they appeared to require, but showing in the first instance to the army, what they appear to have forgot, that their superiors were to regulate, while they were to obey.

I am, &c.,

G. A. ROBINSON.

HIS HIGHNESS THE NABOB OMDAT UL OMRAH, OF THE CARNATIC, TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Received Feb. 1797.]

Chephauck House, Feb. 26, 1796.

MY MOST NOBLE AND WORTHY FRIEND,

Mr. Hall, who is perfectly acquainted with my affairs, now proceeds to England, and I trust will arrive there in safety. I have charged him with copies of all my correspondence, which contain a circumstantial detail of occurrences, and which he will have the honour of laying before your Lordship, and at the same time of representing the particulars more fully in person.

The uneasiness, vexation, and troubles which I have suffered from the unprovoked and unjust enmity of Lord Hobart, have been such that nothing less than the Divine favour could have supported me under them; Sir John Shore has manifested towards me the same sentiments of liberality and candour which I experienced from

your Lordship, and he has continued to do justice to me in all my lawful affairs. In the payment of the Khists, and in all other matters, I have made your Lordship's treaty my guide, and shall continue to do so, but the disinclination of Lord Hobart towards me is to the present moment unabated. I trust however in your Lordship's kindness for my security against every evil, and for the daily increase of my happiness and prosperity. The present situation of affairs gives me much reason for uneasiness and alarm, but by the blessing of God, I trust in the constant protection of the King of Great Britain, in the generous and humane disposition of the Prince of Wales, and in your Lordship's friendship, for my security and safety. I therefore beg leave to request your Lordship's intercession with His most gracious Majesty and with His Ministers Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas, that orders may be issued that the Company's representatives shall not on any account whatever interfere in my hereditary Government and dominions.

May your Lordship's days be long and happy!

What can I say more?

MINUTE OF COUNCIL, FEB. 26, 1797.

Present:—

LORD CHANCELLOR.	MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.	LORD GRENVILLE.
LORD PRESIDENT.	EARL SPENCER.	THE CHANCELLOR OF
DUKE OF PORTLAND.	EARL OF LIVERPOOL.	THE EXCHEQUER.

Upon the representation of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, stating that from the result of the information he had received, and of the inquiries which it has been his duty to make respecting the effect of the unusual demands for specie that have been made upon the metropolis, in consequence of ill-founded or exaggerated alarms in different parts of the country, it appears that unless some measure is immediately taken, there may be reason to apprehend a want of a sufficient supply of cash to answer the exigencies of the public service: it is the unanimous opinion of the Board, that it is indispensably necessary that the Directors of the Bank of England should forbear issuing any cash in payment, until the sense of Parliament can be taken on that subject, and the proper measures adopted thereupon, for maintaining the means of circulation, and supporting the public and commercial credit of the kingdom at this important conjuncture. And it is ordered that a copy of this Minute be transmitted to the Directors of the Bank of England, and they are hereby required on the grounds of the exigency of the

case, to conform thereto until the sense of Parliament can be taken as aforesaid.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Wimbledon, April 23, 1797.

I find from Mr. Dundas that there are no hopes of the discretionary power to reduce the European regiments passing the Court of Directors, without a reference and a consequent debate and ballot in the Court of Proprietors. Mr. D. is sanguine about carrying the question, but says if that should not be the case, that the Board of Controul have an undoubted right to authorize the measure. The great and insurmountable objection to the debate in the Court of Proprietors is the mischief that it will do in India. To obviate this difficulty, Mr. D. proposes that I should go out with the first milk-and-water order, under the assurance that due authority for the execution of the measure shall be sent out in a few weeks after my departure.

I have desired till Tuesday to consider this matter, premising that I could not possibly leave England till the mutiny of the fleet was quelled.[1]

I mean to be in town to-morrow morning pretty early, and I wish you would call and talk it over with me, between eleven and twelve o'clock. You will take into consideration that whatever my orders may be, it is not likely that I should take any decided step within a month after my arrival in India.

I am in agonies till I hear from Portsmouth.

Yours ever, most sincerely,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Culford, May 9, 1797.

I last night received an express from Mr. Dundas, desiring to see me on the subject of moving for a Bill to authorize me to

[1] The mutiny in the fleet began at Portsmouth, April 15. The demands of the sailors were not very unreasonable, and some of them being conceded they returned to their duty on the 23rd. Doubts having arisen among them whether the promises made to them would be fulfilled, they again broke out May 7. But Lord Howe having been sent down, the disputes were finally arranged on the 15th. The fleet at the Nore, however, on May 22, took much more serious steps. All their officers were sent on shore, and delegates were chosen to whom the command of the fleet was intrusted. On the 6th of June a large portion of Lord Duncan's squadron joined them. They blockaded the Thames, and threatened to starve London. But they quailed before the energetic measures pursued by Government, and began to give way on the 9th. The whole terminated on the 15th. Parker, the ringleader, was arrested, tried on the 22nd, and executed June 30.

execute the proposed instructions, and at the same time communicating to me the most alarming and distressing accounts of the mutiny having again broke out at Portsmouth. I promised to be in town by four o'clock to-morrow, and told him that there could be no hurry about the Bill, as it was impossible that under the present calamitous circumstances of this country, I could embark for India. Unless the business of the fleet can be speedily adjusted, a few days must place a French army in Ireland: is this a time to be occupied about speculative arrangements of the Indian army? I wish you would either call, or send to my house by the time of my arrival, the most authentic accounts that you can procure of affairs at Portsmouth.

Your Saturday's letter sufficiently depressed my spirits, and my thoughts are now so gloomy, that the sight of my family and of Culford are painful to me.

Yours ever, most sincerely,

CORNWALLIS.

EARL CAMDEN TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

MY LORD, Dublin Castle, May 23, 1797.

I have received a letter from the Duke of Portland, in which I am informed that it is not impossible your Lordship may be prevailed upon to accept the command of the army in Ireland, "provided I see no objection" to its being proposed to your Lordship.

I can hardly forgive the Duke of Portland for even expressing the possibility that I could entertain any objection to a measure which, if it is practicable, must be so eminently advantageous to the King's service. Since however I am placed under circumstances in which I am called upon to deliver an opinion, that ready and thankful assent which I give, being called for as a duty, precludes what my own judgment would otherwise construe into an impertinence towards a person of your most distinguished station.

I must ever consider your Lordship's inclination to act with me in this country as the most flattering circumstance of my life, and I should ill deserve that good opinion I should ever hope to retain from you, if I did not candidly and openly express all my feeling upon it.

I think in the first place most truly and most sincerely, that although your Lordship has shown a patriotism peculiar to yourself in not being unwilling to undertake the command of the army in Ireland, that *that* patriotism would be still more extended if you could be prevailed upon to accept the Lord Lieutenancy of this

kingdom. I should feel I did my duty in imploring the measure, and that your Lordship would deserve, if possible, still better of your country by accepting it; but since I understand your Lordship has said that no consideration should induce you to accept the Government of Ireland, I should be trespassing on your time and urging that which I am informed is impossible, were I to continue to address you upon that part of the subject. If therefore His Majesty continues to require my services in Ireland, I can only say that no measure could inspire so much confidence, or be so useful to the King's service in this kingdom, as your Lordship's undertaking the command of his army within it.

The extent of our force and the danger of attack makes it a command of the utmost importance, and not unworthy even of your Lordship's military character. The commission which I hold renders my name and assent necessary to the official forms of business. If I knew in what manner consistent with that commission to divest myself of that part of my duty, I should immediately adopt it, but if I am constrained to keep it, I beg to deliver over to your Lordship every military regulation, and to put that part of my office into your hands. As I flatter myself I may be permitted to say that we are both actuated by the same motive, our duty to the King and to our country, I cannot conceive it to be *possible*, your Lordship and I can have any difference of opinion upon any of the subjects upon which we shall have to confer, and very improbable we shall ever have it upon any others. I have explained to the Duke of Portland how desirous I am of Lord Carhampton retiring with satisfaction to his own feelings, and I should do him great injustice if I did not express his opinion of the advantage of your Lordship's appointment to be as decided as that of any one to whom it has been communicated.

I have the honour, &c.,

CAMDEN.

THE DUKE OF PORTLAND TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

MY DEAR LORD, Sunday morn, May 28, 1797.

I should do great injustice to my own feelings as well as to my own opinion, was I to withhold the enclosed because I happen to be represented not exactly as I could wish, or as I think I ought to have been. But as I am convinced of the motives and impression under which the Lord Lieutenant wrote to you, and certainly do not feel less anxiety than he does for your fulfilling the expectation

I have encouraged him to entertain, I should not shun the risk of incurring any blame even from you, that did not obstruct your compliance with those wishes, which I believe in my conscience are common to every friend to the Empire in general, as well as to Ireland. When you give me leave to wait upon you, you will permit me to explain the passage in the Lord Lieutenant's letter to which I allude, and if ten o'clock to-morrow does not suit you, you will be so good as to let me know when I may call upon you.

I am, &c.,

PORTLAND.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Culford, Aug. 20, 1797.

I should hope that the Portuguese peace will not do us much harm, even if the war should go on, and that it may rather facilitate our negotiations. It is however mortifying to our pride to see how much more afraid all nations are of the French than of this country.

The comfort of the country which I proposed to myself, has suffered considerable abatement by the house having been completely full of young ladies in the highest spirits since Tuesday last. Thank God the Cadogans[1] leave us to-morrow, and the Townshends[2] on Tuesday. I should think it likely that I may come to town about the time of your return from Portsmouth, but it may possibly happen much sooner; your proposed distribution of the Engineers will, I believe, do very well.

Lord Grenville must feel very much desœuvré, now we have lost all our Allies, I wish it would give him a distaste to the office of Secretary for Foreign Affairs. I am, dear Ross,

Most truly yours,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Culford, Dec. 15, 1797.

The contents of the letter which you was so good as to write on Wednesday, did not send me out a-shooting in good spirits

[1] Lady Emily, b. May 26, 1778, d. Dec. 22, 1839; m. June 2, 1802, Hon. and Rev. Gerald Wellesley. Lady Charlotte, b. July 11, 1781, d. July 8, 1853; m. 1st, Sept. 20, 1803, Hon. Henry Wellesley, afterwards 1st Lord Cowley; and 2nd, 1810, Henry William, 1st Marquis of Anglesey.

[2] Hon. Caroline, b. Sept. 30, 1778. Hon. Emily, b. December 31, 1779. Hon. Annabella, b. Dec. 12, 1783, d. Jan. 6, 1854. Hon. Anne, b. Jan. 1789, d. Feb. 14, 1854. Daughters of Charles, 1st Lord Bayning.

yesterday morning. Torn as we are by faction, without an army, without money, trusting entirely to a navy whom we may not be able to pay, and on whose loyalty, even if we can, no firm reliance is to be placed, how are we to get out of this cursed war without a revolution? I envy for the moment the feelings of the sanguine part of Administration, but I am afraid the pleasing delusion will not last. I propose to sleep at Hockerell on Sunday night, and shall be in town about one o'clock on Monday.

Yours, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Culford, Dec. 17, 1797.

I cannot wait till I see you to-morrow to say how glad I am that you have got the 89th regiment, and how much I feel the Duke of York's kindness on this occasion. If he had not a good heart, he must hate me, and he has uniformly given me the strongest proofs to the contrary.

Singleton will come up with me, but he must to-morrow attend the Committee on the Assessed Taxes. I have not forced Brome to come up, but he promises to follow if he is wanted. The measure, however, cannot be carried by the authority of Parliament alone, unless it is made more palatable to the country.[1] I am still very low indeed on the state of public affairs.

Yours ever, most sincerely,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Culford, Jan. 3, 1798.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Dundas respecting the appointment of —— to be a member of the Council at Madras.

The statement from —— is in the common Indian cant, and the letter from D. Scott presses the matter very strongly, and speaks of it as a measure that would be acceptable to the Court.

[1] The bill for trebling the assessed taxes had excited some opposition in the country, though the first stage, Dec. 4, had been carried by 214 to 15. Mr. Fox availed himself of having a petition from his Westminster constituents entrusted to him, to reappear in the House, from which he and most of the Whig party had seceded some time before. On the 14th he divided against the second reading—ayes 175, noes 50. Some slight alterations were made in Committee, and Jan. 4 it passed, after two divisions—202 to 75, and 196 to 71. In the Lords there was one division, Jan. 9, 73 to 6, and on this occasion the late Lord Holland made his maiden speech.

It is not prudent to venture positively to charge him with having taken money from the Nabob, unless I was sure of being supported in it; I well remember that we had reason to believe it, from a conversation with the present Nabob, but I have doubts whether the transaction was mentioned in direct terms, and I believe that nothing but my committing myself pretty decidedly on this point, will induce him to put his negative on ——.

I wish you would let me know by the return of the post what passed with the Omdah, to the best of your recollection, and whether you do not think it will be right to let Dundas take his own course, unless I feel confident that I could support a charge of corruption.

Yours ever, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Culford, Jan. 4, 1798.

I have just received your letter, and think you have done as well as possible about the arms; it will take some time to get over 15,000 stand, and before that can be done, we shall be able to judge whether it will be advisable to engage any further.

It is surely impossible that Lord Moira's letter[1] can be genuine, if it is, excess of vanity and self-importance must have extinguished every spark of understanding, and I am sure there was a time when he had sense.

Yours ever, most sincerely,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

DEAR SIR, Culford, Jan. 7, 1798.

. . . It occurs to me, however, that you may wish before I come to town for the birth-day, to make up your mind on the subject of Mr. ——, and I feel both the difficulty of your resisting the wishes of the Court of Directors, without being able to give any

[1] The letter alluded to was one written by Lord Moira from Donnington, June 25, 1797, to Colonel M'Mahon. It is of great length, and will be found printed *in extenso* in a magazine—the Universal—which had little circulation, under date Jan. 1798, and in Hansard's Debates of the same date. It is to the effect, that it had been proposed to him by a large number of the independent members of Parliament, who had hitherto voted with Government, that he should be Prime Minister, to the exclusion of both Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox. That he was quite ready to accept the office if the King wished it; but in addition to the two names just mentioned, he must say that he would not sit in the same Cabinet with the greater part of Mr. Pitt's colleagues, especially the Duke of Portland, and that he would only admit a few of Mr. Fox's followers. Sir James Pulteney was to be his Chancellor of the Exchequer.

just or satisfactory reasons, and the delicacy on my part of suggesting charges, of which I certainly can bring no proof. The natives of India never speak out, and it is always doubtful whether their hints and half-expressions are founded in truth. It is certainly impressed on my mind, from conversations with the Nabob, that Mr. —— has been, and is likely to be, an intriguer at the Durbar, but I can speak with no certainty, nor have I sufficient authority for those impressions, to advise you to take a strong measure, and still less an unjust one, in consequence of them.

From the radical defects which have, till very lately, pervaded the whole system at Madras, there is scarcely a junior Company's servant, who is not highly objectionable. If, on running through the list with me to look for members of Council, you had stopped at —— name, I should have said No; but as circumstances now stand, I do not feel myself warranted in advising you to put a negative on the wishes of the Court, and yet after all I shall have great doubts of the merit of the appointment.

Yours, very sincerely,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Whitehall, Feb. 19, 1798.

I carried the statement of the small arms this morning to Dundas, to whom the Duke of Portland has now given up the entire management of the military defence of the country, and he is clearly of opinion that we should take the additional ten thousand stand of Prussian arms. Will you manage the business through Crew, or shall I send for him on the subject?

D. says they have good intelligence, and particularly in the Admiralty department, and he seems to have no doubt that the French will make the attempt. He told me that if anything happened I should certainly go to the field.

They say that the poor Duke of Northumberland[1] has petitioned for a reduction of ten per cent. on his assessed taxes, because he has seven children to maintain.

Yours ever, most sincerely,

CORNWALLIS.

[1] The fact was true, and it was noticed in the parody of Chevy Chase in the Anti-Jacobin:—

Although full sixty thousand pounds
My vassals pay to me,
From Cornwall to Northumberland,
Through many a fair countrie;

Yet at St. Martin's Vestry Board
To swear I am content,
That I have children eight, and claim
Deductions—ten per cent.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE HON. COLONEL WESLEY.

DEAR SIR, Whitehall, Feb. 23, 1798.

I have received your letters dated February 20 and March 8, 1797, which were a long time on their passage. There is nothing in them which requires an answer, except that part which relates to Mr. Dormer.[1] Lady Elizabeth,[2] on whose account solely I ever took any concern about him, has been constantly tormenting me to let him come home, and on my representing to her that the inevitable consequence of his doing so, must be his being put into prison, she answers that they have made up their mind to it, and that as they should both feel happier in that event than in their present state of separation, she thinks that no other persons have a right to object to it, and she adds, that, as he purchased his lieutenancy in his former regiment, he considers himself as having a claim to dispose of his present commission in the 33rd.

On these considerations I think it would be advisable for you to let him come home, and get Sir A. Clarke to recommend the succession, and I think the 33rd will be very unlucky not to get as creditable a recruit as Dormer.

I have been for a long time kept in the utmost anxiety for fear the expedition to Manilla[3] should take place, and was happily relieved from my apprehensions by the last arrivals from India; I am sure your brother[4] will heartily concur with me in these sentiments, although I am not sure that they will be well received by one of the intended captors.[5]

We are now brought to the state to which I have long since looked forward, deserted by all our Allies, and in daily expectation of invasion, for which the French are making the most serious preparations. I have no doubt of the courage or fidelity of our militia, but the system of David Dundas, and the total want of light infantry, sit heavy on my mind, and point out the advantages which the activity of the French will have in a country which is for the most part inclosed.

[1] Hon. John Evelyn Pierepont Dormer, b. March, 1771, d. Dec. 9, 1826; m. Nov. 6, 1795, Elizabeth, dau. of William John, 5th Marquis of Lothian. Became 10th Lord Dormer on the death of his half-brother, Charles, 9th Baron, April 2, 1819.

[2] Lady Elizabeth, b. Sept. 2, 1765, d. Aug. 18, 1822.

[3] Sir John Shore had prepared an expedition against Manilla, which sailed in August, 1797, under the command of Colonel Wesley. But when it reached Penang, the alarm excited by the intelligence of the Treaty of Campo Formio, and the suspicions which had been aroused by the conduct of Tippoo and the Marathas, induced Lord Hobart, who had authority to that effect, to stop its further progress. See a memorandum by Colonel Wesley on this subject in the Appendix to Vol. I. of Lord Teignmouth's Life by his Son.

[4] Lord Mornington.

[5] Rear-Admiral Rainer commanded the squadron in the East Indies.

Give my kindest compliments to Lord Mornington, and believe me to be with very sincere regard, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS OF CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Office of Ordnance, March 20, 1798.

I am just come from the Duke, who has I find rejected Lord B.'s[1] plan on the reasonable and fair grounds that there must be a general rule for the whole. I have obtained a promise from him that he will never allow a heavier piece of ordnance than a six-pounder to be attached to any battalion. We had afterwards a general conversation about howitzers and the multiplicity of artillery used in the field, which was very friendly, although we did not perfectly agree.

If Lord B. had been the only wrongheaded, absurd, Colonel of militia, I think the Duke might have consented, but as the brotherhood are numerous, he was right to check these follies in the bud. I write in great haste. Yours ever, most sincerely,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO SIR WILLIAM HOWE.

DEAR SIR, March 26, 1798.

I have read with attention your report on the several points submitted to you by H. R. H. the Duke of York, and perfectly agree with you with respect to the distribution of the troops at Ipswich, Colchester, and Chelmsford; and as the numbers which the barracks at those places can contain, will not be sufficient to defend the county of Essex, if the enemy should land in force, it will perhaps be thought necessary to encamp some troops at Danbury and Warley, and especially at the latter place, as the situation is so convenient for reinforcing the southern district.

According to your request, I will make such observations as occur to me on the positions which you describe in Essex, which is a most difficult country to defend with inexperienced troops, unaccustomed to move against a most active enemy, who have derived confidence from their extraordinary success against the most powerful and warlike countries in Europe.

When the army is stationed defensively behind the river Colne at Colchester, it does not appear to me that it would be safe to place a considerable corps on Bexted Heath.

[1] Lord Buckingham.

I have no idea of a position for 30,000 men that could be tenable behind the Chelmer, with a corps upon Danbury and another at Writtle (even with the help of any field-works that can be constructed) against a superior and enterprising enemy; and I confess that the measure of throwing up works and making redoubts in various parts, would, in my opinion, greatly intimidate the country, and occasion an enormous expense, without affording any efficient security, unless the idea was confined to some spot advantageously situated for protecting the capital, the natural strength of which would render it, with the help of such works, a kind of citadel which could hardly be carried by a coup-de-main.

It is impossible to foresee the circumstances on which it would be necessary to act, on the supposition of the invasion of Essex, by an army which it would be imprudent to meet in the field; but if a very respectable force was concentrated on the heights of Danbury, it can scarcely be supposed that an enemy would venture with an army in their rear to advance to the capital.

A large body of infantry, with a considerable corps of light infantry, are, I think, essentially necessary for the defence of Essex; but cavalry, especially of the heavy kind, could render very little service, and in that flat, inclosed country, an army should not be incumbered by a very numerous artillery.

As you are in possession of a copy of the paper which I delivered to the Duke of York in 1796, on the defence of the eastern district, it does not occur to me, that I have anything further to say that is material on that subject.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Whitehall, March 30, 1798.

For your private ear, Abercromby is coming from Ireland. He has been exceedingly wrongheaded, I expect to be most violently attacked, what shall I, what can I do?[1] I intend to postpone my expedition till Tuesday, that I may see you when you come to town on Monday. Yours, most sincerely,

CORNWALLIS.

[1] Sir Ralph Abercromby and Lord Camden, then Lord-Lieutenant, had disagreed upon so many subjects as to render it very unadvisable that the former should remain as Commander-in-Chief in Ireland. Lord Cornwallis anticipated what did occur—*namely*, that he would be pressed to go over to that country in the double capacity of Lord-Lieutenant and Commander-in-Chief.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Whitehall, March 31, 1798.

I have neither seen nor heard from any person belonging to Administration since I wrote to you yesterday, which affords me some hopes that I shall escape the attack which I apprehended.

The Lord Lieutenant said in his letter to the Duke of P., that unless some officer of high rank and estimation, and popular character, was immediately sent, he considered the country to be in the most imminent danger. Lord Spencer said to me, after reading the letter, You must go as Lord Lieutenant, and Commander-in-Chief; I said, You are too good to me, to wish to place me in so easy a situation. Our Cabinet on the defence of the country, which was to have met to-day, is postponed till Monday. That is a subject on which I never have been in the smallest degree consulted by Dundas; he thinks his namesake David a much better officer and a clever fellow.

Yours ever, most sincerely,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Whitehall, April 14, 1798.

I have just received your letter, but I am so much occupied this morning that I cannot enter into any detailed account of our expedition. On the whole I have only to say that Dover Castle is in a better state than I expected, and a very little more work will undoubtedly put it out of danger of an assault. I am sorry to say in other respects, that I have great doubts of the possibility of effectually driving the country, or of making inundations, and that I saw no position that could not be turned.

I have heard nothing further about light infantry, I wish they would think more about them, and less about four-and-twenty-pounders.

Lady Spencer has got a fine boy.

Yours ever, most sincerely,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Office of Ordnance, April 24, 1798.

I was much pleased to learn from the Duke of York this morning, that it was not the intention to fortify any positions until

the country was actually invaded, and that his wish at present was, that every piece of ground that resembled a position should be thoroughly examined, and that a report should be made how far it could be strengthened with field-works, in order to assist the decision of the General when the season for action should arrive. This plan I most perfectly approve.

You will fix at least one day to dine with us whilst you stay in town, but the more days you and Mrs. Ross can give us, the more we shall be obliged to you. Wednesday will be a good day, as there is no opera. I am in great haste,

Yours, most sincerely,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Whitehall, May 19, 1798.

I confess that I have not sent you much information since you last went out of town, but there have been few subjects on which I could write with any degree of certainty, and even those were of so secret a nature that I did not quite like to trust them to the post.

If I hear anything of the expedition[1] before the post goes out I will add a line to give you what information I may receive. You know I was not sanguine under any circumstances, and the blowing weather has kept me in agonies.

There can, in my opinion, be no doubt that the Toulon armament is destined either against Portugal or Ireland, and I should rather think the latter. Government has, I think, taken the best measures to counteract them, but in all naval matters there must be great uncertainty.

You will have seen by the papers that I did the honours of the Tower on Wednesday to the Queen, Princesses, and the Duke of York.

The only means by which the innumerable local corps in all parts of the country can be armed, is by providing balls for fowling-pieces. I am, most affectionately yours,

CORNWALLIS.

[1] The expedition to Ostend sailed May 4; the troops commanded by Sir Eyre Coote, and the fleet by Sir Home Popham.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Whitehall, May 25, 1798.

It is the fashion hardly to consider the late expedition as a failure or a misfortune;[1] I cannot quite agree in those sentiments, but it will be fortunate if it should in general be considered in that light through the country. I have heard no accounts from the Continent, and conclude therefore that there is nothing good from thence. Dundas has been, and I am afraid still continues, much indisposed. I have not seen him since Monday. As we are to meet so soon, I will not enter upon the extensive chapter of arms. The Welshmen will not part with those taken in Pembrokeshire from the French invaders,[2] and there has been a warm contest between Lords Milford[3] and Cawdor[4] about the place where they are to be kept. Believe me to be, most truly yours,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Whitehall, May 28, 1798.

I was much disappointed when I called at your door yesterday at five o'clock, to find that you did not intend to come to town, although the reasons you give for deferring your journey are perfectly just.

You will have been surprised to hear of the *duel*,[5] thank God it terminated so well.

Lady S. told me this morning that the accounts from Ireland were of the most alarming nature. Actual hostilities have been committed, and much blood spilt in and about Dublin. The Lord Lieutenant writes for troops, but from whence are they to come?

I am, in great haste, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

[1] The troops landed May 18, and completely destroyed the sluices, &c. But owing to bad weather they could not re-embark, although they were 16 hours on the beach before the enemy appeared in any force, and were compelled to surrender on the 20th. The loss was 1 off., 43 r. and f., k.; 5 off., 65 r. and f., w.; 62 off., 1123 r. and f., taken and missing.

[2] A small body of French—about 1400—landed in Fishguard Bay, Feb. 22, 1797. The four ships which brought them there sailed away immediately, and left them to their fate. They were surrounded by Lord Cawdor, with what militia he could collect, and the peasantry of the neighbourhood, and surrendered on the 24th, without firing a shot.

[3] Richard, Lord Milford of Ireland, so created July 13, 1776, b. 1738, d. Nov. 28, 1823; m. June 2, 1764, a dau. of James Philips, Esq., of Pontipark.

[4] John, Lord Cawdor, so created May 31, 1796, b. April 24, 1755, d. June 1, 1821; m. July 27, 1789, Isabella Caroline, dau. of Frederick, 5th Earl of Carlisle.

[5] Between Mr. Pitt and Mr. Tierney. It arose out of some strong expressions used by Mr. Pitt in a debate on the affairs of the Navy, May 25. They met on Putney Heath, on Sunday, May 27, with Mr. Ryder, afterwards Lord Harrowby, and the Hon. George Walpole, as their respective seconds. Two shots were exchanged, but without injury to either party.

CHAPTER XIX.

Alarming state of Ireland — Formation of the Volunteer Corps — The Convention — Society of United Irishmen — Their negociations with the French Directory — Attempt of the French to invade Ireland — The Rebel newspapers — Vigorous measures of the Government — Contests with the Rebels — Extent of the insurrection — Necessity of uniting the civil and military command — Lord Cornwallis appointed Lord-Lieutenant and Commander-in-Chief — Proceedings of Irish Parliament — Proclamations of pardon — Decline of the Rebellion — Proposals of the Rebel leaders to surrender — Special Commission for trial of State-prisoners — General Humbert's expedition — Affair at Castlebar — Disposal of State-prisoners — Another French armament — Court-martial on Whollagan — Union question brought forward — Opinions on the measure — Lord Longueville's jobbing — The "Lawyers' Infantry Corps" — Clamour against the Union — Alterations by Government in the proposed measure.

A FEW days after the date of the last letter, Lord Cornwallis accepted, at the earnest request of Mr. Pitt, the offices of Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland and Commander-in-Chief. The state of that country had become most alarming, and the Government were compelled to place at the head of affairs some person of undoubted firmness and acknowledged judgment, who could unite both the civil and military authority.

A long course of neglect and misgovernment had brought Ireland into this dangerous position. Formerly the Irish Parliament met but once in two years, and was only necessarily dissolved by the death of the Sovereign. The grossest corruption prevailed, and Ministers, almost always able to carry any question about which they were really anxious, were very indifferent to the real interests of the country. A perpetual Mutiny Bill relieved them from all difficulty on that subject. Little by little some points were gained by the popular party. An Octennial Bill was passed, and when, owing to the difficulties of England, the regular troops were nearly all withdrawn from Ireland, a general flame burst forth which led in 1778 to the formation of the Volunteer corps. Forty-two thousand men were gradually enrolled—the officers, rejecting royal commissions, were chosen by the members of each corps, by whom also Lord Charlemont[1] was nominated the General. For a time they were most assiduous in discharging their military duties,

[1] Francis, 8th Baron and 1st Earl of Charlemont, so made Dec. 23, 1763; b. Aug. 18, 1728, d. Aug. 4, 1799; m. July 2, 1768, Mary, dau. of Thomas Hickman, Esq.

but politics soon engaged their attention, and Delegates[1] from each corps, calling themselves a Convention, assembled in Dublin, where, while aping the forms of Parliament, they endeavoured to establish an hostile authority. They were principally guided by two men, very dissimilar in character, but both actuated by inordinate vanity and great ambition—the Bishop of Derry[2] and Mr. Flood.[3] Reform in Parliament was their nominal object, and their avowed means, military intimidation. Mr. Flood came down to the House of Commons in full uniform, November 29, 1783, to propose a scheme framed by the Convention, which had declared its sitting permanent till the fate of the motion should be known: the House had however sufficient firmness to reject this motion by a majority of 158 to 49.

Though after this the Convention gradually sank into insignificance, the spirit of resistance to Government was not extinguished, and the most ardent of the Delegates persevered in encouraging agitation. In 1791 they succeeded in forming at Belfast the "Society of United Irishmen," nominally to obtain Parliamentary Reform, but really to promote the separation of Ireland from Great Britain, and to establish a republic in the former country.

An Executive Council managed their affairs. To that body was intrusted the charge of gaining to their cause men of influence and talent—of preparing the lower classes to pay obedience to their appointed leaders—and of working upon the passions of the multitude by the distribution of seditious publications. As early as 1792, emissaries were sent to different regiments to try to seduce the non-commissioned officers and privates. Itinerant Committees travelled through the country, to provide prisoners with pecuniary means for their defence—to endeavour to bribe or intimidate witnesses—to induce Under-Sheriffs to return disloyal panels, and to terrify any well-disposed juryman who might happen to be sworn. Many of the Presbyterian clergy in Belfast ardently promoted these schemes, and some were rash enough to display their hostility to England, by praying in their pulpits for the success of the Republican armies.

[1] Among the delegates were the Hon. Robert Stewart, afterwards Marquis of Londonderry, and Mr. Corry, afterwards Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer.

[2] Hon. Frederick Augustus Harvey, consecrated Bishop of Cloyne Feb. 1767, Bishop of Derry Jan. 1768. Became 4th Earl of Bristol Dec. 22, 1779; b. Aug. 1, 1730, d. July 8, 1803; m. Elizabeth, dau. of Sir Jermyn Davers, Bart. Captain, afterwards General, Eustace, in a letter to General Ross from Dublin in Nov. 1783, says, "The Bishop of Derry was just before me on the road. He was attended by an officer and twenty men, volunteers; he had two sentries at his door wherever he stopped."

[3] Right Hon. Henry Flood, b. 1732, d. Dec. 2, 1791; m. April 13, 1762, Frances Maria, dau. of Marcus, 1st Earl of Tyrone. M.P. for Kilkenny 1759, Callan 1762 to 1776, Enniskillen from 1777 to 1783, and then Kilbeggan to 1790. In England—for Winchester from Oct. 1783 to March, 1784, and for Seaford from 1785 to June, 1790. Vice-Treasurer in Ireland from Oct. 1775 to Dec. 1781.

The leaders, however, conscious that many of their adherents were timid, withheld from them the knowledge of their ultimate plans. But a document, containing a detailed account of the state of Ireland, was drawn up for the information of the French Directory, by Mr. Hamilton Rowan[1] and Mr. Theobald Wolfe Tone[2] (the latter of whom had framed the constitution of the United Irishmen), and transmitted to Paris. By the summer of 1796 large numbers were sworn in as United Irish, the test oath having been altered the year before, to induce the moderate reformers to unite more cordially with the real republicans. Encouraged by this accession of strength, the leaders more openly avowed their intentions, and they eagerly embraced an offer of the French Directory to place a sufficient force at their disposal, to enable Ireland to cast off her dependence on England. Lord Edward Fitzgerald[3] and Mr. Arthur O'Connor[4] were despatched to make the necessary arrangements.

In the same summer, a lawless banditti, calling themselves Defenders, and acting with the knowledge, if not under the direction, of the Executive Committee, committed the grossest outrages, principally in the counties of Roscommon, Leitrim, Longford, Meath, Westmeath, and Kildare. This outbreak, and the religious feuds raging in Armagh, produced the Insurrection Act, under which the Lord-Lieutenant in Council might proclaim the whole or any part

[1] Archibald Hamilton Rowan, a gentleman of good family and some fortune in the north of Ireland, b. May 12, 1751, d. Nov. 6, 1834; m. 1781, Sarah Anne, dau. of Walter Dawson, Esq. of Carrickmacross. He was convicted of publishing a seditious libel in 1794, fined 500*l.*, and imprisoned in Dublin. While in Newgate he involved himself in treasonable practices, and, had he not escaped from prison, would have undergone a second trial.

[2] Theobald Wolfe Tone, b. June 20, 1762, d. Nov. 19, 1798; m. July, 1785, Matilda, dau. of William Witherington, Esq. (her sister married Thomas Reynolds). He was called to the Bar in 1789, but relinquished that profession for politics, and soon became a leading rebel. Captured on board the Hoche in 1798, tried and sentenced to death by a Court Martial, he avoided execution by suicide. His son wrote his memoirs in two volumes, which give a frightful account of the dangers to which Ireland was exposed, and show a painful disregard of all principles of honour or humanity on the part of the United Irish. The American edition is the most complete.

[3] Lord Edward Fitzgerald, son of James, 1st Duke of Leinster, b. Oct. 15, 1762, d. June 4, 1798; m. at Tournay, late in Dec. 1792, Pamela, now known to be a daughter of Madame de Genlis by Egalité, Duke of Orleans. M.P. for Athy 1783 to 1790, then for county Kildare to 1797. He was arrested May 21, 1798, in the house of Nicholas Murphy, a feather-dealer in Thomas Street. The man who gave the information which led to his arrest received 1000*l.*, but his name has never transpired.

[4] Arthur O'Connor, b. July 4, 1765, d. April 25, 1852; m. 1807 the only dau. of Condorcet. M.P. for Philipstown from 1790 to 1795. His mother was sister to Lord Longueville, who brought his nephew into Parliament, but renounced all connexion with him when his revolutionary principles became public. O'Connor was tried for high treason at Maidstone in 1798, and acquitted, but was immediately arrested again. After some months' confinement, on confession of his guilt, he was allowed to go to France, and, entering that service, rose to the rank of Lieut.-General, but was not employed after 1803, in which year he was to have commanded the army destined for the invasion of Ireland. He is said by Mr. Grattan (in his memoirs of his father) to have been in deacon's orders.

of a county. Increased powers were vested in the Magistrates: and shortly after, yeomanry corps were formed, and the Habeas Corpus Act suspended. Meantime an accredited agent from the French Directory visited Ireland, and promised a great supply of arms, of ammunition, and an army of 15,000 men. These pledges seem to have brought about a formal alliance between France and the Executive Committee, who then devoted all their energies to the military organization of the country.

Late in the year General Hoche [1] sailed from Brest, in command of a very considerable army, but the fleet was dispersed by bad weather, and only a portion of it reached Bantry Bay December 22, the vessel in which Hoche himself was, being one of the missing ships. Grouchy,[2] who was next in command, was much discouraged to find that, during the week he remained at anchor, none of the Irish seemed inclined to join, and he accordingly returned to France without having disembarked his men.

During the winter the United Irishmen repeatedly urged the French to repeat their attempt, and thinking the Directory were very dilatory, they sent Mr. Lewins [3] about the end of May to France, with renewed and urgent solicitations. The eagerness of some of the Executive Committee would brook no delay, and they pressed for an immediate rising, without waiting for foreign assistance, but the plan was abandoned on the opposition of the Leinster delegates.

The measures hitherto adopted for the repression of outrages having proved insufficient, General Lake, who commanded in the north, issued, March 13, under the authority of the Lord-Lieutenant, another proclamation, directing a general search for arms. But this search was not very successful—the quantity seized bore but a small proportion to that retained, for, if the rebel returns were correct, there were in April, in Ulster alone, upwards of 100,000 men ready to take the field, well provided with muskets or pikes, and to a great extent disciplined and regimented. An endeavour to restore tranquillity by clemency was equally a failure. By another proclamation, May 17, pardon was promised, with certain

[1] Lazare Hoche, b. Feb. 24, 1763, d. Sept. 15, 1797, not without suspicion of having been poisoned. Originally a groom in the royal stables, afterwards a private in the Gardes Françaises. Of violent democratic principles, and always connected with that party, but, except in the affair of Quiberon, generally moderate in his conduct.

[2] Emanuel Comte de Grouchy, of a noble family, b. Oct. 23, 1766, d. May 29, 1847; m. 1st, 1785, Cecile Felicité Celeste, dau. of M. Le Doulcet de Pontecoulant; 2nd, June 27, 1827, Mdlle. Josephine Fanny Hua. A Marshal. Originally an officer in the Gardes du Corps, he soon joined the revolutionary armies, and served with great distinction. His military career ended with Waterloo, where his conduct gave rise to much discussion.

[3] Edward John Lewins, an attorney in Dublin. He was early obliged to fly the country, and settled at Paris, where he d. Dec. 1827. He was agent to the United Irish, and was included in the list of persons banished by Act of Parliament.

exceptions, to all who should within a month surrender and give security for their future conduct. Very few accepted the offer, and a partial outbreak took place in Ulster, which was easily put down, and the leaders fled to France.

The Rebels had by this time added largely to their numbers in the metropolis and some of the adjoining counties. To excite the Roman Catholics to join, the most unfounded reports were circulated, and the old tithe grievances revived. The midland and southern counties were thus thrown into a state of ferment, and the same scenes of violence which had previously disgraced Ulster were enacted there. All who incurred the resentment of the United Irish were either murdered, or punished by the burning of their stacks and buildings, or by the houghing of their cattle, and wherever arms could be found they were unhesitatingly seized.

Notwithstanding this accession to their strength, the Executive were afraid that their hopes would be destroyed if a premature rising took place before the arrival of the French, and they therefore despatched their Secretary to urge the Directory to immediate action. Dr. M'Niven[1] proceeded first to Hamburgh, and from thence transmitted one memorial to Paris, and afterwards presented a second in person. These documents avowed the most desperate purposes; exaggerated the resources of the United Irish; and entreated the Directory at once to send their promised aid; representing that not only would delay enable Government to frustrate their projects, but that it might also check the favourable disposition of the Irish people, and thus render the establishment of a republic infinitely less easy.

While endeavouring to promote rebellion and treason, the Executive Committee did not overlook the advantage of having a portion at least of the public press under their direct control. Early in 1797 the 'Northern Star' commenced its career of sedition at Belfast, but it was soon put down in a manner more summary than legal. A party of men, some military, some civilians, attacked and gutted the house in which it was printed, and destroyed the types and presses. The shareholders, who were few in number, and far from wealthy, were unable to meet this

[1] William James M'Niven, son of a Roman Catholic gentleman of some property, b. March 21, 1763, d. July 12, 1841; m. in America a Mrs. Jane Tone, dau. of a Mr. Ricker. He was educated in Austria, and in 1794 established himself as a physician in Dublin, where his son joined the United Irishmen. On his return from this mission to the Continent he became a member of the Executive Directory. He was one of those who, in 1798, agreed to disclose the secrets of the conspirators, and in his evidence before the Lords' Committee, stated that one Privy Councillor and one General on the Staff, besides others of lower rank, were privy to their treasonable schemes. When released from Fort George, he went to France, where he served for a short time with the rank of Captain, and then proceeded to New York, where he spent the remainder of his life.

loss, and the paper expired. It was succeeded by the 'Union Star,' published in Dublin. This atrocious paper was printed only on one side, so that it might be pasted on walls. It not only recommended, generally, deeds of violence, but pointed out by name the magistrates or other persons whose conscientious discharge of their duty had rendered them obnoxious to the Rebels, as fit objects for vengeance. Later in the year the 'Press' was commenced, which was conducted with more talent, and, if possible, with more malignity, than its predecessors. The original editors, among whom was Peter Finnerty,[1] an often-convicted libeller, were soon obliged to leave the country, and they were replaced by Arthur O'Connor, who seems to have been always willing to stand forward as the champion of treason.

The battle of Camperdown, October 11, put a stop to the intended invasion of Ireland. It is well known that Admiral De Winter[2] was very reluctant to put to sea, as he anticipated his defeat, which was a very severe blow to the Irish Rebels, and produced a most salutary effect in the country. Numbers who had been misled were now, perhaps because they thought their cause was failing, anxious to avail themselves of the offers of pardon which had been held out; flagrant acts of violence became less frequent, the meetings of the inferior classes of the United Irish were generally discontinued, the people resumed their usual pursuits, and the well-disposed were no longer afraid to display their loyalty.

The civil power was therefore found sufficient for the administration of justice during the circuit of July and August. This state of affairs was far from satisfactory to the rebel leaders; for, although the principal committees still sat in Ulster, many of the counties refused to send delegates, and the province subscribed very little to the funds of the Society. Another cause for this lukewarmness in the north arose from religious differences. The inhabitants of Ulster were mostly Presbyterians, and though the republican nature of their tenets disposed them eagerly to join the United Irish, they hated the Roman Catholics, and were no advocates for their emancipation. As long as the Roman Catholic members of the Society remained in a minority, and the doctrine of emancipation was kept in the background by the Executive, the

[1] Peter Finnerty, a man of obscure birth, b. 1766, d., totally forgotten, May 11, 1822. He was editor and nominal proprietor of the 'Press,' and in that capacity was convicted of having published two seditious libels, signed "Remember Orr," and "Marcus." In England he afterwards pursued the same course, and with the same result.

[2] Admiral De Winter, b. 1750, d. June 2, 1812, raised to the rank of Marshal by Louis Bonaparte. Taken at Camperdown, but released at the time of the Convention of the Helder.

Presbyterians joined heartily in the conspiracy; but when the population of the east and south enrolled themselves, and emancipation became an open and leading object, the hatred of Popery diminished the zeal of the Ulster peasantry. The Executive Committee laboured energetically to re-excite the spirit of disaffection in the north; but as some months passed before their efforts were in any degree successful, their position at the close of 1797 was one of great perplexity.

The United Irish now began to propagate their doctrines in England, where societies were formed to advocate parliamentary reform, annual parliaments, and universal suffrage; but even these points soon ceased to be mentioned, and meetings were held to contrive means for procuring arms with the avowed object of forming a republic by the assistance of France.

In January, 1798, Arthur O'Connor went to London in order to carry on a regular correspondence between the United Irish and the "London Corresponding Society," the leading members of which were in the habit of meeting in a cellar in Furnival's Inn to discuss projects considered too dangerous to be brought forward at the more public meetings. O'Connor and an Irish priest named O'Coigley[1] were constant attendants at these assemblies, where, amongst other schemes, a general rising in the metropolis and throughout the country was contemplated, involving the murder of the King, the Royal Family, and of many members of both Houses of Parliament.

Meantime the system of violence and outrage revived, and though several counties in Leinster and Ulster were proclaimed, the intimidation continued. So daring were the Rebels, that, in open day, a body of 200 took possession of Cahir, while a search for arms and ammunition was regularly carried on from house to house.

The crisis was now approaching, and the Government having got accurate information of their proceedings, arrested, March 12, the Leinster Provincial Committee, and some other leading members of the society, in the house of Oliver Bond.[2] Lord Edward

[1] Rev. James O'Coigley, son of a farmer, b. 1762, executed June 7, 1798. He was educated at Paris and constantly employed as an agent between France and England. He disguised himself as an officer, and went by the name of Jones; Fivey was another alias.

[2] Oliver Bond, of a respectable family in the north of Ireland, b. 1761, d. Sept. 6, 1798; m. Eleanor, dau. of Henry Jackson, an ironfounder, and afterwards implicated in the rebellion. He was an opulent wholesale woollen-draper in Dublin, one of the very few of that class who joined the Rebels, of whom he became an influential leader. As early as 1793 he had made himself conspicuous by affixing his name to a seditious address, attacking the House of Lords. For this he was fined 500*l*., and imprisoned for six months in Newgate. Tried for high treason, and convicted July 23, 1798, but his life was spared on certain terms. He died, however, before he could be removed from prison.

Fitzgerald was accidentally absent from that meeting, and he was therefore still able to carry on his plans for a general insurrection. But the energy of the Government, and the hopes of pardon held out, materially interfered with his schemes, and before the end of April it was evident that there was no alternative between immediate insurrection and the relinquishment of those guilty designs. Lord Edward and his associates determined to follow the first course, and as most of the members of the old Directory were in prison, a new one was formed, and the plan of a general rising was drawn up by the Military Committee. The various barracks and posts of the garrison of Dublin, the camp at Laughlinstown, and the artillery station at Chapelizod, were to be simultaneously attacked; the signal for the provinces to rise, was to be the stoppage of the mail-coaches, and the 23rd of May was fixed upon for the attempt. The Government were, however, aware of their designs, and on the 19th seized several of the leaders, among whom was Lord Edward Fitzgerald. He made a desperate resistance, and mortally wounded Captain Ryan,[1] who had tried to arrest him, but he received several wounds himself, of which he died in prison a few days later. The Sheares[2] and some others were captured on the 21st. That evening a letter from the Lord-Lieutenant warned the Lord Mayor of the approaching outbreak, and a message to the same effect was sent to Parliament next day.

The projected rising nevertheless took place. The disaffected within the metropolis made every effort to co-operate with those outside, but the Government were too well prepared, and the tranquillity of Dublin was scarcely disturbed. The mail-coaches,

[1] Captain Ryan had been in the 103rd Regt., and was now editor of Falkner's Journal. He volunteered his services on this occasion. He died May 30. His widow received a pension of 200*l.*, and some further provision was made for his family.

[2] Henry and John Sheares, sons of an eminent merchant and banker in Cork, at one time M.P. for Cloghnakilty. Henry, b. 1758, was for about three years in the 11th Foot, but, as well as John, b. 1767, was afterwards called to the bar. They visited Paris early in the Revolution, and witnessed the capture of the Bastille and the execution of Louis XVI. It was there probably that John imbibed his sceptical opinions, and that both became deeply imbued with revolutionary principles. On their return to Ireland their conduct and language excited the suspicions of Government, and they would have been brought to trial but for the kindness of Lord Kilwarden, then Attorney-General, and their promise to abstain in future from similar proceedings. That pledge they immediately broke, and as soon, therefore, as sufficient evidence of their renewed guilt could be obtained, they were arrested. Henry was taken May 21, in his own house in Baggot Street, and in his room was found the draft of a proclamation to the people of Ireland, calling on them to give no quarter to the troops or the Loyalists. John was arrested the same day in the house of Mr. Lawless, a surgeon, also one of the conspirators, but who escaped. The two brothers were tried July 12, and executed July 14, 1798. John was unmarried. Henry married, 1st, Alicia (with whom he eloped in April, 1782), a considerable heiress, dau. of Mr. Swete, a merchant in Cork; 2nd, 1795, Sarah, dau. of Garrett Neville, Esq., of Mary Mount. She survived him. The Bill which regulated trials for high treason in Ireland was brought in by their father in 1766.

however, on the northern and southern roads were stopped, and the provincial leaders, obedient to the signal, brought their forces into the field, and much violence and some bloodshed ensued. But the only considerable success of the Rebels was at Prosperous, a town in Kildare. Led by Dr. Esmonde,[1] a yeomanry officer, they took the place on the 24th of May, and murdered almost to a man the few soldiers who defended it. Martial law was then proclaimed, but liberal offers of pardon were also made, in the hope of yet inducing the people to return to their allegiance, and thus preventing further mischief.

Unfortunately a body of 600 men, assembled as they declared for the purpose of laying down their arms, were met by a detachment under Sir James Duff,[2] who was ignorant of their intention. Which party first fired is a matter of doubt, but a conflict took place, which put an end to all hopes of pacification. The Roman Catholics of Wexford, hitherto considered loyal, now showed themselves deeply imbued with revolutionary principles. On the 27th of May, 5000 men, led by John Murphy,[3] curate of Bouvalogue, encountered at Oulart about 110 of the North Cork Militia, of whom the commanding officer and four privates alone survived. Enniscorthy was taken; Wexford was next attacked, and occupied on the 30th, the garrison having abandoned it. New leaders were then brought forward, some of them men of importance, as Cornelius Grogan[4] of Johnstown, Bagenal Beauchamp Harvey[5] of

[1] John Esmonde, a physician, younger son of Sir Thomas Esmonde, 6th Bart., of an old Roman Catholic family. He was Lieutenant of the Clare Corps of Yeomanry, from which he deserted to lead the attack on Prosperous, having dined at mess that evening. The next morning he rejoined his corps as if nothing had occurred, but was immediately arrested, tried by a Court Martial, convicted, and executed June 14th, near Carlisle Bridge. He had been chosen to fill the vacancy in the Leinster Directory, *vice* Reynolds. Dr. Esmonde married Helen, dau. and coheir of Bartholomew Callan, Esq., of Oberstown, who remarried Harvey Morres, a rebel leader (although a near relation of Lord Frankfort), and afterwards a General in the French service.

[2] Major-General, afterwards General, Sir James Duff, Colonel 50th Regt., a natural son of James, 2nd Earl of Fife, b. 1752, d. Dec. 5, 1839, then the senior General in the service. M.P. for Banff from March, 1784, to 1788.

[3] Father John Murphy, b. about 1765, a thorough ruffian; the worst possible specimen of a reckless demagogue. He persuaded his infatuated followers that he was invulnerable, and used to show them bullets which he said he had caught in his hands.

[4] Cornelius Grogan, of Johnstown, b. 1726, executed June 28, 1798. A Protestant gentleman of large property, said to be worth 8000*l.* a-year. He was an old and timid man, and on his trial before the Court Martial endeavoured to show that he was compelled to take a nominal lead, but had abstained from any overt act. The defence was unfounded, as it was clearly proved that he had joined, what he believed would be, the winning side. M.P. for Enniscorthy 1783 to 1790, in which year he contested the county of Wexford, but was beaten by a small majority. His two brothers were Loyalists, and in the Yeomanry; one, Thomas, fell at the battle of Arklow.

[5] Bagenal Beauchamp Harvey, b. 1762, executed, in virtue of the sentence of a Court Martial, June 27, 1798; m. 1796, Miss Stephens, niece of an innkeeper at Arklow. A Protestant gentleman, of good family, with an estate of 3000*l.* a-year. Before the rebellion broke out, his language at his own table, if Sir Jonah Barrington is to be believed, was of such a nature that his arrest

Bagenalstown, John Henry Colchough[1] of Ballyteig, and Edward Fitzgerald[2] of Newpark: the three last had been previously arrested on suspicion of treason. The evidence however failing, they were set at liberty, but were soon found at the head of the insurgents. The troops were generally victorious, but in one instance they sustained a severe loss, through the obstinacy and rashness of Colonel Walpole,[3] who, neglecting proper precautions, was attacked on his march, and fell with upwards of one hundred men at Tubberneering. Gorey and Carlow also fell into the hands of the Rebels, but they were repulsed with immense slaughter at New Ross, after a conflict of ten hours; the loss of the King's troops did not exceed 250 men, but Lord Mountjoy,[4] Colonel of the County of Dublin Militia, was among the slain. On the following day about 250 Protestants of both sexes and of all ages were murdered in cold blood at Scullabogue in revenge for this defeat.

On the 9th of June a body of nearly 30,000 men made a furious attack upon Arklow; but General Needham[5] had collected about 1600 men, and, after a contest which lasted the whole day, the Rebels were defeated with great loss. This repulse gave a fatal blow to the insurrection in the south.

In the north the Rebels attacked Antrim on the 8th of June, and Lord O'Neil,[6] who resided in the immediate vicinity, was

caused no surprise. He was confined in Wexford, and when that town was taken by the Rebels, May 30, he was nominated their leader. On the re-capture of Wexford, he and Mr. Colclough took refuge in the Great Saltee, an island two miles from the coast. They were discovered there by a party of the Royals, and taken prisoners.

[1] John Henry Colclough, a Catholic gentleman of small property, and a near relation of Sir Vesey Colclough, executed June 28, 1798. He was an active leader of the rebels.

[2] Edward Fitzgerald, of Newpark, a man of considerable property. He remained in arms some time, and did not surrender till July 12, 1799, when his life was spared on condition of self-banishment.

[3] Colonel Lambert Theodore Walpole, D.A.G. in Ireland, grandson of Horace, 1st Lord Walpole of Wolterton, b. Dec. 28, 1757, killed June 4, 1798; m. April 11, 1788, Margaret, dau. of Robert, 1st Lord Clive.

[4] Right Hon. Luke Gardiner, created Lord Mountjoy Oct. 18, 1789, and made a Viscount Nov. 6, 1795, b. Feb. 7, 1745, killed June 5, 1798; m. 1st, July 3, 1773, Elizabeth, dau. of Sir William Montgomery, Bart.; 2nd, Oct. 20, 1793, Margaret, dau. of Hector Wallis, Esq. His first wife was sister to the Marchioness Townshend, and to Mrs. Beresford, wife of the Right Hon. John Beresford. These three ladies were celebrated for their beauty, and sat to Sir Joshua Reynolds for the "Three Graces adorning the altar of Hymen," in his picture now in the National Gallery. Lord Mountjoy held the lucrative patent office of Surveyor-General of Customs. M.P. for the County of Dublin from Oct. 1773 till he was created a Peer. His son was made Earl of Blessington.

[5] Major-General the Hon. Francis Needham, b. April 5, 1748, d. Nov. 21, 1832; m. Feb. 20, 1787, Anne, dau. of Thomas Fisher, Esq., of Acton. M.P. for Newry from Dec. 1806 till, on the death of his brother Robert, 11th Viscount Kilmorey, Dec. 14, 1818, he became 12th Viscount. Made Earl of Kilmorey Jan. 12, 1822. A General and Colonel of the 86th Regt. He was captured at York Town with Lord Cornwallis.

[6] John, 1st Viscount O'Neil, one of the very few Irish Peers of Milesian extraction who could trace their descent from the Kings of Ireland, b. 1739, died of his wounds June 17, 1798; m. Oct. 15, 1777, Henrietta, only child of Charles Viscount Dun-

dragged from his horse and murdered. On the 9th one skirmish took place at Saintsfield, and another, of a more serious nature, in the demesne of Lord Moira,[1] but in both the troops were victorious, and many of the rebel leaders were seized and executed. Though hitherto the royal arms had been almost uniformly successful, the extent of the insurrection occasioned general alarm, which was not diminished by the departure of Lady Camden[2] and many other ladies for England. Under these circumstances Ministers saw the necessity of uniting the civil and military authority in Ireland, and Lord Cornwallis was accordingly nominated to discharge the double duty. He reached Dublin June 20,[3] and immediately entered upon his office; but the capture of Wexford by General Moore,[4] on the 21st, and the total overthrow of the insurgents at Vinegar Hill relieved him from much of his anxiety. These events indeed more properly belong to Lord Camden's viceroyalty, as all the arrangements were made during his administration.

Lord Cornwallis had been armed with most extensive powers, and was authorised to grant an amnesty, almost upon any terms

garvon, who predeceased his father, John, 5th Earl of Cork. Created Lord O'Neil Nov. 30, 1793, and made a Viscount Oct. 6, 1795. M.P. for Randalstown, March, 1764, to 1783, and then for the County of Antrim till he was made a Peer. As a Commoner he took a very active part in Irish politics, and was one of the deputation who in 1789 was commissioned to offer the unrestricted Regency to the Prince of Wales. His residence, Shanes Castle, was always celebrated for its hospitality, and especially for private theatricals, in which Mrs. Siddons often took a part. Lord Mountjoy, whose death has just been mentioned, drew up, as a joke, a set of rules for the company, some of which are subjoined, and may give an idea of Irish habits:—

"Resolutions formed to promote regularity at Shanes Castle, at the meeting for the representation of Cymbeline, Nov. 20, 1785.

"1. That no noise be made during the forenoon, for fear of wakening the company.

"2. That there shall be no breakfast made after four o'clock in the afternoon, nor tea after one in the morning.

"3. To inform any stranger who may come in at breakfast, that we are not at dinner.

"4. That no person be permitted to go out airing after breakfast till the moon gets up, for fear of being overturned in the dark.

"5. That the respective grooms may put up their horses after four hours' parading before the hall door of the Castle.

"6. That there shall be one complete hour between each meal.

"7. That all the company must assemble at dinner before the cloth is removed.

"8. That supper may not be called for till five minutes after the last glass of claret.

"9. That no gentleman be permitted to drink more than three bottles of hock at or after supper.

"10. That all M.P.'s shall assemble on post-days in the coffee-room at four o'clock to frank letters."

[1] This skirmish at Ballynahinch is commemorated in the 'Anti-Jacobin,' July 9, 1798:—

"A certain great statesman, whom all of us know,
In a certain assembly, no long while ago,
Declared from this statement he never would flinch—
That no town was so loyal as Ballynahinch."

[2] Frances, dau. and sole heir of William Molesworth, Esq., of Wembury, brother of Sir John Molesworth, of Pencarrow, 5th Bart., b. 1759, d. July 7, 1829; m. Dec. 31, 1785.

[3] The insurgents had on the day previous murdered the Protestants in Wexford.

[4] Major-General, afterwards Lieut.-General, Sir John Moore, K.B., Colonel 52nd Regt., son of Dr. Moore, the author of 'Zeluco,' b. Nov. 13, 1761, killed at the battle of Corunna, Jan. 16, 1809, unm. He served with much distinction in many campaigns. M.P. for the Selkirk Boroughs from May, 1784, to June, 1790.

he chose, and especially he was to endeavour to repress, as far as possible, the spirit of vengeance, so generally engendered by civil war. The following correspondence will show how anxious he was to carry out instructions so much in consonance with his own feelings.

Some idea of the ruin and desolation spread over the country may be formed from the fact that 1,230,000*l.* (about one-half from the county of Wexford) was claimed as compensation for the property of loyalists destroyed, and a large proportion of this sum was paid by a vote of the Irish Parliament.

The following anonymous letter, one of several preserved in Dublin Castle from the same individual, was addressed in February, 1798, to the Irish Government. The writer was evidently a spy upon those with whom he must have been in confidential communication, and it is here inserted as it gives some curious particulars about the Rebels. It has not been found possible to obtain information about several of the persons mentioned, nor to explain all the allusions.

Tuesday, Feb. 6.

The Committee of Anecdote are collecting piles of facts. Carlow has furnished two hanging-matches, of which affidavits are made. Portarlington gives another act of torture by Casey, the magistrate who half strangled two—and on this fact an information is to be moved for in the King's Bench immediately.

A copy of Bird's[1] letter to the Lord Lieutenant is in preparation for the press. Others from the same hand will follow, he is determined (to adopt his own expression) "to let the cat out of the bag." The gaining over this man is undoubtedly a great acquisition. His lodgings are changed almost daily, and Dowling[2] the attorney only knows the places of his confinement.

The "United Englishmen" increase rapidly—they have determined to keep up a communication with the "United Irishmen" by delegates. I heard within this hour that two had arrived from London in that capacity.

Father Quigley[3] of Dundalk, after whom you enquired, has lately

[1] James Bird, *alias* Smith, an Englishman, probably a double spy. He swore informations against various persons, and then declined to repeat his evidence on the trials. He then wrote to Mr. Cooke, threatening to disclose all he knew, and sent his letter to the 'Press.' He was tried April 23, 1794, for a conspiracy to excite insurrection, and at the close of 1798 was apprehended for high treason.

[2] Matthew Dowling, an attorney in Dublin, an intimate private and political friend of Wolfe Tone, and often professionally engaged for him and his confederates. He was outlawed by Act of Parliament.

[3] Father Quigley, the same as O'Coigley, who was convicted at Maidstone. When seized at Margate, he went by the name of Captain Jones.

returned from France, in dress *à la militaire*, and passes as Captain Jones. He sent a long message from N. Tandy[1] to his son; but the latter cautiously avoided giving him an interview.

Wright, the surgeon of Great Sheep Street, has had a long conversation with J. Tandy, in which he urged him to send a paper from Wright to his father; and this he did in such a manner as has created in Wright's mind very strong doubts of his sincerity, indeed he conceives him to be a spy, and has resolved to avoid all future conversation with him. . . .

The resolution unanimously adopted by the Whig Club will probably vanish. Eight Members only attended the last meeting, and they adjourned without proceeding on any business for want of Members.

Of M'Dermot, who shot the woman in Thomas Street, it is said that he is the principal witness against the artillery soldiers who conspired to blow up Athlone—against him there will be a very serious prosecution.

There will also be an immediate prosecution, by information, against Casey the magistrate of Portarlington. The two men whom he hung up and cut down have made affidavits.

Nothing has come from the Great Nation for some time back; but the last communication from that quarter contained repeated assurances that "invasion should follow invasion, though defeat succeeded defeat, until Ireland was completely free."

Monday[2] I expect will make me acquainted with much material matter. You shall have it most minutely.

As to the system, the Societies are increasing rapidly and the upper classes are coming in; but this will be subject, in part, for Monday.

J. W.

[1] James Napper Tandy, b. 1740, d. a General of Brigade in the French service Aug. 24, 1803, a Protestant gentleman of small property, who forced himself into notoriety by incessant agitation in Dublin. Sir Jonah Barrington says that he was ungracious in his person, neither eloquent nor argumentative, generally violent, and often erroneous, that he possessed influence without rank or capacity, and acquired celebrity without any accountable reason. He was one of the early founders of the United Irish Society, where he became acquainted with Wolfe Tone. Soon after, his treasonable practices became known to the Government, and he thought it advisable to fly, first to Hamburgh, then, in 1795, to America, and thence to France. Having gone a second time to Hamburgh, he was there arrested at Sir James Crawford's demand, and sent as a prisoner to Ireland. Tone's assertion in his Memoirs, that Tandy's life was spared for fear of retaliation, is utterly unfounded. He was arraigned at Lifford Assizes, 1801, pleaded guilty, and was allowed to leave the country soon after. Subsequent letters will show how contemptible Lord Cornwallis thought him, and how ready he was to allow him to quit the country.

[2] If he did give further information on that Monday, the documents are lost.

RIGHT HON. W. PITT TO MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

MY DEAR LORD, House of Commons, Thursday, ½ past 5.

I have not had a moment since I received your Lordship's most welcome letter this morning, or I should sooner have expressed how much pleasure it gave me. I will not presume to say how much I feel myself obliged to you for such a mark of your confidence in the present Government. You have in my opinion conferred the most essential obligation on the public, which it can perhaps ever receive from the services of any individual.

I shall be happy to be honoured with your Lordship's commands as soon as you return from Suffolk.

You will, I trust, excuse the haste in which I am obliged to write this note. I could not delay till a more convenient time expressing what I feel on a subject so interesting to me.

I am, &c.,

W. PITT.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Whitehall, June 12, 1798.

There are accounts to-day of an insurrection in Antrim, and Lord Camden seems to have no doubt that the evil will spread. I shall set out for Ireland on Saturday, at least I see nothing at present to prevent it, and should be glad to see you, if you can possibly come up. Pelham [1] will go if his health will permit, and Brownrigg [2] has promised me to ask the Duke of York to let me have Captain Taylor,[3] with whom he is very sorry to part, but

[1] Right Hon. Thomas Pelham, afterwards, Jan. 8, 1805, 2nd Earl of Chichester, b. April 2, 1756, d. July 4, 1826; m. June 14, 1801, Henrietta Juliana, dau. of Francis, 5th Duke of Leeds. Surveyor-General of the Ordnance, April, 1782; Chief Secretary in Ireland under Lord Northington in 1782, and again under Lord Camden in 1795. Secretary of State July 30, 1801, to Aug. 1803, and Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster to June, 1804. Postmaster-General from April, 1807, till his death. M.P. in Ireland for Carrick 1782, Armagh 1795; and in England for Sussex from Oct. 1780 till summoned to the House of Lords as Lord Pelham, June, 1801. For some time previous to the arrival of Lord Cornwallis in Ireland, Lord Castlereagh had been discharging the duties of Chief Secretary, during the absence of Mr. Pelham from ill-health. It was now thought advisable to be prepared with a successor in the event of Mr. Pelham being unable to resume his office, and a negociation was entered into with Mr. Thomas Grenville; but before Mr. Pelham actually resigned (Nov. 2) Lord Castlereagh had proved himself so efficient that the Chief Secretaryship was conferred upon him. Mr. Pelham on his resignation retained the valuable office of Secretary of State for Ireland. See the Letters of Nov. 7 and Dec. 8 of this year.

[2] Colonel, afterwards General, Sir Robert Brownrigg, Bart. (so created March 9, 1816), G.C.B., Colonel 9th Regt., b. 1759, d. April 27, 1833; m. 1st, in Jamaica, April 8, 1783, Elizabeth Catherine, dau. of William Lewis, Esq., of that island, and 2nd, June 27, 1810, Sophia, dau. of Rev. Dr. Bissett of Knighton.

[3] Captain, afterwards Lieut.-General, Sir Herbert Taylor, G.C.B., Colonel 85th Regt.,

who will, he says, be a treasure to me. Macleod begs hard to go for a month or six weeks, and assures me the business will be so conducted as not to suffer by his absence. I have told him that he must obtain the consent of the Duke of York and Sir William Howe. I should certainly be very glad to have him. The Guards embarked last night,[1] and have, I hope, sailed this day.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO LIEUT.-COLONEL MACLEOD.

DEAR MACLEOD, Whitehall, June 18, 1798.

I am just returned from the King's Closet, and have stated to him your earnest wish to be allowed to accompany me to Ireland, for a certain time at least, and the desire which I felt of availing myself of your services. His Majesty expressed himself to be highly pleased with your zealous offer, and to be much disposed to gratify both you and me, by complying with your request, but he added, that he was apprehensive the service here must greatly suffer by the absence of the public officer,[2] and he desired me to tell him fairly, whether that would not be the case.

Called upon in this manner for my opinion, I could not help admitting that the service here must be liable to some inconvenience from your absence, upon which His Majesty desired me not to press him further on the subject.

I am sincerely sorry for this disappointment, on your account as well as my own, but on reflecting coolly on the business, I must confess I think the King is in the right.

Believe me, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

and First and Principal A.D.C. to the King, b. Sept. 29, 1779, d. at Rome April 20, 1839; m. Oct. 5, 1819, Charlotte Albinia, dau. of Edward Disbrowe, Esq., many years Vice-Chamberlain to the Queen. Sir Herbert was A.D.C. to the Duke of York in his campaigns, commanded a brigade in Holland in 1813, and was successively Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief (the Duke of York), Surveyor-General of the Ordnance, and Adjutant-General. In addition to these military offices he occupied from 1805 to 1811 the anomalous but most confidential post of Private Secretary to George III., whose blindness rendering him incapable of reading, every paper, however secret, passed through Sir Herbert's hands. He again occupied the same post under William IV. Sir Herbert was Master of St. Catherine's from Feb. 1819 till his death, and M.P. for Windsor from March, 1820, to Feb. 1823.

[1] The 3rd Battalion of the 1st, the 1st Battalion of the Coldstream, and the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Guards, left London on the 10th, under the command of Major-General Stanwix. These same battalions embarked in 1854 for the Crimea.

[2] Colonel Macleod was Deputy Adjutant-General of Artillery.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

MY DEAR LORD, Dublin Castle, June 21, 1798.

I arrived yesterday in the afternoon, and found General Lake's arrangements were made for attacking the Rebels at Wexford this morning at daybreak, which rendered it unnecessary for me to think of proceeding immediately to join the army.

From the very opportune arrival of the troops from England at Waterford, I trust there can be no doubt of General Lake's complete success.

There has been an inconsiderable rising between Bandon and Cloghnakilty, but the Rebels were soon routed and dispersed; I have heard that the object was only to rescue some prisoners, which is a practice not unusual in this country.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO LIEUT.-GENERAL LAKE.

DEAR SIR, Dublin Castle, June 22, 1798.

I have this instant received your letter from Enniscorthy,[1] which has afforded me the greatest satisfaction, and I request that you will assure the officers and soldiers under your command, that I am fully sensible of their meritorious and gallant conduct on this occasion.

I trust that before this letter reaches you, the town of Wexford[2] will have surrendered to you on the terms which you have so justly and properly demanded, and which it is so necessary for the future peace and safety of this country that you should obtain.

I beg that you will accept my sincere congratulations on your success, and am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

[1] Enniscorthy had been in the hands of the Rebels since the end of May. On Vinegar Hill, which overlooks the town, they had thrown up considerable works, occupied by a very large force. General Lake attacked them, June 21, with about 13,000 men in four columns, which were to have assailed the position simultaneously; but General Needham was accidentally delayed, and the Rebels, who made a feeble resistance, were thus enabled to escape through the pass which his corps would have closed. Although the action lasted some hours, the loss of the King's troops was very small: only one officer killed, and four wounded. The loss of the Rebels was very large, and their defeat fatal to their cause.

[2] Wexford was retaken by the King's troops June 21. It had been in possession of the Rebels since May 30.

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH TO LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR JAMES STEUART,[1] BART.

SIR, Dublin Castle, June 25, 1798.

. . . His Excellency the Lord Lieutenant highly approves of your issuing the most positive orders against the infliction of punishment under any pretence whatever, not authorized by the orders of a General Officer, in pursuance of the sentence of a general Court Martial.[2] . . . . I have the honour to be, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

MY LORD, Dublin Castle, June 27, 1798.

I have the honour of inclosing to your Grace the copies of a message[3] which I have this day sent to both Houses of Parliament, also of the addresses which in consequence thereof, and of my arrival here, have been unanimously passed by the Lords and Commons, and I am to request you will lay the same before His Majesty.

The address to H. M. was moved in the House of Lords by the Lord Chancellor,[4] and in the House of Commons by the Chancellor of the Exchequer,[5] seconded by the Honourable Mr. Trench.[6] The

[1] Lieut.-General, afterwards General, Sir James Stuart, of Coltness, 4th Bart., Colonel of 2nd Dragoons, b. Aug., 1744, d. Aug. 12, 1839; m. 1772, Alicia, dau. of William Blacker, Esq., of Carrick. M.P. for the county of Lanark from 1784 to 1802. He died the senior General in the service. His father was at Culloden, and obliged to expatriate himself.

[2] Several cases had occurred in which officers of very inferior rank, mostly in the militia and yeomanry, had, without first reporting to the Generals commanding, carried into effect the severe and sometimes unjust sentences of Courts Martial.

[3] Recommending them to avail themselves of the offer of various regiments of English Militia to serve in Ireland. The two Houses had adjourned on June 18, before Lord Cornwallis arrived, to June 27.

[4] John, 1st Lord Fitzgibbon, so created June 20, 1789, and made Earl of Clare June 10, 1795, and Lord Fitzgibbon in England Sept. 24, 1799, b. 1749, d. Jan. 28, 1802; m. July 1, 1786, Anne, dau. of Richard Chapel Whaley, Esq., of Whaley Abbey. Made Attorney-General Nov. 29, 1783, and Chancellor June 20, 1789. M.P. for the University of Dublin from March, 1778, to 1783, and for Kilmallock from 1783 till he was created a Peer.

[5] Right Hon. Sir John Parnell, Bart., d. Dec. 5, 1801; m. 1774, Letitia, dau. of the Right Hon. Sir Arthur Brooke, Bart., of Colebrooke. Commissioner of Revenue Dec. 5, 1780; Chancellor of Exchequer Sept. 15, 1785, and dismissed Jan. 27, 1799. M.P. for the Queen's County from 1783 till his death. He was great-nephew to Parnell the poet. His eldest son was a cripple of imbecile mind, and his estates were by Act of Parliament settled upon his second son Henry, afterwards Lord Congleton.

[6] Richard, eldest son of William, Lord Kilconnell (who was made Earl of Clancarty Feb. 11, 1803), b. May 19, 1767, d. Nov. 24, 1837; m. Feb. 9, 1796, Henrietta Margaret, dau. of the Right Hon. Thomas Staples. Commissioner of the Board of Control from May 31, 1804, to Feb. 12, 1806. Afterwards employed in various diplomatic missions, and made G.C.B. Created an English Baron Aug. 4, 1815, and a Viscount Nov. 17, 1824. M.P. for Newton Limavady from April, 1796, to 1797, and for Galway County till he succeeded to the Peerage, April 27, 1895.

addresses to myself were moved in the House of Lords by the Marquis of Waterford,[1] and in the Commons by Mr. Parnell,[2] who was seconded by Mr. Bushe.[3] The utmost warmth was expressed by the Chancellor, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as well of gratitude for the effectual exertions of Great Britain, as of indignation against those few persons who in the British Parliament have endeavoured to justify the present rebellion, and to impute it to the conduct of the Irish Parliament and Government, and the Chancellor intimated that he should further notice this conduct on a future day.[4]

A resolution was unanimously passed in the Committee of Ways and Means, to enable His Majesty to afford relief to loyalists who have suffered by the rebels. The amount of the loan was 100,000*l.* The vote for regulating the English militia while serving in Ireland passed both Houses, and is transmitted by the messenger who carries this despatch.

I have the honour, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

[Private.]

MY DEAR LORD, Dublin Castle, June 28, 1798.

From the number of days which have passed since my landing in this country, your Grace might naturally expect some confidential communication of my thoughts on the present state of affairs. But as you will have received the most ample information of every kind from Lord Camden, with whose general sentiments I perfectly concur, and who from his experience is more able to give

[1] George, 2nd Earl of Tyrone, and made, Aug. 19, 1789, Marquis of Waterford, K.P., b. Jan. 8, 1735, d. Dec. 3, 1800; m. Apr. 18, 1769, Elizabeth, only dau. of Henry Monck, Esq., of Charleville. Created Lord Tyrone in England Aug. 21, 1786. He was the head of the Beresford family, whose influence in Ireland was for many years predominant.

[2] Henry Parnell, 2nd son of Sir John Parnell, created Lord Congleton Aug. 20, 1841, b. July 3, 1776, d. June 8, 1842; m. Feb. 4, 1801, Caroline Elizabeth, dau. of John, 1st Earl of Portarlington. M.P. for Maryborough from 1797 to the Union; for Portarlington in 1802, but vacated the seat in December following; for the Queen's County from Jan. 1806 till Dec. 1832, when, without a struggle, he gave way to a demagogue named Lalor; for Dundee from April, 1833, till he was created a Peer. Secretary at War from April 4, 1831, to Feb. 1, 1832.

[3] Mr., afterwards Right Hon. Charles Kendal Bushe, b. Jan. 13, 1767, d. July 10, 1843; m. Dec. 11, 1793, Anne, dau. of John Crampton, Esq., of Merrion Square. Made Sergeant 1805, and in Nov. of the same year became Solicitor-General, which office he held till Feb. 22, 1822, when he was promoted to be Chief Justice of the King's Bench; resigned Nov. 10, 1841. M.P. for Callan 1796, vacated April, 1799; for Donegal Borough Jan. 1800 to the Union.

[4] Lord Clare alluded to Lord Moira, who had made a violent attack on the Irish Government in the English House of Lords, Nov. 22, 1797, and in the Irish, Feb. 19, 1798.

a detailed account of the situation of Ireland than myself, I shall not enter into a discussion of the subject until I am better prepared.

The accounts that you see of the numbers of the enemy destroyed in every action, are, I conclude, greatly exaggerated; from my own knowledge of military affairs, I am sure that a very small proportion of them only could be killed in battle, and I am much afraid that any man in a brown coat who is found within several miles of the field of action, is butchered without discrimination.

It shall be one of my first objects to soften the ferocity of our troops, which I am afraid, in the Irish corps at least, is not confined to the private soldiers.

I shall immediately authorize the General Officers in the different districts which have been the seat of warfare, to offer (with certain exceptions) to the deluded wretches who are still wandering about in considerable bodies, and are committing still greater cruelties than they themselves suffer, the permission of returning quietly to their homes, on their delivering up their arms, and taking the oath of allegiance, and I shall use my utmost exertions to suppress the folly which has been too prevalent in this quarter, of substituting the word *Catholicism* instead of Jacobinism, as the foundation of the present rebellion.

I have, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Dublin Castle, July 1, 1798.

You see that our success has hitherto been almost uninterrupted, and if we can defeat or disperse a party of the vagabonds who are assembled in the Wicklow Mountains, I think our civil war will, for the present, be nearly at an end, but we shall have made no progress towards permanent peace.

I am not prepared to say anything satisfactory either about measures or people. Lord Buckingham dined with me yesterday, and is all goodness and friendship. He talks most affectionately of you and Mrs. Ross. Dundas wrote to me to know whether we wanted all the regiments they were sending to us, and I have in answer assured him that in my opinion we had not the least occasion for them, and that the Bucks and Warwickshire were perfectly sufficient, unless a French force should invade us. The violence of our friends, and their folly in endeavouring to make it a religious war, added to the ferocity of our troops who delight in murder, most powerfully counteract all plans of conciliation.

The life of a Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland comes up to my idea of perfect misery, but if I can accomplish the great object of consolidating the British Empire, I shall be sufficiently repaid.

I am interrupted. God bless you.

Believe me, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

[Private and Confidential.]

MY LORD, Dublin Castle, July 8, 1798.

I not only wish to take the earliest opportunity of giving every light to His Majesty's confidential servants on the present state of our affairs, but to put them in possession of the best opinions which I have yet been able to form for extricating this country from the immediate danger with which it is threatened.

No actual force at this moment exists in arms against us, except in the county of Wicklow and the northern boundary of Wexford, and in the county of Kildare, and borders of the counties of Meath and Dublin.

In the former the Rebels act sometimes in small parties, but often in a considerable body, amounting, I believe (after due allowance for exaggeration) to at least five thousand men, the greater part of whom are armed only with pikes: the difficulty of coming up with an army of this kind without artillery and baggage, in that wild and mountainous country, has hitherto prevented our striking any serious blow, and the ignorance of our officers who have commanded small detachments, has afforded the Rebels some encouraging advantages; I am however at present arranging a plan of attacking them, which I hope will succeed so far as to disperse them, and to intimidate them so much as to prevent their assembling again in great numbers, which will to a certain degree have its effect in encouraging our friends and disheartening our enemies throughout the whole country; but I am not so sanguine as to hope to reduce the county of Wicklow to a peaceable state in a short time by force of arms.

The warfare in Kildare and the adjoining border of Meath is conducted on the part of the enemy entirely by small parties, which attack escorts and detachments, burn houses, murder those who will not join them, and retire to the bogs.

The rest of Ireland may, I am afraid, be rather said to be in a

state of *present* inactivity than of any friendly or even peaceable intentions towards us.

The Irish militia are totally without discipline, contemptible before the enemy when any serious resistance is made to them, but ferocious and cruel in the extreme when any poor wretches either with or without arms come within their power; in short murder appears to be their favourite pastime.

Under these circumstances I conceive it to be of the utmost advantage that we should put an end to hostilities, provided that measure can be effected by the submission, delivery of arms, and apparent penitence of the Rebels, who have been defeated in every action of consequence, who have lost many leaders by the hands of the executioner, and who, from all accounts, are in general heartily tired of the business in which they are engaged.

The proclamation[1] circulated by the Generals commanding in those districts which either are or have been in a state of insurrection, has, by the reports which I have received, been attended with considerable effect, but it has been represented to me that the greater number dare not desert their leaders, who have it in their power to destroy them if they should return to their houses, and these leaders are rendered desperate, by not having a hope held out to them that even their lives would be spared.

The term leader is indefinite, and it would not be easy to substitute any other denomination of persons for proscription, that would not, at least to the feelings of a guilty conscience, include every factious agitator of the present times.

In the proclamation of general pardon throughout the country, which I have now asked leave from His Majesty to issue (with the full approbation and concurrence of the Chancellor) I propose to exclude from security of life, only those who have been guilty of cool and deliberate murder, and to leave the leaders liable to banishment for such term as the safety of the state may require, to be extended in some instances to banishment for life; and it is proposed, after the report of a Secret Committee shall have been received, to require the surrender of three or four of the most

[1] This proclamation set forth, that although His Majesty's Generals had it in their power entirely to destroy all who had risen in rebellion, it was the wish of Government to receive into His Majesty's peace and pardon all such persons as had been seduced by traitorous machinations, or forced from their allegiance by acts of intimidation. The General commanding in each district was therefore authorised to invite those who were still assembled to surrender themselves and their arms, and to abandon their leaders within fourteen days. To all who would thus acknowledge their guilt, and abjure for the future any engagements at variance with their oath of allegiance, certificates for their protection would be given. These certificates were, by the lower classes, commonly called "Cornys."

dangerous persons, who are now supposed to be out of the country, within a reasonably limited time under pain of an Act of Attainder.

The process in Parliament will not, as I am assured, require above a fortnight's time, and I then propose to prorogue, for although it is the wish of everyone here to continue sitting and to pass Acts of Attainder, I am very sure, even if they could get a reasonable attendance, which the military duty of the Members renders impossible, that they are not at present in a temper to conduct a business of that nature with credit to themselves or utility to the state.

The principal persons of this country, and the Members of both Houses of Parliament, are, in general, averse to all acts of clemency, and although they do not express, and perhaps are too much heated to see the ultimate effects which their violence must produce, would pursue measures that could only terminate in the extirpation of the greater number of the inhabitants, and in the utter destruction of the country. The words Papists and Priests are for ever in their mouths, and by their unaccountable policy they would drive four-fifths of the community into irreconcilable rebellion; and in their warmth they lose sight of the real cause of the present mischief, of that deep-laid conspiracy to revolutionize Ireland on the principles of France, which was originally formed, and by wonderful assiduity brought nearly to maturity, by men who had no thought of religion but to destroy it, and who knew how to turn the passions and prejudices of the different sects to the advancement of their horrible plot for the introduction of that most dreadful of all evils, a Jacobin revolution.

I had written thus far, when I received the honour of your Grace's private and confidential letter dated the 4th instant, and am happy to find the sentiments of His Majesty's confidential servants so much in unison with those which I have above expressed, and I shall immediately consider the means of carrying the measures which they propose into effect, with as little deviation as local circumstances and the temper of the times will admit.

I should be very ungrateful if I did not acknowledge the obligations which I owe to Lord Castlereagh,[1] whose abilities, temper,

[1] Robert, Viscount Castlereagh, K.G., afterwards, April 8, 1821, 2nd Marquis of Londonderry, b. July 18, 1769, d. Aug. 12, 1822; m. Jan. 9, 1794, Emily, dau. and coheir of John, 2nd Earl of Buckinghamshire. Keeper of the Signet in Ireland, July 25, 1797. Chief Secretary from 1798 to May 21, 1801. President of the Board of Control from July, 1802, to July, 1805. Secretary for the Colonial Department to Jan. 1806; and again from March, 1807, to Sept. 1809. Secretary for the Foreign Department from March, 1812, till his death. M.P. in England for Tregony and Orford from May, 1794, to July, 1797: and in Ireland for the county of Down from 1790 to the Union. He sat in the Imperial Parliament for the county of Down from the Union to July, 1805; for

and judgment, have been of the greatest use to me, and who has on every occasion shown his sincere and unprejudiced attachment to the general interests of the British Empire.

I have, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

The Duke of Portland had written on the 4th of July, "I submit to your Excellency's better judgment, the propriety of passing an act of grace, extending to all seditions, &c., committed previous to a day to be named, with many exceptions."

The second proclamation of general pardon, referred to in the foregoing letter, does not appear to have been issued; but for it, was substituted a Bill of pardon, less favourable to the Rebels than the proclamation would probably have been. A message was sent by Lord Cornwallis to the House of Commons on the 17th, and to the House of Lords on the 19th of July, stating that a Bill with the royal sign manual, would shortly be presented, granting, with certain exceptions, a general pardon to the Rebels. The details of the conspiracies were also to be laid upon the table,[1] and the Lord Lieutenant expressed his conviction that Parliament would adopt such measures as circumstances appeared to render necessary. He further recommended that the loyalists should receive compensation[2] for their losses, and declared that the military authorities had orders to proceed with vigour.

All Bills reversing attainders or granting pardon must receive the royal signature before they are submitted to Parliament, and as no subsequent alterations can be made, every detail must previously be most carefully considered. So many objections and difficulties were raised in England, that much time was occupied in their discussion, and the Bill did not receive the royal assent until October 6, the last day of the session. One peculiarity attending this act of grace was, that it was granted pending the rebellion.

The exceptions[3] in this act of pardon were so numerous, that

Boroughbridge and Plympton to 1812; again for Down till his accession to the Peerage; and for Orford from that time until his death. The only other members of the House of Commons who, during a period of 150 years, have been Knights of the Garter are—Sir Robert Walpole, Lord North, and Lord Palmerston. Lord Castlereagh's first contest for Down in 1790 lasted 42 days, and cost 60,000*l*. The poll was—

Hon. Arthur Hill (Lord Downshire)	3534
Hon. R. Stewart (Lord Castlereagh)	3114
Hon. Edward Ward	2958
George Matthews	2223

[1] These papers were referred to the Secret Committees.

[2] According to Gordon, in his History of the Rebellion, the demands for compensation sent in, amounted to 1,033,000*l*. Provision was ultimately made for the payment, after a close examination, of each claim, from which a graduated deduction, in the highest class of 40 per cent., was made.

[3] The principal exceptions were—all persons in custody on Jan. 1, 1795, or who had since been arrested on a charge or a suspicion of treason; all charged with deliberate murder, or conspiracy to murder; all volun-

few of those who had taken any active part in the rebellion, were benefited by its operation, but were compelled to apply individually for conditional pardon, which was seldom refused. Notwithstanding the exclusion of so many classes of persons, this act was considered a great boon, as it relieved from the terror of the law most of the inferior rebels, who, had they been driven to despair, might have become formidable as banditti.[1]

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Dublin Castle, July 9, 1798.

Although there is no enemy here to oppose a large body of our troops in the field, we are still engaged in a war of plunder and massacre, but I am in great hopes that partly by force, and partly by conciliation, we shall bring it to a speedy termination. The minds of the principal people here are much heated, and I must confess not without reason, but the Chancellor and the Speaker[2] have agreed to everything that I proposed, and I have no doubt that the Members of Parliament will easily be persuaded to do what

teers or yeomen who administered illegal oaths, or who had deserted to the enemy; all who had promoted the invasion, or conspired with the enemy; all members of executive, national, provincial, or county committees; all rebel officers, down to captains, inclusive; all who should not surrender their arms within a time to be fixed by the Lord-Lieutenant; all attainted, or to be during the session attainted, for high treason; all who, since Nov. 1797, had offended against the Mutiny Act, or who had, since May 24, 1798, been convicted by court-martial of rebellious conduct; and, lastly, 31 persons excepted by name.

[1] Four other Bills connected with the rebellion also received the royal assent Oct. 6; Chap. 74, "An Act of Indemnity;" Chap. 77, "An Act for attainting Lord Edward Fitzgerald, Mr. Grogan, and Mr. Harvey;" Chap. 78, "An Act forbidding, under severe penalties, all communication between any persons residing in Ireland and those who had been banished; and making the return to Ireland after sentence of transportation by a court-martial a transportable felony;" and Chap. 80, "An Act to compel certain persons therein named, 51 in number, to surrender on or before Dec. 1, 1798, or to be subject to the penalties of high treason." Among these 51 the most prominent were, Tandy, Lewins, Wolfe Tone, Duckett President for the United Irish at Hamburgh, Deane Swift, Major Plunkett, Harvey Morres, and Anthony Maccan. The latter established himself at Altona, where several years later he met Thomas Campbell, who made him the subject of his poem the 'Exile of Erin:'—

"There came to the beach a poor exile of Erin,
The dew on his thin robe hung heavy and chill,
For his country he sighed when at twilight repairing
To wander alone by the wind-beaten hill.
But the day-star attracted his eyes' sad devotion,
For it rose o'er his own native isle of the ocean,
Where once in the pride of his youthful emotion
He sang the bold anthem of Erin go Bragh."

[2] Right Hon. John Foster, b. Sept. 28, 1740, d. Aug. 22, 1828; m. Dec. 14, 1764, Margaretta Amelia, dau. of Thomas Burgh, Esq., of Bert, M.P. (she was created Baroness Oriel, May 31, 1790, and made Viscountess Ferrard Nov. 7, 1797, Irish honours). Mr. Foster held the patent place of Customer and Collector of the Port of Dublin from 1778 till May 4, 1784, when he was made Chancellor of the Exchequer in Ireland, which office he resigned in Sept. 1785, upon being chosen Speaker of the House of Commons. As the Union extinguished the Speakership, Mr. Foster received as compensation an annuity of 5038*l.* 8*s.* 4*d.* He was again Chancellor of the Irish Exchequer from July 12, 1804, to Feb. 24, 1806; and a third time from April 30, 1807, to Aug. 3, 1812. He sat for the county of Louth in the Irish and English parliaments from 1769 till July 17, 1821, when he was created Lord Oriel in England.

is proper. I am heartily vexed at the state of things in the Mediterranean,[1] and do not see how we are to extricate ourselves. Of all the situations which I ever held, the present is, by far, the most intolerable to me, and I have often within this last fortnight wished myself back in Bengal. But having got into the scrape, I am sensible that it is foolish to complain, and that it is now my business to get through it with as much credit as I can.

I have every reason to be highly satisfied with Lord Castlereagh, who is really a very uncommon young man, and possesses talents, temper, and judgment suited to the highest stations, without prejudices, or any views that are not directed to the general benefit of the British Empire.

Believe me, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Dublin Castle, July 13, 1798.

I shall send you a few lines whenever I have five minutes to spare, without having anything particular to communicate, as is at present the case. Our war is reduced to a predatory system in the mountains of Wicklow[2] and the bogs of Kildare, in the latter of which counties, under the fostering hand of Lord Edward Fitzgerald, and the countenance which it received from his weak brother of Leinster,[3] rebellion has taken the deepest root. The numbers in each quarter are, from the best accounts that I receive, very small; they have very few arms, and, except as a band of cruel robbers, house-burners, and murderers, are very contemptible. Their importance, however, is purposely exaggerated by those who wish to urge Government to the continuance of violent measures, or, according to a fashionable phrase of some men of great consequence here, *to keep Government up to their traces.* I apprehend that I am suspected of not being disposed to set my neck stoutly to the collar.

I have been perfectly circumspect in every word that I have uttered, but I have been under the necessity of acting from a conviction that, as far as it concerns the great mass of the deluded people, amnesty is more likely to succeed than extirpation; and

[1] Malta had been taken by Bonaparte on the 12th of June.

[2] In a letter to Mr. Wickham, dated July 9, Mr. Cooke says, "I could not conceive so much obstinacy. The mere republicans submitted at once in the north. The papist fanatics are hardly to be subdued at all. They call the body in the mountains 'The Irish and Catholic Army.'"

[3] William Robert, 2nd Duke of Leinster, K.P., b. March 13, 1749, d. Oct. 20, 1804; m. Nov. 4, 1775, Emilia Olivia, sole dau. of St. George, only Lord St. George of the 2nd creation.

even in respect to the leaders of small note, to suggest that banishment for seven or ten years would answer all the purposes to the State of banishment for life or hanging, which latter is the most favourite kind of punishment.

My sentiments have coincided with those of the British Cabinet and with those of the Chancellor, whose character has been much misrepresented in England. Almost all the other principal political characters here are absurdly violent. Lord Castlereagh is a very able and good young man, and is of great use to me; I doubt much, from what I have heard, whether I should not go on full as well with him as with Pelham. I shall, however, give no public opinion on that head, and let the business take its chance. Excuse my leaving off abruptly. Believe me, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

RIGHT HON. LODGE MORRES[1] TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

MY LORD, July 14, 1798.

I have the honour to acknowledge your Grace's favour of the 4th instant.

I have always looked up to you for every virtue that could adorn the most exalted character, and have ever found them in your possession; and to be esteemed the attached and unalterable friend of your Grace is the highest satisfaction of my heart; in that light I offered my services to Lord Camden, and relinquished my party and broke them up; I showed the Opposition of Ireland when and where to stop, and I succeeded; the value of my friendship was so far estimated that I was desired to name my objects, which I did; they were a Commissionership of the Treasury and a Peerage, and they were acceded to.

When a vacancy happened I was pressed by his Excellency to accept the latter, which having declined, he was then for the first time pleased to think they were incompatible; but Mr. Pelham encouraged me to believe that objection would be got over with your Grace's assistance; I am therefore obliged most reluctantly

[1] Right Hon. Lodge Morres, b. Jan. 26, 1747, d. Sept. 21, 1822; m. 1st., Jan. 1771, Mary, dau. and heir of Joseph Fade, Esq., of Dublin; 2nd, Aug. 6, 1804, Catherine, dau. of George White, Esq., of Castle Bellingham. Receiver-General of the Post-Office from 1784 to 1793. Master of the Permit Office, which he resigned in 1789. Under-Secretary from Feb. 7 to May 15, 1795. Commissioner of the Treasury from 1796 to 1806. He came into Parliament in 1768, and, except for a short time in 1796, sat without intermission for Innistiogue, Bandon, Ennis, and Dingle Icouch, until the Union. He took a very active part in politics, and, till near the close of his parliamentary career, generally supported the Whig party.

The application made in this letter was not immediately successful, but he was, July 30, 1800, created Baron, and Jan. 22, 1816, made Viscount Frankfort.

to renew my application for your interference. In order to do away the precedent, if it should be insisted on, I am ready to agree to any reasonable exchange of office whenever it can be procured. I plead 28 years' services in the House of Commons, the engagements of the Duke of Rutland and Lord Fitzwilliam,[1] your Grace's and Mr. Pelham's partiality. I am prepared to bring a friend into the House of Commons to supply my place, but still something more is demanded, which I am not at liberty to mention,[2] but which when you shall be informed of, I entreat to be allowed to reply to before I have the misfortune to lose my rank in the present promotion. I am to observe no other person brings in a friend to supply his place but myself.

I have the honour, &c.,

LODGE MORRES.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

MY LORD, Dublin Castle, July 15, 1798.

. . . I inclose to your Grace a copy of the message which I propose to send to both Houses of Parliament on Tuesday next, and which will, I trust, appear to you to be written in perfect conformity with the spirit of your private and confidential letter of the 4th instant. The Chancellor entirely approves of the message, and although the feeling of some of the most violent may at first revolt against any measure of amnesty to rebels, I can entertain no doubt that it will be received without much opposition, and perhaps it will be rather desirable to have some debate.

It would greatly strengthen our cause if we could venture to allow the whole or any part of the correspondence with France to

[1] William, 4th Earl Fitzwilliam in Ireland and 2nd in England, b. May 30, 1748, d. Feb. 8, 1833; m. 1st, July 11, 1770, Charlotte, dau. of William 2nd Earl of Bessborough, and 2nd, July 21, 1823, Louisa, dau. of Richard 3rd Viscount Molesworth, and widow of William 1st Lord Ponsonby. Appointed Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland Dec. 10, 1794, but removed in the following March (see Parliamentary Debates of 1795). Lord Fitzwilliam identified himself with Mr. Grattan and his friends, and to gratify them dismissed, or threatened to dismiss, many warm political supporters of Mr. Pitt from offices they had long held. During his administration he endeavoured to remove Mr. Beresford from the offices he held. The manner was so offensive, and the language Lord Fitzwilliam used in writing to Lord Carlisle on the subject so strong, that Mr. Beresford called him out soon after the return of the former to England. They met, June 26, near Tyburn turnpike, but the police interfered. In 1798, when the Duke of Norfolk was dismissed from the Lord-Lieutenancy of the West Riding, and also from his Colonelcy of Militia, for giving a seditious toast, Lord Fitzwilliam succeeded him in the first office, and it is somewhat singular that he himself should have been removed in 1819 for presiding at a meeting called to express sympathy with seditious demagogues. President of the Council from July 11 to Dec. 17, 1794, and again from Feb. 19 to Oct. 8, 1806.

[2] This allusion is nowhere explained. Mr. Morres warmly supported the Union.

be produced in the report of the Secret Committee, but I would not authorise it without the previous sanction of your Grace.

Your Grace will of course be aware that no account will be given, even to the Secret Committee, of the means by which those papers, including Dr. M'Nevin's memoir, came into the hands of Government. . . . I have, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

In another letter, written on the following day, Lord Cornwallis suggests to the Duke of Portland that the amnesty should be proclaimed with as little delay as possible, and requests that a Bill with the royal sign manual may be sent over at once for that purpose, which on July 17th the Duke of Portland announces would forthwith be done.

THE DUKE OF PORTLAND TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Received July 16.]

MY LORD, Whitehall, July 13, 1798.

. . . The manner in which your Excellency describes the state of Ireland so exactly corresponds with the report which has been made of it by your most worthy and respectable predecessor, and the plan of measures you propose to pursue is so exactly conformable to the ideas and wishes which His Majesty's confidential servants had formed for your conduct, that I have it only in command from His Majesty to express to you his entire approbation of the temper, moderation, and firmness with which you have conducted yourself, and of those lenient and conciliatory means you propose to employ for bringing back his deluded people of Ireland to a proper sense of their duty, and of the blessings to which they are entitled under their present form of Government.

I have, &c.,

PORTLAND.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. W. PITT.

DEAR SIR, Dublin Castle, July 20, 1798.

I return you many thanks for your letter, and shall take it as a favour if you will have the goodness to suggest anything that may occur to you. In the direction of parliamentary and legal proceedings; I cannot feel very confident in my own judgment, and although I have the advantage of hearing the opinion of men of

ability in this country, it will always give me the greatest satisfaction to know your sentiments.

The evidence that has been given on the trials here, and especially on that of Maccan,[1] proves in the clearest manner the existence of the conspiracy, and the guilt of Lord Edward; but if no legal obstacles occur, we shall pass a Bill of Attainder before the prorogation of Parliament. The leaders of the Rebels, who still continue in arms in the counties of Kildare and Wicklow, have for some time been making proposals for surrendering, but from the ill-management of General Wilford,[2] that business is at this moment rendered more difficult; as he chose to receive and transmit to Government some rather insolent propositions from them, after they had offered, and I had consented to accept, their submission, without any other terms than that their lives should be spared, and that they should be allowed to choose America or any other country in amity with Great Britain, for the place of their perpetual banishment. If the rebellion should now be completely subdued there remains much to be done to put this country into a tolerable state of security, and how or when to bring forward, or even to broach, the great point of ultimate settlement is a matter in which I cannot see the most distant encouragement. The two or three people whom I have ventured, in the most cautious manner, to sound, say that it must not be mentioned now—that this is a time of too much danger to agitate such a question; but if a period o safety should come, when boroughs will be considered as a sure property, and all good jobs again appear within our grasp, that moment will not, I am afraid, be found propitious for expecting those sacrifices which must be required. Convinced as I am that it is the only measure which can long preserve this country, I will never lose sight of it; and happy shall I be if that fortunate opportunity should ever arrive when we may neither think ourselves in too much danger nor in too much security to suffer its production.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

Lord Cornwallis in this letter mentions the mismanagement of General Wilford with regard to the rebel leaders. There are two

[1] John Maccan, a leading Rebel, delegate from Kildare, and Secretary of the Leinster Provincial Committee. Believing Reynolds to be a friend, he furnished him with the information and pass-words, which enabled the police to effect the arrest at Bond's, where Maccan himself was taken. Convicted July 17, and executed on the 19th. He had been clerk to Messrs. Guinness, the well-known Dublin brewers, and afterwards to Jackson, an ironfounder, a brother-in-law of Oliver Bond, and deeply implicated in the conspiracy.

[2] Major-General, afterwards General, Wilford, Colonel 7th Dragoon Guards, d. Dec. 1822. He was A.D.C. to General Burgoyne at Saratoga, and was employed in Holland and St. Domingo.

despatches from that officer, dated July 17 and 18, stating that he had endeavoured to open a communication with the Rebels, in order to give greater publicity to the late proclamations; and that accordingly at Sallins, a small town two miles from Naas, he had been met by Mr. Aylmer[1] on the part of the Kildare Rebels, and by Mr. Edward Fitzgerald[2] of Newpark, a gentleman of considerable property in Wexford, on the part of the Rebels of that county and of Wicklow, who were desirous of proposing terms of surrender. General Wilford added, "Mr. Fitzgerald appears earnestly inclined to promote to the utmost of his power the faithful performance of the conditions stipulated, and an unreserved surrender of all the arms in their possession, asserting that he was authorised by Perry,[3] Garrett Byrne,[4] and the other leaders in Wicklow and Wexford, to act and engage for them." He also mentioned a letter written by Lord Buckingham to Mr. Aylmer's father, with whom he had been acquainted during his Lord-Lieutenancy, "containing many expressions of encouragement to submission, on which they have formed sanguine hopes of mercy and forgiveness," and announced that "hostilities are by mutual agreement suspended in the county of Kildare," until an answer could be received to the terms which were enclosed for the Lord-Lieutenant's consideration; and that information of this armistice had been "forwarded to General Myers,[5] or the officer commanding at Trim or Kilnock."

[1] William Aylmer, of Painstown, eldest son of a gentleman of some property, b. 1777, d. June 21, 1820. He surrendered July 12 to General Dundas, on the sole condition that his life should be spared. Mr. Wickham, Feb. 23, 1799, wrote from the Home Office to Lord Castlereagh—"Mr. Wogan Browne has brought here to-day young Aylmer, who acted so distinguished a part in the rebellion. May he remain in England?" He entered the Austrian service in 1801, and commanded the escort which accompanied Marie Louise from Paris to Vienna in 1814, soon after which he resigned his commission, and went to South America, where he was Colonel of a regiment of Lancers under General Devereux. Severely wounded at the battle of Rio de la Hache, he was conveyed to Jamaica, but died on landing.

[2] Mr. Fitzgerald accepted the same terms as Mr. Aylmer. Both were banished.

[3] John Perry, a Protestant gentleman of considerable property in Wicklow. He was a man of weak character, and easily induced to join in the conspiracy. Early in May he was arrested and confined at Gorey, but released on the 28th, as he had given much useful information. Being, however, coolly received by the gentlemen of his county, he again joined the Rebels, and after the capture of Wexford fled to the Wicklow mountains. During his march thither, on Friday, June 22, the party under his command committed such atrocities at Gorey that for many years the day was spoken of as "Bloody Friday." Just before the final suppression of the rebellion he was taken at Edenderry, in the King's County, and hanged.

[4] Garrett Byrne, of Ballynamus, a Roman Catholic gentleman of considerable estate. He and his brother William both joined the Rebels. The latter, who had been a yeoman, commanded the Ballynamus rebel corps at Arklow. He was taken, tried by a court-martial, June 24, and sentenced to death, but, owing to repeated applications for mercy, he was not executed till the close of September. Garrett Byrne ultimately surrendered to General Moore. His life was spared on condition of perpetual exile.

[5] Major-General, afterwards General, Sir William Myers, Bart., so created July 3, 1804, b. March 1, 1751, d. July 29, 1805; m. Aug. 1779, Elizabeth, dau. of James M'Evers, Esq., of New York. Commander-in-Chief in the Leeward Islands from 1803 till his death.

Lord Castlereagh answered the same day:—"I am desired to express his Excellency's surprise that you should have entered into an armistice with the Rebels, not only extending to your own post, but to those commanded by other officers, without having communicated with, or received the Lord-Lieutenant's authority for that purpose. Lord Cornwallis has always declined entering into any formal treaty with rebels in arms; and he cannot but express his great disapprobation of your having accredited by your signature a proposal, highly exceptional and assuming in its terms, coming from leaders to whom the proclamation sent to you for publication did not apply. Aylmer, Luby,[1] Ware,[2] and M'Cormick,[3] rebel leaders in Kildare, had reason to know some days since, that upon surrendering within a certain time their lives would be spared. Although they professed at first to look for no further indulgence, they have since continually trifled with Government, and have failed to surrender within the time prescribed. It is his Excellency's command that you do return to them forthwith the proposal in question, and put an end to the armistice immediately; but as there may have arisen some delay in the merciful intentions of his Excellency being made known, he is willing to extend the time for receiving their submission for 24 hours from the communication of your reply; at the expiration of which time it is his Excellency's pleasure that you do publish a reward of 1000*l.* for the apprehension of Aylmer, and 300*l.* for each of the other persons above named."

This determined conduct of Lord Cornwallis produced the desired effect, and the disturbed counties were relieved from most of the desperadoes who had infested those districts. Two bands of mere robbers, alone remained in arms in the neighbourhood of Enniscorthy, and in the woods eight miles in circumference about Kilaughan, whence they acquired the name of "the Babes in the Wood." Their leaders were Hackett,[4] a thorough ruffian, and Holt,[5]

[1] George Luby, a grazier of Cockeranstown, was one of the Belfast United Irishmen.

[2] Hugh Ware, a surveyor, b. 1772, d. Mar. 5, 1846; confined in Kilmainham till the peace of Amiens, when he went abroad, entered the French service, and rose to the rank of colonel.

[3] Richard M'Cormick, a stuff-manufacturer in Dublin, formerly secretary to the Catholic Committee. A warrant was issued against him in 1797, but he made his escape Feb. 20, 1798. Later in life he was allowed to return to Ireland.

[4] Hackett set up as an independent bandit in Sept. 1798, and was killed Nov. 20 following, in an attack on Emma Vale, near Arklow, the house of Captain Atkins, who was agent to Lord Carysfort, and commanded the Arklow yeomanry.

[5] Joseph Holt, son of a respectable farmer, and one of Sir J. Blaquiere's Deputy Alnagers, b. 1756, d. May 16, 1826; m. 1782, Hester Long, dau. of a Protestant farmer. In May, 1798, he commenced his career with about 500 men; his followers at one time amounted to 1000, but dwindled down at last, when Hackett and Doyle left him, to about 50. A reward of 300*l.* was offered for him, and he at last surrendered, Nov. 10, 1798, and gave much information. Trans-

whose conduct had been less atrocious, and who at last surrendered to Lord Powerscourt,[1] on the sole condition that his life should be spared. The actual or anticipated surrender of Aylmer and his associates, was not without its due effect upon the prisoners then confined in Dublin, who were closely connected with many of them; and the proposal mentioned in the despatch of July 26 was probably accelerated by the events above stated.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE BISHOP OF LICHFIELD AND COVENTRY.

DEAR JAMES, Dublin Castle, July 22, 1798.

I have every reason to be satisfied with Horace's[2] conduct; he is good-tempered and well-bred, and seems to be universally liked. The life of an aide-de-camp at Dublin is certainly more idle than I could wish for his sake, and I do not see any mode of employing him; but he lives in as good company as this country affords, and is constantly invited to dinners and parties in the principal towns.

Our warfare, for the present at least, is nearly at an end; the most active leaders of the Rebels in Wexford and Kildare have surrendered on condition of their lives being spared, and, except some parties in the mountains of Wicklow, I know of no hostile force in arms against us. This tranquillity is, however, I am persuaded, to be attributed more to their fear than to their affection. All that you see in the papers of my having had any difference here with the principal personages in public stations is entirely groundless.

Your truly affectionate brother,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Dublin Castle, July 24, 1798.

The overt rebellion is certainly declining, and the principal leaders in Kildare have surrendered with a stipulation for their lives only, but the whole country is in such a state that I feel frightened and ashamed whenever I consider that I am looked

ported to New South Wales Jan. 1, 1799, and returned to Dublin April, 1814, having behaved very well during his exile.

[1] Richard, 4th Viscount Powerscourt, b. Oct. 29, 1762, d. July 9, 1809; m. 1st, June 30, 1789, Catherine, dau. of John 1st Earl of Clanwilliam, and 2nd, Feb. 6, 1796, Isabella, dan. of the Right Hon. William Brownlow. During the rebellion he never abandoned his residence, as the large majority of the gentry did, but armed his tenants, and effectually protected his and their property.

[2] Horace Cornwallis, Ensign in the 1st Regt. of Guards, 2nd son of the Bishop of Lichfield and Coventry, b. March 28, 1780, d. unm. at Hamburgh, Feb. 6, 1799. His elder brother James became 5th and last Earl Cornwallis.

upon as being at the head of it. Except in the instances of the six[1] state trials that are going on here, there is no law either in town or country but martial law, and you know enough of that to see all the horrors of it, even in the best administration of it, judge then how it must be conducted by Irishmen heated with passion and revenge. But all this is trifling compared to the numberless murders that are hourly committed by our people without any process or examination whatever. The yeomanry are in the style of the Loyalists in America, only much more numerous and powerful, and a thousand times more ferocious. These men have saved the country, but they now take the lead in rapine and murder. The Irish militia, with few officers, and those chiefly of the worst kind, follow closely on the heels of the yeomanry in murder and every kind of atrocity, and the Fencibles take a share, although much behindhand with the others. The feeble outrages, burnings, and murders which are still committed by the Rebels, serve to keep up the sanguinary disposition on our side; and as long as they furnish a pretext for our parties going in quest of them, I see no prospect of amendment.

The conversation of the principal persons of the country all tend to encourage this system of blood, and the conversation even at my table, where you will suppose I do all I can to prevent it, always turns on hanging, shooting, burning, &c., &c., and if a priest has been put to death the greatest joy is expressed by the whole company. So much for Ireland and my wretched situation.

Believe me, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EDWARD COOKE,[2] ESQ., TO WILLIAM WICKHAM,[3] ESQ.

[Private.]

DEAR SIR, Dublin Castle, July 24, 1798.

The accepting the submission of the Kildare leaders has not given much satisfaction, but I believe it has shortened the rebellion,

[1] Of Henry and John Sheares; Byrne, Maccan, Bond, and Neilson.—See Howell's State Trials, vol. 27.

[2] Edward Cooke, son of the Rev. W. Cooke, Provost of King's College, Cambridge, b. 1755, d. Mar. 19, 1820; m. Isabella, dau. of Hamilton Gorges, Esq., M.P. for Meath County, whose other dau. m. Major Sandys. Mr. Cooke went to Ireland in 1778 with Sir Richard Heron, Chief Secretary to Lord Buckinghamshire. After filling several inferior offices he was appointed, in 1789, Under-Secretary. Removed by Lord Fitzwilliam, restored by Lord Camden, and resigned 1801. Under-Secretary of War and Colonies 1804 to 1807. Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office from 1812 to 1817. M.P. for Lifford from Jan. to July, 1790, and then for Old Leighlin till the Union.

[3] Mr., afterwards the Right Hon. William Wickham, b. 1761, d. Oct. 22, 1840; m. Eleonora Magdalene, dau. of M. Louis Bertrand of Geneva. Under-Secretary in the Home Department from 1798 to 1800. Afterwards employed as a diplomatist, especially in Switzerland. Chief Secretary in Ireland from Feb. 13, 1802, to Feb. 6, 1804; and a Lord of the Treasury from Feb. 13, 1806, to April, 1807. M.P. for Heytesbury Feb. 1802, for Cashel to 1806, and for Callington to 1807.

which is of more consequence. Some small parties are plundering in the Wicklow mountains still, but we trust they will be rooted out in a day or two. The people are endeavouring to obtain protection, and I believe are in general heartily tired. I conversed a good deal with Fitzgerald, one of the Wexford leaders; he said that at first his men fought well, but latterly would not stand at all; that he and the other leaders had but little command; that the mob were furious, and wanting to massacre every Protestant; and that the only means they had of dissuading them from burning houses was, that they were destroying their own property.

Mr. Ogle[1] was this day elected member for the city of Dublin. He formerly represented Wexford. He is a very honourable character, but uniformly resisted the concessions to the Catholics. What is singular, Lord Mountjoy was one of the foremost in moving those concessions, and Ogle warned him at the time to take care that he did not fall the first sacrifice to them.

Believe me, &c.,

E. COOKE.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

[Private.]

MY DEAR LORD, Dublin Castle, July 26, 1798.

A proposition of an extraordinary nature was brought to me on the night of the 24th, from a number of the state prisoners, and the greater part of the men of consequence amongst them (a list[2] of their names is enclosed) offering to make acknowledgement of their offences, and to submit to banishment for life to any country in amity with His Majesty, provided that Byrne[3] and Oliver Bond who were then under sentence of death, and Neilson[4] who is not yet

[1] Right Hon. George Ogle, b. 1742, d. 1814. M.P. for County Wexford 1770 to 1797, and for the City of Dublin 1798 to 1802. In 1784 he obtained the valuable patent place of Registrar of Deeds, for which he had a compensation of 1300*l.* a year. He fought a duel with a Mr. Coyle, a Roman Catholic distiller, remarkable for the fact that eight shots were exchanged. Mr. Ogle had been amongst the most violent supporters of the Volunteers, and of the "rights of the people," by which he meant exclusive Protestant domination.

[2] This list, containing 64 names, is preserved in the State Paper Office. It includes almost all the leading men who were in prison awaiting their trial.

[3] William Michael Byrne, of Parkhill, a Catholic of good family and of some property; b. 1773, convicted July 21, and executed on the 28th. He was delegate from Wicklow, and had been a yeoman in the Mount Kennedy Corps.

[4] Samuel Neilson, son of a Presbyterian minister in Belfast, b. Sept. 1761, d. Aug. 29, 1803, in America. Originally a woollen-draper in his native town; he abandoned his business early in 1791, when the violence of his political opinions soon led to his imprisonment in Dublin. In the beginning of 1798 he was released on bail, pledging himself never again to join in any treasonable plots; in direct violation of his promise he connected himself with Lord Edward Fitzgerald, and became an active member of the Ulster Committee. In consequence he had been again arrested and arraigned, but there would have been the less objection to

tried, but who is likely to be condemned, might be included in the offer and be allowed to share the same fate with them. Your Grace will observe that it is in general supposed, that there is scarcely any one of the prisoners, except Neilson, against whom there is any evidence that is likely to convict him.

I confess that I thought this a question of the greatest importance, and one that deserved the most mature consideration, and Lord Castlereagh was of the same opinion, but we doubted whether it would be possible to find a third man in this place that would agree with us, and I was sensible of the danger of taking a step without some legal or political support, that would irritate almost to madness the well-affected part of this kingdom. There was but little time for deliberation, as Byrne was to be hanged on the 25th, and Oliver Bond this day. The Chancellor, who, notwithstanding all that is said of him, is by far the most moderate and right-headed man amongst us, was gone for a week to his country house[1] in the county of Limerick for the recovery of his health, which has of late been much impaired, and I knew of no other of our political friends who was likely to have temper to bear even the statement of the question. I sent therefore yesterday morning, as professional men, for Lords Carleton[2] and Kilwarden,[3] the Attorney[4] and Solicitor-General,[5] and the Prime Serjeant,[6] when Lord Castlereagh submitted to them the paper with the signatures above mentioned.

including him in such an arrangement, as M'Cormick, upon whom Government depended for evidence of direct communication with Lewins, had escaped from the custody of the messenger about July 21. And in a letter to Mr. Wickham, dated July 16, Lord Castlereagh says that the principal witness who could then have been brought forward "betrayed symptoms of unwillingness."

[1] Mount Shannon near Limerick.

[2] Hugh Carleton, created Lord Carleton Sept. 9, 1789, and made Viscount Carleton Nov. 7, 1797; b. Sept. 11, 1739, d. Feb. 25, 1826, s. p.; m. 1st., Aug. 2, 1766, Elizabeth, only dau. of Richard Mercer, Esq., and 2nd, July 15, 1795, Mary, dau. of A. Matthew, Esq., of Uxbridge. M.P. for Tuam, Phillipstown, and Naas, from 1771 to 1787. Solicitor-General, May 4, 1779, and Chief-Justice of the Common Pleas, May 9, 1787. One of the 28 representative peers elected at the Union, after which he resided almost entirely in England.

[3] Arthur Wolfe, created Lord Kilwarden July 3, 1798, and made Viscount Kilwarden Dec. 29, 1800; b. Jan. 30, 1739, murdered by the Rebels in Emmett's insurrection, July 23, 1803, m. Jan. 3, 1769, Anne, dau. of William Ruxton, Esq., of Ardee (she was created Baroness Kilwarden Sept. 30, 1795) Succeeded Lord Carleton as Solicitor-General in 1787, and Lord Clare as Attorney-General in 1789. He was many years in Parliament—laterly for the city of Dublin—but vacated his seat when he was made Chief-Justice of the King's Bench, June 13, 1798.

[4] Right Hon. John Toler, b. Dec. 3, 1745, d. July 27, 1831; m. June 2, 1778, Grace, dau. of Hector Graham, Esq. (she was created Baroness Norwood Nov. 7, 1797). Solicitor-General 1789; Attorney-General July 16, 1798; Chief-Justice of the Common Pleas Dec. 1800. M.P. successively for Tralee, Phillipstown, and Gorey, from 1776 to the Union. Created Baron Norbury Dec. 29, 1800, and made an Earl June 25, 1827.

[5] John Stewart, afterwards Right Hon. Sir John Stewart, Bart., so created Jan. 14, 1803, b. 1757, d. Oct. 1, 1825; m. 1790, Mary, dau. of Mervyn Archdall, Esq., of Castle Archdall. Solicitor-General July 6, 1798; Attorney-General Dec. 9, 1800. M.P. for Bangor. Sat in the Imperial Parliament for the county of Tyrone from Nov. 1802 to July 1806, and from 1812 until his death.

[6] Right Hon. James Fitzgerald, b. 1742, d. Jan. 20, 1835; m. 1782, Catherine, dau. of the Rev. Henry Vesey, and ultimately co-

Lord Carleton, who might in any country be considered as a cool and temperate man, gave his opinion in the most decided manner against listening to the proposal, and declared that it would have such an effect on the public mind, that he did not believe, if Byrne and Oliver Bond were not executed, that it would be possible to get a jury to condemn another man for high treason. He said that several of those who signed the papers, and particularly Dr. M'Nevin, might possibly be convicted, and that others might be liable to pains and penalties by proceedings against them in Parliament, and in short he gave his opinion against the measure in the strongest and most decided terms, and Lord Kilwarden and the Attorney-General spoke to the same effect.

Although I was not convinced by their arguments, I was perfectly sensible that I could not act in opposition to them, and the transaction, to my concern, is now at an end. I did and still do consider the establishment of the traitorous conspiracy by the strong testimony of all the principal actors in it, to be a matter of much more consequence than the lives of twenty such men as Oliver Bond; but the minds of people are now in such a state, that nothing but blood will satisfy them, and although they will not admit the term, their conversation and conduct point to no other mode of concluding this unhappy business than that of extirpation. Aylmer and the principal leaders of the rebellion in Kildare are now in confinement here previous to their banishment, by which peace seems to be in a great degree restored to that part of the country, and although the acceptance of the submission of these people has been a most unpopular measure, I have consented to grant the same terms to a man of the name of Byrne,[1] who is the most powerful and active leader of the Rebels in Wicklow. There have been for some days apprehensions of a rising in the county of Tipperary, and some bodies of insurgents have interrupted the communication between Kilkenny and Clonmell, but they were dispersed by a very small force that was sent against them, and as a considerable number of troops are assembling in that quarter, I trust that no serious insurrection will take place.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

heir to her brother and uncles (she was created Baroness Fitzgerald and Vesci June 27, 1826). M.P. for Tulsk from 1783 to 1790; for Kildare Borough from 1797 till the Union, and for Ennis from 1802 to Dec. 1812. He was made Prime-Serjeant June 21, 1787, but was removed from that office Jan. 28, 1799, on account of his refusal to support the Union.

[1] Garrett Byrne of Ballynamus.

The Special Commission for the trials of the state prisoners was opened in Dublin June 11, but owing partly to the state of the country (the rebellion was still raging), and partly to the efforts made by the counsel for the prisoners to delay the proceedings, various adjournments took place, and the business did not actually commence till July 12, when Henry and John Sheares were placed at the bar. Their trial continued without interruption till eight the following morning, when, after very short consideration, a verdict of guilty was delivered. The Court adjourned for a few hours, and it became the painful duty of Lord Carleton, the senior Judge in the Commission, an old and intimate friend of their father, to pronounce sentence of death. They were executed on the 14th. The principal witness on this trial was Captain Armstrong [1] of the King's County militia. Whether he had joined the Sheares with the intention of betraying them, or whether he was actuated by a subsequent conviction of the dangerous tenor of their conduct, it is impossible to say; certain it is that he wormed himself into their confidence, and was deep in all their secrets.

The trial of John M'Cann occupied the 16th and 17th. Mr. Reynolds [2] and Mr. Cope [3] were the important witnesses, and, notwithstanding the aspersions cast on the character of the former, a verdict of guilty was returned, and M'Cann suffered accordingly on the 19th.

[1] Captain John Warneford Armstrong, b. 1769, had been in the Somerset and South Middlesex Supplementary Militia. An unsuccessful attempt was made to prove that he had been compelled to leave those regiments for misconduct. It was an easier task to show that he had at times held language inconsistent with a belief in revealed religion, but the jury, mainly on his evidence, convicted the prisoners. He received a pension of 500*l.* a-year.

[2] Thomas Reynolds, a silk manufacturer in Dublin, in extensive business, b. March 12, 1771, d. in Paris Aug. 18, 1836; m. March 25, 1794, Harriet, dau. of William Witherington, Esq., of Dublin, another of whose daughters married Wolfe Tone. Reynolds was early enrolled as a United Irishman, and was delegate for Kildare, in which county he had a residence, Kilkea Castle. By the advice of Mr. Cope, to whom he had given some hints of the plans contemplated, he communicated with Government, and, continuing his intimacy with the conspirators, became thoroughly acquainted with their schemes. He was taxed by the prisoner's counsel with having been accused of poisoning his mother-in-law, as well as of having committed several minor offences. Some of the latter charges he admitted, pleading his youth in extenuation. Notwithstanding all such allegations, the juries, in this and subsequent trials, accepted his evidence, without which the cases for the prosecution must have broken down. For his services he received a pension of 1000*l.* per annum, for the lives of himself, his wife, and two sons, besides a sum of 5000*l.* paid in the course of 1798 and 1799. Owing to the feeling against informers, his life was not safe in Ireland, and he came to England. Mr. Cooke strongly recommended him to Government, as a man whose character was really untainted, and who had rendered most essential services. He was in consequence, after a considerable interval, employed as Postmaster at Lisbon in 1810, as Consul in Iceland in 1817, and as Consul at Copenhagen in 1819.

[3] William Cope, an eminent merchant in Dublin, residing in Merrion Square. He was brought forward to testify to the general credibility of Reynolds, and to prove that he had previously heard from him the facts which he stated on the trials. Such testimony, and the influence he originally exercised over Reynolds, were considered so valuable, that a pension of 1000*l.* a-year was conferred upon his wife and his three daughters.

William Michael Byrne, convicted on the 21st, was, after one respite, executed on the 28th; and Oliver Bond was convicted on the 23rd, and sentenced to death.

Of those arraigned at the opening of the Special Commission, only one more, Neilson, remained for trial.

Upwards of seventy rebels however were still in confinement, and they, seeing that a stern, though necessary, severity had already sent four of their leaders to the scaffold, conscious of their own criminality, and ignorant how far the revelations of those whom they had considered faithful associates, might have placed them at the mercy of Government, determined to save their lives by an admission of their own guilt, and a disclosure of the plans formed by themselves and their companions in crime.

Many erroneous statements have been made in reference to this subject, but a correct history of the transaction is given in the two despatches of July 26th.[1] Mr. Dobbs,[2] a well-intentioned but very eccentric individual, took an active part in the arrangement, which was first mentioned by him to Lord Castlereagh, in an interview on July 24. Mr. Dobbs was accompanied by Mr. Archer[3] the Sheriff of Dublin, and they then in the name of the prisoners, made the propositions referred to; but whether those for whom they acted, originally intended honestly to carry out their part of the engagement, is more than doubtful. They attempted at first to suppress many facts, and it was only when they became aware how extensive was the information possessed by Government, that they made any very important disclosures. Even after the reports of the Committees of the Lords and Commons, before whom they were examined, had been made public, they asserted in a public advertisement that their statements had been totally misrepresented. But upon an intimation that this proceeding might be held to release Government from their part of the engagement, the prisoners, on a re-examination before the same Committees, retracted their assertions, and admitted that their evidence had been correctly reported.

The original intention was to send all these prisoners to the United States, but the refusal of the American Government to

[1] See Castlereagh Correspondence, vol. i. p. 347.

[2] Francis Dobbs, b. April 27, 1750, d. April 11, 1811; m. 1st, July 17, 1773, Jane, dau. of Alexander Stuart, Esq., of Ballintry; 2nd, Charity, dau. of Robert Burrowes, Esq., of Kildare; M.P. for Charlemont from Jan. 1798 to the Union. He entertained the strange idea that the union with England was forbidden both in the Book of Daniel and in that of Revelations, and wrote a book to prove it. He also published nine volumes on history, but mixed up with his peculiar prophetical views. On June 7, 1800, he spoke at great length on the last stage of the Union Bill in the same tone.

[3] William Henry Archer, afterwards Lord Mayor of Dublin, 1811-12.

admit so many traitors into their country rendered such a step impossible; they were therefore confined in Fort George, where there was a considerable garrison. The local position of this fortress, situated in the county of Nairn at the extremity of a tongue of land running out into the Moray Firth, and equally destitute of houses and of trees, made it easy to keep the prisoners in safe custody, without imposing on them restrictions prejudicial to health; and here most of them remained until the Peace of Amiens, after which they were released.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

[Private.]

MY DEAR LORD, Dublin Castle, July 26, 1798.

Since I wrote to you this morning a proposition of a much more extensive nature as to confession and information has been made by the prisoners, which has induced me, with the full consent of the five Lords and Gentlemen of the Law whom I consulted yesterday, to postpone the execution of Oliver Bond until Monday next.

I believe that the rejection of their proposal yesterday, and the execution of Byrne, has operated very forcibly on the minds of the prisoners.[1]

Sampson,[2] Hamden Evans,[3] and the O'Connors have joined in the second application. I have the honour to be, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EDWARD COOKE, ESQ., TO WILLIAM WICKHAM, ESQ.

[Secret and Confidential.]

DEAR SIR, Dublin Castle, July 28, 1798.

. . . The universality of the conspiracy, the frequent detections, and the consequent trials, keep up irritation. Our militia is also disorderly, and our yeomen resentful. These cir-

[1] Seventy-eight signed the second application, among them was *Arthur*, but *not* Roger O'Connor.

[2] William Sampson, a barrister, of an Episcopalian family in Londonderry, b. Jan. 17, 1764, d. in New York Dec. 28, 1836; m. 1790, Miss Clarke. Among the first of the United Irishmen, he became a principal contributor to the 'Press.' To avoid arrest, he fled to England early in 1798, but was taken at Whitehaven, and sent back to Ireland. On account of his health he was allowed to go to Portugal, from whence he went to France. After a short visit to England in 1806, he settled in America.

[3] Hamden Evans, of Portrane, b. 1740, d. April 23, 1820; m. July, 1769, Margaret, dau. of Joshua Davis, Esq., a barrister. He had leave to return to Ireland in 1806, but did not come back till 1811. His son, Right Hon. George Evans, represented the County Dublin from 1832 to 1841.

cumstances are impediments to tranquillity, but indeed the disorder is deep.

The Chancellor came to town on Saturday, and highly approved of entertaining the measure, in consequence of which Mr. Arthur O'Connor, Dr. M'Nevin, and Mr. Emmett[1] met the Chancellor and Lord Castlereagh yesterday at my rooms, and in consequence of their engaging to give the fullest information to Government without implicating persons, and to be perpetually banished, Government consented to respite Mr. Bond. These gentlemen are now preparing their Memoir. I believe they mean fairly, for on talking with them to-day I asked a few questions, especially as to M'Nevin's Memoir.[2] He said that he found Government were in possession of it, and he should beg leave to refer to it, as he had no copy. Whether information of real value, beyond what we know, will be obtained, I know not, but what we have will be ascertained. We get rid of seventy prisoners, many of the most important of whom we could not try, and who could not be disposed of without doing such a violence to the principles of law and evidence as could not be well justified. Our zealots and yeomen do not relish this compromise, and there has been a fine buzz on the subject, but it being known the Chancellor most highly approves of it, the tone softens. . . .

I am, &c.,

E. COOKE.

[1] Thomas Addis Emmett, b. April 24, 1764, d. Nov. 14, 1827; m. Jan. 1791, Jane, dau. of the Rev. J. Patten, a Presbyterian minister. His father, Dr. Emmett, State Physician to the Lord-Lieutenant, and in considerable practice, was a man of strong democratic opinions, with which he had deeply imbued his sons, one of whom, Robert, who had been expelled from Trinity College in 1798, was the leader of the insurrection of 1803. Thomas, originally intended for the medical profession, renounced it for law on the death of his eldest brother, Temple. In 1797 he became one of the Directory, but his proceedings had long been watched, and he was arrested in 1798. He was sent to Fort George in 1799, and released June, 1802. Two years after he went to New York, where he practised with some success as a barrister, distinguishing himself, like most of the pardoned rebels, by his extreme violence against England, remembering only his banishment, and forgetting the lenity which had spared his life.

[2] Dr. M'Nevin had prepared an elaborate report on the state of Ireland, which he was desirous of personally placing in the hands of the French Government, but, not being allowed to enter France, he gave it to M. Reinhard, French Minister at Hamburgh, by whom it was translated and sent to Paris. It was soon communicated to the English Cabinet, through what channel has never been made public, but money then, as in later times, overcame all obligations to secresy, nor could Buonaparte himself check the evil. As an instance,—previous to the Russian campaign of 1812, Michel, a clerk in the War Department, sold to Comte Chernicheff (then residing, apparently for his pleasure, at Paris) all the details relating to the organization of the army. This treachery being discovered, he was seized, tried, and shot, March, 1812, on the Plaine de Grenelle, whilst the Comte by rapid flight barely escaped the vengeance which threatened him.—See 'Recueil de Causes Celèbres,' par Mejan, vol. 14.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Dublin Castle, July 28, 1798.

I yesterday received your letter dated the 23rd, and from your statement of Serjeant Adair's[1] office I conclude that it must be held by a counsel, and have written to Vernon[2] to explain the matter to him. If it could with propriety be held by an attorney, although I made no promise, I gave Vernon encouragement to hope for it, but I had great doubts of its being proper to give it to an attorney. In the other event of its being held by a counsel, I will certainly give it to Mr. Perceval,[3] whose character and great abilities are well known to me, although I have not the pleasure of his personal acquaintance. The rebellion in Kildare is now, I think, perfectly at an end, and the appearance of insurrection which showed itself in Tipperary has subsided, and there are scarcely any Rebels left in arms, except some parties of plunderers in the Wicklow mountains, where it is very difficult to get at them. I shall send Moore and Lord Huntley with the 100th regiment, and some troops that can be depended upon, to try either to subdue them or invite them to surrender, for the shocking barbarity of our national troops would be more likely to provoke rebellion than to suppress it.

There are some hopes that all the state prisoners here will come forward with a full confession of their sins, every information respecting the conspiracy and treason both at home and abroad, with a consent to be banished for life to countries at amity with Great Britain, in order to save the life of Oliver Bond, who will otherwise be hanged on Monday next.

Believe me, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

[1] The office of Solicitor to the Ordnance has been held both by barristers and solicitors. One of the latter class now *fills it*, and his immediate predecessor, Mr. James Smith, one of the authors of the 'Rejected Addresses,' was also a solicitor. Serjeant Adair d. July, 1798. His strenuous support of Wilkes obtained for him in 1779 the office of Recorder of London; and in 1782 Mr. Fox made him Solicitor to the Ordnance, the whole duties of which office he allowed to devolve on the Assistant-Solicitor. In 1789 his political views were so much moderated that he found it advisable to resign the Recordership. Next year he was made Chief Justice of Chester, and was one of the Crown counsel in the State Trials of 1794-5. M.P. for Cockermouth from Nov. 1774 to July, 1780, and for Higham Ferrers from Sept. 1793 to his death.

[2] Mr. Vernon was private solicitor to Lord Cornwallis. He was also solicitor to the Mint.

[3] Hon. Spencer Perceval, youngest son of John, 2nd Earl of Egmont, by his second wife, Catherine, dau. of the Hon. Charles Compton (father of the 7th and 8th Earls of Northampton), b. Nov. 1, 1762; m. Aug. 10, 1790, Jane, dau. of Sir Thomas Wilson, Bart. After filling various offices, he was, on the resignation of the Duke of Portland, in 1809, made Prime Minister, and, whilst holding this office, was murdered by Bellingham in the lobby of the House of Commons on the 11th of May, 1812. M.P. for Northampton from April, 1796, till his death.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

[Secret.]

MY LORD, Dublin Castle, July 29, 1798.

. . . I yesterday received your Grace's secret letter dated the 25th of July. From the tenor of your answer I wish that my request had been confined to the permission of laying the authentic documents relating to the conspiracy in Ireland before the Secret Committee; but on recurring to my letter dated the 15th instant, you will find that I made no doubt of the propriety of that measure, and that I *only* asked leave to have them mentioned in the Report.

The papers in question have unfortunately been read to the Secret Committees of both Houses, but they were not suffered to go out of the hands of Lord Kilwarden in the Committee of the Peers, or of Lord Castlereagh in that of the Commons; nor was any person allowed to take notes or make inquiries how they were obtained; but on the contrary the members were informed that they could have no other assurance of their authenticity than the word of honour of the Secretary of Government. Under these circumstances it does not appear to me that much more danger is to be apprehended from the whole of the papers having been read to the Committees, than if the selections only, which your Grace has transmitted to me, had been laid before them. It was with reluctance that I consented to the measure of communicating the contents of those papers to the Secret Committees, without obtaining the previous sanction of His Majesty's confidential servants, and I should not have ventured to have done it, if I had not been assured that the contents of them had necessarily been made known to several of the members of both Committees in the former examination of the state of the conspiracy. . . .

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Dublin Castle, July 29, 1798.

I inclose a letter which I have received from Vernon on the subject of the solicitorship of the Ordnance. . . . If you could find out how, and on what grounds the office was established, and whether any particular duties were ever assigned to it, you will oblige me, as it would distress me very much to give Vernon any just cause to complain of me, after the long connexion which his

father and himself have had with our family. I believe Serjeant Adair died just now on purpose to add to my plagues, which, God knows, need not be multiplied.

My conduct hitherto has got me abused by both sides, as might naturally be expected, being too coercive for the one, and too lenient for the other; I trust, however, it will terminate advantageously for the country, and consequently with satisfaction to myself.

July 30. Our state trials have succeeded so well that above forty of the principal criminals, amongst these O'Connor, Sampson, &c., &c., have been obliged to come forward in order to save Oliver Bond, who probably had it in his power to hang them, and have signed a paper promising to make full confession of their guilt, and particularly of their correspondence with France, and to submit to perpetual banishment, at such time as it may be convenient to us to banish them, to any country in amity with Britain. What will the gentlemen[1] who appeared at Maidstone say to this? In short I think it the most complete triumph both in England and Ireland.

Believe me, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH TO WILLIAM WICKHAM, ESQ.

SIR, Dublin, July 31, 1798.

. . . The respite of Mr. Bond did not fail to produce considerable warmth in this town, to which the conversation of some of the friends of Government materially contributed. Every sort of misrepresentation prevailed, and there were many well-disposed men indiscreet enough to expect in Parliament an explanation of the grounds upon which Government had acted. In moving an adjournment till the 9th I had an opportunity of repressing the disposition to clamour too prevalent amongst our friends, and one of them observed with very great spirit upon the pains that had been taken out of doors to mislead the public mind on this subject. . . .

I am, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

P.S. It has been thought expedient to include Mr. Bagenall Harvey and Mr. Cornelius Grogan in the Bill of Attainder,[2] that

[1] Messrs. Fox, Grattan, Erskine, Whitbread, and Sheridan, Lords Thanet and John Russell (afterwards Duke of Bedford), who came forward at the trial of the prisoners in May to testify to the loyalty of O'Connor, declaring that their political sentiments were identical with his.

[2] This Bill was introduced by the Attorney-General July 31, passed the House of Commons Aug. 27th, and received the Royal

the measure may not appear altogether personal to the Leinster family.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

MY LORD, Dublin Castle, August 2, 1798.

A Memorial from Sarah Anne Hamilton Rowan[1] was, I believe, forwarded to your Grace by Lord Camden.

Lest, however, from the multiplicity of business which has been occasioned by the late distracted state of this country, it should have escaped your notice, I have been requested by the Chancellor, and other persons of the greatest respectability in this country, to transmit a copy of it, and to request that your Grace would recommend to His Majesty so far to consider the case of this very deserving and unfortunate woman, that she may be permitted to receive the rents of her husband's estate, being about six hundred pounds a-year, for her own support and the education and maintenance of her numerous family.

Many strong symptoms of contrition for his past conduct having been manifested on the part of Mr. Hamilton Rowan, he may perhaps, after the termination of the war, appear to be a proper object for His Majesty's clemency and pardon.

I have the honour, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

[Secret.]

MY LORD, Dublin Castle, Aug. 7, 1798.

. . . On the 5th Lord Castlereagh brought me a paper, which had been transmitted to him from the state prisoners, which was long and ably written; but although it admitted fairly enough the most material parts of their guilt, was written (on the pretence of its being an apology for their conduct) in the style of a controversial pamphlet, and was in some parts rather inflammatory.

It appeared to me that this would be a very inconvenient paper for us to receive, and I therefore yesterday directed Mr. Cooke to return it to them, and to express my surprise, that, instead of an

Assent Oct. 6, 1798. There was only one division on the third reading, when the numbers were—Ayes 63, Noes 9. This Bill was repealed, as regarded Lord Edward, in 1819, and somewhat earlier as regarded the other two.

[1] Daughter of Walter Dawson, Esq., of Lisanisk, b. 1764, d. Feb. 26, 1834; m. Aug. 2, 1781.

admission of the material articles of their delinquency, they should have sent a narrative containing many gross misstatements of facts, and much unwarrantable invective against the Government of this country.

On receiving my message, they assured Mr. Cooke that they had not the slightest idea of offending, that they wrote what they did, from desiring to give full information and the state of their own feelings, that they had not shown what they wrote to any but the prisoners, and they submitted, if Government objected to what they had written, that the best mode would be to draw from them the information by examination before the Secret Committee.

This was exactly the point to which I wished to bring them, as it will prevent the necessity of our taking any notice of the *secret information* in the report, and I have determined that they should be examined before the Committee of the Lords, as their being upon oath will give more solemnity to their declarations, and as they will be much better examined by the Chancellor, than by any other person.

I have, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Dublin Castle, Aug. 10, 1798.

. . . Dr. M'Nevin was the first of the state prisoners who was examined by the Secret Committee of the House of Lords. The Chancellor was in possession of a memoir which the Dr. had sent to the French Directory, soliciting and suggesting the plan of an invasion. He admitted his guilt in the fullest degree. Arthur O'Connor was yesterday before the same Committee, and the Chancellor says that his examination has not been less satisfactory than that of Dr. M'Nevin, he having admitted himself to be of the Directory of the Union, and privy to all their treasons for the last two years.

People's minds are getting cooler, and I have no doubt of their being sufficiently manageable for all ordinary purposes, but I do not know how they will be brought to act on the great measure of all, on the event of which the safety of Great Britain and Ireland so much depends. . . .

Believe me, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

THE DUKE OF LEINSTER TO MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Received August 10.]

MY LORD, Brompton, Aug. 6, 1798.

I take the earliest opportunity of returning your Excellency my most sincere thanks for your attention in directing Lord Castlereagh to communicate to me, that a Bill of Attainder is brought into Parliament against my unfortunate brother's property, which goes to affect his innocent wife[1] and still more innocent children, the eldest of which is not yet four years old. I shall not animadvert upon the conduct of my unfortunate brother, or the villany of Mr. Reynolds, who, not content to injure the character of my deceased brother, has gone so far as to calumniate Lady Edward, by swearing the most downright falsehood as to the having handed money over to Mr. Reynolds from Lord Edward, as Treasurer of the county of Kildare. The fact is, Mr. Reynolds did call upon her at the time Lord Edward had disappeared. She asked him whether Lord Edward was safe—Reynolds answered Yes. She then gave him twenty or twenty-five guineas to carry to Lord Edward. Reynolds said there was no occasion, that he would give him any money he wanted. However she desired him to take it—he did—whether he gave it to Lord Edward she does not know, but a little boy brought it back to her in the evening. I should not mention this subject to your Excellency, but, from what I can learn, your Excellency is ready and willing to do justice to all parties. I trust your Excellency will never pass a law that goes to affect the innocent wife and children of a person who never was tried by either the military or civil law of his country. I cannot take upon me to say what would be the event of his trial; he certainly was no fugitive, as he died in the common gaol, and had the permission of Government to make a will. The property is very small, and when the legal debts that affect it are paid, there will be but little to revert to the Crown. My private concerns prevent my returning to Ireland, but as your Excellency has taken upon you the humane part of restoring peace to that unhappy country, and as your measures seem to be of so conciliatory a nature, I feel particularly sorry in not being present to give them my feeble assistance: should your Excellency pursue that system, I do not doubt that you will receive the grateful thanks of the majority of the nation. I fear it will take much time to restore perfect tranquillity. I trust your

[1] Lady Edward Fitzgerald, b. 1777, d. Nov. 1831, at Paris, in very indigent circumstances. She m. 2nd, Nov. 1800, Mr. Pitcairn, American Consul at Hamburgh, from whom she was afterwards divorced.

firmness and resolution will have the desired effect, that by your example and moderation others will see the good effects, and that the army will be restored also to discipline. Various reports are industriously propagated to injure me; I trust from our early acquaintance you will not harbour any of those calumnies, as I shall be ready to clear myself to your Excellency.

I remain, &c.,

LEINSTER.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF LEINSTER.

MY LORD, Dublin Castle, Aug. 11, 1798.

I yesterday received the honour of your Grace's letter dated the 6th, and am much distressed at being obliged to return an answer on points of so delicate a nature, and on which your feelings are so deeply interested. Your Grace says that you trust I will never pass a law, &c., but you must recollect that in a case of this nature, I am not to act according to my private inclination, but that I am bound to perform my duty to the public in the character which I hold in the state.

Knowing as I do with the utmost certainty, that Lord Edward was the great author and contriver of all the mischief and treason which has already cost so many lives, and which has nearly reduced to ruin and beggary the wives and families of every man of property, and deluged the whole island with blood, can I say to the most injured people of this country, You must not mark the man who has been the cause of all your sufferings, but tamely allow him to be recorded as the innocent martyr of your violence and persecution?

Your Grace says that Lord Edward was not tried by either the civil or military law of his country, and that he certainly was no fugitive; I must however observe that it was not the fault of the Government of this country that he was not brought to trial, and that he was not only a fugitive, but the most criminal of fugitives; for although he to all intents and purposes fled from the justice of his country, he would not remove himself to such a distance as to relinquish all hopes of effecting its destruction.

I hope and trust, my Lord, that to every candid mind the system of my Government will appear conciliatory and moderate, but if I were to insult the feelings of the loyal, and to protect the characters and properties of those who attempted to destroy them, such conduct would not be called moderation but criminal weakness.

I have the honour, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Dublin Castle, Aug. 12, 1798.

. . . It gives me I assure you great pleasure to be able to make Perceval Solicitor, as I know that it will be very gratifying to you.[1]

The examination of the traitors before the Committee of the House of Lords is as satisfactory as can be desired, and must clearly convince every man of common sense, that unless *a great measure* is adopted, the connexion between Great Britain and Ireland must soon be at an end. I have prevailed upon the Chancellor to go to Harrowgate *for his health*[2] this autumn, and to return by way of London.

Believe me, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

I wish you would tell the Duke of York, with all possible expression of respect on my part, that I am as desirous as ever, although the difficulties are much increased, to incorporate the artillery and engineers of both establishments, but that we must first secure a reasonable prospect of our keeping Ireland.[3]

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Dublin Castle, Aug. 16, 1798.

I last night received your letter dated the 11th, and most sincerely hope that at last we shall hear something good from the Mediterranean.[4] I generally write to you in such a hurry, that I have not a clear recollection of all that I have said, but I am pretty sure that I have told you that I did not approve of the paper of confession or manifesto, and that it was agreed that we should examine such of the prisoners as we chose upon their oaths before the Secret Committee of the Lords. All this has been done and their answers have been perfectly satisfactory. From what I said in former letters of the Chancellor, you will see that I can have no Government secrets that are to be kept from him, and I dare

[1] Mr. Perceval was a most intimate friend of both General and Mrs. Ross.

[2] It was a great object that the Chancellor should have personal communication with the English Cabinet without going to England ostensibly for that purpose. Hence this pretence of ill health.

[3] This scheme of the Duke of York's was carried out a few years later, but not without difficulty, as a feeling of jealousy was felt in Ireland when establishments were consolidated and transferred to England. In fact, the hungry claimants of patronage were afraid that fewer places would remain for distribution.

[4] The intelligence alluded to was the pursuit of the French fleet by Lord Nelson. In fact, the battle of the Nile had already been fought on Aug. 1, but of course the intelligence had not yet reached England.

say that he does not write confidentially to Lord W. (Westmorland).[1]

I am on good terms with the Speaker, but do not see much of him. I have totally set aside the Irish Cabinet,[2] which Lord Castlereagh told me was very inconvenient and embarrassing to Lord Camden.

Believe me, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

This day eighteen years was an interesting day to us both.[3]

MEMORANDUM AS TO THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE COUNTY OF WICKLOW.

Aug. 20, 1798.

When the troops were sent about a month ago into the county of Wicklow, the country appeared a desert, for though the inhabitants were not all in arms they fled everywhere on the approach of the army—old men and terrified women were alone to be found in the cottages.

The good conduct of the troops, who were kept from marauding, made to pay for everything they got, and not permitted to molest the people, together with kind treatment and encouraging language from the officers, gradually brought back the inhabitants to their houses. The proclamation and humane intentions of Government were then explained and circulated; and protection offered to such as would bring in their arms.

At this time a considerable body of Rebels in arms still haunted the mountains who threatened death and destruction to all who should take protections; and the people owned that they were afraid to take them, lest the troops should be withdrawn and leave them afterwards to the mercy of the mob. This fear diminished daily, and at last when the mob was dispersed and began to sur-

[1] John, 10th Earl of Westmoreland, K.G., b. Jan. 1, 1759, d. Dec. 15, 1841; m. 1st (at Gretna Green), May 20, 1782, Sarah Anne, only dau. and heir of Robert Child, Esq., the eminent banker; 2nd, March 24, 1800, Jane, dau. and co-heir of R. H. Sanders, Esq., nephew and heir of Admiral Sir Charles Sanders, K.B. Lord Westmoreland was Lord Lieutenant of Ireland from Oct. 17, 1789, to Jan. 4, 1795, and Privy Seal from Feb. 14, 1798, to April 30, 1827, with the exception of 13 months, from Feb. 5, 1806, to March 25, 1807; also Postmaster-General from Sept. 12, 1789, to March 16, 1790. M.P. for Lynn Regis from Nov. 1762 to Jan. 1772.

[2] The Irish Cabinet usually consisted of the Chancellor, the Chief Secretary, and the Attorney-General, who is always a Privy Councillor. To these the Speaker and Primate were frequently added, and some one or two other influential persons not holding office. For many years the Right Hon. John Beresford, who was at the head of the Revenue departments, was confidentially consulted.

[3] The battle of Camden, in America, in which Lord Cornwallis totally defeated General Gates; General, then Captain, Ross, brought home the despatches.

render, the greatest forwardness appeared in every one to get a protection—the country is now full of people at work.

This submission on the part of the people, is a submission to a necessity undoubtedly. Men's sentiments or prejudices are not to be changed in an instant—I believe it however to be sincere. They find themselves the weakest and have suffered so much by the rebellion, that they wish now to be quiet. It is by kind treatment that these sentiments are to be encouraged. If their intention was to rise in the winter, it can hardly be supposed that they would be at the trouble to get in the harvest, and collect it where it will be still more in the power of the troops, either to use or to destroy it.

The minds of both parties are unfortunately still much irritated by mutual and recent injury, the loyal party, conscious of their own merit and good conduct, see with disgust that by the pardon held out, the authors of their ruin are placed nearly in as good a situation as themselves. Some acts of violence and revenge from the lower orders of yeomen have excited great alarm, lessened the confidence in the promises of Government, and have tended to increase that hatred and animosity between the parties, which it is the interest of all to destroy.

Enlarged views and liberal conduct are not to be expected from uneducated men; and it is to be regretted that the gentlemen have not more generally taken advantage of the neighbourhood of the troops, to visit their tenants. Their presence and example would have been of much use in restraining the lower orders of yeomen, and their advice would have been equally so to the General Officers commanding. They would also upon the spot have been able to form more just notions of the state and temper of the country.

Contrary to the words of the proclamation, protections have been granted where arms have not been surrendered. It would have been difficult for officers otherwise to have fulfilled the spirit of their instructions.

It was known that many men never had arms; some had surrendered them before the rebellion broke out, and others certainly lost them in the different retreats, when pursued by the soldiers. In such instances after taking every means to obtain the existing arms by delay and the refusal of protections, officers were guided in the final delivery of them, by their own discretion, aided by such information as they could obtain from the gentlemen, clergy, and priests near them—that they may have been mistaken in many instances cannot be doubted—that improper people have obtained protections, and that arms still exist among the people is most natural to suppose.

A great object was to get the people to return to their industry; this they could not do without a protection. Had officers refused them to all who denied having arms, they must either have arrested them, or, if left at liberty unprotected, have forced them for immediate safety to take refuge with the Rebels in the mountains.

The county of Wicklow has now a quiet and settled appearance; after such a convulsion, and in the neighbourhood of woods and mountains, occasional robberies and murders are still to be expected. These will be more effectually stopped and prevented by the presence and vigilance of the gentlemen, their good offices to their tenants, and by assisting the poor to rebuild their cottages, than by the exertion of troops.

CAPTAIN TAYLOR TO WILLIAM WICKHAM, ESQ.

[Private.]

MY DEAR SIR, Dublin Castle, Aug. 21, 1798.

I was convinced that there could be only one sentiment on the subject of Lord Cornwallis's letter to the Duke of Leinster, and from that conviction I felt anxious that it should be communicated to you, although not absolutely necessary. Every day confirms me in the idea I had formed of the perfection of Lord C.'s character, and I am persuaded that he is fully equal to the execution of any enterprise, and that no difficulty, however great, will ever deter him from it.

It was impossible not to suppose that the French would make some effort in favour of the disaffected in this country, and we had long been prepared for the receipt of the private intelligence you have lately sent. In the new distribution of quarters now arranging, and which will take place immediately, Lord Cornwallis has, as far as the state of the interior would admit, consulted principally the security of the southern coast, which appears most exposed, although the north and west will also be well protected. The Fencible regiments and those of the line will, with such of the militia as can be most depended upon, be placed nearest the coast, or at the stations that must be considered as a reserve, and the General Officers on the coast will be directed to keep on permanent establishment such yeomanry corps as they may think useful.

As soon as the regiments shall have taken their new stations, strict inspections will be ordered, particularly of the militia regiments, where I fear they are often much required, and in which it is very essential that every man should be satisfied that every justice is done to him by his Colonel, and that nothing is due to

him. A spirit of disaffection has lately shown itself in some of the militia regiments; conspiracy and desertion have even gone to great lengths. The circumstance of its being confined in great measure to the northern regiments, confirms me in the idea I have long entertained, that the rebellion is more deeply rooted in the north than anywhere else, although they have hitherto appeared better disposed than was expected, or rather more prudent than their partisans in the south.

Although the people in the counties that have been the seat of rebellion continue coming in, I fear their submission *as yet* proceeds entirely from necessity, that it is by no means sincere, and that the first prospect they have of foreign assistance, or the first thought they indulge of success with impunity, would lead them again to rise. I think however we have a force sufficient to curb that spirit and to resist the attempts of a foreign enemy, with the assistance which we cannot but expect in some degree to receive from the navy. We have not however more than is sufficient. Pray excuse my taking up so much of your time, and

Believe me, most truly yours,

H. TAYLOR.

The following day the intelligence that the French, under General Humbert,[1] had landed in Killala Bay, reached Dublin. Lord Cornwallis was well aware that he could not confide in all the regiments under his command, and fearful that a defeat might occasion a general insurrection, he determined to assemble an efficient force before he attacked the French. The first rumours of their strength were greatly exaggerated: the whole corps, as it afterwards appeared, not exceeding 1100, of whom not one ultimately escaped. Some were killed in action, 96 officers and 746 rank and file surrendered at Ballynamuck, and the remainder were captured at Killala and other places.

The original plan of the French Directory had been to effect landings at several points, and, by distracting the attention of Government, to facilitate the rising in various parts of the country, which they had been taught to anticipate. But the arrest of the Rebel leaders, and the energy of the Irish Government, had put an

[1] Joseph Amable Humbert, b. 1767, d. 1823. He was a man of low extraction, coarse and profligate in his manners, and cruel in his character, as his conduct at Quiberon proved. He was sent to St. Domingo in 1801, and, returning home with Madame Le Clerc, then a widow (afterwards Princess Borghese), is reported to have intrigued with her, and thus incurred the enmity of Bonaparte. Shortly after he went to New Orleans, where he died, having assisted in 1815 in the defence of that town.

end to the rebellion, and the want of money, arms, ammunition, and ships, delayed the sailing of the French fleet. Urged on at last by the rash impatience of Napper Tandy, Humbert, without waiting for orders, obtained from La Rochelle a small sum of money by military requisition, and about the middle of August sailed with three frigates and a few transports. He was accompanied by Matthew Tone,[1] Teeling,[2] and Sullivan.[3] Tandy and some others followed in the Anacreon, and reached the northern coast of Ireland about the middle of September. Hearing that Humbert had surrendered, they did not land, but returned immediately to France.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

[Private.]

MY LORD, Dublin Castle, Aug. 25, 1798.

. . . I sent Lieut.-General Lake yesterday to Galway, to take the command of the troops on the other side of the Shannon, and I shall myself proceed to-morrow by the canal with about 3000 men to Tullamore, and have ordered the Sutherland and Reay Fencibles to march to Longford.

From the intelligence which I may receive at Tullamore, I shall determine whether I shall assemble the troops from Leinster at Athlone or Carrick on Shannon, but I have every reason to believe it will be at the latter place.

Several regiments were moving from the south-east part of the island towards Connaught, according to the intended distribution of the troops, before we heard of the landing of the French. . . .

I have, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

MY LORD, Dublin Castle, Aug. 25, 1798.

I have the honour to acquaint your Grace that advices have been this morning received from Brigadier-General Taylor,[4] dated

[1] Matthew, brother of Theobald Wolfe Tone, b. 1770, captured at Ballynamuck, tried by a Court Martial, and executed Sept. 29, 1798.

[2] Bartholomew Teeling, originally a linen-merchant at Dundalk, and an early member of the Directory, b. 1774, executed, pursuant to the sentence of a Court Martial, Sept. 24, 1798. He had entered the French service under the name of Biron, and was A.D.C. to Humbert, with whom he was captured.

[3] Sullivan was captured, but was not recognised. He was nephew to Madgett, who had been some time in Paris, in the Foreign Office. Madgett was a native of Cork, and had once been a Roman Catholic priest.

[4] Brigadier, afterwards General the Hon. Robert Taylor, Colonel 6th Dragoon Guards, son of Thomas, 1st Earl of Bective, b. Nov. 26, 1760, d. unm. May 23, 1839. M.P. for Kells from 1791 to the Union.

Sligo the 24th instant, by which it appears that the enemy had taken possession of Ballina early on that morning, and that the three frigates had quitted the Bay of Killala.

I am collecting with all possible speed such a force as I trust will be sufficient in a very few days to check the progress of the enemy.

I have the honour, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH TO WILLIAM WICKHAM, ESQ.

SIR, House of Commons, Monday night, 9 o'clock, Aug. 27.

. . . I have the honour to enclose a very unbecoming advertisement[1] which three of the state prisoners thought fit to insert in this day's paper. Since terms were granted them their confinement has been less strict, which liberality has enabled them to commit this offensive act. It is artfully contrived, by denying generally the unauthorised statement of the report in the newspaper, to be considered as thereby denying the report itself; and the latter flourish to their friends, connected with the enemy being actually in the country, does not savour much of contrition or of an abdication of their cause.

Directions have been given for reinstating them in their former state of solitary confinement; and it has been explained to them, that unless they alter their conduct the conditions of the agreement will be considered as violated on their part. It has produced a warm conversation in the House of Commons, which was unavoidable. The printer has been ordered to attend.[2] As the paper itself is an additional avowal of their treason, there can be no harm in having the publication brought home to them, though it does not appear any breach of parliamentary privilege of which the House can take cognisance. . . . I have, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

ADVERTISEMENT. Appeared in the Newspapers on Monday, Aug. 27.

Having read in the different Newspapers, publications pretending to be abstracts of the Report of the Secret Committee of the House of Commons, and of our depositions before the Committees of the Lords and Commons, we feel ourselves called upon to assure the public that they are a gross and, to us, astonishing misrepre-

[1] It is worthy of remark that this advertisement was published Aug. 27, immediately after the prisoners heard of the landing of the French in Killala Bay on the 22nd. Their re-examination, when they again admitted their guilt, took place after they became aware of the defeat of the French.

[2] Mr. F. Hutchinson in this debate suggested that Arthur O'Connor and his two friends should be tried and executed. On the 29th the printer was committed to Newgate by 27 to 16.

sentation, not only not supported by, but in many instances directly contradictory to the facts we really stated on these occasions. We further assure our friends that in no instance did the name of any individual escape us; on the contrary, we always refused answering such questions as might tend to implicate any persons whatever, conformably to the agreement entered into by the State prisoners and the Government.

ARTHUR O'CONNOR.
THOS. ADDIS EMMETT.
WM. JAS. M'NEVIN.

LIEUT.-GENERAL LAKE TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

MY LORD, Tuam, Aug. 28, 1798, 5 o'clock, A.M.

I was so much distressed when I wrote yesterday that I was not able to express my feelings, which were then, and still are, most acute; but I trust when your Lordship is acquainted with the transaction I shall stand acquitted in your opinion, which will give me the greatest satisfaction upon this occasion, though I must feel what a situation this country is placed in by this unfortunate event.

I think it absolutely necessary to state for your Lordship's information that it is impossible to manage the militia; their whole conduct has been this day of action most shameful, and I am sorry to say that there is a strong appearance of disaffection, particularly in the Kilkenny, as Lord Ormonde[1] has reported to me. His Lordship's conduct has constantly been most meritorious, but his men are not obedient to his orders. The Louth regiment are well-disposed and in good order.

I have thought it necessary to march for this place in hopes the soldiers will get the better of their panic, which is beyond description, but I hope in a day or two they may forget it; whence their behaviour proceeds I am at a loss to guess.

I have reason to apprehend the people of the country are flocking in to the French very fast, which will not be prevented unless they are beat shortly, which I should think might easily be done with any troops but those I have to deal with. . . .

I have, &c.,

G. LAKE.

[1] Walter, 17th Earl and 1st Marquis of Ormonde, K.P., b. Feb. 4, 1770, d. Aug. 10, 1820; m. March 17, 1805, Anne, dau. and sole heir of Joseph Clarke, Esq. Created Lord Butler in England, Jan. 20, 1801, and made Marquis of Ormonde in Ireland Jan. 22, 1816. M.P. for the county of Kilkenny from 1790 to Feb. 1796.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

[Private.]

MY LORD, Kilbeggan, Aug. 28, 1798, 5 o'clock, A.M.

I have the honour to transmit to your Grace the copy of a letter from Lieut.-General Lake, reporting to me the unfortunate result of an attack made by the French on the corps which Major-General Hutchinson[1] had assembled at Castlebar.

I need not point out to your Grace the impression which this event[2] will make upon the country in general, and have only most strongly to represent the very urgent necessity of immediately sending from Great Britain as great a reinforcement as possible, either to Dublin, Waterford, or Belfast.

I shall proceed this morning to Athlone, and I hope to collect such a body of troops as will enable me to act offensively.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

EDWARD COOKE, ESQ., TO WILLIAM WICKHAM, ESQ.

DEAR SIR, Dublin Castle, Aug. 31, 1798.

I have been endeavouring, hitherto without much effect, to send you some details as to the action at Castlebar. The following has an air of probability, but I do not desire you to consider it as authentic.

The French had advanced to Ballina. There are two roads to Castlebar, one by Foxford, where part of our forces was stationed to check them; the other a mountain-road.

General Hutchinson was with about 1500 men at Castlebar, and he had settled the ground on which he meant to resist an attack. On the 26th, at 12 at night, General Lake joined him. At 5 in the morning of the 27th the report came in that the French were advancing by the mountain-road. The position was

[1] Hon. John Hely Hutchinson (2nd son of the Right Hon. John Hutchinson and of Christiana, 1st Baroness Donoughmore), afterwards K.B., a General, and Colonel of 18th Regt., b. May 15, 1757, d. June 29, 1832. Created, Dec. 16, 1801, Baron Hutchinson, for his services in Egypt, where he was second in command to Sir Ralph Abercromby. Succeeded his brother as 2nd Earl of Donoughmore, Aug. 22, 1825. Attached to the Russian armies in 1806-7, till after the battle of Freidland. M.P. for Cork city from 1790 to the Union. He was Searcher of Strangford and Donaghadee, compensated by 900*l.* a year.

[2] Several regiments of Irish militia ran away, almost without firing a shot, some probably from panic, but many doubtless from disaffection, as several hundreds of them immediately joined the French. An officer and 60 men of the Carbineers are said to have reached Athlone, 80 miles from the field, in 27 hours. The battle went by the name of "The races of Castlebar."

immediately occupied. Between 6 and 7 the French appeared. They came on in three columns of near 800 each, as they had armed many of the country people, and with two curricle-guns. They advanced with rapidity, firing their cannon obliquely on all parts of our line. Their fire was returned with much effect by our artillery, which did execution. The French continued advancing, and began a rapid charge with the bayonet in very loose order. At this moment the Galway Volunteers, the Kilkenny and Longford Militia, ran away. Lord Ormonde exerted himself to stop his men; he first begged and beseeched; he then upbraided and swore at them; he ran two of them through the body, and burst into tears. Lord Granard[1] in vain exerted himself with the Longford—they behaved as ill. The 6th regiment, of 120 men, and the Frasers, behaved well, and had the rest done the same the day had been completely ours. One of the French columns made for our flank, which I suppose first disconcerted the militia.

I hear that a person who was prisoner with the French reports, that had our troops sustained the attack for a minute longer the French would have turned about.

A detachment of Lord Roden's[2] behaved gallantly. The French had turned one of our guns against us in the pursuit: they attacked them, retook the gun, and killed 25 of them.

I fear there was disaffection in the two militia regiments; they are Catholics, and were many, if not most of them, sworn United Irishmen. They are both fine regiments in appearance, fine men and well drilled, capable in point of body, youth, and agility, and *habilité*, to face any troops. I am confident treachery will come out. The Longford, &c., were rallied in a churchyard at Castlebar, and so covered with the wall that they could not be touched; they would not stand even then.

I am glad his Excellency means to make assurance doubly sure. We are teazed with stories, but I feel confident that things will remain quiet till the event of his Excellency's attack is known.

Believe me, &c.,

E. Cooke.

[1] George, 6th Earl of Granard, b. June 14, 1760, d. June 9, 1837; m. May 10, 1779, Selina Frances, dau. of John 1st Earl of Moira.

[2] Robert, 2nd Earl of Roden, K.P., b. Oct. 26, 1756, d. June 29, 1820; m. 1st, Feb. 5, 1788, Frances Theodosia, dau. of the Very Rev. Dean Bligh, brother of John 1st Earl of Darnley, 2nd, July 5, 1804, Juliana Anne, dau. of John Orde, Esq., of Westwood. He succeeded his father in the office of Auditor of the Exchequer. M.P. for Dundalk from 1790 till he became a Peer, June 22, 1797.

CAPTAIN TAYLOR TO VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH.

MY DEAR LORD, Balinamore, Aug. 31, 1798.

We halt here this day to give the Queen's and 29th time to join us: they have made a most expeditious march from Wexford, and will be at Ballinasloe this day. We shall proceed towards Tuam to-morrow, and they will march in the same direction. As far as we can learn as yet, the French are still at Castlebar, entrenching themselves, and drilling those of the inhabitants who have joined. Among the latter I fear there are some of the Longford and Kilkenny: those regiments marched to this place yesterday, and upon our arrival, were immediately ordered on towards Athlone. Their conduct, and that of the Carabineers and Frazers, in action on the retreat from Castlebar and Tuam, and the depredations they committed on the road exceed, I am told, all description. Indeed they have, I believe, raised a spirit of discontent and disaffection which did not before exist in this part of the country. Every endeavour has been used to prevent plunder in our corps, but it really is impossible to stop it in some of the regiments of militia with us, particularly the light battalions. It has been, however, considerably checked, and as the women (far the greatest plunderers) are left at Athlone, I hope we shall have less difficulty in stopping it. The Downshire appear to be a good regiment, and, as well as the Louth, in better order and more attentive to their officers than the generality; the Suffolk Fencibles are bad; the Frazers, who we now hear behaved very ill at Castlebar, are ordered back; Lord Roden's dragoons, whose conduct has been admirable, remain with us. Lieut.-Colonel Craufurd[1] has been sent forward towards Castlebar, with a strong patrol of the latter, to gain positive information of the proceedings and position of the enemy. Major-General Taylor's corps waits further orders at Boyle, and the brigade of Guards are ordered to halt at Birr.

I remain, &c.,

H. TAYLOR.

I understand the officers of M——[2] regiment in general behaved well, and General Lake speaks of Lord Ormonde's and Lord Gra-

[1] Lieut.-Colonel, afterwards Major-General, Crawford, at this time D.Q.M.G. in Ireland, b. 1764, d. Jan. 29, 1812, of wounds received on the 19th at the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo, in command of the Light Div sion; m. Feb. 6, 1800, Bridget, dau. of Henry Holland, Esq. Served in India under Lord Cornwallis, in command of the 75th Regt., although only a Captain. M.P. for East Retford from Nov. 1802, to Oct. 1806.

[2] Sic in orig.

nard's exertions and gallantry in the highest terms possible. The conduct of the artillery was beyond all praise.

GENERAL ORDERS.

Balinamore, Aug. 31, 1798.

It is with very great concern that Lord Cornwallis finds himself obliged to call on the General Officers and the Commanding Officers of regiments in particular, and in general on the officers of the army, to assist him in putting a stop to the licentious conduct of the troops, and in saving the wretched inhabitants from being robbed, and in the most shocking manner illtreated by those to whom they had a right to look for safety and protection.

Lord Cornwallis declares, that if he finds that the soldiers of any regiment have had opportunities of committing these excesses from the negligence of their officers, he will make those officers answerable for their conduct; and that if any soldiers are caught either in the act of robbery, or with the articles of plunder in their possession, they shall be instantly tried, and immediate execution shall follow their conviction.

A Provost-Marshal will be appointed, who will with his guard march in the rear of the army, and who will patrol about the villages and houses in the neighbourhood of the camp.

The capture of the whole of Humbert's corps having put an end to the French invasion, the English and Irish Governments were able to turn their attention to the internal state of the country, and especially to the consideration of the measures to be adopted in consequence of the Reports of the Secret Committees of the Lords and Commons, which had just been made public.

Of these, the former was the most important, both because the evidence was given upon oath, and because it contained very serious matter not alluded to in the Report from the Lower House. Among other statements, there was one materially affecting Mr. Grattan's character. A man named Hughes,[1] swore

[1] John Hughes had been a bookseller, in a respectable position, at Belfast. He was arrested for high treason in 1797, but liberated immediately. In the same year he became bankrupt, and was soon afterwards employed by Government as a spy, and visited the north, where he obtained important and accurate information. For a considerable time he was lodged in the Castle, in order to protect his life, as in the case of a man named Newell, the Rebels had recourse to assassination as the easiest mode of suppressing inconvenient evidence. In 1802 Hughes received a considerable sum of money in lieu of all claims, and went to America, but in 1812 he returned for a short time to Dublin.

that Neilson, Sweetman,[1] and Bond, went on a particular day to Tinnehinch,[2] and that Neilson afterwards told him (Hughes) that he had there sworn Mr. Grattan in as a United Irishman. The alleged interview with these individuals was never denied by Mr. Grattan, though he repudiated the statement regarding the oath.

Hughes himself bore a very indifferent character, and his evidence being merely secondary, would have availed nothing on a trial; nor could Neilson or Sweetman be brought forward, as, when they confessed their own guilt, they expressly stipulated that they should never be put into the witness-box. It was further known that Neilson was prepared to deny having ever given such information to Hughes. These circumstances rendered it impossible to bring forward any legal evidence against Mr. Grattan. But the characters of some of his associates, and the evidence which he gave on the trial of Arthur O'Connor, raised in the minds of many serious doubts as to his loyalty; and from the entries in Wolfe Tone's own journal, it is evident that Mr. Grattan was still in constant communication with Tone after the latter had connected himself with Jackson.[3] In answer to a letter on this subject from the Duke of Portland, Lord Cornwallis concludes a long despatch (September 24) with these words: "But we must be satisfied with dismissing him from the Privy Council, which measure I had meant to request your Grace to recommend to His Majesty as soon as the Reports of the Committees should have been laid before him."

EDWARD COOKE, ESQ., TO WILLIAM WICKHAM, ESQ.

[Private.]

DEAR SIR, Dublin Castle, Sept. 1, 1798.

I guarded you last night from believing as authentic what I had picked up of the Castlebar affair. I have just seen General

[1] John Sweetman, a brewer of considerable business in Dublin, Secretary to the Catholic Committee in 1795. He had a house at Bulldoyle, four miles from Dublin, to which the conspirators frequently resorted, and where they were occasionally concealed. On the same day that the delegates were seized at Bond's, he was arrested in his own house, and was, with others, ultimately sent to Fort George.

[2] The country residence of Mr. Grattan, in the county of Wicklow, close to Powerscourt.

[3] Rev. William Jackson, a clergyman of the Church of England, April 30, 1795. In early life he was the Duchess of Kingston's agent in her infamous attack upon Foote, and figures as Father O'Donavan in the "Trip to Calais," where the Duchess herself is introduced as Lady Kitty Crocodile. Jackson was afterwards in the pay of France, but being betrayed by a disreputable London attorney of the name of Cockayne, who was his agent and *friend*, he was tried for high treason in Dublin, April 23, 1795. He was convicted, but on the 30th he terminated a life of guilt by swallowing poison, and died actually in the dock, when sentence of death was about to be pronounced.

Lake's secretary, who has left him from illness, and was at the battle. He says we had about 1100 firelocks, and 9 guns, and a good position. The French he cannot consider to have amounted to 800. He saw no peasantry. They came along the road in one column; when they came within cannon-shot our guns stopped the column, they then deployed in an irregular manner to the right, and advanced in an excellent style—with great rapidity as sharp-shooters.

Had our line been steady, all was right; but when the French were 150 yards off the Longford began running off, and then the Kilkenny, &c., and there was no possibility of rallying. The men totally indifferent to their officers, and so shameful a rout he never saw.

What I wrote of our artillery is true, and of Lord Ormonde's and Lord Granard's personal good conduct, and of the good behaviour of the detachment of Lord Roden. We are all quiet here.

Believe me, &c.,

E. COOKE.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

MY LORD, Knock Hill, Sept. 1, 1798.

I have the honour to acquaint your Grace that the corps under my command marched this day from Balinamore, and has encamped near this place.

From the reports of my patroles, and the accounts of several persons who have made their escape from the enemy, it appears that they are still at Castlebar; and the information I have received, particularly from a person who held formerly the commission of Captain in His Majesty's service, and who has been for several days a prisoner with the enemy, affords every ground for persuasion that the number of the French soldiers has been grossly exaggerated, that they have as yet been joined by a very inconsiderable portion of the inhabitants, and those (with very few exceptions) of the lowest order. No material disaffection has shown itself in other parts of the kingdom.

I shall to-morrow be joined by the Queen's and 29th regiments, a few miles on the other side of Tuam.

I have the honour, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

MY LORD, Ballyhaunis, Sept. 5, 1798.

I arrived at Hollymount, 13 miles from Castlebar, yesterday, and was assured by persons who left that place on the preceding evening, that the enemy were still there; that they were endeavouring to strengthen the place, and that there was every appearance of their waiting for our attack. Thinking this however very improbable, I used every means in my power to watch their motions, but I did not receive certain intelligence that they had withdrawn themselves from the town, until 5 o'clock in the evening of yesterday.

Although I marched at daybreak this morning to the northward, it was not till late in the day that I learned that the enemy had marched with the utmost rapidity on Sligo, and I found that it was not possible for me either to come up with them before they could reach that place, or to send a reinforcement to General Lake in time to enable him to attack them. The General has hung as close as it was prudent on the rear of their march, with a force which I did not think sufficient to warrant his hazarding an action, but he has not been able essentially to retard their progress.

I have written to the commanding officer of the two regiments stationed at Sligo, to abandon the place and retire to Ballyshannon or Enniskillen, and I shall detach General Moore with the two battalions of light infantry and the 100th regiment to reinforce General Lake; who will, after these troops have joined him, march on the direct road to Sligo.

I propose with the remainder of my corps to pass the Shannon at Carrick, and march up the Eastern Bank. Both these corps are, I trust, sufficient separately to meet the enemy, and this appears to be the only chance of forcing them to an action. The reports of the number of the Rebels who have joined the French are very vague, but from what I can collect, I do not conceive that they can exceed four thousand. I have ordered the brigade of Guards to march from Birr to Kilbeggan.

I have, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH TO WILLIAM WICKHAM, ESQ.

[Private.]

SIR, Dublin Castle, Sept. 5, 1798.

. . . In consequence of the suggestions contained in Mr. Pitt's letter to me,[1] the Chancellor this day moved to revive the Secret Committee of the Lords, and will to-morrow interrogate the State prisoners relative to their very impudent and mischievously intended advertisement. I am happy to observe that it has produced little or no effect in this country in point of discrediting the report, and should imagine from its being published in the Courier[2] without comment, that the party in England do not build much upon it: however there is too much at stake to risk anything, and an argument might be drawn from it hereafter, when it would be impossible to have it explained by the parties.

I have, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH.

MY DEAR LORD, French Park, Sept. 6, 1798.

The inclosed letters will inform you of anything material that has passed in this quarter since I wrote yesterday. The mistaken confidence of the City of Limerick regiment[3] was unfortunate, as we should otherwise hitherto have sustained no loss from the rapid inroad of the enemy.

I have directed General Lake in the event of the enemy's marching to Manor Hamilton, to follow them as fast as possible, taking with him Major-General Moore's brigade; but if the enemy should march down the Shannon to the westward of Lough Allen, I have desired him to fall back towards General Moore and take

[1] The Duke of Portland and the Chancellor equally thought the re-examination necessary.

[2] 'The Courier' was then the organ of the revolutionary party in England.

"'Couriers' and 'Stars,' sedition's evening host,
Ye 'Morning Chronicle' and 'Morning Post.'"
Anti-Jacobin.

[3] Under the impression that it was merely the van, this regiment, instead of falling back, awaited the attack of the whole French force at Coloony, Sept. 5, and made a most gallant stand. Their colonel was Charles Vereker, afterwards 2nd Viscount Gort, b. 1768, d. Nov. 11, 1812; m. 1st, Oct. 1789, Jane, widow of William Stamer, Esq., of Cornelly, and dau. of Ralph Westropp, Esq., of Attyfenn; 2nd, March 5, 1810, Elizabeth, dau. of John Pallister, Esq., of Derryluskan, Colonel Vereker was M.P. for Limerick City from 1795 to the Union, and again from 1802 to 1817, when, on the death of his maternal uncle, John Prendergast Smyth, 1st Viscount Gort, he succeeded to the peerage. At the Union he received a pension of 365*l.*, as compensation for the office of Constable of Limerick Castle, which he then held. He was permitted to adopt as his motto the word "Coloony," in reference to the affair noticed above.

the best means of preventing their return into Connaught. I shall myself proceed to-morrow to Carrick-on-Shannon, and afterwards regulate my movements according to those of the enemy.

The Guards are ordered to Kilbeggan, where they will be at hand to assist any of our operations, and from whence, in case of any serious alarm, they might arrive either by land or water in the course of a few hours in the Capital. I have, without assigning reasons, ordered boats to be held in readiness at Philipstown.

You will be pleased to transmit the contents of this letter, with copies of those which are enclosed, to Mr. Wickham for the Duke of Portland's information.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

P.S. Poor Taylor is too ill to be able to write, which is at this time peculiarly unfortunate.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

MY LORD, Camp near St. Johnstown, Sept. 8, 1798.

When I wrote to your Grace on the 5th, I had every reason to believe from the enemy's movement to Drumahair, that it was their intention to march to the North, and it was natural to suppose that they might hope that a French force would get into some of the bays in that part of the country, without a succour of which kind, every point of direction for their march seemed equally desperate.

I received however very early in the morning of the 7th, accounts from Lieut.-General Lake that they had turned to their right to Drumkeirn, and that he had reason to believe that it was their intention to go to Boyle, or Carrick-on-Shannon, in consequence of which I hastened the march of the troops under my immediate command, in order to arrive before the enemy at Carrick, and directed Major-General Moore, who was at Tubbercurry, to be prepared in the event of the enemy's movement to Boyle.

On my arrival at Carrick, I found that the enemy had passed the Shannon at Balintra, where they attempted to destroy the bridge, but Lieut.-General Lake followed them so closely, that they were not able to effect it.

Under these circumstances I felt pretty confident that one more march would bring this disagreeable warfare to a conclusion, and having obtained satisfactory information that the enemy had halted for the night at Cloone, I moved with the troops at Carrick

at 10 o'clock on the night of the 7th to Mochill, and directed Lieut.-General Lake to proceed at the same time to Cloone, which is about three miles from Mochill, by which movement I should be able either to join with Lieut.-General Lake in the attack of the enemy, if they should remain at Cloone, or to intercept their retreat, if they should (as it was most probable) retire on the approach of our army.

On my arrival at Mochill soon after daybreak, I found that the enemy had begun to move towards Granard; I therefore proceeded with all possible expedition to this place, through which, I was assured, on account of a broken bridge, that the enemy must pass in their way to Granard, and directed Lieut.-General Lake to attack the enemy's rear and impede their march as much as possible without bringing the whole of his corps into action. Lieut.-General Lake performed this service with his usual attention and ability, and the enclosed letter which I have just received from him will explain the circumstances which produced the immediate surrender of the enemy's army.

The copy of my Orders which I enclose will show how much reason I have to be satisfied with the exertions of the troops, and I request that your Grace will be pleased to inform His Majesty that I have received the greatest assistance from the General and Staff Officers who have served with the army.

I have the honour, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

GENERAL ORDERS.

Head-quarters, Camp near St. Johnstown,
Sept. 9, 1798.

Lord Cornwallis cannot too much applaud the zeal and spirit which has been manifested by the army, from the commencement of the operations against the invading enemy, until the surrender of the French forces.

The perseverance with which the soldiers supported the extraordinary marches which were necessary to stop the progress of the very active enemy, does them the greatest credit, and Lord Cornwallis heartily congratulates them on the happy issue of their meritorious exertions.

The corps of Yeomanry in the whole country through which the army has passed, have rendered the greatest services, and are peculiarly entitled to the acknowledgment of the Lord-Lieutenant, from their not having tarnished that courage and loyalty, which

they displayed in the cause of their King and country, by any acts of wanton cruelty towards their deluded fellow-subjects.

EDWARD COOKE, ESQ., TO WILLIAM WICKHAM, ESQ.

[Private.]

DEAR SIR, Dublin Castle, Sept. 11, 1798.

You see Bartholomew Teeling mentioned among the prisoners: he called himself Biron and aide-de-camp to Humbert. I saw him this morning and talked to him freely; he did not wish to communicate much, was collected and prepared for his fate.

He said he conceived another column had attempted to sail, but had been prevented. That when they found themselves unsupported at Castlebar, they resolved to attempt something daring, and to march for Dublin upon speculation of insurrection; that their troops had latterly grown mutinous, and refused to march and fight any longer.

The corps which came is not of the Italian, but Vendean army; Humbert was second in command to Hoche and was at Bantry. He said 200 of the Longford and Kilkenny at one time joined them, but they all deserted from them except about sixty. He said the country-people were very ill-behaved, came in, got arms and clothes, and ran away, and that their sole object was plunder; the French shot two of them. He praised Colonel Craufurd much for the manner he harassed them.

He said the Limerick militia behaved gallantly at Colooney, but were ill-posted and ill-conducted.

He thought the French brought clothing and arms for about 4000; only 3 four-pounders, a good deal of ammunition. It does not appear that the French had much money; they had some brass and paper, but little gold or silver, but I have not all particulars.

I am, &c.,

E. COOKE.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

[Secret.]

MY LORD, Dublin Castle, Sept. 13, 1798.

During our short but very active and fatiguing campaign, I was obliged to desire Lord Castlereagh to make all necessary communications to your Grace on the conduct of the civil affairs of this country, by which you will have seen that our parliamentary business is nearly concluded, and that although there have been

many alarms, no serious rising has taken place in the interior of the country.

The re-examination of the three state-prisoners appears to me to be very satisfactory; and I hope that I do not deceive myself in thinking that the measures pursued by this Government in regard to them, will be attended with the most beneficial consequences both in Ireland and in Great Britain.

In order that the matter may be fairly submitted to the judgment of your Grace and His Majesty's other confidential servants, I enclose a statement of the whole transaction, which, if I can place any trust in my memory, is most perfectly correct; and now, after having proved the treason by the most incontrovertible evidence, we have still the power of detaining the whole of the state-prisoners in custody as long as the war lasts, or as it shall be thought necessary, which could with difficulty have been effected by the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act alone, and we have besides the additional advantage of being afterwards enabled to banish them for life, instead of turning them loose on the public to pursue their treasonable practices.

It is undoubtedly desirable that they should be sent as soon as possible out of this country, where, unless their confinement was so rigid as to preclude all communications with persons who are not in custody, they might yet do some mischief; but there are difficulties at present attending the banishment, and even if we could trust to any security for their remaining in America, there would be a doubt, if they went in a body, whether under the present circumstances that country would receive such a cargo of sedition.

It has occurred to me that perhaps they might be safely stationed at Fort George and other of the forts in the Highlands of Scotland, with liberty of walking within a mile or two of the fort, but such a measure might perhaps alarm the people, and I throw it out merely as a vague suggestion.

We have discovered a Mr. Teeling of Lisburne amongst the French prisoners, and I believe that we shall prove a Monsieur La Roche to be a Mr. Roche[1] of Ireland. It is my intention to send the French prisoners, both officers and soldiers, to Liverpool, in some of the transports which have brought over the five regiments of English militia to this place.

[1] He was also supposed to be Byrne, but he satisfied Mr. Cooke that he was born of English parents in France, to which country he was allowed to return with Humbert, to whom he was A.D.C. After his departure fresh suspicion arose that he was one of the Roches of Trabolgan, county of Cork, and he was ordered to be arrested. But he had previously escaped. O'Keon was also set at liberty. The papers about him are omitted.

The great and ample reinforcement which has been sent to this country will, I hope, secure Ireland against all her foreign and domestic enemies. I have the honour to be, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

[Secret and Confidential.]

MY DEAR LORD, Dublin Castle, Sept. 16, 1798.

If I have not appeared to give my sentiments to your Grace with the utmost freedom, and to speak with the most perfect openness of heart on the subject both of men and measures in this country, I most earnestly request that you will believe that such apparent reserve has not proceeded from a want of the most affectionate regard personally to yourself, or the most entire confidence in your uprightness and honour, but in truth from my not being able to give you opinions which I had not formed, or to explain things which I was not sure that I understood.

The quick succession of important events during the short period of my Lieutenancy has frequently diverted my attention from the pursuit of that great question—How this country can be governed and preserved, and rendered a source of strength and power, instead of remaining an useless and almost intolerable burthen to Great Britain.

Your Grace will not be so sanguine as to expect that I am now going to tell you that I have succeeded in making this discovery. Sorry am I to say that I have made no further progress than to satisfy myself that a perseverance in the system which has hitherto been pursued, can only lead us from bad to worse, and after exhausting the resources of Britain must end in the total separation of the two countries.

The principal personages[1] here who have long been in the habit of directing the councils of the Lords-Lieutenants are perfectly well-intentioned and entirely attached and devoted to the British connexion, but they are blinded by their passions and prejudices, talk of nothing but strong measures, and arrogate to themselves the exclusive knowledge of a country, of which, from their mode of governing it, they have, in my opinion, proved themselves totally ignorant.

To these men I have shown all civility and kindness in my

[1] The Chancellor, the Speaker, the Right Hon. John Beresford, and others; the Speaker perhaps the most prominent.

power, and have done for them all ordinary favours which they have asked, but I am afraid that they are not satisfied with me, because I have not thrown myself blindly into their hands. With the Chancellor, who can with patience listen to the words *Papist* and *Moderation*, I have invariably talked on all public points which have occurred, and I have shown no marks of confidence to any other set of men, and have particularly given no countenance whatever to those who opposed the former Government. I have at all times received the greatest assistance from Lord Castlereagh, whose prudence, talents, and temper I cannot sufficiently commend.

No man will, I believe, be so sanguine as to think that any measures which Government can adopt would have an immediate effect on the minds of the people, and I am by no means prepared to say what those should be, which slowly and progressively tend to that most desirable object.

I have hitherto been chiefly occupied in checking the growing evil, but so perverse and ungovernable are the tempers here, that I cannot flatter myself that I have been very successful.

With regard to future plans I can only say that some mode must be adopted to soften the hatred of the Catholics to our Government. Whether this can be done by advantages held out to them from an union with Great Britain, by some provision for their clergy, or by some modification of tythe, which is the grievance of which they complain, I will not presume to determine. The first of these propositions is undoubtedly the most desirable, if the dangers with which we are surrounded will admit of our making the attempt, but the dispositions of the people at large, and especially of the North, must be previously felt.

The Chancellor, who is much disposed to this measure, will go soon to Harrowgate, and will return by the way of London, where he will have an opportunity of talking the subject over with your Grace, and by that time I shall probably be better able to judge how it will go down in this country. I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH TO WILLIAM WICKHAM, ESQ.

[Private and Confidential.]

SIR, Dublin Castle, Sept. 17, 1798.

. . . . Your letter, marked private and confidential, of the 10th has been received. The Duke of Portland may depend on every

exertion of mine, in seconding the salutary military regulations his Excellency the Lord-Lieutenant is about to adopt for restoring the discipline of the Irish army, particularly of the native militia, which has suffered more from the irregular service in which the troops have necessarily been engaged, than any other description of force. The spirit of party naturally finds its way amongst the privates, and it is much to be lamented that the officers are not more sensible of the necessity of repressing it than they have yet shown themselves. As far as I can presume to give an opinion, there is little to fear from disaffection—much from insubordination and religious distinction; a disposition to plunder has grown out of the unfortunate warfare in which they have been engaged, which the principle of free-quartering, however well regulated, was calculated to countenance. I have no doubt the Lord-Lieutenant will speedily bring them back to a respect for property; it is more difficult to make them respect the inferior officers who have suffered authority to pass from their hands.

I can easily conceive the Guards have suffered from the abundance of spirits at Waterford, the English regiments generally on their landing indulge in the use of whiskey for a time; it does not however appear to me that drunkenness is by any means the prevailing vice of the Irish army. In the Irish Militia regiments by no means so: bad officers, perpetually soliciting leave of absence, and a total ignorance and inexperience of every military duty beyond that of a common parade, are our weak points. The troops on the late expedition, I am told, visibly improved, a repetition of such attacks would not injure us. My Lord Cornwallis is determined to enforce the strictest discipline, and his Grace may be assured I shall lose no opportunity of impressing on the minds of those with whom I communicate, how much the safety of the country is at present exposed from the indiscipline of its Militia.

The French prisoners sailed this morning for Liverpool. The officers not much pleased with their Connaught allies. General Humbert very much surprised to find the negotiation and connexion between the Directory and the Union disclosed by the Irish agents.

I have, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Early in August an application was made by Mr. Rufus King to the Government, to obtain authority for the purchase of a quantity of cannon and small arms wanted for the use of the American Government. There seems to have been considerable difficulty in

acceding to the request, and the Ordnance Department denied that the Birmingham manufacturers were able to furnish more than Government were ready to take. Mr. King wanted 25,000 stand of small arms either from the manufacturers or from the Tower stores, as many iron cannon of various calibres for the navy as could be bought for 6000*l.*, and the same for the army to the extent of 4000*l.* The Ministry were inclined to accede to the request, and the following correspondence passed between Lord Grenville and Lord Cornwallis:—

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Private.] Received Sept. 17.

MY DEAR LORD, Cleveland Row, Sept. 13, 1798.

During your absence from Dublin I felt it quite impossible to trouble you on the subject of the inclosed papers. You will recollect that we had formerly some conversation on the business, and I think then you seemed to be of opinion, that, although we could not suffer the American Government to employ the British manufacturers, yet that the Ordnance here might afford them some limited supply.

Not knowing to what degree you are enabled to mix with the labours of your present situation, any attention or superintendence of the details of the Ordnance here, I am not sure whether I do right in troubling you upon this subject, but Mr. King's applications are so pressing, that I am under the necessity of giving him a definitive answer.

I have, &c.,

GRENVILLE.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[Private.]

MY DEAR LORD, Dublin Castle, Sept. 18, 1798.

No branch of the Ordnance business has given me so much anxiety and uneasiness as the situation in which we stood in regard to small arms, of which article when I came into office we were almost entirely unprovided. The loss of arms in Holland, and still more in the West Indies, have exceeded all bounds of calculation, and we have since been called upon to provide in the first instance for the Supplementary Militia, and afterwards for the general arming of the country.

In order that we might pursue an uniform system as well in our transactions with the manufacturers as in the distribution of arms, I requested the Surveyor-General (General Ross) to take the peculiar superintendence of this branch of the Department and to manage the correspondence, and all the transactions with the manufacturers, who were prepared to take every advantage of our difficulties and distresses.

I have desired General Ross to wait upon your Lordship, and to lay before you the amount of our present stock with our probable receipt and deliveries, and your Lordship and His Majesty's confidential servants will then be enabled to judge how far it may be in our power to assist the American Government.

I shall only add that I am perfectly persuaded that it would be better for us to give them every firelock in our store, than to allow Mr. King to employ our manufacturers. I have, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MAJOR-GENERAL THE HON. J. H. HUTCHINSON TO MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

MY LORD, Dublin, Sept. 20, 1798.

From the conversation I had the honour of holding with your Excellency at Ballynamon, and from subsequent events, I have the mortification of finding that my conduct has met with your disapprobation. Thus circumstanced, nothing remains for me to do, but to request your Excellency's permission to resign my situation on the Staff of Ireland.

I was originally placed on it without any solicitation on my part by the express command of H. R. H. the Duke of York. I have hitherto served without reproach, but having now the misfortune of incurring your censure, I feel myself bound as a man of honour to retire from a situation in which I can be no longer useful to the public, and not to impose upon your Excellency the difficulty of employing a general officer who has forfeited your confidence.

If anything can increase the regret which I feel in discontinuing to serve under your Excellency's command, it is the high sense I entertain of your military character, and the respect I bear to those wise and humane principles of policy, upon which you administer the Government of this unhappy country.

I take the liberty to inclose a statement of facts.

I have, &c.,

J. H. HUTCHINSON.

STATEMENT BY THE HON. MAJOR-GENERAL HUTCHINSON WITH REFERENCE TO THE ACTION AT CASTLEBAR.

Sept. 21, 1798.

At nine in the morning of Thursday August 23, Major-General Hutchinson, then commanding in Connaught, received a report that the enemy had landed in the Bay of Killala.

Sir Thomas Chapman[1] mentioned in the letter that there were seven or eight ships, without specifying whether they were men of war, frigates or transports. As eight ships of a large size might have contained a considerable force, the General thought it his duty to remain at Galway until he had received better information of the movement, and the real strength of the enemy, and that morning, shortly after nine o'clock, reported his intention of continuing there, until he should receive further advices—giving orders at the same time to the troops under his command to hold themselves in readiness to move on the shortest notice.

About two o'clock of the morning of the 24th, General Taylor reported the landing of the troops at Killala, from three ships, and giving the various accounts he received of their force, making their amount from 600 to 1200 or 1600 men, and pressing for immediate support and assistance.

At the same time, or rather before, the General was informed that the Carbineers and the Yeomanry had moved forward toward Ballina and Killala. From those different accounts, the General, judging that the force of the enemy was probably not above 1000 men, and knowing with that number their object must be either to plunder property, or to organize a civil war in the country, and he having a force under his command of near 4000 men, thought it his duty to move forward on the enemy, in order to prevent, by the quickness of his movements, the possibility of their succeeding in either design. He reported this his intention to Dublin, and left Galway about ten o'clock on Friday and arrived at Castlebar that night, from whence he communicated to the Lord-Lieutenant all the intelligence which he had received of the probable strength and movements of the enemy.

During the course of Saturday and Sunday he communicated all the intelligence which it was in his power to collect, particularly the information brought by Lieutenant Grey of the Carbineers, who had been sent with a flag of truce to the enemy, and returned about two o'clock on Saturday, reporting the strength of the enemy to be by no means so considerable.

[1] Colonel Sir Thomas Chapman, Kt., 2nd Bart. Aug. 1810, Lieut.-Colonel 6th Dragoon Guards, b. Oct. 20, 1756; d. Dec. 23, 1837; m. 1808, Margaret, dau. of James Fetherstonhaugh, Esq., of Bracklyn Castle.

General Lake arrived between ten and eleven o'clock on that night, and took upon himself the command of the troops.

On Monday morning, 27th August, about an hour before sunrise, a report was received from the outpost, distant about six miles, that the enemy were advancing. The troops were immediately assembled, having the night before received orders to be under arms two hours before daybreak. The troops and cannon were then posted on a position previously taken, where they remained until seven o'clock. They were 1600 or 1700 cavalry and infantry, ten pieces of cannon and one howitzer. The ground was very strong by nature; the French were about 700, having left 100 at Ballina, and 100 at Killala. They did not land above 900 rank and file. They had with them about 500 rebels, a great proportion of whom fled after the first discharge of cannon. The French had only two 4-pounders, and from 30 to 40 mounted men. Nothing could exceed the misconduct of the troops, with the exception of the artillery, which was admirably served, and of Lord Roden's Fencibles, who appeared at all times willing to do their duty. There is too much reason to imagine that two of the regiments had been previously tampered with, the hope of which disaffection induced the French to make the attack, which was certainly one of the most hazardous and desperate ever thought of against a very superior body of troops, as their retreat both on Killala and Ballina was cut off by Sir Thomas Chapman and General Taylor. When the troops fell into confusion without the possibility of rallying them, there was scarcely any danger; very few men at that time had fallen on our part; the French on the contrary had suffered considerably. They lost 6 officers and from 70 to 80 men, which was great, considering how short a time the action lasted, and the smallness of their numbers. I am convinced had our troops continued firm for ten minutes longer, the affair must have been over to our entire advantage, but they fired vollies, without any orders, at a few men before they were within musket-shot. It was impossible to stop them, and they abandoned their ground immediately afterwards.

I do not mention these circumstances in order to exculpate myself. It would be the height of presumption in me to make myself accountable for the events of that day, as General Lake had the command; I have only positively to maintain that I never placed him under the necessity of fighting. He might, if he had judged it necessary, have abandoned the position at Castlebar on Sunday night, and in the morning the troops had at least two hours to retire either on Hollymount or Foxford, with a certainty of not

being followed, as our force was greatly superior to theirs, and it would have been impossible for them to harass us on account of their inferiority in cavalry. Their object on that day was Castlebar alone, and they aimed at nothing else.

I do not at all mean to infer that General Lake deserves any blame for engaging the enemy; perhaps he might not have thought it wise to abandon a great tract of country to an inferior force, without making an effort for its preservation.

Had I received any instructions, or been made acquainted with your Excellency's intentions, I do most solemnly assure you nothing should have induced me to depart from them. With a very superior force under my command, I thought it my duty not to leave a great proportion of the province of Connaught open to the incursions of an inferior enemy. I therefore advanced from Galway to Castlebar; in that position remained from Friday night until the arrival of General Lake, and I humbly submit to your Excellency that I ought not to be held responsible for any subsequent event.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL THE HON. J. H. HUTCHINSON.

SIR, Dublin Castle, Sept. 23, 1798.

I have received your letter dated 20th instant, desiring to retire from the Staff of this country, and I am sorry to find you feel yourself under the necessity of taking this step in consequence of my having expressed a disapprobation of your conduct, in moving so hastily forward with your whole force to Castlebar, without waiting for any communication from me on a matter of so great inportance.

Your zeal to prevent a great part of the country from being plundered by the enemy, was highly meritorious, and your behaviour in the action, according to General Lake's report, was such as to do you the greatest credit; but still I thought it my duty, as Commander-in-Chief, to point out to you what appeared to me to be an error of judgment on your part, and especially as it is one of that kind which is likely to produce the most fatal consequences, and which a General Officer, who has more zeal and courage than experience in the practical part of his profession, is very liable to commit.

You state the force under your command to have amounted to near 4000 men; but I have understood that you had not more than 1000 infantry with you at the time that you exposed yourself to be attacked by the French; and, considering that your troops

had never yet seen a regular enemy, I think it would not have been prudent or advisable to place that corps in such a situation as to be subject to receive an attack, or make a precipitate retreat, even if you had seen no necessity for waiting for any communication with the Commander-in-Chief.

I have now only to assure you, that so far from having any personal ill-disposition towards you, I have been much prepossessed in favour of your character, and I earnestly recommend it to you to consider the business once more before you take the final resolution of resigning your appointment on the Staff.

I have the honour, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MAJOR-GENERAL THE HON. J. HELY HUTCHINSON TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

MY LORD, Dublin, Sept. 25, 1798.

I have been honoured with your Excellency's letter, and am to assure you, that when I requested your permission to resign my situation on the Staff of Ireland, it was under the impression that I might have been so unfortunate as to forfeit your Excellency's confidence, and, in that event, I certainly should have thought myself bound to retire from a situation, in which I might have embarrassed your Excellency, and could have been of no further use to the public.

The letter which your Excellency has done me the honour to write to me, has entirely removed every feeling of that nature, and has finally decided me to continue under your command, from which I never thought of retiring but with the utmost reluctance and concern, and under which I shall feel it my pride and pleasure to remain.

I have, &c.,

J. H. HUTCHINSON.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. W. PITT.

MY DEAR SIR, Dublin Castle, Sept. 25, 1798.

About three hours after your letter reached me, I received the enclosed information[1] of the sailing of the second armament

[1] The Duke of Portland had, Sept. 21, informed Lord Cornwallis that the French were about to invade Ireland, and also to attack Portsmouth and Plymouth. The squadron which did sail from Brest about Sept. 20, consisted of the Hoche of 78 guns, eight frigates, and two small vessels. Dispersed by heavy gales they reunited, Oct. 10, off Lough Swilly, and on the following day they were attacked by Sir John Borlase Warren. A general action ensued, and on that and the subsequent days all the French

which has been for some time prepared at Brest against this country, and which had been once stopped by Lord Bridport's[1] fleet. Situated as I am for my sins in the direction of the affairs of a country, nine-tenths of the inhabitants of which are thoroughly disaffected to the Government, with a militia on which no dependence whatever can be placed, and which Abercromby too justly described by saying that they were only formidable to their friends,[2] and with the constant threats of foreign invasion, how hard it is for me to say what troops I can spare. But this is not my only difficulty, as great part of what is supposed to be disposable, is in fact an ideal force. You will see by the enclosed statement, that the eight skeleton regiments which are on this establishment, are too weak to be of any use here, or to render service elsewhere, and even their wretched numbers are composed chiefly of raw recruits. The brigade of Guards cannot, I conclude, be disposed of for the service of India. There remain then the four regiments which were sent in the last spring from Britain. The Royals, consisting when they landed of about 300 men; the 2nd and 29th, which corps, when they were with me in the late business, brought about 450 each into the field; and the 100th (Huntley's), which produced 600 under arms.

Of all those, the corps which I should be most concerned to part with would be Huntley's, as they are exemplary in their conduct and discipline, and are brigaded under General Moore, with two strong battalions of Irish light infantry, in whom we could place no trust, if they were not supported by the steadiness of the 100th.

I have now put you in possession of all my wealth, and told you all my dangers; it is for you to dispose of the former according to your judgment of the comparative hazard of the two countries, for I really do not know how far India is in any immediate danger from Buonaparte, although I am well aware of the ultimate mischief that may attend the establishment of the French in Egypt.

ships, except two frigates and the two small vessels, were captured. Thomas Corbett, M'Guire, and Russell, three of the leading Irish leaders, escaped, but Wolfe Tone was taken on board the Hoche. The French fleet was commanded by Commodore Bompart, and the land force, about 3000 strong, by General Hardy.

[1] Alexander, only Viscount Bridport, K.B., Admiral of the Red, Vice-Admiral of Great Britain, and General of Marines, b. Dec. 2, 1726, d. May 3, 1814; m. 1st, 1761, Maria, dau. of the Rev. R. West, Prebendary of Durham, and 2nd, June 26, 1788, Mary Sophia, dau. and sole heir of Thomas Bray, Esq., of Edmonton. Created Aug. 12, 1794, Lord Bridport in Ireland, and June 13, 1796, Lord Bridport in England. Promoted to an English Viscounty June 10, 1801. M.P. for Bridgewater, May, 1784, to June, 1790, and then for the Borough of Buckingham to May, 1796.

[2] An expression used by Sir Ralph Abercromby in General Orders dated Dublin, Feb. 26, 1798.

The principal people here are so frightened that they would I believe, readily consent to a union, but then it must be a Protestant Union, and even the Chancellor, who is the most right-headed politician in this country, will not hear of the Roman Catholics sitting in the United Parliament. You will easily conceive that with a hostile fleet hovering on our coast, and two civil wars—(one in Wexford and Wicklow, and the other in Mayo) raging in the country, I am at this moment pretty well occupied. You may depend on hearing either from me or Lord Castlereagh if anything material should occur.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Phœnix Park, Sept. 30, 1798.

The last has been a week of alarms. On Sunday last, the 23rd, I received advice from a frigate which arrived in Bantry Bay, that two line-of-battle ships and seven frigates full of troops had come out of Brest, and on Tuesday I was told from high authority in England, that the most authentic information had just been received, that the French were prepared to take advantage of Lord Bridport's being obliged to go into port, and to make a formidable attack on Cork and the southern coast of this country. At the same time I received a letter from Dundas in Scotland, saying that he must call upon me for some of my disposable force to go to India, to resist Buonaparte. The eight regiments on this establishment[1] are mere skeletons, yours[2] is by far the strongest; the 30th is the only other corps that has 250 men; several of them have not half that number—the 2nd and 29th being about 450 men each under arms, and the 100th (by far the best of the whole) 600. The Royals have on paper only 300. By taking the three serviceable regiments he may ruin Ireland, but I am afraid he cannot save India.

This country is daily becoming more disturbed. Religious animosities increase, and I am sorry to say are encouraged by the foolish violence of all the principal persons who have been in the habit of governing this island; and the Irish militia, from their repeated misbehaviour in the field, and their extreme licentiousness,

[1] At this time the troops in England and Ireland, being voted by different Parliaments, were on separate establishments. But during the rebellion, regiments were lent by England to Ireland, and paid by the latter country. This was the case with the 2nd, 29th, and others.

[2] The 89th, of which General Ross was colonel.

are fallen into such universal contempt and abhorrence, that when applications are made for the protection of troops, it is often requested that Irish militia may not be sent.

The great measure from which I looked for so much good, will, if carried, fall far short of my expectations, as all the leading persons here, not excepting the Chancellor, are determined to resist the extension of its operation to the Catholics. I feel the measure of so much importance that it is worth carrying anyhow, but I am determined not to submit to the insertion of any clause, that shall make the exclusion of the Catholics a fundamental part of the Union, as I am fully convinced that until the Catholics are admitted into a general participation of rights, (which when incorporated with the British Government they cannot abuse,) there will be no peace or safety in Ireland.

Believe me, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

I have asked the Duke of York to let Nightingall come over to command the 1st battalion of light infantry under General Moore.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

MY LORD, Dublin Castle, Oct. 6, 1798.

I have received your Grace's letter of the 1st instant, enclosing His Majesty's royal letter directing me to cause the name of Henry Grattan, Esq., to be struck out of the list of His Majesty's Privy Council in Ireland.

Having directed a Council to be summoned this day, I struck the name of Henry Grattan, Esq., out of the list of the Privy Council in their presence, pursuant to His Majesty's commands, and I have directed the same to be notified in the Gazette accordingly.

I have, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. W. PITT.

[Most Private.]

DEAR SIR, Dublin Castle, Oct. 8, 1798.

I had yesterday a long conversation with the Chancellor, who purposes to embark this evening for England. You will find him disposed to discuss the important subject in question with

great fairness, and with the most sincere good wishes for the future welfare of both countries. He does not, however, appear to feel sufficiently how absolutely dependent the Protestants at present are on the support of Britain; but indeed it must be allowed that if they are sensible of it themselves, their opposition to the measure of admitting the Catholics to sit in Parliament would be as violent as if such dependence did not exist. I certainly wish that England could now make a union with the Irish nation, instead of making it with a party in Ireland; and although I agree with those who assert that the Catholics will not be immediately converted into good subjects, yet I am sanguine enough to hope, after the most plausible and most popular of their grievances is removed (and especially if it could be accompanied by some regulation about tythes) that we should get time to breathe, and at least check the rapid progress of discontent and disaffection.

After what I have said I shall submit the present question entirely to your decision, and shall only press strongly upon you my most earnest recommendation, that, whatever your determination now may be, you will not suffer it to be made irrevocable.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

[Most Private and Confidential.]

MY DEAR LORD, Dublin Castle, Oct. 8, 1798.

. . . The Chancellor sails for England this evening, and he goes with the thorough conviction that unless an union between Great Britain and Ireland can be effected, there remains but little hope that the connexion between the two countries will long subsist.

He thinks, however, that at present the admission of Catholics into Parliament would create alarming discontents among the Protestants, and go but a little way towards removing from the minds of the former that poison which has been infused into them with so much art and industry.

The question is of so great magnitude, that I dare not place sufficient confidence in such judgment as my recent knowledge of this country has enabled me to form, to speak decidedly on the subject.

The Chancellor is fully impressed with a sense of the extreme dangers which so imminently threaten this island, and he will, I am persuaded, discuss the matter with your Grace and the others of His Majesty's confidential servants with whom he may converse, with fairness and candour and without being biassed by little considerations and prejudices. Perhaps he does not feel with sufficient force how dependent the Protestants are at this moment on Great Britain for their very existence. . . . .

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE BISHOP OF LICHFIELD AND COVENTRY.

DEAR JAMES, Phœnix Park, Oct. 11, 1798.

I have taken a long time to thank you for your very kind letter dated the 19th ult.; but you, who have seen how much a Lord-Lieutenant is worried and teased even in peaceable times, can make allowances for my situation.

We have been for this last fortnight in hourly expectation of the arrival of the armament which sailed from Brest in the middle of last month,[1] but I begin now to think that they will not come: we are, however, well prepared for them, and with our present military force have nothing to fear. This wretched country, I am sorry to say, is, in its internal state, getting worse and worse every day. The evil is apparent, but God knows where we are to find the remedy.

Horace is vastly well; he is very good-humoured, and consequently much liked and everywhere well received. The life of a Dublin aide-de-camp, except when the French give us a little occupation, is rather of the idle kind, and, although Horace is not disposed to vice or irregularity, it can hardly be expected that he should be getting forward in knowledge of any kind. Perhaps when you go to town for the winter, you may think it right to send for him over for two or three months, that he may not become too much an Irishman.

Nothing can be more unpleasant and more repugnant to all my ideas of comfort and happiness than the life I lead here, and I am not sanguine enough to hope that it can be attended with much good to the public. I have got some credit with the Church for my new Bishop; I do not mean by the translation of O'Beirne,[2]

[1] Sir J. B. Warren fell in with this squadron the very day this letter was written. See note to the letter to Mr. Pitt, Sept. 25.

[2] Thomas Lewis O'Beirne, b. 1749, d. Feb. 15, 1823; m. Nov. 1, 1783, Jane, dau. of the Hon. Francis Stuart (son of Francis 6th Earl of

for he was the D. of Portland's choice, but Dr. Young[1] who succeeds to Clonfert, and who is universally allowed to be the man who best deserved a seat on the Bench.

I beg to be most kindly remembered to Mrs. and Miss C.,[2] and James,[3] and am with great truth,

Your most affectionate brother,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. W. PITT.

DEAR SIR, Dublin Castle, Oct. 17, 1798.

The great question which is now depending in regard to Ireland occupies my mind so fully, that I cannot help taking advantage of the favourable opportunity of Mr. Elliott[4] going to England to offer a few more words to you on this most important subject.

It has always appeared to me a desperate measure for the British Government to make an irrevocable alliance with a small party in Ireland (which party has derived all its consequence from, and is in fact entirely dependent upon the British Government), to wage eternal war against the Papists and Presbyterians of this kingdom, which two sects, from the fairest calculations, compose about nine-tenths of the community.

If the danger of such an act should strike His Majesty's Ministers, as I trust to God it will, in the same forcible light, it

Moray). He was ordained a Catholic priest abroad, but on his return to England he renounced the Church of Rome, a step greatly owing to the persuasions and influence of the Bishop of Peterborough (Hinchcliffe) and of the Archbishop of Canterbury, uncle to Lord Cornwallis. He then went to America with Lord Howe, as Chaplain, without fresh ordination. Private Secretary to the Duke of Portland when Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and when he became Premier in the following year, and also to Lord Fitzwilliam, by whom, in 1795, he was made Bishop of Ossory, and afterwards translated to Meath; a solitary instance of a man originally a Roman Catholic attaining such a dignity in the Church of England. His brother was actually a Roman Catholic priest in his diocese.

[1] Dr. Matthew Young, a Senior Fellow of Trinity College, Dublin, one of the ablest of the Irish prelates, b. 1750, d. Nov. 28, 1800; m. Miss Cuthbertson. Appointed Bishop of Clonfert, Jan. 28, 1799. He left a widow and eleven children in narrow circumstances, and Lord Cornwallis, who highly valued the Bishop, obtained for them a pension of 500*l*.

[2] Elizabeth, dau. of the Bishop, b. March 5, 1774, d. Jan. 24, 1813, unm.

[3] James, 5th and last Earl Cornwallis, b. Sept. 20, 1778, d. May 21, 1852; m. 1st, Dec. 12, 1804, Maria Isabella, dau. of Francis Dickens, Esq., M.P. for the county of Northampton; 2nd, Jan. 22, 1829, Laura, dau. of William Hayes, Esq.; and 3rd, Aug. 4, 1842, Julia, dau. of Thomas Bacon, Esq., of Redlands. At his death the male branch of the family, and all the titles, became extinct.

[4] Mr., afterwards the Right Hon. William Elliott, b. March 12, 1766, d. Oct. 26, 1818, unm. Under-Secretary in Ireland from 1797 to Feb. 1801, and Chief Secretary from March, 1806, to April, 1807. Buried in Reigate Church, where a monument, copied from Scipio's tomb, is erected to his memory. M.P. for S. Canice from 1797 to the Union, for Portarlington till 1802, and then till his death for Peterborough. He was well-known when first in Ireland by the sobriquet of the "Castle Spectre," and on his return in 1806 was called "Le Revenant."

comes then to be considered whether a union with the Protestants will afford a temporary respite from the spirit of faction and rebellion which so universally pervades this island, and whether the Catholics will patiently wait for what is called their emancipation from the justice of the united Parliament.

If we are to reason on the future from the past, I should think that most people would answer these questions in the negative, even if it could be supposed that there would be no mischievous intervention on the part of the English Opposition, from which quarter I am convinced that you will not flatter yourself with the hope of such conscientious forbearance.

Upon this view of the subject, if it is in contemplation ever to extend the privileges of the Union to the Roman Catholics, the present appears to be the only opportunity which the British Ministry can have of obtaining any credit from the boon, which must otherwise in a short time be extorted from them.

Mr. Elliott, who is well known to you, has been much in my confidence, and there are few persons who can give a more just, and who will give a more dispassionate, opinion on the state of this wretched country.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

CAPTAIN TAYLOR TO LIEUT.-GENERAL CRAIG.[1]

SIR, Dublin Castle, Oct. 18, 1798.

Having laid before the Lord Lieutenant the proceedings of a General Court-Martial held by your orders in Dublin barracks on Saturday the 13th instant, of which Colonel the Earl of Enniskillen[2] was President, I am directed to acquaint you that his Excellency entirely disapproves of the sentence of the above Court Martial, acquitting Hugh Whollaghan of a cruel and deliberate murder, of which, by the clearest evidence, he appears to have been guilty.

Lord Cornwallis orders the Court-Martial to be immediately dissolved, and directs that Hugh Whollaghan shall be dismissed from the corps of yeomanry in which he served, and that he shall not be received into any other corps of yeomanry in this kingdom.

[1] Lieut.-General Peter Craig, then in command of the Dublin district, d. Jan. 18, 1811, Colonel of the 67th Regt.

[2] John Willoughby, 1st Earl of Enniskillen, so made Aug. 18, 1789, b. 1736, d. May 22, 1803; m. Nov. 3, 1763, Anne, sister of Armar, 1st Lord and 1st Earl of Belmore. Lord Enniskillen was very much offended at the reprimand which Lord Cornwallis gave to the members of this Court-Martial. A great coolness, both political as well as personal, ensued, and it was not till Feb. 1800 that a reconciliation was effected.

His Excellency further desires that the above may be read to the President and Members of the Court-Martial in open court.

I have, &c.,

H. TAYLOR, Mil. Sec.

P.S. I am also directed to desire that a new Court-Martial may be immediately convened, for the trial of such prisoners as may be brought before them, and that none of the officers who sat upon Hugh Whollaghan be admitted as Members.

The facts connected with this case were shortly these. A party of the Mount Kennedy corps of yeomanry, one of whom was Whollaghan, were patrolling at night. They entered a cabin occupied by a woman named Dogherty and her son, who was at that time eating his supper. Whollaghan charged him with having been a rebel, and declared he would kill him. The young man begged the soldier to spare his life, and expressed his readiness to go before a magistrate. Whollaghan however twice snapped his piece at him, and one of his comrades coming in fired and broke Dogherty's arm, although the poor mother, seeing their murderous intentions, endeavoured to seize the muzzle of his gun. Whollaghan, in spite of her prayers and entreaties, deliberately levelled at Dogherty who was lying on the floor, and shot him dead. A permanent Court-Martial, consisting of Lord Enniskillen, President, a Major and three Captains of the 5th Dragoons, one officer of the Fermanagh militia, and one of the 68th, was sitting at Dublin, and Whollaghan was brought before them. The facts above stated were not denied, but the defence was, that Dogherty had been a rebel, though now provided with a protection, and that Whollaghan was a very loyal subject. To prove this some evidence was tendered, and, as it was mostly hearsay, very improperly admitted. The sentence pronounced on the prisoner was, that "this Court do find that he did shoot and kill Thomas Dogherty, a rebel, but do acquit him of any malicious or wilful intention of murder." Lord Cornwallis, naturally indignant at such perversion of justice, ordered the preceding letter to be written, for which he was much blamed by the ultra-loyalists both in Ireland and England. But a different opinion might perhaps have been formed, had the public known what the conduct of a large proportion of the troops (principally of the Irish militia and yeomanry) had been. Among those corps an impression existed, that it was perfectly justifiable to put to death, without even the formality of a trial, any man who was known or

was even suspected to have been a Rebel—an impression too often confirmed by the conduct of their officers, who sometimes joined in, and frequently defended, these atrocious proceedings. This rendered it very difficult to check the evils arising from such feelings, the more so, as the ferocity of the Rebels had at times afforded a pretext for the violence of the military.

Whollaghan's was by no means a solitary case. Many other trials took place in which the members of the courts-martial, influenced by similar feelings, availed themselve of every subterfuge; sometimes admitting illegal, sometimes rejecting legal, evidence, to avoid giving a just and honest decision. Among such cases may be mentioned the trial of Lieutenant ——— of the ——— militia, who, at the head of a party of his men, had committed a crime as nearly similar as possible to Whollaghan's. Though the murder took place in June, 1798, the trial was postponed to May, 1799, when Lieutenant ——— was acquitted, but some of his men were convicted, the sentence being—guilty, death. "But it appearing that the deceased had belonged to a yeomanry corps which had been disbanded, and that he had not joined any other, the Court are of opinion that at the time the crime was committed, the prisoners did not think they were doing an improper act in putting a person *that they thought a Rebel* to death, and from their former good conduct, the Court submit to his Excellency whether they are not fit objects for mercy, and be sent to serve in a regiment abroad for life." . . .

Lord Cornwallis took the opinion of the Attorney-General, as to the possibility of trying by another court-martial Lieutenant ———, who was evidently the most culpable, as the party acted under his orders; but receiving an answer in the negative, he recommended that the Lieutenant should be dismissed from the service. These instances prove that Lord Cornwallis had ample grounds for the strong expressions often used in his private letters.

A circumstance, in some degree connected with this trial, must not be passed over in silence. It will be observed that four officers of the 5th Dragoons served upon this Court-Martial, and one at least of them must have concurred in that verdict of acquittal which Lord Cornwallis so strongly condemned. Some persons have therefore chosen to imagine that Lord Cornwallis on this account afterwards recommended the regiment to be disbanded; and, impressed with this view, they have within these last few years published some violent attacks upon him in the public press. Nothing can be more unfounded than such an idea. The real

facts are these. In the latter part of this year, the General[1] commanding the district in which this regiment was quartered, officially reported on their insubordination and want of discipline, stating that many of the soldiers were United Irishmen, and were in the habit of drinking most seditious toasts. Upwards of twenty had been tried for high treason, desertion to the enemy, arson, &c.; almost all of them were convicted, and several shot or hung. It further appeared that the conduct of the officers, with the exception of the Lieut.-Colonel[2] (whose very meritorious exertions had been little assisted by the others), had been very blameable, and that much of the disorder prevailing in the regiment was to be attributed to their neglect of duty. Many reasons, one of which was the name of the regiment—the Royal Irish Dragoons—made Lord Cornwallis very unwilling to recommend that it should be disbanded; but he at length received positive orders from the Government to take that step. As it was not advisable to dismiss from the service, while quartered in Ireland, men so connected with secret societies, the regiment was sent to England under convoy of a man-of-war, lest it should rise while on the passage; and it was finally disbanded April, 1799.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. W. PITT.

DEAR SIR, Dublin Castle, Oct. 25, 1798.

I have transmitted your letter to Mr. Beresford,[3] who is in

[1] Major-General, afterwards General, Lord Charles Fitzroy, Colonel of the 48th Regt., son of Augustus Henry, 3rd Duke of Grafton, b. July 14, 1764, d. Dec. 20, 1829; m. 1st, 1795, Frances, dau. of Edward Mundy, Esq., of Shipley; 2nd, March 10, 1799, Frances Anne, dau. of Robert, 1st Marquis of Londonderry. He served in America and in Flanders, 1793-4. M.P. for Bury St. Edmunds from Jan. 1787 to May, 1796, and from Nov. 1802 till the dissolution of 1818.

[2] Lieut.-Col. the Hon. Charles Stewart, afterwards, Aug. 12, 1822, 3rd Marquis of Londonderry, K.G., a General, and Colonel of 2nd Life Guards; b. May 18, 1778, d. March 6, 1854; m. 1st, Aug. 8, 1804, Catherine, dau. of John, 3rd Earl of Darnley; 2nd, April 3, 1819, Frances Anne, only dau. and heir of Sir H. Vane Tempest, by Catherine, Countess of Antrim in her own right, 2nd of that creation. Under-Secretary of State from 1807 to 1809; Ambassador at Berlin, 1813-14; at Vienna, 1814-22. M.P. for Thomastown for a short time in 1800, and for the county of Derry from May, 1800, till July 1, 1814, when he was created Lord Stewart. March 28, 1823, he was advanced to the dignity of Earl Vane, with remainder to the children of his second marriage.

[3] Right Hon. John Beresford, 2nd son of Marcus, 1st Earl of Tyrone, and brother of George, 1st Marquis of Waterford, b. March 14, 1738, d. Nov. 28, 1805; m. 1st, Nov. 12, 1760, Anne Constantia, dau. of the Comte de Ligondes; and, 2nd, June 4, 1774, Barbara, dau. of Sir William Montgomery, Bart. He was a Commissioner of Revenue from 1770 to 1780, when he became Chairman of that Board till 1801.; during a great part of this time he was one of the confidential advisers of the Castle. In 1772 he was appointed, jointly with his son Marcus, who died before him, to the Patent office of Taster of Wines. He was made a Commissioner of the Treasury in Dec. 1793, and it was his proposed dismissal from this place, early in 1795, by Lord Fitzwilliam, which led to the duel already mentioned. He represented the county of Waterford from April, 1761, till his death. He went to England to discuss financial and commercial matters with Government. —See Beresford Correspondence, vol. ii.

the county of Derry, and encouraged him to undertake the journey which you propose to him. He is a sensible and well-disposed man, and may give some useful hints, especially on the commercial points.

I was a little hurt at an expression in a letter from the Duke of Portland directing that the state-prisoners should not be sent to America, when he says, "these traitors, whose lives were spared on condition of their being banished." Had the lives of these traitors been in my power, or had I felt confident that I could have produced sufficient evidence to have proved them traitors in a court of justice, I should have thought that I deserved ill of my country if I had spared their lives on any such conditions.

It is, I am sure, unnecessary for me to call to your recollection the importance of making them confess their guilt, the impossibility of their conviction, that it was Oliver Bond's life, and not theirs, which was spared, and all the other circumstances of the case.

I shall trouble you no further on the subject than to request that you will have the goodness to explain the matter when you hear it misrepresented.

The prisoners have been taken out of the two French frigates at Belfast, and will proceed on board the Van Tromp for Liverpool. The other ships have not yet arrived at Lough Swilly.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

MY LORD, Dublin Castle, Oct. 29, 1798.

I have received the honour of your Grace's[1] letter dated the 17th instant, enclosing copies of a letter which you received from the American Minister, and of your Grace's answer, and shall pay due attention to His Majesty's commands respecting the traitors who have consented to be banished for life.

I must, however, take this occasion to remind your Grace[2] that it was not on condition that their own lives should be spared, but on condition that Mr. Oliver Bond should not suffer death, that these men (who were only proved to be traitors by their own confession) consented to a voluntary exile, and that it was the general opinion that there was very little prospect of our being able to convict any of them except Neilson, and even his case was thought to be extremely doubtful.

[1] Neither the despatch of the 17th nor the draft of it can be found.
[2] See Letter to Mr. Pitt, Oct. 25.

Had I made an agreement of the nature described with traitors who were either already convicted, or against whom there was sufficient evidence to render their conviction tolerably certain, I should have thought my conduct blameable; but as there is the greatest reason to believe that the steps which I took in regard to the prisoners were the means of producing the most incontrovertible proofs of treason against a dangerous set of men, whose guilt was not likely by due course of law to be ascertained, I have the satisfaction to think that I have especially served my country.

If His Majesty should not have perfectly understood the circumstances of this transaction, I must request that your Grace will have the goodness to explain them to him.

I have the honour, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH TO WILLIAM WICKHAM, ESQ.

SIR, Dublin, Oct. 29, 1798.

. . . . I fear the Irish state-prisoners are yet likely to prove an embarrassment to us. Exclusive of the 80 whose names are set forth in the Banishment Bill, from 200 to 300 persons (some sentenced by court-martials on condition of banishment for life, others against whom prosecution was discontinued from doubts entertained of the evidence against them being sufficient to convict them upon it) are now confined in different parts of the kingdom. A proportion of those in Dublin, and a few of them in the provinces, are the active and intelligent heads of the party: the remainder are inferior, insignificant persons, very little formidable from their talents. . . . I have, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

The Irish Government were much embarrassed with the state-prisoners yet untried; the more so as the English Government doubted whether it was consistent with the law of nations, to convey such prisoners to any country at amity with Great Britain without having previously obtained the permission of that country. A paragraph appeared in the newspapers early in October announcing the immediate departure of a large number of these prisoners for America, and the Duke of Portland, on seeing this statement, wrote to Lord Cornwallis to say that the King expressly forbid that any traitor should be sent to America, without the previous authority of a Secretary of State.

Many communications on this subject took place between the Secretary of State and Mr. Rufus King,[1] the American Minister, of which the result is given in the following extract from Mr. Wickham's letter to Lord Castlereagh.

"I had some conversation with Mr. King yesterday, when he assured me that under the powers given him by the Act lately passed in America, the President would not suffer any of the traitors from Ireland to land in America, and that if they set foot on shore he would instantly have them sent back to Europe.

"This determination of the President, which Mr. King told me I might consider as official, seems to furnish a conclusive answer to any complaint that may be made by these people, when the Government shall signify to them the impossibility of their being suffered to go to America."

In a subsequent despatch Lord Castlereagh reverts to the subject, repeating that about 80 were banished by Act of Parliament; many others in consequence of the arrangement of July; and nearly 300 more sentenced by courts-martial, and there were no means, recognised by law, of disposing of any of them. Ultimately a proposal was made, and partially carried into effect, to allow them to enter the Prussian service.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

MY LORD, Dublin Castle, Oct. 29, 1798.

The embarrassment in which we are placed by His Majesty's late orders respecting the state-prisoners who are to go into banishment, makes it necessary that I should call your Grace's serious attention to that subject.

When Government acceded to their proposition of submitting to perpetual exile on condition that Mr. Oliver Bond's life should be spared, no time was fixed for their leaving Ireland, and it was understood that it must depend on the pleasure of Government. But still I cannot help thinking that it would be considered as a virtual breach of faith on the part of Government, if no prospect was held out of a term for their imprisonment, and, independent of this consideration, the State would be subjected to much inconvenience and some danger from their confinement in this country, as it would be exceedingly harsh, and indeed almost unjustifiable, to prevent their having communication with many persons on the settlement of their private affairs and various other pretexts.

[1] Rufus King, b. 1755, d. April 29, 1827; m. 1786, Miss Alsop, of New York. Minister in England from 1796 to 1803.

Before I received from your Grace the orders prohibiting their emigration to America, Mr. Arthur O'Connor, Mr. Emmett, and Dr. McNevin, had signified their wish to proceed to Germany, and to fix their residence during the war in some part of that country which should be at peace with His Majesty. But as I then thought that this plan would give them a more easy and expeditious correspondence with France and Ireland, I discouraged the proposition, and intimated that the only means by which they could expect a speedy liberation would be by making arrangements for their voyage to America, according to their first intention.

There were about eighty of the prisoners who signed their acquiescence in perpetual banishment to save the life of Mr. Bond, but there are not more than fifteen of that number who are men of sufficient talents and consequence to render the place of their exile a matter of any material importance, and I much doubt whether the fifteen principal traitors will not be able to do as much mischief during their imprisonment in Ireland, as they could effect by their intrigues in any part of Germany.

The inconvenience and expense of the great number of prisoners who were confined in every part of this kingdom are exceedingly distressing, and besides the ordinary culprits who have been sentenced to transportation and other punishments, there are about three hundred persons who have not been sufficiently criminal to justify their being sent to Botany Bay, notwithstanding that their disaffection has been so strongly marked, that it would occasion great uneasiness amongst the well-disposed part of the community if they were allowed to go at large to their former habitations.

I have the honour, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Dublin, Oct. 29, 1798.

When I thought that we were laid up quietly for the winter, behold another French armament in Killala Bay.[1] We have different accounts of the number of their ships, but a lieutenant of the navy, who commands a cutter, reports the force to be four frigates and a brig, which latter was within hail, and fired at him. I should doubt whether they will land when they hear of the disaster of the former squadron.

[1] See Lord Cornwallis's Letter to General Ross, of Nov. 8.

I am prepared to leave Dublin on the shortest notice. I must refer you for Irish politics to Elliott, who will communicate freely with you, and has been much in my confidence.

Believe me, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. W. PITT.

[Private.]

DEAR SIR, Dublin Castle, Nov. 1, 1798.

From the prejudices and the various interests of people in this country, a considerable opposition to the Union must be expected in the Irish Parliament, in whatever shape that business may be submitted to their consideration.

As soon, therefore, as some of the leading principles are settled, it would be expedient that we should have authority to communicate them to our friends, to canvass in some degree the public opinion, and to endeavour to counteract any evil impressions by which the unwary may be induced to engage themselves to oppose a measure which, on its being fairly represented to them, they might feel it their interest to support.

I have most carefully avoided to give offence to any man, or set of men, and I have great reason to believe that no person of consequence is hostile to my government except the Speaker, and I know no method by which I could have secured his political friendship unless I had placed myself entirely under his guidance, and persevered in a system which I disapproved, and which I was convinced from experience must end in the utter ruin of the country.

I have, however, let no opportunity pass of showing my disposition to oblige him personally; and I trust that you will do me the justice to believe that no humours or feelings of my own, will ever make me neglect any means that may be useful to His Majesty's service, and promote the real interests of the British Empire.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

[Private.]

MY DEAR LORD, Dublin Castle, Nov. 7, 1798.

I have just received a letter from Mr. Pelham, notifying to me his determination, in consequence of the state of his health, to

resign his office in this country,[1] and I lose no time in preferring my most earnest request to your Grace that Lord Castlereagh may succeed to the Secretaryship.

I know that, with some few exceptions, it has been a rule that this place should not be held by an Irishman, but still exceptions have been made, and in no case could they have been with more propriety admitted, than to bring forward at so important a crisis a man of Lord Castlereagh's talents, who possesses the general esteem of his countrymen, and who knows too well the real interests of Ireland, to suppose that they can be promoted by any measures that are not equally favourable to the welfare and prosperity of Great Britain.

I have, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. W. PITT.

DEAR SIR, Dublin Castle, Nov. 7, 1798.

The Speaker is to embark this evening for England. I saw him yesterday morning, and although he does not profess himself to be well disposed to the measure in question, I am inclined to think that you will find him more placable on the subject than I had reason to expect.

We had an amicable explanation on the score of his supposed grievances, after which we shook hands, and parted very good friends.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

I have just received a letter from Mr. Pelham, notifying his resignation; I need not, I am sure, repeat my earnest wishes in favour of Lord Castlereagh.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Phœnix Park, Nov. 8, 1798.

Brownrigg has privately communicated to Taylor that the Duke of York intended soon to appoint him private secretary. Although I am very glad of this for Taylor's sake, it still is a terrible blow upon me, as I do not know where to look for one to fill his place, and it would be difficult *indeed* to find one like him.

[1] Mr. Pelham had for some time been desirous of resigning the Secretaryship, but the Duke of Portland had urged him to remain, and only yielded to his wishes on the 2nd of November.

Talents, habits of business, fidelity, and discretion are not easily to be found united in the same person, and in the present state of Ireland it is almost necessary that Taylor's successor should be either a military man, or one well acquainted with the usages and civil business of the army. If, however, the other requisites could be found, I might perhaps, with the assistance of Hewitt,[1] make shift with a private secretary who had no military knowledge. I wish you would make inquiries, and let me know if you should hear of any person that you may think may suit me. The Duke is so good as to say that he will allow me time to look out for a person to fill Taylor's place.

The Speaker came to me at my request before he embarked for England, and after an amicable explanation we parted good friends. He is ill disposed to the great measure now in agitation, but I doubt whether he has made up his mind to oppose it, and indeed I should think it would be carried here without much difficulty.

Pelham has notified to me his determination to resign on account of his health, and I have written in strong terms both to Mr. Pitt and the Duke of Portland in favour of Lord Castlereagh. The French seem determined, by the best intelligence we receive, to continue their attacks on this country, but this resolution was, I believe, taken before they heard of their late discomfiture, and will probably be abandoned.

The Cæsar, Terrible, and Melpomene were in chase of the four last frigates[2] which came into Killala Bay from Rochfort, when the Cæsar, which had got within shot of the enemy, carried away her fore and main topmasts, and was obliged to give up the chase; the Terrible and Melpomene frigate, however, continued the pursuit, and there is reason to hope that we may get one or two of them.

Believe me, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

[1] Major-General Hewitt, Adjutant-General in Ireland, afterwards Right Hon. Sir George Hewitt, Bart., so created Nov. 6, 1813, G.C.B. A General, and Colonel of the 61st Regt., b. 1750, d. March 21, 1840; m. July 26, 1785, Julia, dau. of John Johnson, Esq., of Blackheath. He was for some time Commander-in-Chief in India.

[2] Three of these very frigates, under the same officer, Savary, had conveyed Humbert to Killala, and had returned to France without encountering an enemy. This second expedition sailed from Rochfort the very day the Hoche was taken, Oct. 12. It was intended to strengthen Bompart's squadron, of which no tidings had been heard, and to carry some reinforcements to Humbert. The vessels reached Killala Bay in safety, but, on learning the fate of the first expedition, both by sea and land, sailed immediately for France. Sir James Saumarez fell in with them Oct. 28, but, owing to the weather, could not bring them to close action. The Cæsar was disabled the same day, and the Terrible on the 30th, when within two miles of one of the frigates, and thus the whole squadron escaped.

THE DUKE OF PORTLAND TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Most Secret and Confidential.] Received Nov. 10.

MY DEAR LORD, Whitehall, Nov. 4, 1798.

. . . The manner in which your Excellency appears to have understood an expression in the letter I had the honour of addressing to you on the subject of the representation which had been made to me by the American Minister, a copy of which I sent you enclosed, will not suffer me to trust to the expectation which your candour would authorise me to indulge in a common instance, but impels me to urge you to read the whole of that letter over again, and particularly to reconsider the sentence which I conceive to have been the cause of your dissatisfaction, and of your entering into the justification of a measure which, so far from its being my intention to arraign, could not be as a principal, and really was not as an accessory, in that moment in my contemplation.

The sentence to which I allude, because I suppose it to be *that* which in the whole of that letter could alone give you any cause for the particulars which you took the trouble of detailing, is that in which, after stating that, by the law of nations, powers in amity have not a right to transport such of their subjects as have been guilty of crimes, into the other dominions, I say that "it is unnecessary, therefore, for me to enter into the policy of the measure;" by which I meant (and am willing to think I cannot, upon reflection, be understood to have meant otherwise) strictly the transportation of the prisoners of state who had been convicted of, or confessed, their treason, to the territories of the United States of North America; and I should have flattered myself that the reasoning which immediately follows would infallibly have removed any doubt, could any have suggested itself upon reading the words I have quoted.

I therefore request your Excellency to refer to that letter, and to have the goodness, if I am mistaken, to point out distinctly the paragraph or expression which has led you to suspect me of intending to glance at, or insinuate anything against, any part of your conduct in your transactions with the prisoners of state. That measure is now completed and concluded, irrevocably and for ever, and I should never have mentioned it but to rejoice at, and congratulate you upon the success of it. But as accident has occasioned me to mention it, I will not conceal from you that I had very great doubts at the time of its propriety, and should certainly not have gone to the extent of the concessions which you judged

expedient; but I am most ready and happy to say that the event has most fully justified you, and that your utmost expectations have been most satisfactorily and completely fulfilled.

I have, &c.,

PORTLAND.

Thus much of this draft was sent to the Lord-Lieutenant on the 4th Nov. The remainder was couched in strong language, complaining, at great length, that Lord Cornwallis did not write often enough, and, above all, that his communications were chiefly private or demi-official letters instead of public despatches. Lord Camden (in the Castlereagh Correspondence) mentions more than once that he had heard such complaints made. The draft must have been submitted to Mr. Pitt, for the following Memorandum in his own handwriting is bound up with it in the State Paper Office:—

Hollwood, Saturday, 5 P.M.

The manner in which the Duke has conveyed his opinion about the transaction with the state-prisoners is such as cannot, I think, give the Lord-Lieutenant any uneasiness, or produce any unpleasant effect; but I confess I think otherwise with respect to what relates to the official correspondence. That subject would, I think, be much better treated in a private letter, and the object much better answered by a mere intimation (in that shape) of the Duke's wish that, for the sake of regularity, the correspondence on all material points might (when leisure would admit) be official, and carried on as usual directly between the Lord-Lieutenant and the Secretary of State. The laying so much stress upon it, and arguing it at any length, seems to suppose it a matter of difficulty. I really trust it will be found that there has only been an accidental omission under the unusual pressure of business, and it seems at all events most desirable to treat it as such. On this account I should feel very anxious that the despatch should stop at the place I have marked, at the conclusion of the first paragraph in the third page. I do not observe anything said about Lord Castlereagh's permanent appointment as Secretary, but I conclude any notification necessary from hence will not be delayed, as his being established in his office will be of the greatest use in various ways.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

[Secret and Confidential.]

MY DEAR LORD, Dublin Castle, Nov. 12, 1798.

I shall trouble your Grace with a very few lines in answer to your secret and confidential letter dated the 4th instant, merely to state that it was not, as you suppose, in consequence of your expression, "it is unnecessary therefore for me to enter into the policy of the measure," that I felt myself called upon to enter into a justification of my conduct, but from your saying, "it is His Majesty's command that not one of the traitors, whose lives have been spared upon condition of being banished from Ireland and passing the remainder of their days in the dominions of some State in amity with His Majesty, shall be suffered," &c., &c.

I must confess that from this last paragraph I did apprehend that His Majesty had conceived that the lives of the traitors alluded to were in my power, and that I had spared them on the above-mentioned conditions, and it was under this impression that I requested your Grace to have the goodness to explain to him the circumstances of the transaction.

I most earnestly entreat you, my dear Lord, not to suspect me of a disposition to be captious, and I think I may, upon a revision of the letter, submit to your candid judgment whether I could sit easy under the idea that so important a measure of my administration had been entirely misapprehended.

The opinion which your Grace has given of the success of the business in question affords me the greatest satisfaction.

I have the honour, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

E. COOKE, ESQ., TO W. WICKHAM, ESQ.

DEAR SIR, Dublin, Nov. 12, 1798.

Mr. Tone was to have been executed this morning in consequence of a sentence of a Court Martial. Having contrived to obtain a razor, he cut his throat this morning at 6 o'clock. The wound is very dangerous, but not certainly mortal. His execution was suspended. The King's Bench sat at eleven, affidavits were produced, and a *habeas corpus* moved for, which was issued, and the sheriffs were ordered to prevent the execution. The Court could do no otherwise.

Martial law and civil process are now at issue, and I believe it is impossible that the former can be exercised whilst the civil courts are allowed to proceed and hold their sittings. I fear also we shall have much embarrassment from our prisoners on board tenders. They will all move for writs of *habeas corpus*, and it will be a nice point for the Courts to decide on the legality of proceedings under martial law.

Lord Castlereagh will be in town to-morrow.

I am, &c.,

E. COOKE.

Tone was tried November 10. In his defence he attempted to justify his conduct, and to prove that, having accepted a commission in the French service, he was no longer amenable to English law. The greater part of his defence has already been published, but as the Court Martial would not allow him to read the passage which follows, it has never been made public:—

"I have laboured in consequence to create a people in Ireland, by raising three millions of my countrymen to the rank of citizens. I have laboured to abolish the infernal spirit of religious persecution by uniting the Catholics and Dissenters. To the former I owe more than can ever be repaid; the services I was so fortunate as to render them they rewarded munificently; but they did more: when the public cry was raised against me, when the friends of my youth swarmed off and left me alone, the Catholics did not desert me—they had the virtue even to sacrifice their own interests to a rigid principle of honour; they refused, though strongly urged, to disgrace a man who, whatever his conduct towards the Government might have been, had faithfully and conscientiously discharged his duty towards them, and in so doing, though it was in my own case, I will say they showed an instance of public virtue and honour of which I know not whether there exists another example."

Tone died in prison of his self-inflicted wound a few days after the preceding letter was written.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Phœnix Park, Nov. 15, 1798.

Had Mr. Dundas been in town before the Chancellor went over, he might perhaps have been able to carry the point of establishing the Union on a broad and comprehensive line; but things have now gone too far to admit of a change, and the prin-

cipal persons in this country have received assurances from the English Ministers which cannot be retracted.

On my pressing the matter strongly, Mr. Pitt has promised that there shall be no clause in the Act of Union which shall prevent the Catholic question from being hereafter taken up, and we must therefore only look forward to the wisdom and liberality of the United Parliament. From what I learn, the present mode is not likely to be opposed by the Catholics: they consider any change better than the present system. . . .

Believe me, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

The prospect of losing Taylor distresses me very much, and I have not yet heard or thought of anybody that can supply his place.

THE DUKE OF PORTLAND TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Secret and Confidential.] Received Nov. 16, 1798.

MY LORD, Whitehall, Nov. 12, 1798.

I have the honour of sending your Excellency inclosed, the heads of a Treaty of Union between this kingdom and Ireland, in which the King's confidential servants are of opinion that all the great interests of that country have been so fully and impartially attended to, that no material difficulty can occur in the completion of that measure, the necessity of which must be now no less apparent than its advantages.

I shall reserve for a separate letter such suggestions as I conceive your Excellency will expect to receive from hence, respecting the manner in which it may be wished that the outlines which are herewith communicated to you should be filled up, and they shall be accompanied by such observations and explanations as they may seem to require. But as I understand that the question of a Union is become a very general subject of discussion, and that consequently the friends of Government must be anxious to know the ideas as well as the wishes of Administration upon it, I have determined to transmit this plan to your Excellency, that you may be enabled, without further loss of time, to satisfy the expectations of your friends, and to bring forward the measure in such a manner as you shall judge most likely to facilitate and insure its success.

I have, &c.,

PORTLAND.

The heads of the Treaty of Union inclosed in the foregoing despatch of the Duke of Portland are, substantially, as follows:—

1. The kingdoms to be united, and the succession to remain as fixed by the existing laws.
2. The British Parliament to be unchanged. The Irish portion to be settled by an Irish Act.
3. Irish Peers to enjoy the same privileges as Scotch Peers.
4. All members of the United Houses to take the oaths now taken by British members; but such oaths to be subject to such alterations as may be enacted by the United Parliament.
5. The continuance of the present Irish Church Establishment to be a fundamental article of the Union.
6. Tariff in the French treaty of commerce with England in 1786, to be adopted as between England and Ireland. The duties may be diminished, but may never be increased. Countervailing duties to be enacted. Special provisions to be made with reference to the export of salt provisions and linen to Great Britain and to the Colonies.
7. Revenue and debts. The accounts to be kept separate. Ireland to pay ——[1] of the annual charges. If the Irish taxes already existing produce a larger sum than the foregoing proportion, the surplus to be employed in paying off Irish debt.
8. The Courts of Justice to be untouched. Final appeal to the House of Lords.
9. The Great Seal of England to remain; so, also, the Privy Council in Ireland, or else a Committee of Privy Council in Ireland. The Lord-Lieutenant to remain, but not to be mentioned in the Act.

There were several other articles, but of little or no importance. It is worthy of remark that, under the 4th Article, power was reserved to alter the oaths taken by Members of both Houses, evidently intending that Roman Catholics might be admitted to Parliament.

THE DUKE OF PORTLAND TO THE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Received Nov. 16, 1798.]

MY LORD, Whitehall, Nov. 12, 1798.

. . . . As to the 10 or 15 other State prisoners, among whom I conclude Arthur O'Connor, Emmett, and M'Nevin are

[1] The proportion was ultimately fixed at $\frac{2}{17}$.

to be counted as the most exceptionable and most dangerous, I very strongly recommend it to your Excellency to avail yourself of the right, no less explicitly than wisely reserved to yourself, of retaining them in custody as long as the war lasts, or as it shall be thought necessary; and from the terms in which I observe Lord Castlereagh mentions them, I cannot but think your Excellency will be fully justified in directing them to be guarded with that degree of circumspection which, though it does not prevent their having communication with such persons as the management of their private affairs may render necessary, will effectually check and annihilate the means which they have employed to maintain in prison that ascendancy which they had, unfortunately for themselves and country, acquired before they were confined, and to which I suppose they owe the title of the Directory in Kilmainham, by which Lord Castlereagh distinguishes them. Although the circumstances which have procured them that title are not specified, it may not unreasonably be inferred that they are such as must arise out of a constant and unlimited intercourse with each other; and when I recollect the transaction of the advertisement which was published by them, respecting their examinations before the Committee of Secrecy, I do not think that I exceed the bounds of sound discretion in suggesting to your Excellency the propriety of ordering the three persons, or any others who are considered to be members of the Directory in Kilmainham, to be kept separate, and not suffered to have any intercourse whatever with each other, or any other person, but in presence of the gaoler. I, however, submit this to your better judgment, and am persuaded that I shall be satisfied with the reasons which govern your determination.

I have, &c.,

PORTLAND.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

MY LORD, Dublin Castle, Nov. 16, 1798.

I have the honour to enclose to your Grace the proceedings of a General Court Martial,[1] held at Limerick on three captains of the —— Fencibles, upon charges preferred against them by Colonel —— of that regiment, together with originals and copies of correspondence which has passed in consequence, as well as

[1] This Court Martial, composed of four officers of the Line and eleven of Fencible regiments, acquitted the prisoners, to which decision they adhered when ordered to revise their proceedings. Lord Cornwallis was obliged to confirm the sentence, but Captain Taylor wrote to the General commanding the district in these terms:—"His Excellency desires you will communicate to the Court his entire disapprobation of their proceedings."

the revisal of the proceedings which I thought it necessary to order for the reasons stated in Captain Taylor's letter to Major-General Sir James Duff; and in order to give your Grace less trouble, I have directed Captain Taylor to transmit to Mr. Wickham for your Grace's information, such further particulars as may tend to the explanation of some circumstances connected with the perusal of the above papers. In consequence of what has appeared relative to the conduct of some officers of the —— Fencibles, in the course of the transaction to which the papers I have enclosed relate, as well as from the knowledge of former very serious complaints against Colonel —— himself, and individuals of his corps, I beg leave to offer it as my opinion to your Grace that the regiment should be disbanded, and the example will probably be productive of good effect in some other Fencible regiments in this kingdom whose amendment is much required. Should your Grace, upon consideration of the subject, coincide in opinion with me, I am to request you will be pleased to lay the same before the King, for His Majesty's pleasure thereon.

I have, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

Attached to this Despatch is the following Memorandum in the King's own handwriting:—

Nov. 25, 1798.

I perfectly agree in opinion with the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland as to the conduct of the —— regiment of —— Fencibles, and approve of its being disbanded.

G. R.

The papers mentioned as having been enclosed are omitted as they possess no general interest; but this letter, and some others on military subjects, are published to show the disorganization of a considerable part of the army on which Lord Cornwallis was forced to depend, both to repel foreign invasion and to suppress domestic insurrection.

The following letter, addressed about December, 1800, by a subaltern of the —— regiment to his commanding officer, presents a curious picture of the interior discipline of some regiments.

TO LIEUT.-COLONEL ——, —TH FOOT.

SIR,

I *believe* (I am a member of the —— mess), if so I will take the liberty to submit the following argument, viz., every gentleman under the immediate propensity of liquor has different propensities; to prove which I have only to mention the present instance with respect to myself and Lieutenant ——. *My* pro-

pensity is *noise and riot*—his *sleep*. I ever conceived that in a public mess-room three things were certain. First, that it was open to every officer who chose to pay the subscription; second, that he might indulge himself with liquor as much as he pleased; and third, that if a *gentleman* and a *member of the mess* chose to get intoxicated in the mess-room, that no other officer (however high his rank in the regiment) had a right, or dare order to restrain (not being president) *his momentary propensity in the mess-room*. As such, and this being the case, I must inform you that you have acted in a most unprecedented and unknown (not to say ungentlemanlike) way, in presuming to enter the mess-room as a commanding officer, and to bring a centry[1] at your back (which you asserted you had) to turn out the amusement (a hand organ) of the company (a stranger being present), and thereby prevent the harmony which (it is ever supposed) ought to subsist in a mess-room. I appeal to you as a gentleman,—if you will answer this letter *as such*, you at all times know how to direct to

———,

Lieutenant, — Foot.

The Lieut.-Colonel of the regiment applied for a court-martial, but the offending officer was summarily dismissed without a trial, as appears from the subjoined memorandum.

MEMORANDUM BY THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

(Lord Lieutenant's Despatches, received 2nd and 3rd Jan. 1801. Read by the King.)

His Majesty is pleased to order that the Lord-Lieutenant be directed instantly to dismiss Lieutenant ——, of the —— foot, from the service, for having written the mutinous letter which he addressed to Lieut.-Colonel ——: that this order of His Majesty be signified in Public Orders, and read on the parade of the —— regiment of foot, and communicated to all the regiments of cavalry and infantry in Ireland, to prevent any future ill-conduct of the same nature.

P.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE ARCHBISHOP OF CASHELL.[2]

MY LORD, Dublin Castle, Nov. 19, 1798.

I find that the unfortunate situation of this country has induced His Majesty's Ministers to think seriously of an Union

[1] Sic in orig.

[2] Charles Agar, brother of James, 1st Viscount Clifden, b. Dec. 22, 1736, d. July 14, 1809; m. Nov. 22, 1776, Jane, dau. of William Benson, Esq. Made Bishop of Cloyne, March, 1768; Archbishop of Cashel, Aug. 1779; Archbishop of Dublin, Dec. 9, 1801. Created Lord Somerton June 12, 1795, and made Earl of Normanton Feb. 6, 1806.

between the two kingdoms. Had this intention been notified to me before you left Ireland, I should have been very glad to have conversed with you on the subject, and in the event of the measure ultimately taking place, I shall hope to derive great assistance from your Grace's talents and knowledge of the country.

I have had no opportunity of being acquainted with the general sentiments of the principal people here, but I trust that they will consider the matter dispassionately, and think it wise to make a small sacrifice of vanity, in order to secure more substantial benefits.

I have the honour to be, with very sincere esteem,

Your Grace's most obedient and faithful servant,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

[Private.]

MY DEAR LORD, Dublin Castle, Nov. 20, 1798.

. . . Lord Castlereagh's appointment gave me great satisfaction, and although I admit the propriety of the general rule, yet as he is so very unlike an Irishman, I think he has a just claim to an exception in his favour.

When I met your Grace at Mr. Pitt's, the morning before I left London, the subject of the Secretaryship was talked over, and several excellent persons named, but scarcely a hope was entertained that any one of them would accept the office, and when I therefore found a man in the actual execution of the duty, possessed of all the necessary qualifications, with a perfect knowledge of the characters and connexions of the principal personages in this country, I felt it to be my duty at this very important moment to press his appointment in the strongest terms.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

RIGHT HON. W. PITT TO MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Private.] Received Nov. 21, 1798.

MY DEAR LORD, Downing Street, Nov. 17, 1798.

I have had a great deal of conversation with the Speaker, who arrived here on Wednesday. I found him in his manner perfectly cordial and communicative, and though in his own general opinion strongly against the measure of an Union (particularly at the present moment), yet perfectly ready to discuss the point fairly. I think also that, supposing the general measure to be resolved

on, he does not see any material difficulty or objection likely to arise in the detail of the measure, if executed conformable to the sketch[1] which you have received from the Duke of Portland, and of which I showed the Speaker a copy.

On the whole, though he wished his conversation to be considered confidential, and I am therefore not at liberty to make any but this confidential use of it, I think I may venture to say that he will not obstruct the measure; and I rather hope, if it can be made palatable to him personally (which I believe it may) that he will give it fair support. It would, as it seems to me, be well worth while for this purpose to hold out to him the prospect of an English peerage with, if possible, some ostensible situation, and a provision for life to which he would be naturally entitled on quitting the chair. Beresford and Parnell do not say much on the general measure, but I think both, or at least the former, against trying it, but both disposed to concur when they understand it is finally resolved on. They all seem clearly (and I believe sincerely) of opinion that it will not be wise to announce it as a decided measure from authority, till time has been given for communication to all leading individuals and for disposing the public mind. On this account we have omitted all reference to the subject in the King's speech, and the communication may in all respects be more conveniently made by a separate message when the Irish Parliament is sitting, and it can be announced to them at the same time. In the interval previous to your Session there will, I trust, be full opportunity for communication and arrangement with individuals, on whom I am inclined to believe the success of the measure will wholly depend. You will observe that in what relates to the oaths to be taken by Members of the United Parliament, the plan which we have sent copies the precedent I mentioned in a former letter of the Scotch Union; and on the grounds I before mentioned, I own I think this leaves the Catholic Question on the only footing on which it can safely be placed. Mr. Elliott, when he brought me your letter, stated very strongly all the arguments which he thought might induce us to admit the Catholics to Parliament and office; but I confess he did not satisfy me of the practicability of such a measure at this time, or of the propriety of attempting it. With respect to a provision for the Catholic clergy and some arrangement respecting tithes, I am happy to find a uniform opinion in favour of the proposal among all the Irish I have seen; and I am more and more convinced that those measures, with some effectual mode to enforce the resi-

[1] Transmitted in the Despatch of Nov. 12, 1798.

dence of *all* ranks of the Protestant clergy, offer the best chance of gradually putting an end to the evils most felt in Ireland.

Believe me, my dear Lord,

Most sincerely and faithfully yours,

W. P.

P.S. You may be assured that I shall omit no opportunity of obviating any false impression of the transaction with the State-prisoners, but I believe the benefits derived from their discovery are now generally felt and admitted in both countries.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Phœnix Park, Nov. 22, 1798.

I inclose two letters from poor Mrs. Caddy, whose misfortunes are very affecting. Had I known that Lieut.-Colonel Caddy[1] had lost a son in that cursed island of St. Domingo, I do not think that I should have ordered him thither.

The loss of a son, very soon followed by the loss of a husband, just at the time that she expected him to return, are severe afflictions; and the being placed on the pension of a Captain's widow, with two daughters unprovided for, and one of them a cripple, when her husband was so very near that situation in the corps that would have entitled her to the pension of a widow of a Lieut.-Colonel, are all circumstances that render her case truly compassionate.

The contraction in the arm of one daughter, which undoubtedly is an hindrance to her procuring a livelyhood, and the youth of the other, will enable the Board to make some further provision for this family, without departing from the rules which we were under the necessity of laying down for our conduct in cases of this nature, and I think on this occasion, that the Board should go to the extent of that power.

Believe me, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Phœnix Park, Nov. 23, 1798.

My time has lately been much taken up with seeing, and breaking to the principal persons here, the projected Union, and

[1] Lieut.-Colonel Caddy, R.E., d. June, 1798.

when you send for a man on such business, he must stay with you and talk to you as long as he likes. I have no great doubts of being able to carry the measure here, but I have great apprehensions of the inefficacy of it after it is carried, and I do not think it would have been much more difficult to have included the Catholics.

Those who are called principal persons here, are men who have been raised into consequence, only by having the entire disposal of the patronage of the Crown in return for their undertaking the management of the country, because the Lords-Lieutenants were too idle or too incapable to manage it themselves. They are detested by everybody but their immediate followers, and have no influence but what is founded on the grossest corruption.

I suppose that you have heard that your friend Lord Buckingham has chosen to break off all communication with me, because I did not think it right that he should march into Connaught, at the head of a detachment of 600 men, formed principally from the flank companies of the Buckingham and Warwick regiments of militia. He has since been most patriotically occupied in endeavouring to make the militia regiments discontented with their situation in this country, and to instil into their minds an idea, that as the Rebellion is now over, and martial law at an end, the purposes for which they volunteered their services are answered, and that it would be illegal to keep them here longer than a month after the meeting of the British Parliament. In this undertaking he has, I am sorry to say, succeeded too well with both officers and soldiers, as mankind are apt to believe what they wish, and the most dangerous consequences are, in my opinion, to be apprehended. . . .

I have written to T. Grenville on the business of the Secretaryship, and have I hope explained my conduct in a satisfactory manner. If I can find time within these few days, I will send you a copy of my letter.[1]

I have requested that the D. of Y. would allow me to keep Taylor for two months, and if he grants me that favour, I would not hastily decide on a succession which is so very important to me.

I am obliged to leave off, but will write again soon.

Believe me, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

[1] This letter has not been found, but Mr. Grenville's reply will appear under the date of Dec. 8.

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH TO WILLIAM WICKHAM, ESQ.

[Secret.]

MY DEAR SIR, Phœnix Park, Nov. 23, 1798.

. . . It would be hazardous to give any opinion so early, on the public disposition towards an Union. The question is very little understood, and has not yet been agitated by either parties with that spirit which renders it easy to collect the general impression; as far as we have gone, I see nothing to discourage us; there certainly is not that positive prepossession in its favour, which can be expected to render it a very popular question, but there is as little appearance of indignant resistance. The Bar continues to feel most warmly upon it, even in this body the steps that have been taken seem to have had their effect; there is more disposition to reason the point, and less to bring it to a question of arms. Perhaps it is too much to expect to divide this learned body, I do not despair however of having a respectable minority. I am sorry to observe that Mr. Saurin,[1] whose character is such as to give him the greatest weight, and from whose manly exertions, the King's Government during the late trying period, has derived the greatest advantage, is a declared enemy to the measure.

Opposition from the citizens of Dublin is not less to be expected. Mr. Ogle, one of the members for the city is favourably disposed, Mr. Beresford is to be with me to-morrow. We have secured Alderman James,[2] who has great weight, not only in the Corporation, but particularly in the Orange Lodges; he is eager for the question, considering the Prince of Wales and the Opposition as pledged to the Catholics; this consideration will have great weight in that body now both numerous and formidable. There is every reason to hope that a different sentiment prevails at Cork; the Protestants and Catholics in that city (who seldom agree on any point) are both alive to the great commercial benefits they would derive from it, the same is said to be the feeling of Limerick; these towns cannot fail extensively to influence the province of Munster.

There appears no indisposition on the part of the leading Catholics; on the contrary, I believe they will consider any transfer of power from their opponents as a boon; I should hope the pro-

[1] Mr., afterwards the Right Hon. William Saurin, descended from an old Protestant family driven from France by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, b. 1758, d. Feb. 11, 1839; m. 1786, Mary, sister of William, 1st Marquis of Thomond, and widow of Sir Richard Cox, Bart. Attorney-General from May 15, 1807, to Jan. 15, 1822. M.P. for Blessington from Feb. 1800 to the Union.

[2] William James. Had been Lord Mayor of Dublin in 1793-94.

posed arrangement for the Catholic clergy will reconcile that body. Dr. Troy[1] is perfectly well inclined.

The measure as yet has made no sensation in the North; some time since, the Presbyterians would have been found most energetic opponents, but they have been long disinclined to the existing system; of late they are rather tired of the treason in which they had very deeply embarked, perhaps they may be inclined to compromise with the Union; some additional provision for the clergy, connecting the Church more closely with the Crown, would probably disarm the opposition, if not secure the support, of that body. As a measure connected with the Union, nothing would engage the great body of the people of all persuasions so certainly in its support as coupling it with a regulation of tythes, which in this country has always been the first substantive object to which all reformers looked. . . .

The principal provincial newspapers have been secured, and every attention will be paid to the press generally. As far as I can yet judge, the measure may be carried in Parliament, the temper of the public is as yet unformed, the part two or three leading characters will take is likely to have the most extensive effect; the Speaker's weight will be prodigious, his declarations before he left Ireland were very adverse, and letters received from him yesterday preserved the same tone.

I have, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Phœnix Park, Nov. 24, 1798.

I have just received your letter dated the 18th, and wish to lose no time in acquainting you that Broke[2] was made a lieutenant by Lord Hotham[3] in 1795, but the Admiral's secretary, who was I suppose as indolent as his master, neglected to send home the commission. Broke continued to serve as lieutenant two years in the Mediterranean fleet, and although he never heard of the con-

[1] Dr. Troy, b. July 1739, d. May 10, 1823. He was very moderate in his views, both religious and political, and very temperate in his conduct, always exhibiting a strong desire to be on good terms with the Government. He was made Roman Catholic Archbishop of Dublin in 1786.

[2] Philip Broke (eldest son of Philip Broke, Esq., of Nacton), afterwards Rear-Admiral Sir Philip Broke, Bart., K.C.B., b. Sept. 9, 1776, d. Jan. 2, 1841; m. Nov. 25, 1802, Sarah Louisa, dau. of Sir William Middleton, Bart. He was created a Baronet Nov. 2, 1813, as a reward for the capture of the Shannon. He never recovered from the effects of the wounds he received in that action.

[3] William, 11th Bart. and 1st Baron Hotham, so created March 7, 1797, in consequence of his victory in the Mediterranean March 14, 1795, Admiral of the Red; b. April 8, 1736, d. unm. May 2, 1813.

firmation of his commission, felt so confident on the subject, that he refused a lieutenant's commission which was offered to him by Lord St. Vincent, lest he should lose the rank to which he conceived himself entitled by his former commission.

On his return to England in 1797, he discovered the cause of his not receiving the confirmation which he expected, and he was then forced to seek for all the papers and vouchers of his first appointment; when these documents came to be examined at the Admiralty, it appeared that he wanted a few months of the time of service which is required, when he received Lord Hotham's appointment, and the Lords of the Admiralty in consequence refused to confirm his old commission, and gave him a new one dated in 1797. By this transaction he lost the opportunity that offered from Lord St. Vincent's kind intention towards him, as well as the benefit of Hotham's appointment.

All this I stated to Lord Spencer, who said that he could not ante-date his commission, but that the circumstances should be considered on his future promotion.

Believe me, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

This letter refers to one written to General Ross three weeks earlier, in which Lord Cornwallis had expressed the great interest he felt in Mr. Broke's promotion, and complained that Lord Spencer had delayed acceding to his request, notwithstanding Mr. Broke's great professional merit. The application at last succeeded, Mr. Broke was made Master and Commander the January following, and a Post-Captain February 4, 1801.

THE DUKE OF PORTLAND TO MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Secret and Confidential.] Received Nov. 25.

MY LORD, London, Nov. 21, 1798.

I cannot learn, from such authority as Lord Castlereagh's, the possibility of an intention in the English militia regiments now serving in Ireland to return to this country at the expiration of the term for which the King was empowered to avail himself of the offer they made in the course of last session, without urging your Excellency not to lose a moment's time in taking every means which your information and better judgment can suggest, for preventing the further progress of such an inclination, and inducing them to make a new tender of their services, at least to the end of the present session, or, if possible, for as long a time as the com-

mon interests of the two kingdoms can be promoted by their continuance in Ireland. The consequences of such a step as the return of these corps, or indeed of any one considerable regiment at such a moment as the present, must be so obvious and so alarming, that I should misspend your time in entering into any detail of them. It occurs to me that the officers possibly may have inferred, from the success which has attended the measures which your Excellency has pursued in repressing the rebellion, and in defeating the various attempts which have been made to invade the country, that if their services have been either necessary or desirable, they would have received such an intimation from the Government of one or the other kingdoms; and that they would not be justified in sounding the dispositions of the non-commissioned officers and privates, without knowing that it would be agreeable to His Majesty that they should remain with you. I therefore could not suffer myself to defer, even for a single day, my most earnest instances to your Excellency, to employ the most immediate and efficacious measures to represent to the commanding officers of those corps, the extreme importance of their extending the time of their service, and that great as has been the advantage which has been derived from their gallantry and liberality, the withdrawing themselves at this moment could not but be productive of dangers of a magnitude to which they could never have attained, but from the strength and confidence which their gallantry could only have been capable of giving to the inhabitants of Ireland.

Your Excellency may be assured that nothing will be wanting on the part of the King's confidential servants, to assist and support you in the exertions I am to desire you to make for this object; and I shall most gladly and thankfully receive any suggestions from you, which you may be of opinion can conduce to the attainment of it.

I have, &c.,

PORTLAND.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

[Secret and Confidential.]

MY LORD, Dublin Castle, Nov. 26, 1798.

At the time that I desired Lord Castlereagh to mention to Mr. Wickham the necessity of bringing in a Bill at the opening of the session of the British Parliament, to empower His Majesty to prolong the service of the English militia in this country, I had

only heard that conversations had passed on the subject, and that the legality of their remaining in Ireland after the period prescribed by the Act of Parliament had been questioned by some officers; but I did not understand that the soldiers had taken any concern, or that any appeal had been made to them on the subject.

On enquiry I found that the whole matter had originated in the Buckinghamshire regiment, and that some explanation had been made to the soldiers by the Colonel of that regiment, which went to establish their right of returning to England at the expiration of the Act of Parliament.

As the Marquis of Buckingham has for some time past withdrawn himself from all communication with me, I desired Lord Castlereagh to wait upon him, and your Grace will no doubt have seen before this letter reaches you, the substance of their conversation, which Lord Buckingham transmitted to Mr. Dundas, and Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Wickham.

I found that an impression has been made on some of the officers of the Warwickshire and South Lincoln, but I flatter myself that I have convinced the latter of their error, and I believe that Lord Hertford has met with some success with the former. The officers of the Leicestershire regiment have taken no part, and I cannot on this occasion too much commend the exertions of the Duke of Rutland[1] to prevent their being led into measures which might prove so ruinous to the interests of their country.

I do not learn that the soldiers of any of the four regiments in garrison at Dublin have had knowledge or taken concern in this business, except those of the Buckinghamshire, but I cannot venture to assert this as a positive fact.

Your Grace may be assured that nothing shall be wanting on my part to check the further progress of this most alarming disposition in the English militia, wherever it has taken effect, and to prevent the introduction of it amongst those corps in which hitherto no such idea has been entertained; but your Grace will, I am sure, feel for the delicacy of my situation, and the danger which must attend every step that I can take when precautionary measures may create the very mischief which they are intended to avert.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

[1] John Henry, 5th Duke of Rutland, K.G., b. Jan. 4, 1778, d. Jan. 20, 1857; m. April 22, 1799, Elizabeth, dau. of Frederick, 5th Earl of Carlisle. He succeeded his father (who died whilst Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland) Oct. 24, 1787.

The preceding is one of many letters relating to the continuance of the English militia in Ireland. Government had no authority to *order* the militia of one country into another, and the regiments which volunteered for service, themselves fixed the duration of their absence from England. The Acts which authorised the Crown to accept these offers were ill-drawn up, and the Duke of Portland, November 27, stated that it would be necessary to introduce a new Bill on this subject into the English Parliament. Many of the colonels behaved very well, but some, from various motives, discouraged in their regiments any renewal of the offers of service.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

[Secret.]

MY LORD, Dublin Castle, Nov. 27, 1798.

As your Grace and the King's confidential servants may wish to be informed minutely of the steps which I have felt it my duty to take, in consequence of your Grace's despatch of the[1] instant, inclosing heads of an Union between the two kingdoms, I am induced to be the more circumstantial in my communications on this most important object given me in charge.

In obedience to your Grace's instructions, I lost no time in opening the subject to the persons of the first consideration in this kingdom who happened to be within my reach. Lord Castlereagh has also, by my directions, communicated with others less considerable in point of situation, but whose active support is scarcely of less importance to the success of the measure.

I feel myself justified in stating to your Grace that as far as I have yet gone, there appears to me no general repugnance to the measure of an Union. Some persons, as might naturally be expected, are at present more strongly impressed with its difficulties than its advantages, and there are individuals of very great consideration whose support it may not be in my power ultimately to obtain; but upon the whole there seems a disposition to consider the question coolly, and many, notwithstanding their reluctance to make an absolute declaration of their intentions at so early a stage of the business, have not hesitated to assure me of their readiness to give it a decided support.

As your Grace may wish to be informed of the particular sentiments of the most leading characters, I think it necessary to mention that Lord Shannon,[2] to whom I first addressed myself, is

[1] The date is blank in the original, probably Nov. 12.

[2] Richard, 2nd Earl of Shannon, K.P., b. Jan. 30, 1727, d. May 20, 1807; m. Dec.

impressed in the strongest manner with the difficulties and disadvantages of the present system, and is disposed to entertain the measure favourably; at the same time his Lordship wishes not to declare himself openly till he sees that his doing so can answer some purpose.

Lord Ely [1] (relying on the favour of the Crown in an object personal to himself) is prepared to give it his utmost support.

Lord Pery [2] expressed strong doubts upon the question itself, and much apprehension lest the division of sentiment it must occasion, might at the present moment be injurious to the public safety. His Lordship, in a subsequent conversation with Lord Castlereagh, said he should certainly *not pledge himself* hastily against it, and should the measure in progress receive such a support from Parliament and from the country as justified a perseverance on the part of the Ministers, he should feel it his duty to surrender his own opinion, and give it his best assistance in the detail.

Lord Yelverton [3] had no hesitation upon the principle, it met his full approbation.

15, 1763, Catherine, eldest dau. of the Right Hon. John Ponsonby, Speaker of the Irish House of Commons. He was Master-General of the Ordnance from 1766 to 1770, joint Vice-Treasurer of Ireland from Dec. 1781 to 1789, and Commissioner of the Treasury from Dec. 1793 to 1804. M.P. county of Cork, 1761, till he succeeded to the Peerage Sept. 27, 1764.

[1] Charles, 1st Earl of Ely of the 2nd creation, K.P., eldest son of Sir John Tottenham, by Anne, sister of the last Earl of the 1st creation. Created Lord Loftus June 28, 1785; made Earl of Ely Feb. 15, 1794; and Marquis Dec. 29, 1800; created Lord Loftus in England Jan. 19, 1801; b. Jan. 23, 1738, d. March 22, 1806; m. June 23, 1766, Jane, dau. and co-heir of Robert Myhill, Esq., of Killarney. Lord Ely was joint Postmaster-General in Ireland from Jan. 14, 1789, to 1806; and Teller of the Exchequer from 1777 to 1793. M.P. for Clonmines from 1761 till he was made a Peer. His grandfather, Mr. Tottenham of Ballycarny, M.P. for New Ross, was well-known as "Tottenham in his Boots," a sobriquet acquired by his rushing into the House of Commons in dirty jack-boots, in which he had hastily ridden up from the country, at a time when members always appeared there in full dress. The House was about to divide on the question as to the right of the Crown to any surplus remaining in the Exchequer after defraying the charges of the year. The numbers on each side were exactly equal, and Mr. T.'s vote formed the majority against Government.

[2] Edmund Sexton, 1st and only Viscount Pery, b. April, 1719, d. March 24, 1806; m. 1st, June 11, 1756, Patty, dau. of John Martin, Esq.; 2nd, Oct. 27, 1762, Elizabeth, dau. of John, 1st Lord Knapton, and widow of Robert Handcock, Esq., of Watherstown. He was chosen Speaker of the House of Commons in March, 1771, June, 1776, and Oct. 1783; retired from Parliament, 1785; and, March 30, in the same year, was created Viscount Pery, with a pension of 3000*l.* a-year. M.P. for the borough of Wicklow from 1751 to 1761, and then for the city of Limerick till he was made a Peer. His family came originally from Brittany.

[3] Barry, 1st Lord Yelverton, so created June 16, 1795, b. May 28, 1736, at Newmarket, in the county of Cork (also the birthplace of Mr. Curran), d. Aug. 19, 1805; m. July 2, 1761, Mary, dau. of William Nugent, Esq., of Clonlost. He began life as a sizar in Trinity College, Dublin, and was early called to the Bar, where he rapidly rose to eminence. M.P. for Belfast in 1776, and for Carrickfergus, 1783: he at first attached himself to the popular party, but in 1782 accepted the office of Attorney-General, and on Nov. 29, 1783, became Chief Baron of the Exchequer, and remained so till his death. Made Viscount Avonmore, Dec. 29, 1800.

Lord Kilwarden expressed himself guardedly, but appeared to have no particular objection to the idea.

Lord Carleton professed not to have considered the question with much attention, but at present saw many difficulties, which perhaps might disappear upon further investigation.

Mr. Conolly[1] had always been a decided friend to an Union, and was ready to give it his best assistance.

The Attorney and Solicitor General were very well disposed.

The Duke of Leinster, to whom I felt it my duty to mention the measure, was reserved, and seemed disinclined to give an opinion, which I did not think it necessary to press for from his Grace.

The sentiments of the several other persons who have hitherto been communicated with, are, upon the whole, favourable, but I have not yet sounded a sufficient number to enable me to judge of the disposition of the Parliament at large.

Having put your Grace in possession of the opinions of some of the leading persons now in town, as far as their minds are yet made up on the question, I should wish to give your Grace some information, were it in my power, how the public at large are disposed to it. As yet the measure is not sufficiently understood, nor has it been brought into general discussion so as to enable me to form any correct judgment on this point. Measures will be taken in the course of a few days to bring the general principle into consideration in the most favourable point of view.

I have reason to hope that the inhabitants of Munster, but particularly the citizens of Cork, are partial to the measure.

The principal opposition may be expected in Dublin, the rather as the fears of decay incident to a metropolis will be much excited by the activity of the Bar. Communications have taken place and applications been made to the sheriffs to call an aggregate meeting of the city, so soon as the measure is avowed, to which they have consented. The Bar also have it in contemplation to meet.

Every endeavour has been and shall be used to keep back, if possible, opposition till the question has been more discussed and is better understood. Already the repugnance of the Bar has in some degree been softened, and I entertain a sanguine hope that if the country can be prevented from pledging itself precipitately,

[1] Right Hon. Thomas Conolly, b. 1738, d. April 27, 1803; m. Dec. 30, 1758, Louisa, dau. of Charles, 2nd Duke of Richmond. He sat in the English House of Commons for Malmsbury from March, 1759, to March, 1768, and then for Chichester till March, 1784. He was for many years a most influential member of the Irish Parliament, in which he sat for the county of Derry from 1761 to May, 1800.

that all classes of the community may be awakened to a sense of its advantages.

Your Grace may depend on my utmost efforts being directed to the furtherance of this great work, so important to preserve this kingdom in connexion with Great Britain, and I shall not fail to communicate to your Grace the particulars of my progress in the execution of the task confided to me.

I have the honour, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSS.

DEAR ROSS, Phœnix Park, Nov. 27, 1798.

I was so much occupied all yesterday that I had not time to write to you. Nightingall is gone to London, on an invitation from Maitland to accompany him on some expedition,[1] and though I feel a little alarmed for public reasons at the word expedition, yet I perfectly approve of Nightingall's going upon all that may offer.

He tells me that he thinks Lieut.-Colonel Littlehales,[2] who was long with Simcoe, and afterwards with Maitland, would be a very proper person to succeed Taylor. He says that he is remarkably good-tempered, very laborious, and one of the most disinterested and honourable men that he has met with, and he mentioned a striking circumstance or two that occurred in his official business of Quartermaster-General at St. Domingo. I have directed Nightingall to ask Brownrigg's opinion, who knows Littlehales very well, and if he thinks he is qualified for the situation, to make the proposition to Littlehales.

They are taking from us, as I suppose you know, your regiment, the 30th, 2nd, and 29th, so that we shall only retain of King's troops, the Guards, Huntley's, and a very weak battalion of the Royals. The rest are mere skeletons. The strong regiment of Sutherland Fencibles have declared their determination to return to Scotland, and I am under the greatest alarm about the English Militia. Lord B. has been indefatigable in blowing the coals and

[1] This expedition was originally destined against the coast of France, but was afterwards sent in the Camilla to America, Jamaica, and St. Domingo.

[2] Lieut.-Colonel, afterwards Sir Edward Littlehales Baker, Bart., so created Sept. 2, 1802, b. 1765, d. March 4, 1825; m. July 22, 1805, Elizabeth Mary, dau. of William Robert, 2nd Duke of Leinster. After having seen much service, at the siege of Gibraltar in 1792-93 under General Simcoe in America, and afterwards in St. Domingo, he was, in May, 1801, made Under-Secretary in Ireland, which office he held for 19 years. Lord Cornwallis entertained the highest opinion of his talents and integrity, and selected him as one of his suite when he went to negociate the Treaty of Amiens.

doing all the mischief in his power, and would sacrifice fifty kingdoms to gratify his ill-humour and selfish considerations. My sentiments about the narrow bottom are as public as I can with propriety make them, and I must not walk in the paths of the noble Lord whom I have lately mentioned. I think that I have managed, with the assistance of my friend Blaquiere,[1] that Sir W. Homan[2] shall be Secretary to the Board for Paving, Lighting, &c. It is not a high office, but he will get a tolerable house, and at least 400*l.* a-year.

Believe me, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

THE DUKE OF PORTLAND TO MARQUIS CORNWALLIS.

[Secret.] Received Nov. 30, 1798.

MY LORD, Whitehall, Nov. 25, 1798.

. . . In the letter with which I transmitted to your Excellency the proposed Articles of Union, I informed you it would shortly be followed by suggestions and observations which it was hoped would facilitate the accomplishment of that very desirable event. . . .

With reference to the mode of choosing the representatives of the Commons of Ireland in the United Parliament, I shall confine the instruction which I am to give to two great outlines, and leave the decision open till we receive from your Excellency the results of the conferences which you will have with those most immediately versed in the right of voting, and in the consequences of elections.

. . . I have at present only to recommend that you should take particular care, that it may be clearly understood that the preservation of the rights of election in every county, city, and place, which now sends Members of Parliament, precisely in the same manner and form in which they are now exercised and enjoyed, is one of the fundamental points in which no alteration

[1] Right Hon. Sir John Blaquiere, K.B., b. May 15, 1732, d. Aug. 27, 1812; m. Dec. 24, 1775, Eleanor, dau. of William Dobson, Esq., of Anne's Grove. Secretary of Embassy to Lord Harcourt in Paris from 1768 to 1772, when he accompanied that nobleman to Ireland, where he was Chief Secretary from Nov. 1772 to Jan. 1777. M.P. for Old Leighlin from 1773 to 1783, for Carlingford to 1790, Charleville to 1797, and Newtown Ards till the Union. He took an active part in politics, and aided the cause of the Union as much by his hospitality as by his exertions in Parliament. He was Bailiff of the Phœnix Park and Alnager, July, 1797; on the abolition of those offices he received pensions of 1200*l.* and 2062*l.*, and an additional one of 1000*l.* when the Union was completed. Created Lord de Blaquiere July 20, 1800. He had been a Colonel in the Army early in life.

[2] Sir William Homan, b. Nov. 24, 1771, m. June 13, 1797, Charlotte, daughter of John, 1st Marquis of Bute. Created a Baronet Aug. 2, 1801. He was agent for Lord Grandison, and lived at Dromana. Gentleman of the Bed-Chamber under the Duke of Bedford.

whatever will be suffered to be proposed; and the other is, that the number of representatives to be chosen by the Commons of Ireland is upon no account whatever to exceed one hundred.

Subject to these two conditions, in neither of which will any relaxation be admitted, it is not the wish of this Government to dictate or intimate any preference as to the selection—whether one member should be returned for each county instead of two, and the boroughs classed as in Scotland; or by alternating some of the counties; or by returning the present number of representatives, and empowering them by ballot or otherwise to choose delegates for the whole body of electors—are considerations of so local a nature, that it is to be wished that your Excellency may be able to ascertain the mode which will be most grateful to the general feelings of the Irish.

With respect to the future representatives of the peerage of Ireland, it should seem that a better model, except as to numbers, could not be followed than that of the election of the 16 peers for Scotland; and I should think that 32 at most (6 or 4 of whom should be elected from among the bishops) would be thought a very competent number to represent the peerage, which, exclusive of 42 or 43, already peers of Great Britain, amounts, together with the bishops, to about 180. . . . I have, &c.,

PORTLAND.

The whole despatch is of great length: in the portion omitted the Duke of Portland expresses a hope that the Irish would not require the full number of representatives proposed, and this concession he thinks would be a mark of confidence on their part. That this hope was not realised will be seen hereafter. The Duke also alludes to the articles about commerce and revenue, and states, in confidence, that Mr. Pitt had a plan in contemplation to make every individual contribute to the exigencies of the State in proportion to the fair amount of his income, which would be the best criterion to determine the quota of expense each country should bear. This was evidently the income-tax.

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

[Private.]

MY LORD, Dublin Castle, Nov. 30, 1798.

. . . What was apprehended and intimated by me to Mr. Wickham has happened. Captain Saurin, who commands the Lawyers' Corps of Yeomanry, this day, in the Four Courts, ordered

them to assemble on Sunday next to take into their consideration *a question of the greatest national* importance. Several of the members then present spoke in terms of the strongest disapprobation of so unwise and so unconstitutional an attempt, declared their determination to resist it, and urged him, but without effect, to abandon his purpose. The meeting will certainly take place, but I indulge a sanguine hope that the majority of the Bar, however adverse to the measure of an Union, will not be betrayed into so criminal a proceeding.

The events of the next week cannot fail to be peculiarly important, and as they will enable me in some degree to judge of the public temper, as also to collect more ample information for your Grace's consideration, I trust your Grace will sanction with your approbation my Lord-Lieutenant's decision.

I have the honour, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

[Private and most Secret.]

MY DEAR LORD, Dublin Castle, Dec. 1, 1798.

I last night received your Grace's letters dated the 24th and 25th ultimo, the former of which contained Mr. Dundas's circular letter to the Colonels of the regiments of English Militia.

Your Grace will have observed from my former communications, that I have felt a perfect conviction that the supposed dissatisfaction was confined to one corps, and that I doubted very much whether, even in that corps, it had originated amongst the soldiers.

Under these circumstances I certainly should not recommend the immediate removal of any of the Militia regiments, and I have no difficulty in declaring, that although the French appear for the present to have laid aside the intention of making any further attempts against Ireland, I think this country would be exposed to the most imminent danger of becoming again a scene of bloodshed and rebellion, and that all thoughts of uniting the two kingdoms must be given up, if that force should now be withdrawn.

Lord Castlereagh has informed your Grace of the spirit of opposition to the great measure now in agitation, which has already manifested itself, and has explained the reasons which induce both

his Lordship and myself to think that he cannot set out before the latter end of next week.

I shall not before Lord Castlereagh's departure enter into any details on the subject of the proposed representation. I do not, however, flatter myself with the hopes of obtaining any very disinterested opinion upon the subject on this side of the water, as I have not the smallest doubt that every man whom I might consult, would advise such measures as he thought would best suit his private views, without having the smallest consideration for the public welfare.

I have forwarded Mr. Dundas's circular letter by express to the respective Colonels of the Militia regiments, and I have accompanied it with a letter from myself, a copy of which I have the honour to enclose.

The queries which your Grace mentions to have been placed opposite to the articles were not transmitted to me, but as Lord Buckingham showed them to Mr. Cooke, I had an opportunity of obtaining a copy of them.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

ROGER O'CONNOR,[1] ESQ., TO VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH.

MY LORD, Prison, Dec. 1, 1798.

In pursuance of your desire expressed to Mr. Grady,[2] I have the honour of enclosing a list of damages done at Connorville by the military. I cannot, nor will I, vouch for the truth of their extent; I believe it true. I need not point out to your Lordship how to act.

I have the honour to be,
Your Lordship's obedient servant,

R. O'CONNOR.

The foregoing letter refers to the damages said to have been done at Mr. O'Connor's residence by a body of soldiers who had

[1] Roger Connor, who, with his younger brother, Arthur, adopted the surname of O'Connor, in consequence of a family tradition that it had been merely discontinued by an ancestor to escape persecution from the English Government, was born 1763, d. 1835; m. 1st, 1784, Louisa Anna, dau. of Colonel Strachan; and, 2nd, 1788, Wilhelmina, dau. of Nicholas Bowen, Esq., of Bowenscourt. He was in 1798 arrested for high treason, and detained for some time in confinement. He was sent with the other prisoners to Fort George, from whence, on account of his health, he was released rather sooner than his companions. He went to France, but afterwards was allowed to return to Ireland. By his 2nd wife he was father to Feargus O'Connor, b. 1796.

[2] Henry Deane Grady, Counsel to the Board of Revenue, b. 1762, d. 1847; m. 1802, Miss Spread. His political opinions were democratic, nevertheless he steadily, though unwillingly, supported the Union. M.P. for Limerick City, 1797 to 1802. The communication made by Mr. Grady to Mr. O'Connor cannot be traced.

been sent there to live at free-quarters. The sum claimed was 631*l.* 8*s.* 8*d.*; one item of 10*l.* 15*s.* was for grapes and other fruit, and another of 43*l.* 10*s.* for lodging 87 soldiers for five weeks at 2*s.* a week per man. The claim was rejected, and the original document was preserved, docketed "put by." In the following year Lord Castlereagh, writing to Mr. Cooke, refers to this claim and treats it as absurd. In the autumn of 1811, when death had removed most of the persons cognizant of the facts, Mr. O'Connor again applied, but with this difference, that he then raised his demand to 2190*l.* The Duke of Richmond, at that time Lord-Lieutenant, caused every possible investigation to be made, and the result was that Mr. O'Connor's claims were not admitted. Some portions of his letters, with one from Mr. Marsden,[1] are subjoined, as the latter contains some details respecting the negociation with the state-prisoners.

Mr. R. O'Connor says, "In July, 1798, a treaty (the origin of which is known only to myself of all men living) was set on foot by Mr. Samuel Neilson to prevent his own trial, and entertained by Lord Castlereagh in the dread of exposure on that trial, of his former acts in connexion with the 'Northern Star' paper and Neilson, and concluded between Lords Clare and Castlereagh on the part of the then Government, and my brother on behalf of the United Irish. To induce me to negotiate, great pains were taken, and very extraordinary measures resorted to by agents of that Government. Entreaties proving unavailing, Mr. Alexander Marsden under the mask and in the name of friendship, which my knowledge of the man could not have authorized him to assume, came to my prison to warn me of the great danger to which my obstinacy would expose me, and to inform me that my resistance to enter into the treaty 'concluded with all the state-prisoners,' myself excepted, would determine the Government to take possession of my house and lands; an intention which he said he had accidentally discovered, and of which he came, unknown to any person at the Castle, to apprize me. This act of treachery towards me, or of treason towards his employers, not producing the desired effect upon me, in so short a space of time as distance admitted, advice reached me from Connorville that my house, gardens, and grounds were in possession of a considerable body of soldiers, horse and foot, and on the 7th of October I learned that the troops

[1] Alexander Marsden, b. Oct. 17, 1761, d. Sept. 16, 1834; m. 1794, Elizabeth, dau. of — Cooper, Esq. Assistant-Secretary in the Law Department; Under-Secretary in Ireland (*vice* Cooke) from Oct. 21, 1801, to Sept. 8, 1806. Commissary Judge in the Slavery Courts; then Commissioner and afterwards Chairman of Excise to 1817.

had marched away, after an occupation of the place for seven weeks, during which time they had, after expelling my little children and servants, committed every excess that either insubordination, or rigid observance of the barbarous orders of predatory superiors, could prompt men to or dictate."

After defending himself from the probable charge of allowing so long a space of time to elapse without endeavouring to obtain redress, Mr. O'Connor proceeds to say: "Nor should I, even now, in all probability, have urged my claims, did I not feel myself reduced to the necessity of calling in all quarters where money is due, to meet a conspiracy formed against me in a legalized way, in consequence of which I have been plundered of a very considerable sum since my return from England, in August last was twelvemonths."

ALEXANDER MARSDEN, ESQ., TO THE RIGHT HON. W. W. POLE.[1]

MY DEAR SIR, Dublin, Sept. 15, 1811.

I am much obliged to you for communicating to me Mr. Roger O'Connor's letter of the 13th instant.

I remember he applied for compensation on the grounds he has stated, but I do not think so early as he alleges; and I am certain that his application was not thought deserving of attention then, any more than it seems worthy of it now.

You may suppose I do not overlook how much he has made me a party in the scenes he has invented; and it is not the only instance in which the confidential servants of the Governments of those times, are brought to trial on the complaints of the least deserving of the men who have escaped the execution of the law. Without descending to a defence of my conduct, I may perhaps be allowed to say, that I had no previous acquaintance whatever with Mr. Roger O'Connor, and consequently no grounds on which I could practise a deceit towards him on the score of friendship; that if such a contrivance against him as he states had been framed, Lord Cornwallis must have been a party to the orders which Mr. R. O'Connor alleges were issued, and need I say more to disprove it?

[1] Right Hon. William Wellesley Pole, next brother of Richard Marquis Wellesley, b. May 20, 1763, d. Feb. 22, 1845; m. May 17, 1784, Katherine Elizabeth, dau. and coheir of Admiral the Hon. John Forbes. Created Baron Maryborough July 17, 1821, and succeeded to the Earldom of Mornington on the death of Lord Wellesley, Sept. 26, 1842. He was successively Clerk of the Ordnance, Secretary to the Admiralty, Chief Secretary and Chancellor of the Exchequer in Ireland, and Master of the Mint. He was also Master of the Buckhounds. M.P. in the Irish Parliament for Trim from 1783 to 1790, and in the English Parliament for East Looe from November, 1790, to March, 1794, and for Queen's County from 1801 till raised to the Peerage.

In fact the treaty with the prisoners was speedily concluded and the determination to give up further prosecution, after four or five had been hanged, was for good reasons adopted.

Mr. R. O'Connor's refusing to *sign* the agreement was an adroit trick on his part, but weighed nothing in the transaction at the time, nor was it thought of as a matter of any consequence until he afterwards founded a distinction of his case upon it. The measure of pardon was taken in respect to about seventy persons then in the gaols, among whom Mr. R. O'Connor stood very low in *their* matters, whatever might have been the equality of his guilt.

I ask your pardon for having taken up so much of your time on this subject. I have before seen a statement in print from Mr. O'C. similar to that in his letter, which I have always disregarded, as I am in the habit of treating such matters.

Yours, dear Sir, very faithfully,

A. MARSDEN.

APPENDIX.

INDIA.—*continued.*

No. XXXII.

MINUTE OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Feb. 10, 1790.

I HAVE considered Mr. Shore's minutes[1] on the proposed Settlement of the Revenue, which were recorded on the proceedings of the 18th September, and 21st December last, with all the attention which the importance of the subject deserves, and which is due to the opinions of a man who is so distinguished for his knowledge of the revenue system of this country, and for whose public-spirited principles, and general character, I have the highest esteem.

After having experienced so much advantage from the able and almost uniform support that I have received from Mr. Shore, during a period of near three years, it would have been particularly gratifying to me, if we could have avoided to record different opinions at the moment of our separation; but a regard to the due discharge of public duty, must separate all other considerations; and I have at least the satisfaction to be certain, that no private motives have influenced either of us, and that a sense of our duty alone has occasioned the few exceptions that have arisen to that general concurrence, which there will appear to have been in our sentiments, on almost all important points relating to the public business.

The interests of the nation, as well as the Company, and the happiness and prosperity of our subjects in this country, are deeply concerned in the points on which we differ; and as the public good is our only object, I am persuaded, that it is equally our wish, that the final decision may be such as will most effectually promote it.

Mr. Shore, in his propositions for making the Bahar settlement, objected to our notifying to the landholders the intention of the Court of Directors to declare the decennial settlement permanent and unalterable, provided that it meets with their approbation; and, in his two last minutes, he goes further, and endeavours to prove that a permanent assessment of the lands of these provinces would, at any time, be unadvisable. He also contends, that the taking into the hands of Government the collection of all internal duties on commerce, and allowing the zemindars and others, by whom these duties have been hitherto levied, a deduction equal to the amount which they now realize from them, will not be productive of the expected advantages to the public at large; and that it is moreover an unjustifiable invasion of private property

Had I entertained a doubt of the expediency of fixing the demand of Govern-

[1] See Life of Lord Teignmouth, by his Son.

ment upon the lands, I should certainly have thought it my duty to withhold the notification of the intention of the Court of Directors, which I recommended; but after the most mature and deliberate consideration of Mr. Shore's reasoning, being still firmly persuaded that a fixed and unalterable assessment of the land-rents was best calculated to promote the substantial interests of the Company and of the British nation, as well as the happiness and prosperity of the inhabitants of our Indian territories, and being also convinced that such a notification would render the proprietors of land anxious to have the management of their own estates, and in many instances induce them to come forward with more fair and liberal offers at the period of making the new settlement, and, at the same time, that even a disappointment of their expectations would be the cause of no real injury to them, or place them in a worse situation than they were before such hopes were held out to them, it became my indispensable duty to propose that the intentions of the Court of Directors should be published.

The notification has been accordingly made in the several collectorships of Bahar, and in the collectorship of Midnapore in Orissa, the final orders for the settlement of which have been issued, and the same reasons will induce me to recommend its being published throughout Bengal.

The accompanying extracts from the correspondence of the Collector of Shahabad in the province of Bahar, with the Board of Revenue, will prove that my expectations regarding the effect of this notification were well founded.

I now come to the two remaining points on which I have differed with Mr. Shore, and the final decision regarding which must rest with the Honourable Court of Directors, viz., the expediency of declaring the decennial settlement permanent, and appointing officers on the part of Government to collect the internal duties on commerce.

The following appears to me to be Mr. Shore's principal objections to a permanent assessment:—That we do not possess a sufficient knowledge of the actual collections made from the several districts to enable us to distribute the assessment upon them, with the requisite equality: that the demands of the zemindars upon the talookdars and ryots are undefined; and even if we did possess a competent knowledge of the above points, there are peculiar circumstances attending this country, which must ever render it bad policy in the Government to fix their demand upon the lands.

I shall now offer such remarks as occur to me on the facts and arguments adduced by Mr. Shore in support of the above objections.

Mr. Shore observes, that we profess to take from the zemindars nine-tenths of their receipts, and, under these circumstances, allowing for the common variations in the state of society, in the improvement and in the decline of agriculture, and admitting the probable alterations in the value of silver, it is certain that the constancy of the assessment may be of great inconvenience, and even ruinous to many of the contributors; and, in this case, that there will be a necessity of some future alteration, which must always take place to the disadvantage of Government, if the assessment be now declared fixed for ever.

Were there any grounds for supposing that a system which secures to the landholder the possession of his lands, and the profits arising from the improvement of them, will occasion a decline in agriculture, then might we apprehend that a permanent assessment would, in a progress of time, bear hard upon the contributors; but reason and experience justify the contrary supposition; in which case, a fixed assessment must be favourable to the contributors, because their resources will gradually increase, whereas the demand of Government will continue the same.

Equally favourable to the contributors is the probable alteration in the value of silver; for there is little doubt, but that it will continue to fall, as it has done for centuries past, in proportion to the quantities drawn from the mines, and thrown into the general circulation, increases. If this be admitted, the assessment will become gradually lighter, because, as the value of silver diminishes the landholder will be able, upon an average, to procure the quantity which he may engage to pay annually to Government, with a proportionably smaller part of the produce of his lands, than he can at present.

The circumstance of the country being occasionally liable to drought and inundation, which Mr. Shore adduces as an argument against a permanent assessment, appears to me strongly in favour of it. The losses arising from drought and inundation are partial and temporary; the crops only are damaged or destroyed; the land is neither swept away by inundation, nor rendered barren by drought, but, in the ensuing year, produces crops as plentiful as those which it would have yielded had it not been visited by those calamities.

Now, if Mr. Shore's calculation of the proportion which the zemindars in general receive of the produce of their lands be accurate, it is obvious that every temporary loss must fall upon Government; for so long as we profess to leave the zemindars no more than that proportion, and claim a right to appropriate the excess to the public use, from what funds are they to make their losses good? But when the demand of Government is fixed, an opportunity is afforded to the landholder of increasing his profits by the improvement of his lands; and we may reasonably expect that he will provide for occasional losses from the profits of favourable seasons.

The necessity, therefore, of granting remissions to the landholders for temporary losses will diminish in proportion as the produce of the lands increases and exceeds the demand of Government.

But let us suppose that hereafter it should be found necessary to grant remissions in districts which may suffer from drought or inundation; this is no argument against a permanent assessment; for, under the present system of variable assessments, we are frequently obliged to grant considerable deductions on these accounts, and there is no prospect of our being able to discontinue them so long as the country is assessed at its full value, and no more is left to the landholder than is barely sufficient for his subsistence, and for defraying the charges of collecting the rents from his lands.

There is this further advantage to be expected from a fixed assessment in a country subject to drought and inundation, that it affords a strong inducement to the landholder to exert himself to repair as speedily as possible the damages which his lands may have sustained from these calamities; for it is to be expected that when the public demand upon his land is limited to a specific sum he will employ every means in his power to render them capable of again paying that sum, and as large a surplus as possible, for his own use. His ability to raise money to make these exertions will be proportionably increased by the additional value which the limitation of the public demand will stamp upon his landed property: the reverse of this is to be expected, when the public assessment is subjected to unlimited increase.

I am of opinion, therefore, that there is no reason to apprehend a greater deficiency in the public revenues from drought and inundation, when the assessment is fixed, than we have hitherto sustained under the system of variable assessments; on the contrary, that we have very sufficient grounds for supposing that the necessity for granting remissions on these accounts will become gradually less. It further appears to me, that the practice of heaping up the public revenue by

charging occasionally the improved estate of one landholder with deficiencies in the public revenue assessed upon the lands of his neighbour, is both unjust and impolitic, and that until this practice is discontinued, both the landholders and their under-tenants and ryots will in general remain in a state of impoverishment, and that landed property will continue at its present depreciated value.

Mr. Shore observes, that the zemindars are ignorant of their true interests, and of all that relates to their estates: that the details of business with their tenants is irregular and confused, exhibiting an intricate scene of collusion opposed to exaction, and of unlicensed demand substituted for methodized claims: that the rules, by which the rents are demanded from the ryots, are numerous, arbitrary, and indefinite: that the officers of Government possessing local control are imperfectly acquainted with them, whilst their superiors, further removed from the detail, have still less information: that the rights of the talookdars dependent on the zemindars, as well as of the ryots, are imperfectly understood and defined: that in common cases we often want sufficient data and experience to enable us to decide, with justice and policy, upon claims to exemption from taxes, and that a decision erroneously made may be followed by one or other of these consequences,—a diminution of the revenues of Government, or a confirmation of oppressive exaction: that no one is so sanguine as to expect that the perpetuation of the zemindarry assessment will at once provide a remedy for these evils, that time must be allowed for the growth of confidence, and the acquisition of knowledge: that we know from experience what the zemindars are, and that he is not inclined, in opposition to that experience, to suppose that they will at once assume new principles of action, and become economical landlords and prudent trustees of the public interests.

With regard to the ignorance and incapacity of the zemindars, admitting these defects to exist in that class of people to the extent supposed, I have already given it as my opinion, that they are to be attributed greatly to the system of collecting the public revenue from their lands which has long prevailed in this country. To keep them in a state of tutelage, and to prohibit them from borrowing money, or disposing of their lands without the knowledge of Government, as we do at present, with a view to prevent them suffering the consequences of their profligacy and incapacity, will perpetuate these defects. If laws are enacted which secure to them the fruits of industry and economy, and at the same time leave them to experience the consequence of idleness and extravagance, they must either render themselves capable of transacting their own business, or their necessities will oblige them to dispose of their lands to others who will cultivate and improve them. This I conceive to be the only effectual mode which this or any other Government could adopt to render the proprietors of the lands economical landlords and prudent trustees of the public interests.

I must here observe, however, that the charge of incapacity can be applied only to the proprietors of the largest zemindarries. The proprietors of the smaller zemindarries, and talooks in general, conduct their own business; and I make no doubt would improve their lands, were they exempted from the authority of the zemindars, and allowed to pay their revenue immediately to the public treasuries of the collectors.

Admitting the detail of business between the zemindars and their under-tenants and ryots, to be in the intricate state described by Mr. Shore, does it not prove that the various attempts hitherto made by successive administrations to simplify this intricacy have been defective in principle, and consequently establish the necessity of having recourse to other measures for that purpose? We have found that the numerous prohibitory orders against the levying of new

taxes, accompanied with threats of fine and punishment for the disobedience of them, have proved ineffectual; and, indeed, how could it be expected, that whilst the Government were increasing their demands upon the zemindars, that they in their turn would not oppress the ryots; or that a farmer, whose interest extended little further than to the crops upon the ground, would not endeavour to exact, by every means in his power, as large a sum as possible, over and above the amount of his engagements with the public?

If the officers of Government possessing local control are imperfectly acquainted with the rules by which the rents are demanded from the ryots, and their superiors, further removed from the detail, have still less information of them, at what period are we to hope that Government and its officers will obtain a more perfect knowledge of them? The collectors have now been three years acting under positive instructions to obtain the necessary information for concluding a permanent settlement. They have transmitted their reports, and if the information contained in them, and the numerous discussions on the same points, recorded on the proceedings of former administrations, are insufficient for us to act upon, at what period and from whom are we to expect to procure more perfect materials? Most of the collectors, who have furnished the last reports, are now upon the spot, and are the best persons qualified for carrying into execution the system which we may adopt. It is to be supposed that they have communicated all the information which they possessed, and no further lights are therefore to be expected from them. Shall we act upon this information, or shall we wait for other collectors and fresh reports, or shall we calmly sit down discouraged by the difficulties which are supposed to exist, and leave the revenue affairs of this country in the singular state of confusion in which they are represented to be by Mr. Shore?

In order to simplify the demand of the landholder upon the ryot, or cultivator of the soil, we must begin with fixing the demand of Government upon the former; this done, I have little doubt but that the landholders will without difficulty be made to grant pottahs to the ryots upon the principles proposed by Mr. Shore in his propositions for the Bengal settlement. The value of the produce of the land is well known to the proprietor or his officers, and to the ryot who cultivates it; and is a standard which can always be reverted to by both parties, for fixing equitable rates.

Mr. Shore, in his minute prefixed to his propositions for the Bengal settlement, has furnished the most satisfactory arguments, to prove the incompetency of the officers of Government to enter into this detail, with any prospect of success. He observes, "that it would be endless to attempt the subordinate variations in the tenures or conditions of the ryots: that it is evident, in a country where discretion has so long been the measure of exaction, where the qualities of the soil, and the nature of the produce, suggest the rates of the rents; where the standard of measuring the land varies, and where endless and often contradictory customs exist in the same district and village, the task must be nearly impossible; that the collector of Rajeshahy observes upon the subject, that the infinite varieties of soil, and the further variations of value, from local circumstances, are absolutely beyond the investigation, or almost comprehension, not merely of a collector, but of any man who has not made it the business of his life."

It is evident therefore, that the only mode of remedying these evils which is likely to be attended with success, is to establish such rulers as shall oblige the proprietors of the soil, and their ryots, who alone possess the requisite information for this purpose, to come to a fair adjustment of the rates to be paid for the different kinds of lands or produce in their respective districts. Mr. Shore's proposi-

tion, that the rents of the ryots, by whatever rule or custom they may be demanded, shall be specific as to their amount,—that the landholders shall be obliged, within a certain time, to grant pottahs or writings to their ryots, in which this amount shall be inserted; and that no ryot shall be liable to pay more than the sum actually specified in his pottah, if duly enforced by the collectors,—will soon obviate the objection to a fixed assessment, founded upon the undefined state of the demands of the landholders upon the ryots.

When a spirit of improvement is diffused throughout the country, the ryots will find a further security in the competition of the landholders to add to the number of their tenants.

It is no objection to the perpetuation of the zemindarry assessment, that it will not at once provide a remedy for those evils: it is sufficient if it operates progressively to that end.

Mr. Shore observes, that we have experience of what the zemindars are; but the experience of what they are, or have been, under one system, is by no means the proper criterion to determine what they would be under the influence of another, founded upon very different principles. We have no experience of what the zemindars would be under the system which I recommended to be adopted.

I agree with Mr. Shore, that some interference on the part of Government is undoubtedly necessary for effecting an adjustment of the demands of the zemindars upon the ryots; nor do I conceive that the former will take alarm at the reservation of this right of interference, when convinced that Government can have no interest in exercising it, but for the purposes of public justice. Were the Government itself to be a party in the cause, they might have some grounds for apprehending the result of its decisions.

Mr. Shore observes that this interference is inconsistent with proprietary right; that it is an encroachment upon it to prohibit a landlord from imposing taxes upon his tenant, for it is saying to him that he shall not raise the rents of his estates; and that if the land is the zemindar's, it will only be partially his property, whilst we prescribe the quantum which he is to collect, or the mode by which the adjustment is to take place between the parties concerned.

If Mr. Shore means that after having declared the zemindar proprietor of the soil, in order to be consistent, we have no right to prevent his imposing new abwabs or taxes on the lands in cultivation, I must differ with him in opinion, unless we suppose the ryots to be absolute slaves of the zemindars: every begah of land possessed by them must have been cultivated under an express or implied agreement that a certain sum should be paid for each begah of produce, and no more. Every abwab or tax imposed by the zemindar over and above that sum is not only a breach of that agreement, but a direct violation of the established laws of the country. The cultivator, therefore, has in such case an undoubted right to apply to Government for the protection of his property, and Government is at all times bound to afford him redress. I do not hesitate, therefore, to give it as my opinion that the zemindars, neither now nor ever, could possess a right to impose taxes or abwabs upon the ryots; and if from the confusions which prevailed towards the close of the Mogul Government, or neglect, or want of information, since we have had the possession of the country, new abwabs have been imposed by the zemindars or farmers, that Government has an undoubted right to abolish such as are oppressive and have never been confirmed by a competent authority, and to establish such regulations as may prevent the practice of like abuses in future.

Neither is the privilege which the ryots in many parts of Bengal enjoy of holding possession of the spots of land which they cultivate, so long as they pay the revenue assessed upon them, by any means incompatible with the proprietary

rights of the zemindars. Whoever cultivates the land, the zemindars can receive no more than the established rent, which in most places is fully equal to what the cultivator can afford to pay. To permit him to dispossess one cultivator, for the sole purpose of giving the land to another, would be vesting him with a power to commit a wanton act of oppression, from which he could derive no benefit. The practice that prevailed under the Mogul Government of uniting many districts into one zemindarry, and thereby subjecting a large body of people to the control of one principal zemindar, rendered some restriction of this nature absolutely necessary. The zemindar, however, may sell the land, and the cultivators must pay the rent to the purchaser.

Neither is prohibiting the landholder to impose new abwabs or taxes on the lands in cultivation tantamount to saying to him that he shall not raise the rents of his estates. The rents of an estate are not to be raised by the imposition of new abwabs or taxes on every begah of land in cultivation; on the contrary, they will in the end be lowered by such impositions, for when the rate of assessment becomes so oppressive as not to leave the ryot a sufficient share of the produce for the maintenance of his family and the expenses of cultivation, he must at length desert the land. No zemindar claims a right to impose new taxes on the land in cultivation, although it is obvious that they have clandestinely levied them when pressed to answer demands upon themselves, and that these taxes have, from various causes, been perpetuated, to the ultimate detriment of the proprietor who imposed them.

The rents of an estate can only be raised by inducing the ryots to cultivate the more valuable articles of produce, and to clear the extensive tracts of waste land which are to be found in almost every zemindarry in Bengal. It requires no local knowledge of the revenues of this country to decide whether fixing the assessment or leaving it liable to further increase, at the discretion of Government or its officers, will afford the greatest encouragement to the landholder to have recourse to these means for the improvement of his estate.

In support of the opinion which I expressed upon a former occasion respecting the large proportion of waste land in the Company's territories, I have annexed some extracts from the correspondence of the collector in the Dacca province, &c., and whoever will take the trouble to consult the public proceedings will find there are many districts, both in Bengal and Behar, which are not better cultivated than those alluded to in letters of the above-mentioned collectors.

It does not appear to me that the regulations for the new settlement confirm all existing taxes if, upon enquiry, they shall appear to be unauthorised, and of recent imposition, nor that the zemindars will be entitled to deductions upon the abolition of them.

With regard to the rates at which landed property transferred by public sale, in liquidation of arrears, and, it may be added, by private sale or gift, are to be assessed, I conceive that the new proprietor has a right to collect no more than what his predecessor was legally entitled to, for the act of transfer certainly gives no sanction to illegal impositions. I trust, however, that the due enforcement of the regulations for obliging the zemindars to grant pottahs to their ryots, as proposed by Mr. Shore, will soon remove this objection to a permanent settlement. For whoever becomes a proprietor of land after these pottahs have been issued will succeed to the tenure under the condition and with the knowledge that these pottahs are to be the rules by which the rents are to be collected from the ryots.

With respect to the talookdars, I could have wished that they had been separated entirely from the authority of the zemindars, and that they had been allowed to remit the public revenue assessed upon their lands immediately to the

officers of Government, instead of paying it through the zemindar, to whose jurisdiction they are subjected. The last clause in the 16th Article of Mr. Shore's propositions, which directs that the lands of the talookdars shall be separated from the authority of the zemindars, and their rents be paid immediately to Government, in the event of the zemindars being convicted of demanding more from them than they ought to pay, will afford them some security from oppression.

When the demand of Government upon the zemindars is fixed they can have no plea for levying an increase upon the talookdars, for I conceive the talookdars in general to have the same property in the soil as the zemindars, and that the former are to be considered as proprietors of lesser portions of land, paying their revenues to Government through the medium of a larger proprietor, instead of remitting them immediately to the public treasury. The pernicious consequences which must result from affording to one individual an opportunity of raising the public revenue assessed upon the lands of another at his own discretion, and for his own advantage, are evident; and on this account I was desirous that all proprietors of land, whether zemindars, talookdars, or chondries, should pay their rents immediately to the European collector of the district, or other officer of Government, and be subject to the same general laws.

The number of names upon the rent-roll will add little to the business of the collector of a district, provided that the sum to be paid by each proprietor of land is fixed.

In support of this opinion I have annexed some extracts from the proceedings of the Committee of Circuit, the members of which must have been well acquainted with the customs and practices of the Mogul Government.

These extracts afford convincing proofs of the proprietary rights of the inferior zemindars and talookdars, and that their being made to pay their rent through the superior zemindar of the district was solely for the convenience of the Government, which found it less difficult to collect the rents from one principal zemindar than from a number of petty proprietors.

They further prove that the zemindars who sold their lands to raise money for the liquidation of the public balances disposed of all the rights which they possessed in them as individuals; and that whatever authority they might exercise over them after the sale must have been virtually delegated to them by the Government, and not derived from themselves; and consequently that, in separating such talookdars from the jurisdiction of the zemindars, we should not have infringed the rights of the latter, but only deviated from a practice of the Mogul Government, from which that administration itself frequently departed, and whose conduct, in cases of this nature, should not, I conceive, be made the rule of ours when found to be inconsistent with the good of the community.

The temporary reduction of the tribute of the Rajah of Benares, adduced by Mr. Shore to prove that the internal arrangements which we may find it necessary to make, after fixing the jumma payable by each zemindar, may hereafter oblige us to grant remissions, and thereby diminish the public revenues, does not appear to me a case in point.

The revenue received from Benares was at once raised from 22 to 40 lacks of rupees. The Rajah being incapable of transacting his own affairs, the management of them was vested in a naib or deputy, whose rapacity and mal-administration, together with that of his officers, occasioned a general decline in the cultivation of the country, and consequently diminished its resources. The late reform of the customs and internal duties gave rise to a further temporary diminution of them.

The above are the principal causes which have occasioned the reduction in the

revenues in Benares; but as it is obvious that similar causes will not exist either in Bengal or Behar, no arguments against fixing the assessment in these provinces can be founded upon this temporary deficiency in the revenues of Benares.

Still less can any just conclusions be drawn against fixing the demand of Government upon the lands from the instance of the settlement made last year in Midnapore by the present collectors. Mr. Shore observes, that if this assessment, formed upon documents of the greatest probable authenticity, had been declared permanent, the collection of it, if enforced, would have reduced many of the talookdars to distress, and some to ruin; that, are we not as likely, or more so, to err in the distribution of the assessment upon collectorships as upon the subdivisions of a peculiar district?

How far this reasoning is applicable to the settlement which we are about to conclude in the districts of Bengal will appear from a reference to our proceedings regarding Midnapore.

The canongoe of that district delivered in accounts in which the gross produce of the country was estimated to be nearly double the amount of the revenue collected from it on the account of Government. The supposed profits of the landholders, after making allowance for their charges in collecting the rents, were thought larger than what they were entitled to, and measures were taken to appropriate a part of them to the public use.

A considerable increase was accordingly imposed on the country, and the canongoe, through whom the accounts of the produce were obtained, pledged himself to become responsible, should the produce of any district fall short of his estimates.

It appears from the collector's report, referred to in Mr. Shore's minute of the 25th November last, that the collection of this settlement was made with much difficulty, and that it was attended with great distress, entailing indigence on the renters of Mineehourah, Kookulpour, and Boccamootah; and that in the two last districts, after the mofussil assets had been completely collected, there remained a balance due from those mehals, which it was pretty well known was discharged by the sale of effects and the mortgaging of rent-free lands.

The collector further represented that the canongoe's estimates had in many places proved fallacious, that the assessment was too high, and that there was an absolute necessity for lowering it in the ensuing year; he was accordingly directed to repair to Calcutta, and after the accounts which he brought with him were carefully examined, we judged it expedient to grant him a general authority to propose such remissions in the assessment as might appear to him necessary.

I confess my expectations were never sanguine that this settlement would be realised without distress to the numerous zemindars and talookdars who are proprietors of the lands in Midnapore, and it is my opinion that every attempt of this nature to appropriate to the use of Government the profits of the landholders, allowing them only what, upon an arbitrary average estimate, is deemed sufficient for their maintenance, and defraying the necessary charges of collecting the rents of their estates, will end in disappointment to Government, ruin to the proprietors of the soil, and in the establishment of mutual distrust.

The history of this settlement may be traced upon the public proceedings, and I trust that the state to which it has reduced many of the landholders will suggest to the Court of Directors very strong arguments in favour of a permanent assessment, and prove to them the justness of Mr. Shore's own observation—"That the mere admission of the rights of the zemindars, unless followed by the measures that will give value to it, will operate but little towards the improvement of the country; that the demands of a foreign dominion like ours ought certainly to be more moderate than the impositions of the native rulers, and that to render the

value of what we possess permanent, our demands ought to be fixed; that, removed from the control of our own Government the distance of half the globe, every practicable restriction should be imposed upon the administration of India without circumscribing its necessary power, and the property of the inhabitants be secured against the fluctuations of caprice or the licence of unrestrained control."

The principles which influenced the conclusion of this settlement, I am happy to say, have not found admission among those which are to regulate the formation of the future settlement of the districts in Bengal; and consequently I trust that we shall not be subjected to the same disappointment which we have experienced in Midnapore.

Mr. Shore admits the general principle of the inexpediency of the total of the public assessment being increased at any future settlement; but the adoption of his proposition to correct periodically the inequalities that may appear in the proportions which are paid by the individual landowners would, in my opinion, be attended with almost every discouragement and mischievous effect that the annual farming system could be supposed to produce.

No previous assurances, however solemn, could convince the zemindars that Government would at the expiration of their leases be contented with less than the highest rent that could be exacted from their lands; and even if experience should prove to them that the intention of laying an additional assessment upon the most wealthy went no further than to indemnify the public treasury for the losses that had been sustained by deficiencies in the rents of others, it would be vain to expect them to admit the justice of the principle that the industrious man should be taxed in proportion to the idleness and mismanagement of his neighbours; or if they admitted it, to persuade them that the shares of those deficiencies had been freely and impartially distributed; and I must confess that I do not think that a Government or a set of collectors will ever exist in this country that would be qualified, at the end of a ten years' lease, to discriminate the acquisitions of fortune which had arisen from advantageous agreements from those that had been produced by the superior economy and industry of other proprietors, and consequently that to proportion a general assessment upon that principle would be absolutely impracticable.

Although the zemindars and other landholders in this country are in general extremely improvident, and from their having been hitherto harassed with annual assessments, would no doubt receive a ten years' settlement with much satisfaction, yet short-sighted as they are, I cannot by any means admit that they would not clearly see a wide difference between a tenure of a short duration and a perpetuity. But should it ever happen, in the first moments of their joy, that they could lay aside all apprehensions of meeting with vexations in future settlements, they would infallibly recollect themselves when their leases approached within three or four years of a conclusion; and as the same pernicious effects would then follow that are now experienced annually, they would endeavour to give themselves an appearance of poverty by concealing the wealth that they might have acquired, and to depreciate the value of their lands by neglecting their cultivation, in hopes of obtaining by those means more advantageous terms at an ensuing settlement; and these consequences, by withdrawing the application of certain portions of stock and industry, must operate for a time to the general detriment of the State.

I trust, however, that it cannot be imagined that I would recommend that the proposed settlement should be made with a blind precipitation, or without our having obtained all the useful information that, in my opinion, can be expected of the real state and value of the different districts.

Twenty years have been employed in collecting information. In 1769 supervisors were appointed; in 1770 provincial councils were established; in 1772 a committee of circuit was deputed to make the settlement, armed with all the powers of the presidency; in 1776 ameens were appointed to make a hustabood of the country; in 1781 the provincial councils of revenue were abolished, and collectors were sent into the several districts, and the general council and management of the revenues was lodged in a committee of revenue at Calcutta under the immediate inspection of Government. Like our predecessors we set out with seeking for new information, and we have now been three years in collecting it. Voluminous reports have been transmitted by the several collectors on every point which was deemed of importance. The object of these various arrangements has been to obtain an accurate knowledge of the value of the lands, and of the rules by which the zemindars collect the rents from the ryots.

The collectors in Behar, not even excepting the two to whom Mr. Shore alludes as having declared it impracticable to make the proposed settlement, have already, with great appearance of benefit to the Company, and of advantage to the natives, made considerable progress in executing the instructions that they received for making the ten years' settlement conformable to the orders of the Court of Directors; and in every instance where it has been stated that further time was necessary to acquire a minute knowledge of the resources of any particular district the Board has readily acquiesced in allowing a partial delay.

I shall certainly be no less inclined to recommend the observation of the same rule during the progress of the settlement in Bengal and Orissa; and in those districts that, from long mismanagement, are evidently in a state of decline and disorder, I shall not only willingly agree to postpone the settlement for a twelvemonth longer, but also assent to any modification in it that may appear to be applicable to their present conditions. But after having adopted those and such other measures as may appear necessary from the reports and explanations which may be laid before us by the different collectors, whilst they are engaged in the execution of our instructions, I must declare that I am clearly of opinion that this Government will never be better qualified, at any given period whatever, to make an equitable settlement of the land-revenue of these provinces; and that if the want of further information was to be admitted now, or at any future period, as a ground for delaying the declaration of the permanency of the assessment, the commencement of the happiness of the people and of the prosperity of the country would be delayed for ever.

The question that has been so much agitated in this country, whether the zemindars and talookdars are the actual proprietors of the soil, or only officers of Government, has always appeared to me to be very uninteresting to them; whilst their claim to a certain percentage upon the rents of their lands has been admitted, and the right of Government to fix the amount of those rents at its own discretion has never been denied or disputed.

Under the former practice of annual settlement, zemindars who have either refused to agree to pay the rents that have been required, or who have been thought unworthy of being intrusted with the management, have, since our acquisition of the Dewanny, been dispossessed in numberless instances, and their land held khas, or let to a farmer; and when it is recollected that pecuniary allowances have not always been given to dispossessed zemindars in Bengal, I conceive that a more nugatory or delusive species of property could hardly exist.

On the other hand, the grant of these lands at a fixed assessment, will stamp a value upon them hitherto unknown; and, by the facility which it will create of raising money upon them, either by mortgage or sale, will provide a certain fund

for the liquidation of public or private demands, or prove an incitement to exertion and industry, by securing the fruits of those qualities in the tenure to the proprietor's own benefit.

The latter part of Mr. Shore's minute, recorded on the 21st December, commencing from the 27th paragraph, and from thence to the conclusion, relates to a settlement of four or five pergunnahs in the collectorship of Behar proper, concluded by the collector, and confirmed by this Board in December, 1788, from year to year, until the pleasure of the Court of Directors regarding it shall be known.

I shall hereafter record my sentiments on Mr. Shore's remarks on this settlement. I must observe, however, that they are not applicable to the general question now under discussion. The parts of that settlement which Mr. Shore thinks exceptionable, have not been adopted in the remainder of the collector's districts, nor in the other collectorship in Behar; nor is it proposed to introduce them in the settlement of Bengal.

I have thought it necessary to say thus much, lest, from the subjects being so much blended in Mr. Shore's minute, it should be supposed that his objections to the settlement of these pergunnahs in the collectorship of Behar proper are equally applicable to the general plan of settlement for the Company's dominions at large.

I readily agree, however, that the collector of Behar be called upon to answer the queries proposed by Mr. Shore, and that his reply be transmitted to the Court of Directors with such remarks upon it as we may hereafter think necessary.

I now come to the remaining point upon which I have differed with Mr. Shore, viz., the expediency of taking into the hands of Government the collection of the internal duties on commerce, and allowing to the zemindars and others, by whom these duties have been hitherto levied, a deduction adequate to the amount which they now realize from them.

Mr. Shore's propositions for the settlement of Bengal will point out his sentiments regarding the collection of the internal duties, and I believe it was principally at my instance that he acquiesced in the resolution for taking the collection of these duties into the hands of Government, in Behar, as entered on our proceedings of the 18th September last.

It was by my desire, also, that similar instructions were issued to the collector of Midnapore.

To those who have adopted the idea that the zemindars have no property in the soil, and that Government is the actual landlord, and that the zemindars are officers of Government removable at pleasure, the question regarding the right of the zemindars to collect the internal duties on commerce would appear unnecessary. The committing the charge of the land-revenues to one officer, and the collection of the internal duties to another, would to them appear only a deviation from the practice of the Mogul Government, and not an infringement of the rights of individuals; but what I have already said will be sufficient to show that these are not the grounds upon which I have recommended the adoption of the measure.

I admit the proprietary rights of the zemindars, and that they have hitherto held the collection of the internal duties; but this privilege appears to me so incompatible with the general prosperity of the country, that however it may be sanctioned by long usage, I conceive there are few who will not think us justifiable in resuming it.

It is almost unnecessary to observe how much the prosperity of this country depends upon the removal of all obstructions, both to its internal and foreign commerce. It is from these resources only that it can supply the large propor-

tions of its wealth, which are annually drained from it, by the Company and by individuals.

The rates by which the internal duties are levied, and the amount of them collected in each zemindarry, have, as far as I have been able to trace, never been ascertained; when the lands of the zemindars have been leased out to farmers, these duties have been collected by them.

It is, I believe, generally allowed that no individual in a state can possess an inherent right to levy a duty on goods or merchandise purchased or sold within the limits of his estate, and much less upon goods passing along the public roads which lead through it. This is a privilege which the sovereign power alone is entitled to exercise, and nowhere else can it be lodged with safety. Every unauthorised exaction levied on the goods of a merchant, and every detention of them in their progress through the country, is a great public injury. The importation of foreign commodities, and the exportation of our own, are alike obstructed; for accumulated exactions, by raising the price, diminish the consumption of the commodity, and the merchant is under the necessity either to give up his trade, or to go to other countries, in search of the same goods.

It cannot be expected that a zemindar will be influenced by these considerations, and much less a temporary farmer, whose only object can be to exact from the cultivators of the soil, as well as from merchants and traders, as much as he can compel them to pay.

The Court of Directors themselves appear to have been of this opinion from the following paragraph of their letter of the 10th April, 1771:—

"As we have reason to believe that many bazars are held in the provinces without the authority of Government, and which must be an infringement of its right, a great detriment to the public collection, and a burden and oppression on the inhabitants; you will take care that no bazars or gunges be kept up, but such as particularly belong to the Government. But in such bazars and gunges the duties are to be rated in such manner as their situations, and the flourishing state of the respective districts will admit."

And in the same letter they observe:—"Persuaded as we are that the internal traffic of Bengal has received further checks from the duties which are levied and the exactions which are imposed at petty chokies, we positively direct that no such chokies be suffered to continue, on any pretence whatever, to impede the course of commerce from one part of the province to the other. It is necessary, however, that the nine general chokies which have been established for collecting the duties payable to the circar, should remain, and these only."

The chokies stationed upon the banks of the rivers to collect duties on boats, on the part of the zemindars, were directed to be abolished, in consequence of the Company's orders, and adequate deductions were granted to the zemindars; but the duties levied at the hauts, gunges, and inland chokies, were ordered to be continued in the hands of the zemindars as formerly. The zemindars were also prohibited from collecting inland rahdarry duties, that is, duties upon goods not bought or sold within their zemindarries, but only passing through them. Notwithstanding this prohibition has been frequently repeated, our proceedings exhibit numerous instances of rahdarry duties being levied by zemindars and farmers; and from opportunities which are afforded them by having the collection of the authorised inland duties in their hand, I have every reason to believe that the practice is but too general. I understand that the collector of Nuddea has lately abolished a very considerable number of chokies, at which unauthorised duties were collected on the internal trade, by the officers of the zemindar, in defiance of the repeated orders of Government. If these interruptions to commerce are found

to exist in a district almost in the neighbourhood of Calcutta, and under a vigilant collector, it may be supposed that in the more inland parts of the country, and under collectors less active, that the evil prevails to a greater extent.

The inefficacy of the power of Government to restrain zemindars from these oppressive exactions, whilst they are allowed to possess the right of levying taxes of any kind upon commerce, has been long experienced in many shapes. It is only by the total resumption of this right that such abuses can be prevented, and as the general interests of the community require that a regular system of taxation upon the internal trade of the country should be established, we are justified by the constant practice of our own country, and that of other nations, in demanding from individuals, upon granting them a full compensation for their present value, a surrender of privileges which counteract so beneficial a measure.

Further benefits are to be derived from this arrangement, when the amount of the internal duties, the rates by which they are levied, and the articles subject to the payment of them, are ascertained. Some may be increased, and others diminished or struck off, according as may be judged advisable; and in course of time, as commerce and wealth increase, such regulations may be made in the duties on the internal trade, and the foreign imports and exports, as will afford a large addition to the income of the public, whenever its necessities may require it, without discouraging trade or manufactures, or imposing any additional rent on the lands.

Having stated such remarks on Mr. Shore's minute as appeared to me necessary, I shall subjoin the following observations on the revenue system of this country, which may be found deserving of consideration.

Although Government has an undoubted right to collect a portion of the produce of the lands to supply the public exigencies, it cannot, consistent with the principles of justice and policy, assume to itself a right of making annual or periodical valuations of the lands and taking the whole produce, except such portion as it may think proper to relinquish to the proprietors for their maintenance, and for defraying the charges of managing their estates.

The supreme power in every state must possess the right of taxing the subject agreeably to certain general rules; but the practice which has prevailed in this country for some time past of making frequent valuations of the lands, and where one person's estate has improved, and another's declined, of appropriating the increased produce of the former, to supply the deficiencies in the latter, is not taxation, but in fact a declaration that the property of the landholder is at the absolute disposal of Government. Every man who is acquainted with the causes which operate to impoverish or enrich a country must be sensible that our Indian territories must continue to decline as long as the practice is adhered to.

The maxim that equality in taxation is an object of the greatest importance, and that in justice all the subjects of a state should contribute as nearly as possible in proportion to the income which they enjoy under its protection, does not prove the expediency of varying the demand of Government upon the lands; on the contrary, we shall find that, in countries in which this maxim is one of the leading principles in the imposition of taxes, the valuation of the land on which they are levied is never varied.

In raising a revenue to answer the public exigencies we ought to be careful to interfere as little as possible in those sources from which the wealth of the subject is derived.

Agriculture is the principal source of the riches of Bengal; the cultivator of the soil furnishes most of the materials for its numerous manufactures. In proportion as agriculture declines the quantity of these materials must diminish, and

the value of them increase, and consequently the manufactures must become dearer, and the demand for them be gradually lessened. Improvement in agriculture will produce the opposite effects.

The attention of Government ought therefore to be directed to render the assessment upon the lands as little burdensome as possible: this is to be accomplished only by fixing it. The proprietor will then have some inducement to improve his lands, and as his profits will increase in proportion to his exertions, he will gradually become better able to discharge the public revenue.

By reserving the collection of the internal duties on commerce, Government may at all times appropriate to itself a share of the accumulating wealth of its subjects without their being sensible of it. The burden will also be more equally distributed; at present the whole weight rests upon the landholders and cultivators of the soil.

Whereas the merchants and inhabitants of the cities and towns, the proprietors of rent-free lands, and, in general, all persons not employed in the cultivation of the lands paying revenue to Government, contribute but little in proportion to their means to the exigencies of the state, it is evident that varying the assessment on the lands is not the mode of carrying into practice the maxim, that all the subjects of a state ought to contribute to the public exigencies, in proportion to their incomes, and that other means must be employed for effecting this object.

In case of a foreign invasion it is a matter of the last importance, considering the means by which we keep possession of this country, that the proprietors of the lands should be attached to us from motives of self-interest. A landholder, who is secured in the quiet enjoyment of a profitable estate, can have no motive for wishing for a change. On the contrary, if the rents of his lands are raised in proportion to their improvement,—if he is liable to be dispossessed, should he refuse to pay the increase required of him,—or if threatened with imprisonment or confiscation of his property, on account of balance due to Government upon an assessment which his lands were unequal to pay, he will readily listen to any offers which are likely to bring about a change that cannot place him in a worse situation, but which hold out to him hopes of a better.

Until the assessment on the lands is fixed, the constitution of our internal Government in this country will never take that form which alone can lead to the establishment of good laws, and ensure a due administration of them. For whilst the assessment is liable to frequent variation, a great portion of the time and attention of the Supreme Board, and the unremitted application of the Company's servants of the first abilities and most established integrity will be required to prevent the landholders being plundered, and the revenues of Government diminished at every new settlement; and powers and functions, which ought to be lodged in different hands, must continue, as at present, vested in the same person; and whilst they remain so united we cannot expect that the laws which may be enacted for the protection of the rights and property of the landholders and cultivators of the soil will ever be duly enforced.

We have, by a train of the most fortunate events, obtained the dominion of one of the most fertile countries on the face of the globe, with a population of mild and industrious inhabitants, perhaps equal to, if not exceeding, in number, that of all the other British possessions put together.

Its real value to Britain depends upon the continuance of its ability to furnish a large annual investment to Europe, to give considerable assistance to the treasury at Canton, and to supply the pressing and extensive wants of the other presidencies.

The consequences of the heavy drains of wealth from the above causes, with the addition of that which has been occasioned by the remittance of the private fortunes, have been for many years past, and are now, severely felt by the great diminution of the current specie, and by the languor which has thereby been thrown upon the cultivation and the general commerce of the country.

A very material alteration in the principles of our system of management has therefore become indispensably necessary, in order to restore this country to a state of prosperity, and to enable it to continue to be a solid support to the British interests and power in this part of the world.

We can only accomplish this desirable object by devising measures to rouse and increase the industry of the inhabitants; and it would be in vain to hope that any means but those of holding forth prospects of private advantage to themselves could possibly succeed to animate them to exertion.

I am sorry to be obliged to acknowledge it, but it is a truth too evident to deny that the land proprietors throughout the whole of the Company's provinces are in a general state of poverty and depression.

I cannot even except the principal Zemindars from this observation; and it was not without concern that I saw it verified very lately, in one instance, by the Rajah of Burdwan who pays a yearly rent of upwards of £400,000 to Government, having allowed some of his most valuable lands to be sold for the discharge of an inconsiderable balance due to Government.

The indolent and debased character of many of the Zemindars must no doubt have contributed to the ruin of their circumstances; and though I am afraid the cases are but few, yet I conceive it to be possible that there may be some instances in which the poverty that is pleaded may be only pretended.

Either supposition must, however, reflect some discredit upon our system of management; for it would imply that we have been deficient in taking proper measures to incite the Zemindars to a line of conduct, which would produce advantage to themselves; or that, if they have acquired wealth, their apprehension of our rapacity induces them to conceal it.

We are therefore called upon to endeavour to remedy evils by which the public interests are essentially injured; and by granting perpetual leases of the lands at a fixed assessment, we shall render our subjects the happiest people in India; and we shall have reason to rejoice at the increase of their wealth and prosperity, as it will infallibly add to the strength and resources of the state.

I therefore propose, that the Letter from the Board of Revenue, with the reports of the collectors in Bengal respecting the ten years' settlement, and Mr. Shore's Minute and Proposition, delivered in for record in June last, be now entered upon the proceedings.

That a copy of Mr. Shore's Propositions (the articles relating to the gunges excepted), with such of the alterations contained in our Resolutions of the 25th November last, for the settlement of Midnapore, as are applicable to the districts in general, be transmitted to the Board of Revenue; and that they may be directed to proceed, without delay, to form the ten years' settlement in Bengal, agreeable to the rules and prescriptions therein laid down.

That the Board of Revenue be directed to notify to the landholders that the settlement, if approved by the Court of Directors, will become permanent, and no alteration take place at the expiration of the ten years.

That the Board of Revenue be further directed to issue the same instructions to the collectors in Bengal for the separation of the gunges, bazars, and hants, held within them, as have been transmitted to the collectors of Behar and the collector of Midnapore.

No. XXXIII.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN COUNCIL TO THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

[Extract.]

HONOURABLE SIRS, Feb. 13, 1790.

We beg leave to refer you to your Secret Committee for extracts of our letters to them, and copies of the papers with which they have been furnished relative to a purchase made by the Rajah of Travancore from the Dutch, of Cranganore and Jycottah. From these you will observe, that, after the purchase had been concluded, it was stated by Tippoo, that the Rajah had no right to make it without consulting him, as the two places were subject to a quit-rent, and held as dependencies of his tributary the Rajah of Cochin, while on the other hand, it was declared both by the Rajah and the Dutch, that these two forts had been conquered by the latter from the Portuguese, and, after they came into the possession of the Dutch Company, had never acknowledged a dependence on any native power in India. You will further observe that in order to furnish the most convincing proofs on our part of a spirit of conciliation, a letter was written to Tippoo in consequence of our directions by the Governor of Fort St. George, to acquaint him that if he could produce evidence of the forts having either paid tribute to the Rajah of Cochin, or been held by the Dutch under any dependence on that Rajah, since the period at which he became tributary to the Mysore Government, our ally should be obliged to restore the places to the Dutch, or, in case of his refusal, the Company's protection should be withdrawn from him. To determine this question it was proposed to Tippoo that the matter should be examined by Commissioners appointed on the part of his Government and ours for that purpose. . . It was also written to Tippoo upon another matter of complaint, that, if it appeared that any of his rebellious subjects had taken refuge in the Travancore country, the Rajah should be obliged to dismiss them. During this disposition shown on the part of the English Government to redress any real grievance that Tippoo might have reason to complain of, his vakeel, who had been expected for some time by the Rajah of Travancore, arrived and delivered a letter with complaints which we shall specify, because, however weak the motives, we know of none other that he could bring forward for the war, which he has actually commenced against your ally the Rajah of Travancore.

1st. That the Rajah had given protection to the Rajahs of Calicut, Cootingherry, &c., who were indebted to Tippoo's Circar.

2nd. That he had purchased Cranganore from the Dutch.

3rd. That he had erected lines on a part of Cochin dependent on Calicut.

Tippoo required of the Rajah that he should withdraw his troops from Cranganore, destroy the lines he had erected, and deliver up the rebellious subject of the Circar, the vakeel further intimating from Tippoo, that, if the troops were not withdrawn from Cranganore, and the lines destroyed, he would bring his army against the Rajah of Travancore.

To the first of Tippoo's complaints the Rajah replied that the Rajahs of Calicut, Cootingherry, &c., were his relations, and had been long in his country, during which no demand had been till then made for them; but as Tippoo asserted that they were indebted to him, they should be ordered to depart from the Rajah's dominions. The Rajah also declared that he had not, as was stated, ever given protection to thieves, or to Tippoo's refractory subjects.

To the second complaint the Rajah replied that he had purchased Cranganore,

after having ascertained that the Dutch had an indisputable right to sell it, and that this would be confirmed by the Governor of Cochin.

Upon the third complaint the Rajah observed that that part of the country where the lines were erected was given to him before the Cochin Rajah paid tribute to Tippoo, and that the lines had been erected twenty-five years, during which no demand had been made concerning them.

But after delivering these answers to the demands of Tippoo, the Rajah of Travancore expressed his wish to have them understood as explanations, reserving his ultimate decision on the requisitions made of him until he had received the advice of the English Government for the regulation of his conduct.

It appears that at that time Tippoo was encamped with a large army at the distance of ten miles from the lines of Travancore.

His answer to the Rajah's explanations, which was expressed in terms that indicated an intention to support the requisitions he had made by force, was soon succeeded by actual hostilities. On the 29th of December he attacked in person the Rajah's lines at the head of considerable part of his army, and after carrying and possessing them to the extent of two or three miles for several hours, he was forced to abandon them with great loss, by a spirited exertion of the Rajah's own troops, far beyond what could have been expected from people so deficient in military skill and discipline.

The account which we have received mentions Tippoo's army at the attack of the lines to have consisted of about 34,000 men, including regulars, irregulars, and cavalry, besides ten pieces of cannon. We have no account that states exactly the number of killed upon that occasion; but we are informed generally that on the side of the Rajah it was about 200, and on that of Tippoo about 1000 men. Our intelligence acquaints us that among the latter were Jamaul Beg, the Commander of a Division of about 1500 men, and Tippoo's son-in-law Meer Camur ud-din Cawn. It is understood that Tippoo's horse was shot under him. There is also some reason to suppose that he received some hurt. One report mentions that he was wounded in the shoulder by a musket-ball, another that in leaping from the rampart he had been much bruised, and torn by a bamboo hedge which grows in the ditch, where his palankeen was afterwards found with a silver box (containing some diamond rings and other jewels), his large seal with his titles, his fusee and pistols, with his name upon them, and likewise his sword.

Immediately on the appearance of Tippoo's being determined to attack the Travancore lines, the Rajah made application to your Resident for the assistance of the Company's troops in the defence of his country, and orders were given in compliance with it to Captain Knox, the commanding officer, who was prepared to act as emergency might require. The detachment was at some distance and not engaged in the conflict at the lines.

We received advice of the war on the 26th of last month, and measures were immediately taken by this Government to assist your Presidency at Fort St. George at this important crisis.

Orders were sent to your Resident at Poona to negociate for an alliance with the Mahratta state against Tippoo, with authority to conclude an agreement with it under the instructions given to him for that purpose, and we directed your Resident, with Mahajee Scindia, to endeavour to engage that chief and Tuccoojee Holcar, to use their interest at Poona for the same end.

Orders were also sent to your Resident at Hydrabad to take the necessary steps for securing the cooperation of Nizam Ally in the war against Tippoo.

We likewise directed the Bombay Government to comply with such requisitions as might be made of them by Mr. Malet, the Resident at Poona, for a

detachment of the Company's troops to act with the Mahrattas, in case they should insist upon it as an indispensable condition of their entering into an alliance with the Company. They were also instructed to make a powerful diversion by attacking Tippoo's dominions, and by exciting his subjects and tributaries to revolt on the Coast of Malabar. To enable them to effect these purposes we directed that they should immediately raise and add two companies to each of their twelve battalions of regular native troops; and we requested their opinion whether any further augmentation of their army would be necessary, as well as a communication, as soon as they might find it convenient, of the plan they intended to pursue for executing our orders.

In writing to Fort St. George upon receiving the intelligence of Tippoo's attack on the lines at Travancore, we could not allow ourselves to doubt, that upon the first information they had of it, they had considered the Company as at war with him, and had proceeded to take measures to carry it on with vigour, according to the terms of our instructions, dated the 29th of August last, a copy of which we have the honour to enclose; and consequently that, amongst other precautions, all payments to the Nabob of Arcot's private creditors, and all steps for providing an investment had immediately ceased, so that the whole of their pecuniary resources might be applied to the maintenance of the interests and honour of the Company and the British nation. We acquainted them with the orders sent to Mr. Malet and Captain Kennaway, and to the Governor in Council at Bombay, as already mentioned, and assured them that we should take every other means in our power to exact a full reparation from Tippoo for his wanton and unprovoked violation of his treaty with the Company.

On the day after the account arrived from Madras that Tippoo had actually commenced hostilities against your ally the Rajah of Travancore, the members of the Board were apprised that in the critical situation in which your affairs appeared to be in the Carnatic, the Governor-General looked upon it as a duty which he owed to his country, to lay aside all considerations of his own personal ease or responsibility, or even of what the existing laws might specifically authorise, and to determine on proceeding to the coast, as soon as might be possible, to take a temporary charge of the civil and military at the Presidency of Fort St. George. Exclusive of other reasons his Lordship thought himself called upon to take so decided a step from its being consistent with his knowledge that there was not a sufficient harmony and mutual confidence between the civil and military departments at Madras, and that there was an evident backwardness on the part of the Government to consult the officer commanding the troops, or make any use of his experience and opinion in making preparations and arrangements for carrying on a war. It was further observed by the Governor-General that the inattention, amounting in appearance to disregard, which had been shown by the Madras Government to some of our late instructions, on points of great importance, was highly deserving of our severe reprehension, and could not fail to operate as an additional reason in his mind for entertaining great doubts of the good disposition or ability of that Government to support and maintain the public interests and honour at this critical period; under these impressions his Lordship thought himself required by a sense of duty to the Company, as well as by an attention to the general interests of the nation, to stand forth and endeavour to avert the misfortunes with which negligence and misconduct or jealousies between the civil and military departments might be attended; with that view and upon the ground of state necessity, it was the intention of Lord Cornwallis to take the responsibility of an irregular measure upon himself, and to propose that the Board should invest him with full powers to assume a temporary charge of

the civil and military affairs at your Presidency of Fort St. George, by exercising the functions of Governor, as well as those of Commander-in-Chief. His Lordship received with the highest satisfaction the warm approbation which the members of the Council bestowed upon this determination, and the ready concurrence which they gave to its being communicated to the Government of Bombay, and to the Residents at the courts of the country powers, before the necessary despatch of other business would admit of its being put in any other form upon the public records. But private advices having lately been received of the arrival of the Vestal frigate at Anjingo on the 3rd of January, with a commission appointing General Medows to be Governor of Fort St. George, and as in consequence of the Vestal's having proceeded on that day from Anjingo to the Presidency of Bombay, there was every reason to hope that he would be able to take charge of his Government before, or at least as soon as, it would have been possible for Lord Cornwallis to have reached Madras; his Lordship observed that the grounds, on which he had formed his first resolution were in a great measure, or perhaps entirely, done away. For as it would have been incompatible with the station which he held in this country that his Lordship should have rendered himself in any degree subordinate to the Government of Madras, and as General Medows is a man of acknowledged ability and character, and regularly invested by your Honourable Court with the offices of Governor and Commander-in-Chief at the Presidency of Fort St. George, he could not venture to say that, by relinquishing the immediate direction of the Supreme Government after a knowledge of the appointment of General Medows, his Lordship would not be justly exposed to blame and censure for executing a determination taken a few days before, under belief of the existence of circumstances very different. Lord Cornwallis, upon further considerations, was induced to lay his intention to proceed to the coast entirely aside, unless new occasions should arise calling upon him to resume it.

The declaration of his Lordship's purpose was followed by a Minute from the Members of the Council, in which they expressed their entire concurrence in the reasons assigned by the Governor-General, for the change of his former resolution; taking this occasion to assure his Lordship, generally, of their most decided support, if any future exigencies should induce him to resume his first intention. They further desired to add a particular assurance, the natural results of the sentiments they expressed in regard to Lord Cornwallis's Administration, that had his Lordship proceeded to the coast, it would have been their earnest and constant endeavour to have carried on the public business during his absence according to the principles and regulations at present practised and established, or that his Lordship might have thought necessary to establish previous to his departure.

Advices received subsequently from the coast, and daily coming in, have left the Governor-General in doubt whether his duty may not yet require him to go there for a short time, in order, if possible, with due regard to the public honour, to prevent further hostilities, and under this circumstance a vessel has been engaged to take his Lordship to Madras if his going there should be rendered expedient.

Private accounts have just come in from Bombay that the Vestal frigate had arrived there on the 13th of January, with General Medows' Commission to the Government of Fort St. George, and that he intended to proceed to that Presidency on the 20th of the same month, having had intelligence of Tippoo's attack on the Travancore lines.

We have, &c.

No. XXXIV.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN COUNCIL TO THE GOVERNOR AND COUNCIL AT COLUMBO.

GENTLEMEN, Calcutta, Feb. 26, 1790.

The Governor and Council of Madras have submitted to us copies of your letters addressed to them, dated the 9th and 12th ultimo, and we think it incumbent upon us to assure you that we entertain a proper sense of the concern which you have expressed about the interest of the English East India Company, and of its ally the Rajah of Travancore.

Although the 6th Article of the late treaty of alliance, which has been entered into by the Crown of Great Britain and the States-General of the United Provinces, only contains specifically a mutual defensive stipulation against the hostile attempts of any other European power in India, yet we are so much convinced of its being our mutual interest that the strictest cordiality should subsist between us, that we shall be happy to embrace every opportunity that offers, to manifest our earnest inclination to promote an interchange of good offices, and to cultivate and cement the ancient friendship which has been so happily restored between our respective nations.

We think ourselves much obliged to you for the clear and satisfactory information with which you furnished the Government of Madras of the nature of the tenure by which the Dutch East India Company held the Fort of Cranganore, previous to its being ceded to the Rajah of Travancore; and as we agree entirely in opinion with you that the Nabob Tippoo Sultaun had no right whatever to interfere with the transaction by which the Rajah obtained possession of that fort from your nation, we should not have looked on with indifference even if he had confined himself solely to an attempt of wresting Cranganore from the Rajah by force of arms.

The violent and ambitious spirit of that Prince seems, however, to have much more important objects in view, and his total disregard of the faith of treaties, and his designs upon the country of Travancore, having appeared in the most unequivocal shape by his daring attack on the Rajah's lines on the 29th of December last, we consider ourselves bound in honour not to abandon an ally in such imminent danger, and have accordingly determined to give him our decided support, as well as to resent the outrage that has been committed upon him in the same manner as if it had been offered to ourselves.

It gave us particular satisfaction to learn that you also take a warm concern about the Rajah, and upon a supposition that you may be inclined to assist him upon this occasion, we shall direct the Government of Madras to inform you of the nature of the operations which will be undertaken for the protection of Travancore by the troops of that Presidency, and to take the liberty of pointing out to you from time to time the mode in which, according to the best of their judgment, the aid which it may be in your power to grant from Cochin or Ceylon, may be applied most efficaciously for promoting the success of the common cause.

We have been informed of some late instances of Tippoo's insulting behaviour to the Governor of Cochin, and of the designs which he seems to entertain against that fort and settlement; and should he proceed so far as to attack that fortress in resentment for the proofs which you may give of your friendship for us, or for our ally the Rajah, we will engage to exert our utmost endeavours to force him to desist from the enterprise, and also to obtain for you, at a negotiation for peace, a full reparation for any injuries that you may have sustained.

As Tippoo has become the aggressor by the most wanton violation of the late

treaty of peace, he has forfeited all claim upon the French for assistance, and we trust that it will be as little the inclination, as it would be irreconcileable to every principle of justice and good faith in that nation, to interfere in the present contest. Sensible, however, of its being our public duty to take every precaution in our power to render any attempt abortive that, contrary to our expectations, may be made from that quarter, we shall request of Commodore Cornwallis, the Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty's ships in these seas, to keep a watchful eye upon all the motions of the French. We shall likewise esteem it as a particular mark of your friendship if you will be equally vigilant on your part, to endeavour to discover and to counteract any designs of that nature that may be in agitation, and should you acquire any information upon that subject which it may appear to you of consequence for us to know, we shall esteem it as a peculiar obligation if you will convey it to us or the Commodore, or to any of our other settlements, which it may particularly concern, with all possible despatch.

We have, &c.

No. XXXV.

Earl Cornwallis to the Court of Directors.

[Extract.]

Honourable Sirs, Calcutta, April 10, 1790.

. . . I must freely confess that many circumstances which were either communicated to me, or that came under my own observation, concurred to persuade me that the general principles on which your affairs have been conducted during the greatest part of the last twelve months at the Presidency of Fort St. George, have been highly criminal or objectionable.

Circumscribed however as the grounds are on which the controlling power of this Government is warranted by law, to interfere with efficacy in the management of the internal affairs of the other Presidencies, and possessing no authority of our own to invest any of your servants at Fort St. George with the direction of your affairs on the coast, in case it should have been resolved to suspend the late President and Council, even if a sufficient personal knowledge of such servants could have enabled us to select those on whose integrity we could have depended, I thought that it would be most prudent to defer, if possible, taking any decisive steps for investigating and reprehending the measures which appeared to us in a very disadvantageous point of view, until you should determine to send a successor to Sir Archibald Campbell in that Government.

It was not without the greatest concern and dissatisfaction that I saw the enormous balances which had been suffered to accumulate in the accounts with the Nabob of Arcot and the Rajah of Tanjore, and especially when I heard the forbearance of the Madras Government ascribed by the public voice to the most unworthy motives, and it affected me still more sensibly when I saw the little exertion that was made on their part to discharge the annual peshcush due to the Nizam, not one rupee of which was liquidated at the time of General Medows's arrival, although they know that the public faith was pledged for its being punctually paid, and that all bills that they might draw to assist their own funds in fulfilling so sacred an engagement, would have been readily honoured by this Government.

These points might have been subjects of investigation after the arrival of a new Governor; but the imminent danger to which your affairs in the Carnatic appeared to be exposed by the misconduct of your own servants, and by the daring spirit of hostility which was manifested by the most formidable enemy which the

British army has in India, induced me, as you have already been informed, to lay aside all other considerations, and by charging myself with the responsibility of an irregular measure, to take a temporary direction of the Civil as well as of the Military affairs at the Presidency of Fort St. George in person.

The arrival of the Vestal frigate at Anjingo, with the account of your having appointed General Medows to that Government, rendered it as unnecessary as it would have then been improper for me to execute that resolution; but I have now conceived it to be my peculiar duty to take care that some parts of the conduct of the late President and Members of that Board, which have appeared to be particularly culpable, shall be exposed to your notice, and punished as far as it is in the power of this Government. . . .

It may also be unnecessary to remark to you, that to show signs of timidity and indecision, or to submit tamely to injuries or insults from an avowed and insolent enemy, instead of averting, would tend to invite and bring on a war in any part of the world. But in this country in particular, I may safely venture to pronounce, that, if ever the native Princes can see grounds to despise the force of our arms, and to lose confidence in our honour and fidelity as allies, the existence of our power and influence amongst them will not afterwards be of long duration. It has, therefore, been with no small degree of mortification that I have seen your reputation tarnished and your interests endangered by a train of conduct in the late Government of Fort St. George, which has been no less calculated to dishearten an old and faithful friend, than to encourage a powerful and implacable enemy.

The late President, Mr. John Hollond, having thought proper to leave India without giving any notice of his intention to this Government, Mr. Edward John Hollond entered two Minutes in answer to our letters (dated February the 8th and February 11th), in which we required of the Board to give explanations of several parts of their conduct, and their reasons for disobeying the explicit orders of this Government, which directed that Tippoo should be considered as at war with the Company if he should attack any part of the dominions of the Nabob of Arcot or the Rajah of Travancore, which were in their possession at the period of the late treaty of peace, and consequently guaranteed to them by the Company, and in that event that no time should be lost in making the necessary preparations for carrying on the war with efficacy and vigour.

The culpability of part of the neglect that we imputed to that Government, rested no doubt principally with the late President; but as Mr. Edward Hollond entered no dissent upon record to the measure, he, as a member of the Board, participates in the blame of having disobeyed our positive orders to consider Tippoo as at war with the Company, in the event of his committing hostilities as above stated, and I must acknowledge that the credit which he takes for economy by delaying the preparations for enabling the army to take the field, has only excited my warmest indignation. The Company may not only pay dear for that temporary piece of economy, by its occasioning a prolongation of the war, but the delay has already furnished great advantage to an inveterate enemy, by giving him time to employ his whole force in endeavouring to enrich himself at the expense, and by the ruin, of one of our faithful allies. Should he unfortunately succeed in those endeavours, he will be enabled to prosecute his designs against ourselves with great increase of strength, whilst, in addition to the pernicious effects which may probably follow from the tardiness of our operations, we have been exposed in the eyes of all the powers in India, to the imputation of want of honour and fidelity in adhering to our engagements with an ally, when in the most urgent danger and distress.

No regard could have been paid by the Madras Government to Tippoo's assertion in his letter, dated the 1st of January, that the Rajah's lines had been

attacked on the 29th of December by accident and without his sanction, as they were then possessed of letters from the Resident at Travancore, and of accounts through other channels, which concurred in stating explicitly that Tippoo had conducted the attack in person, and that there was good reason to believe that he had been actually wounded in the action, and it was the more unjustifiable in the members of that Board to pretend to construe that disavowal as a symptom of a conciliatory disposition in Tippoo, as his determined spirit of hostility is manifested in the same letter which contains the disavowal, by a repetition of the unjust and inadmissible demands that the Rajah should restore Cranganore and Jacottah to the Dutch, and demolish part of the lines on his Northern frontiers, or in other words, that he should tamely lay his dominions open to be overrun by one of the most savage barbarians that has ever appeared in India. I must likewise observe that no existing circumstance at the time, nor any part of Tippoo's subsequent conduct, could warrant a doubt of his having had any other object in view by the effrontery of such a disavowal, but that of gaining time by lulling the Government into a fatal supineness, until he should, without being interrupted, have it in his power to complete the destruction of one of our allies, whom, by the ties of our own private interest as well as those of public faith, we were bound to protect and defend.

Viewing such conduct of your late Government of Fort St. George in a very criminal light, I thought it my duty to propose that Mr. Edward John Hollond, who has a share of responsibility for all the above measures, should be suspended from his seat and emoluments as a member of that Council, and that the Governor should be directed to call in another member to supply his place; and, however painful it may be for me to employ rigorous measures against your servants in this country, I have considered it as no less my indispensable duty to propose that Mr. James Taylor, who, from the time of his being called into Council by the Messrs. Hollond, appears to have acquiesced in the disobedience of that part of the orders of this Government which required that Tippoo should be considered as at war with the Company in the event of his attacking any part of the possessions of the Rajah of Travancore, should also be suspended. . . .

Upon this occasion, when there is so much reason to apprehend that in several instances the public interest has been sacrificed to private views and motives, I think it my duty to offer it to your serious consideration, whether it should not be laid down as an invariable rule by your Honourable Court, that no private creditor of the Nabob of Arcot or the Rajah of Tanjore should ever be appointed to, or suffered to hold a share in, the Government of Fort St. George, because, exclusive of other temptations that offer to bias them against a due discharge of their duty to the public, the private interest of those creditors is frequently in direct opposition to a proper regard to national honour, and to the true interests of the Company. . . .

Everything that I have heard in this country has impressed me with the strongest conviction that the whole, or by far the greater part, of the claims on the Nabob and the Rajah were created by modes which have been highly injurious to the Company, and that have most essentially added to the present embarrassed state of his Highness's affairs, and I am afraid that I may too truly add, that it is notorious that some of those pecuniary transactions at his Highness's durbar, have contributed to disgrace the British name both in India and in Europe.

In the mean time I have, from a sense of duty and in pursuance of those sentiments, proposed that the Supreme Board should recommend to General Medows to hesitate and consider whether he should call any of your servants into Council to fill the places of Messrs. Hollond and Taylor, who will not declare upon their honour that they are not directly or indirectly creditors of the Nabob or the

Rajah, and that they will not become creditors to either of them, during the time of their continuance in Government, unless from a succession by will or some other unavoidable cause. . . .

The reform of the present wretched and corrupt system of the administration of criminal justice, has occupied much of my time since I mentioned the subject to you in my letter of the 2nd of August, 1789; but I have of late been so much interrupted by the pressure of the political business, that I have not yet been able to reduce my proposed regulations sufficiently into form to enable me to submit them to the Board, but I hope by the August despatch to have it in my power to inform you that we have adopted a plan that will remedy those evils, which have been so ruinous to the honest and industrious inhabitants of this country, and so disgraceful to our Government. . . .

I have, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

No. XXXVI.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE SECRET COMMITTEE.

[Extract.] Secret.

GENTLEMEN, Fort William, April 12, 1790.

. . . I am persuaded that you will observe with satisfaction that by the means of the powerful preparations which we have made on our own part, and by the apparent hearty disposition of the Nizam and the Marattas to co-operate with us in this war, there is very reasonable ground to expect that we shall be able to exact ample reparation from Tippoo for his insolent and flagrant violation of the late treaty of peace.

Every personal consideration rendered it peculiarly desirable for me to take all means that were honourable to prevent an interruption of the public tranquillity, because many of the effects of my earnest endeavours since my arrival in India to restore order to the Company's finances, must be counteracted by the unavoidable expenses of a war, and it may likewise be the cause of detaining me another year in this country, which I shall feel as a severe disappointment. But at a crisis when Tippoo's enmity and ambition prompted him to commit a decided act of hostility against one of our allies, I should have deservedly incurred the contempt and censure of my country, if a pusillanimous anxiety for the continuance of peace had induced me to endeavour to delay an open rupture with him by abandoning the dominions of that ally to ruin and devastation, or if I had even hesitated in resenting so daring an insult, according to the clear dictates of sound policy, honour, and justice.

The cordial reception which the Nizam and the Marattas gave to the propositions that I have made to them to avail themselves of this opportunity to revenge the many injuries that they have suffered at different times from Tippoo or his father, by joining with us in the war, have been highly gratifying to me, and you will see from my correspondence with Mr. Malet and Captain Kennaway, that we have good grounds to expect that we shall obtain an early and vigorous co-operation from both these powers upon very advantageous terms.

You will be informed by the despatches to the Court of Directors that I have been extremely dissatisfied with the conduct of the late Government of Fort St. George, and I am still under great apprehension that many fatal consequences may follow from their criminal disobedience of our orders, which directed them to consider Tippoo as at war with the Company, if he should attack any part of the

ancient possessions of the Rajah of Travancore, and to make preparations accordingly for carrying it on with vigour. . . .

I trust that it is not yet entirely impossible that Tippoo may be deterred from prosecuting his designs against Travancore, by the accounts which he must constantly receive of our military preparations, or at least if he should penetrate into Travancore, that he will be obliged to evacuate that country, and to employ his troops in the defence of his own dominions, when General Medows, according to his present plan, shall be enabled to commence offensive operations against the country of Coimbatoor.

There are hardly any circumstances that could be supposed under which an expensive and a dangerous war would not be to a certain degree a distressing event to the Company's affairs. But as we know that Tippoo's enmity to the British name and interests is avowed and implacable, that he put himself to the expense of sending an embassy to our formidable European rival to propose an offensive alliance against us, that exclusive of repeated pressing general applications to the Nizam and the Marattas to join in a league with him to subvert our power, that there is at this moment an embassy from him at Hydradad for the express purpose of soliciting his Highness to join with him in attacking our dominions, or those of our allies, and consequently that we must have looked upon a war with him as constantly impending over us, and if it could have been avoided at present, absolutely certain at some future and perhaps early period, I do not think it unreasonable to expect that it may ultimately prove fortunate both for the Company and the Natives, that by a most flagrant breach of a solemn treaty we have been forced, by adhering to the principles of honour, justice, and good faith to our allies, to come to a rupture with him at a juncture which offers to us so many considerable and evident advantages.

Should the war prove successful, we shall have a variety of interests and political arrangements to adjust with our confederates; and should the Nizam and the Marattas continue to act with the same fairness and openness that they have hitherto manifested in the preliminary negotiations, they will have the strongest claims to a liberal share of the advantages that can be secured for the Confederacy by a treaty of peace.

I have, &c.,

Cornwallis.

No. XXXVII.

The Governor-General in Council to the Court of Directors.

Honourable Sirs, Fort William, April 12, 1790.

. . . Your Honourable Court will observe in our proceedings of the 24th of February, that the independence of Jacottah and Cranganore upon the Rajah of Cochin, the tributary of Tippoo, when the places were made over by the Dutch to the Rajah of Travancore, is asserted positively, and in the strongest terms, by the Governor and Council of the Dutch settlement at Cochin, who deny altogether the sovereignty that Tippoo claims.

We think it proper to mention in this place that some days after the attack made by Tippoo on the lines of Travancore on the 29th of December, letters were written to the Government of Madras by the Governor and Council at Columbo, and communicated to us, in which a supposition was expressed that if Tippoo should succeed in his endeavours to subdue Cranganore (but against this place no attempt that we are advised of has yet been made), he would proceed to attack Cochin.

They there take notice that, "although this does not come within the letter of the 6th Article of the Treaty between England and the Republic, it is nevertheless very clear that it would be contrary to the spirit and real intention of that treaty, if the two nations in India, in a case like the present, were not to have in view the welfare of each other, and reciprocally promote it as much as possible."

Upon this ground the Dutch were persuaded that (during the uncertainty they were in how far Tippoo's designs might extend) the necessary measures had been taken by the Government of Fort St. George most conformable to the spirit and intention of the States-General.

The subject of these despatches from Columbo being of considerable importance, we thought it proper to communicate our sentiments upon it to the Governor and Council of that settlement, and to the Government of Madras.

The terms of the letter from the former expressing a zealous concern for the interests of the Rajah of Travancore, and inducing us to think that they were inclined to assist him in the war, the Government of Madras were instructed to inform them of the nature of the operations intended for the protection of Travancore by the Company's troops, and to point out to them from time to time the mode in which the aid that it might be in the power of the Dutch to grant from Cochin or Ceylon, might be applied most efficaciously for promoting the success of the common cause; and we acquainted the Dutch, in answer to their application relative to Cochin, that if Tippoo should proceed so far as to attack that fortress, in resentment for the proofs they may give of their friendship for us or for our ally the Rajah of Travancore, we would engage to exert our utmost endeavours to force him to desist from the enterprise, and to obtain for them at a negotiation for peace, a full reparation for any injuries they may have sustained. . . .

The intention of Mr. Powney (signified in our advices by the Berrington) to send a flag of truce to Tippoo was followed on the 15th January, and a letter was written to him desiring him in the name of the Company, to desist from proceeding in further acts of hostility against the possessions of the Rajah of Travancore. It was at the time mentioned to him that, if he were desirous of settling the points in contest by the investigation of commissioners, the Government of Madras would appoint one or more to meet such persons as might be appointed by Tippoo, at any convenient place on the borders of the respective countries belonging to him and the Company; Tippoo, in his answer, recited the three subjects of demand on the Rajah, and acquainted Mr. Powney that he had written to the Governor of Madras concerning them. What he observed respecting the appointment of commissioners was similar to the reply which he sent to Madras upon this subject, and will be noticed in the course of our narrative.

In our advices by the Berrington we mentioned that two letters had been received by the Governor of Fort St. George from Tippoo, dated the 24th of December and 1st of January. We related their contents, but were not able to inform you of the answer that had been sent to them. Your Honourable Court will recollect that his letter of the 1st of January was written after his attack on the Travancore lines, and that his account of the circumstances attending it was not entitled to the smallest credit, while on the other hand it was a matter of important consideration, that he had committed an act of hostility for which a suitable reparation was absolutely and indispensably necessary, but none was offered. Yet the Governor of Madras, Mr. Hollond, without paying the least regard to ours dated August 29th and 13th of November, was entirely silent in his answers to Tippoo's letters concerning the attack upon the lines of Travancore, and with the same composure that might have suited a different state of affairs, he repeated his offer to have the causes of complaint investigated by commissioners

to be appointed for that purpose; and upon the same principle of forbearance, but, at the hazard of materially affecting the negotiations at Poona and Hydrabad, he notified what he deemed a disavowal of hostilities by Tippoo to Captain Kennaway, who naturally communicated the information to Mr. Malet at Poona, which could only tend to impede the success of the measures we had taken to obtain the alliance of the Nizam and the Mahrattas.

Under these and other circumstances, we could not but be happy to hear of the arrival of General Medows at Madras with your commission appointing him to take charge of the Government. In a short time after this happened, letters came from Tippoo (in answer to those of Mr. Hollond dated the 2nd and 9th January), in which, upon the subject of appointing commissioners, he observed, that if this were yet wished, one or two trusty persons should be sent to the *Presence*, that, having arrived in the Presence, they might settle the business.

To enable you to form a judgment of the extent of the Travancore lines, and to preclude any sanguine expectation of their being defended by people so inexperienced and undisciplined as those in the Rajah's service, we shall quote in this place an extract of a letter dated in January from Mr. Powney:—

"These lines form the northern barrier to the Travancore possessions. They run west to east. They commence at the sea on the island of Vipeen, and continue to the Chinnamungulum River, which intersects them. They begin again on the opposite bank, and extend as far as the Animally Hills, where they terminate on one of them, so that the eastern boundary is covered by a range of mountains under that denomination. From the sea to the Chinnamungulum River is an extent of about 4 or 5 miles, and from the opposite bank to the hills, the lines continue without any interruption about 24 or 25 miles. They consist of a ditch about 16 feet broad and 20 deep, a slight parapet and thick rampart, and bastions flanking each other from one end to the other. The approach to them is only from the north."

We have much pleasure in bearing testimony to the readiness with which his Highness has engaged to enter into the war as an ally of the Company against Tippoo. The terms of the alliance are under negotiation, and we hope will soon be concluded. But Nizam Ally Khan has not waited for the formal settlement of conditions. He moved to his tents the 18th of March, and proposes, we have reason to think, to march his army to the attack of Tippoo's northern frontier, as soon as he receives accounts of the Company's troops having commenced their operations.

We have directed Captain Kennaway to urge every argument with the Nizam and his minister that will persuade them to commence theirs without loss of time; and in order to encourage his Highness to take such an immediate and decided part as would favour the operations of the southern army, or tend to prevent Tippoo's banditti from ravaging the centre and northern parts of the Carnatic, we have instructed Captain Kennaway to inform the Nizam that the detachment of artillery which we have mentioned, with Lascars and a suitable train of field-pieces, proceeding from hence by sea to Masulipatam, will be in readiness to act in conjunction with other troops as circumstances may require, and that the brigade under Colonel Cockerell, which is now advancing fast on its march to the southward, will, if it be thought expedient for promoting the success of the common cause, be directed to co-operate with his Highness's army, either to strengthen it against any forces that Tippoo may detach to the northward, or enable it to continue its operations with increased efficacy against Tippoo's dominions.

We are the more solicitous that his Highness should lose no time in penetrating into Tippoo's territories, as we should hope that, by the Nizam's troops making some progress to the westward of the Ghauts, Tippoo's irregular cavalry might be

deterred from venturing through the passes to carry their ravages and depredations into the Carnatic.

Our orders of the 28th of January were received at Bombay on the 24th of February, and we have been promised by the Governor in Council that all possible attention shall be paid to the several points recommended by us to his notice. Colonel Abercromby was waiting to be informed of the plan of operations which General Medows may have projected on the coast of Corromandel, and he intended to employ the interval in making the necessary levies to strengthen your battalions, and in forming a system to abridge that extraordinary expense with which the armaments equipped from Bombay have been commonly attended.

On a supposition that the Nairs and Tippoo's other subjects and tributaries adjoining to Tellicherry, are desirous of making vigorous efforts to relieve themselves from the cruel oppressions of his Government, and that the Government of Bombay may find it practicable to send a reinforcement to that settlement, of sufficient strength to enable the commanding officer of the troops to give effectual support and assistance to the exertions of the inhabitants of the country against such of Tippoo's forces as may be stationed in that part of his dominions, we have authorized the Governor in Council to encourage these people to shake off all dependence upon him, and to engage on the part of the Company, on condition that they will act heartily, and submit to be directed by us in carrying on the present war against him, that our utmost endeavours shall be used to render them in future entirely independent of him, and at the conclusion of the war to retain them upon reasonable terms under the protection of the Company.

On the 26th of February we wrote to his Excellency to let him know that hostilities had been committed by Tippoo against our ally the Rajah of Travancore, and that although we could not then determine how far any military operations that must be undertaken in consequence would stand in need of his Majesty's squadron, we were well assured that, if the Government of Fort St. George or Bombay should make application to his Excellency for such aid as he may think it in his power to afford, he would be perfectly well disposed to comply with their request.

We observed to his Excellency that we had every reason to believe that the French Government in this country would not be disposed to countenance the unwarrantable conduct of Tippoo, but if, contrary to our expectations, his cruizers should fall in with any vessels of that nation with a considerable number of troops on board, or with a large quantity of military stores on the Malabar coast, the commanders pretending that they were going to the small factory possessed by the French at Mahe, we submitted our opinion to his Excellency that they ought to be informed, that, if they please, they may proceed to Pondicherry, but that they cannot be permitted to land their troops or stores either at Mahe or at any port on the coast of Malabar, as we are convinced that in that case they must be intended for the use of our enemy Tippoo Sultaun. We are, &c.

No. XXXVIII.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN COUNCIL TO CAPTAIN KENNAWAY.

SIR, Fort William, May 31, 1790.

. . . I am fully aware of the importance of giving the Nizam every encouragement in our power, especially since we have reason to doubt the sincerity of the Mahrattas, and I approve therefore of the articles of agreement which you

have signed relative to the Bengal detachment, understanding it of course to be considered by the Nizam to be no further binding than may be compatible with previous military arrangements, which from circumstances cannot now be altered.

I enclose copies of the letters that I have written to Colonel Brathwaite and to Lieutenant-Colonel Cockerell, from which you will be enabled to explain in a satisfactory manner to his Highness the principles on which my orders are necessarily given, and I am persuaded you will be able without difficulty to make him sensible of the dangerous consequences that might attend my sending positive and unconditional orders to the troops, which are placed under the immediate command of General Medows, without giving that General time to prepare against the ill effects which such orders might produce to his general plan of operations.

By the time this letter reaches you, his Highness will either have passed the Khristna, or he will have determined not to pass it till after the rains. If he should have passed it, and the Mahrattas still hang back, and there should really be reason to apprehend that Tippoo could send a formidable force against him, he must, at all hazards, be supported without loss of time, and without regarding the distress which the troops will suffer by making a long march at that season. But if he should not have crossed the Khristna he can have nothing to fear from Tippoo before the breaking up of the rains, and I really think that in that case it would be for the safety and advantage of the common cause, that Cockerell should be employed for the defence of the Carnatic till that period, when he might, without much risk, leave a country in which the rains would soon be expected to commence, and when, unless a powerful co-operation on the part of the Mahrattas should render it unnecessary, the Nizam may depend upon being joined by so considerable a body of our infantry as to enable him to advance with confidence against the enemy. . . .

I cannot help thinking, notwithstanding the present doubtful appearances, that the Mahrattas will ultimately perform their engagements and take part with us, but, if I am too sanguine in this opinion, I can never believe that they would adopt a contrary line, and assist their inveterate enemy, Tippoo, whom they have so much cause to hate and dread. It is, however, possible that the apprehensions of the Nizam and his ministers of their hostile intentions, may again revive on the present occasion, and although I should wish you to avoid a discussion of this delicate subject if it was practicable, yet, if you find them seriously alarmed, you may repeat in the most explicit terms, that so long as his Highness acts heartily with us and fulfils his engagements, we shall think ourselves bound to defend him against attacks from any quarter whatever. . . . I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

No. XXXIX.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN COUNCIL TO THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL, FORT ST. GEORGE.

HONOURABLE SIR, Fort William, June 21, 1790.

We have received your letters, dated the 7th and 9th instant, with their different enclosures, and we must acknowledge that the contents of them have given us the most serious concern.

It has ever been as much our earnest inclination and disposition, as we know it to be the wish and desire of the British nation and of the Honourable Court of

Directors, that the Nabob Mahomed Ali should in all public and private transactions be treated with every degree of liberality and delicacy which could be expected by an old friend and ally of the Company, who has with them experienced great vicissitudes of fortune during the long period of their mutual connection, and from these considerations we should perhaps on any common occasion conceive that we should not commit a very unwarrantable breach of our public duty, by exposing the Company's interests to the risk of suffering some moderate pecuniary loss, rather than give a sanction to any measure which we had reason to believe would violently shock the private feelings of a respectable old Prince, who has probably now but a few years to live.

Forced, however, as we have been, into an expensive and dangerous war, with the most inveterate, as well as the most powerful enemy that the British nation and the Nabob have ever had to contend with in India, and in the event of which the future safety of his Highness's own dominions is as deeply staked as the essential interests of the Honourable Company, we plainly perceive that we could not gratify the Nabob's private sensations by forbearing to take efficient steps to exact the performance of his engagements to the Company, without being guilty of a flagrant neglect of the attention which is due to the honour and interests of our country, and no less to the security of his Highness's own dominions.

We need not conceal from you that the resources of Bengal, exhausted as they are by drains of various kinds during a long series of successive years, could not, even with the aid of the utmost punctuality in his Highness's payments, either according to the terms of the treaty concluded with Sir Archibald Campbell, or of those of the propositions made to him by the Court of Directors to which he has lately acceded, long support such expenses as those with which the present war must unavoidably be attended, without being reduced to great extremity of distress. But we must freely declare that unless the whole or a great part of the heavy arrears which are at present due by the Nabob of Arcot and the Rajah of Tanjore can be recovered, and a punctual discharge of the stipulated proportions of their revenues can be secured in future for the general good, we not only foresee great embarrassment to the Company's finances, but also much ground for apprehension that the ultimate success of the war may be greatly endangered.

Under these impressions, and being at the same time perfectly persuaded that in giving your opinions you are actuated solely by a regard to the substantial interests both of his Highness and the Company, as well as convinced that your judgment cannot be erroneous on the impossibility of obtaining in future the stipulated proportion of the Nabob's revenue through the medium of his Highness's own managers, which must also preclude all hopes of your being able to recover by these means the immense amount of his present balance, we think it our indispensable duty to authorise and direct you to take effectual measures, in as delicate a manner as may be possible, to put the Company into immediate possession of his Highness's revenues and country, in order that the total amount of the collections may be applied with fidelity and economy, in the proportions that have been already settled to defray the exigencies of the war for the general benefit of the parties, and to support his Highness's own family and dignity.

We sincerely lament that your endeavours to prevail upon the Nabob by argument and persuasion, to sacrifice his ideas and private feelings respecting his own personal dignity and importance to the real and substantial good of his subjects, and for that purpose to make a voluntary surrender to the Company of the management of his country during the present war, have proved so fruitless and ineffectual, because it has been with the utmost reluctance that we could bring

ourselves to instruct you to take any step which would give his Highness the least uneasiness or mortification. . . .

No pains must be spared to give his Highness the most minute and full explanation of all the particulars of which the account consists, and of the general principles on which it is formed, in order that he may, if possible, be convinced that the Company's Governments are incapable of making demands upon him that cannot be supported by the clearest and most obvious tenor and meaning of specific agreements. It must likewise be shown and proved to his Highness in the most satisfactory manner, that his receipt of his proportion of the revenue will be completely secured by the officers that may be appointed by him, having the most free and uninterrupted access, not only to observe the general conduct of the Company's servants that may be employed in those collections, but to inspect and examine all accounts whatever of receipts and disbursements that may relate to them during the time that his country shall remain under the management of your Government.

We cannot entirely abandon the hopes that upon a more mature reflection on Tippoo's insatiable ambition, and his personal inveteracy to him and his family, on the many insults and injuries that he has already suffered from that prince, or from his father, and on the danger to which the Carnatic has long been, and is at present, exposed from that powerful chief, his Highness may at last be inclined to lend a more favourable ear to your arguments and persuasions, and it would be so highly gratifying to us, if the indispensable point of putting the collections into the hands of your officers could be carried, without your being obliged to proceed to any act which should bear the least appearance of violence, that if his Highness should, instead of receiving one-fifth part of the nett realised revenue, prefer your acquiescence to his retaining in his own hands a part of the country estimated at one-fifth of the amount of the gross revenues of the Carnatic, and would on that condition make a voluntary surrender of the remaining four-fifths to the management of the Company during the continuance of the war, and until his present arrears shall be discharged,—although we believe that it would not be so advantageous as the other mode for the interests either of the Nabob or the Company, yet, if it would tend to render the effect of our instructions less painful to him, we shall be happy to give the measure our entire approbation.

His Highness cannot lament more than we do, that a necessity has arisen for our adopting the determination that we have directed you to execute; but you will have it in your power to prove to him by a variety of unanswerable arguments, that consistent with an honourable discharge of our public duty it was entirely unavoidable. . . . We are, &c.

No. XL.

Earl Cornwallis to the Court of Directors.

Honourable Sirs, Fort William, Aug. 10, 1790.

. . . Copies of the treaties that have been concluded with the Nizam and the Peshwa will be transmitted to you in the despatch from the Board, and as we should have thought it our duty to have subscribed to much less favourable conditions, if they had been insisted on, for the support and assistance of those powers on the present occasion, you will be glad to observe from the tenor of the treaties, that whilst the detachment of Company's troops that have joined the armies of the Nizam and the Peshwa, are to be paid at the expense of those

powers, the advantages that may be obtained over the common enemy are to be equally divided amongst the three confederates, except the article of peshcush, which is reserved exclusively to the Peshwa and the Nizam, from certain displaced Zemindars and Polygars who are to be restored to their possessions.

This exclusive article of partition is understood, however, to be limited in its amount to twelve lacks, a small proportion of which can only be claimed by the Nizam, and the remainder has been considered in the stipulations as a reasonable equivalent to the Peshwa, for the eventual loss that he may sustain, by the general success of the confederacy, of the annual tribute which was due to him from Tippoo by former engagements. . . .

It could at present answer no useful purpose to enumerate how much we have suffered both in interest and reputation, by the supineness of the Government of Fort St. George after Tippoo's first attack of the Travancore lines on the 29th of December last; but it has been peculiarly gratifying to me that the Rajah of Travancore and his subjects, have been in a great measure saved from the ravages and ruin to which the criminal conduct of the Madras Government appeared for some time to have devoted them, by a combination of circumstances that have operated with more success than could reasonably have been expected in their favour; amongst those are to be reckoned the well-judged exertions of the Bombay Government, our own military preparations at Trichinopoly, but above all a want of vigour and activity for several months on the part of Tippoo in carrying on his approaches afterwards against the lines, which by no means corresponds with his former character, and I think is not sufficiently accounted for by any of the causes to which I have hitherto heard it ascribed.

Much time was necessarily required to make the numerous arrangements that are indispensible for enabling a considerable army to undertake active field-operations in this country; and after General Medows took the command of the army at Trichinopoly and put it in motion towards the enemy's country, several defects were discovered in some of those arrangements that were supposed to have been completed, which occasioned a little delay.

I have likewise had the greatest reason to be satisfied with the liberal and explicit declaration which was made by the Comte de Conway, the Governor-General of the French possessions in India, that France had no treaty with Tippoo, and that according to the instructions which he has uniformly received from his own Court, he is determined to observe the strictest neutrality in the present war. . . .

There is no circumstance that I am acquainted with either in the public or private character of the Rajah of Tanjore, which in my opinion gives him the least claim to forbearance from the Company in exacting the performance of his public engagements, and I therefore felt no reluctance at proposing the resolution to the Board that related to him; but I cannot help viewing the old Nabob of Arcot in a very different light, and it was therefore, I must acknowledge, with great concern that I gave my sanction to a measure which I knew would occasion pain and mortification to a Prince so far advanced in years, and whose interests have long been so closely connected with those of the British nation, but I was impelled to the determination by the strongest considerations of humanity, justice, and public necessity.

The flagrant failure on his part in the performance of the stipulations of the treaty with the Company, ought long ago to have awakened the Government of Fort St. George to a sense of their public duty, and would, in strictness, at any time have merited the serious interference of this Government; but at a dangerous juncture when the resources of Bengal are totally inadequate alone to support the

expense of the war into which we have been forced by one of the most inveterate enemies of his Highness's family and of the British name, I could not give way to my private feelings, and for a moment hesitate in discharging what clearly appeared to me to be the duty of my station, by taking the only measures that could be effectual for securing the proportional assistance to which we are entitled from the funds of the Carnatic.

I must likewise observe that by executing this resolution, I have every reason to believe that, whilst we provide for the general safety, we at the same time greatly promote the interests of humanity; for, by the concurrent accounts that I have received from many quarters, I am perfectly convinced that from the Nabob's being unacquainted with the details of business, and either from an indifference to the distresses of his subjects, or from a total incapacity to superintend and control the conduct of his renters and managers, the most insatiable extortions and cruel oppressions, are nowhere in India more openly and generally committed with impunity upon the mass of the miserable inhabitants, than by his Highness's officers in the internal management of his country; and it will therefore not only be felt as a relief by the body of the people to be put under the authority of the Company's servants, but we shall probably be able by mild and just treatment to conciliate on this critical occasion the attachment of the Southern Polygars, who, from being harassed by the unreasonable exactions of the Nabob's renters, have almost always been ripe for disturbance and revolt. . . .

The Nabob's age, his long connexion with us, his rights to the possession of the country, which however without our assistance would have been but of little value to him, and exaggerated accounts of his former services, may furnish topics for popular declamation, and may possibly engage the nation upon mistaken ideas of humanity, to support a system of cruelty and oppression. But whilst I feel conscious that I am endeavouring to promote the happiness of mankind and the good of my country, I shall give very little weight to such considerations, and should conceive that I had not performed the duty of the high and responsible office in which you did me the honour to place me, if I did not declare that the present mixed Government cannot prosper even in the best hands in which your part of it can be placed, and that unless some such plan as that which I have proposed should be adopted, the inhabitants of the Carnatic must continue to be wretched, the Nabob must remain an indigent bankrupt, and his country an useless and expensive burthen to the Company and to the nation. . . .

I am, &c.,

Cornwallis.

No. XLI.

The Governor-General in Council to the Court of Directors.

Honourable Sirs, Fort William, Aug. 16, 1790.

. . . Our former despatches will have acquainted you that we had taken into the hands of Government the collection of the internal duties usually denominated the Sayer, both in the rent-free lands, and those paying revenue to Government, and that the persons by whom those duties have been hitherto levied, were to be allowed a compensation adequate to the net amount of their authorized collections. On the 28th of April having received a letter from the Board of Revenue, expressing their opinion that the Sayer generally, exclusive of the rents of fisheries only, and inclusive of all duties of whatever nature, or taxes personal or profes-

sional, should be taken from the landholders of every description, to whom they conceived the rents of the lands and lakes alone should be left, which opinion they observed was founded on the consideration of its being particularly incumbent on Government when the proprietary right of zemindars to the soil is admitted, and the land-tax fixed eventually for ever, to assert and secure their sole right to impose, collect, and modify all duties, customs, and taxes of every description,—we finally determined, with the reserve of your approbation, not to restore those collections to the landholders.

In consequence of the information and accounts furnished by the collectors subsequent to the above determination on the 28th of July, we at length resolved to abolish all internal duties and impositions whatever, levied throughout the provinces under the denomination of Sayer, with the exception of the Government and Calcutta customs, the duties levied on pilgrims at Gya and other places of pilgrimage, the abkarry or tax on spirituous liquors, the collections made in the gunges, bazars, and hauts situated within the limits of Calcutta, and such collections as are confirmed to the landholders by our resolutions of the 11th of June last, viz. rents paid for the use of land, or for houses, shops, or other buildings erected thereon, or for orchards, pasture-ground, and fisheries, sometimes included under the denomination of Sayer. . . :

The duties at Gya have been long established, and similar exactions are levied at most of the places of pilgrimage in Hindostan. The collections at Gya are now made chiefly from subjects of the Mahratta States, numbers of whom resort annually to that place for the purposes of devotion. We are aware of the objections to continuing these duties, but political considerations have induced us to defer the abolition of them until a future opportunity.

From the accounts of the Sayer collections in Burdwan, Dinagepore, Beerbhoom, and Jessore, recorded on our proceedings of the 7th of July, you will perceive that the probable loss arising from the abolition of these imposts will be inconsiderable, when compared with the great benefits which the country will derive from the abolition of all the numerous impositions that appear to have been levied upon every article of commerce and necessary of life, and from the various classes of manufacturers and lower orders of people being exempted from the variety of personal and professional taxes hitherto collected from them by the landholders.

We are, &c.

No. XLII.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN COUNCIL TO THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL AT FORT ST. GEORGE.

HONOURABLE SIR, Fort William, Oct. 30, 1790.

. . . We have received your letter dated the 1st instant, and have perused with great attention the extract which you transmitted of your minutes of consultation regarding the charge exhibited by the Nabob against Paupiah, dubash to your late president, Mr. John Hollond, which has been extended to Mr. John Hollond himself as well as to his brother, Mr. Edward John Hollond, late a member of your Board, with the letter addressed to you by Mr. Popham, the Company's solicitor, which you enclosed; and in addition to the further instructions which our duty requires from us on this important subject, we think that it may be satisfactory to you, and proper and expedient in every other respect on account of the violent protests of Paupiah himself against our orders, and the language which

Mr. Edward John Hollond has ventured to make use of in the letter that he addressed to your Board, to take this opportunity to give you an explanation of the grounds on which our orders respecting Paupiah have been issued, and from which we trust it will appear that, far from having acted in regard to him with cruelty, oppression, or injustice, he has been treated with every degree of lenity which was compatible with a regard to an honourable discharge of our public duty, or of yours.

The Nabob of Arcot's representation, dated the 5th of August last, having stated that sums of money to a very great amount, which were destined for the Company's treasury, had been detained by Paupiah, the dubash of Mr. John Hollond, you were impressed with a proper sense of the necessity of securing Paupiah's person until you could receive instructions from us, and we not only confirmed what you had done, but we judged it indispensably incumbent upon us to direct that further steps should be taken to secure both the person and property of Paupiah, pending the investigation of the charges which his Highness has preferred.

Our object in giving these orders must have been no less obvious than they were important: by securing Paupiah's person, our intention was not only to insure his attendance to the committee during the progress of the investigation, but also to prevent him from eluding the purposes of justice by flight, in the event of its appearing by the result of the investigation that there were good grounds to sue him at law for the sums of public money that had been detained by him for his own use, or to prosecute him criminally for the embezzlement of public money, or for a corrupt and fraudulent combination with others to assist them in abusing the power that they possessed in virtue of their offices; and it was no less necessary for the reasons above mentioned that his property should be secured until the result of the investigation could be known, as he might otherwise have had it in his power to have secretly assigned it away, or to have disposed of it in such a manner as to have put it out of the reach of any execution which the law might ultimately award against his effects.

At the same time we conceive that it will be admitted by every unprejudiced person, that the steps that were originally taken by you with regard to Paupiah, or those that we afterwards directed you to adopt in consequence of his Highness's representations, were as lenient as could be justified by the nature of the charges, and this will be the more apparent when it is adverted to, that, if the proceedings against him in consequence of the Nabob's charges, had in the first instance commenced in a court of law, he must have been arrested by a common bailiff, and have given bail for the full amount of the sums which he was charged with having detained from the Company's treasury, or have been committed to the common jail of Madras. He must also have been arrested on the criminal charge, and in like manner committed to jail until he should have given bail for his appearance to take his trial at the general quarter-sessions at your presidency on such indictment as should be laid against him, and which, if he had been the sole offender, it would have been your duty to have preferred without delay.

Insensible, however, as Paupiah seems to be of the liberality and moderation with which he has been treated, we wish you to continue to give him the fairest opportunities to produce whatever he may choose to offer in proof of his innocence, or in extenuation of guilt; and as the Nabob's representations describe him not as the sole offender, but rather as an instrument in the hands of others whose high station rendered the acts with which they have been charged infinitely more criminal in them than in Paupiah, we think it necessary in justice to him,

as well as to the public, that the circumstances of his Highness's very weighty charges should now be fully investigated by the committee acting as a Court of Inquiry, in order that the real offenders, or the extent of their guilt respectively, may be so far discriminated by the researches of the committee as to enable your Government to proceed upon sure grounds, and to take those steps which may promise to be most effectual for recovering to the Nabob, or to the Company, the money that may have been fraudulently and surreptitiously obtained from either of them, and for bringing the offending parties otherwise to condign punishment.

The public charge which the Nabob in his letter addressed to you, dated the 27th ultimo, has brought against Mr. Edward John Hollond, for having been equally implicated with his brother and Paupiah in detaining the money which was destined for the Company's treasury, has attracted our serious attention, and we conceive that it will be incumbent upon you to take as early measures as circumstances may render advisable, to secure both his person and his property in such a manner as to render him amenable to the consequences of any civil or criminal prosecution which it may eventually become necessary to institute against him.

If it has not yet appeared in the proceedings of the Committee that evidence could be brought of Mr. E. J. Hollond having been guilty of appropriating to his own use any sums of money belonging to the Nabob, or to the Company, or of aiding and abetting his brother and Paupiah in any such criminal acts, it could answer no purpose to file a Bill in Equity against him, because he could demur to the discovery, on the ground of its relating to facts which if confessed would subject him to a criminal prosecution and conviction. It is therefore of great moment that the committee should proceed with as much dispatch as possible in the investigation of the charges that have been preferred by the Nabob, and if it shall appear from their proceedings that Mr. E. J. Hollond has been concerned in diverting to his own private use any sum of money which had been intended by his Highness to be paid into the Company's treasury, or obtained any sum from the Nabob as a present under the colour of a loan, or under any other unlawful pretext whatever, we recommend that a Bill in Equity may be filed upon those grounds, according to the real truth of the transactions, against Mr. Edward J. Hollond, in order to oblige him to restore the money that he may have received in the above manner, either to the Nabob or to the Company's treasury, as may be judged most equitable, and at the same time that a criminal prosecution may be instituted against him upon the grounds that may be justified by the result of the investigation. . . .

We apprehend, however, that the Company may carry on those prosecutions against Paupiah and the two Messrs. Hollond, or either of them, without giving credit to the Nabob for the sums which he charges them with having detained from the Company's treasury and appropriated to their own use, until the amount of those sums shall be proved by the evidence furnished by his Highness, and until that amount shall have been recovered by a decree against them. For unless the Nabob can show by such proof as will satisfy a court of justice, that the money which he charges them with having devoted to their own use was actually paid to them for the use of the Company, and thereby enable the Company to recover it from them, he cannot in our opinion, have any just claim to receive credit for it.

We have, &c.

No. XLIII.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO CAPTAIN ALEXANDER KYD.

SIR, Fort William, Nov. 9, 1790.

The Juno Pilot Vessel having been prepared for sea with instructions to proceed to Madras, you are directed to embark on board her, and to wait at that place my arrival.

The chief objects on which you are deputed there, are to learn, as correctly as you can by every inquiry which is likely to be the source of good information, what is the nature and face of the country which is between the passes leading to the Mysore country, and the centre and southern armies; to obtain the most accurate information possible of the number and precise situation of the passes into Tippoo's country; which of them are calculated for the passage of artillery, and which of them are so situated as to render them naturally strong and defensible.

You are likewise to endeavour to make yourself fully acquainted, for my information when I arrive at Madras, with the state of the country and roads, as well as with the distance and means of communication between what may then be the respective situations of the centre and southern armies, so as to enable me to determine how far it may be eligible or practicable to strengthen either of them by reinforcements of cavalry, artillery, or infantry to be drawn from the other.

You will receive herewith a letter addressed to the Madras Government from the Governor-General in Council, and another from me to the Chief Engineer at Fort St. George, explaining the objects of your deputation, and desiring them to assist your inquiries, as well as to give you access to such plans and descriptions of the country in the possession of Government, or of the Chief Engineer, as may lead to any useful information. Letters will also be written by me to General Medows, and to the Commanding Officer of the centre army, requesting of them to direct the Quarter-Master General, his deputies, as well as the captains of the Guides, who may be serving with their respective armies, to send the best information they possess upon the above points to you at Madras; and I shall also instruct Captain Read, who is stationed at Amboor, and employed by Government to obtain information, to collect the best accounts he can of all the passes into the Mysore country, and to communicate the result to you.

I am disposed to hope that much useful information may be obtained from these sources, either to confirm or to invalidate what you may be able to acquire otherwise, and I am perfectly satisfied that your best exertions will not be wanting to obtain such useful knowledge of the countries which may either lead to or eventually become the seat of war, as may contribute very much to secure success to our operations in the future prosecution of it.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

No. XLIV.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO LIEUTENANT G. A. ROBINSON.

SIR, Fort William, Nov. 9, 1790.

The Juno Pilot Vessel having been prepared for sea, with instructions to proceed to Madras, you are directed to embark on board her, and to wait at that place my arrival.

The general outlines of the objects on which you are deputed from hence being pointed out to you, I shall rely upon the efficacy of your zealous endea-

vours (aided by the assistance of the Madras Government, and the ready communications of the heads of departments) to obtain the fullest information respecting them; they will be chiefly as follows:—

To inquire into the state of pecuniary matters, and what funds can be procured to put both the southern and centre armies in motion in the beginning of January, and to obtain the most accurate estimates procurable of the sum that will be required monthly to pay both the above armies as they stand at present constituted;

To obtain the fullest information of the state of ordnance and military stores, camp equipage, &c., at Madras, as well as at all the garrisons to the northward or southward, from whence the wants of either army can be supplied;

To endeavour to learn what quantity of grain is collected in the magazines at Arcot, Arnee, Vellore, or any other places from whence the centre army must draw their provisions, and to what amount such magazines might in a short time be increased;

To inquire as to the probable number of serviceable draught and carriage cattle that might be procured from the country about Ongole, Vellore, &c., from the Guntoor Sircar, and from Masulipatam, and whether it would be most advisable and expeditious to procure them by the present contract or by agency.

Whether it is thought possible by any exertions to put the present centre army, with the addition of two or three battalions from Bengal, into a state of activity without withdrawing some bullocks from the southern army;

To endeavour to learn the condition in general of the cattle, both with the southern and centre armies; and whether by the influence of the collectors it would be possible to press and load for one trip only, a sufficient number of bullocks from the Tanjore and Tritchinopoly countries, to form a magazine of forty days' provisions at the foot of the Ghauts for the southern army, and whether the same could not be done from various parts of the Carnatic or Sircars for the centre army;

Whether considerable supplies of provisions might not be conveyed by boats upon the Cavery to Erode;

To inquire into the regulations respecting the hospitals on the coast, and to inform yourself particularly about the stock of entrenching tools with each army.

You will receive herewith a letter addressed to the Madras Government from the Governor-General in Council, informing them of the objects of your deputation, and desiring them to assist your inquiries, by giving instructions to the heads of the different departments under Government, to afford you the fullest and most complete information, as well upon those points which are herein particularly detailed, as upon any others which may occur to yourself as connected in any respect with the general purposes of forwarding the preparations for my taking the field as soon as may be practicable after my arrival. I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

No. XLV.

MEMORANDA of the Points upon which it is requested of GENERAL MEDOWS to furnish the best information procurable, and to transmit it to LORD CORNWALLIS at Madras as early as possible in December.

Calcutta, Nov. 10, 1790.

The state as to actual strength and situation of the several corps composing the southern army, and mentioning their condition in respect to health and fitness

for service. The number of pieces of ordnance of different kinds that are with the southern army, and how they are disposed of.

The number of draught and carriage cattle, including those employed in the transportation of grain with the southern army, specifying the numbers *fit* and *unfit* for service, and the manner in which they are employed or intended to be employed.

The number of bullocks, including spare, which it is found necessary to allot for the draught of each different description of ordnance, for a tumbril, and for any other kind of carriage which is in use with the army.

What is the average quantity of grain which carriage bullocks are found competent to carry; both these last questions applying only to the cases of reasonable marches.

A distinct statement of the number of guns with a proper complement of ammunition tumbrils, &c., with which the draught bullocks then attached to the southern army could make reasonable marches.

Whether the General expects a battering train from Bombay. If he does—

At what place he proposes it should be landed, and what measures have been taken to have it brought to the army.

The General to be requested to send as near an estimate as can be made of the quantity of grain required for the daily consumption of the southern army, including as well the troops in the garrisons as those in the field, and all necessary followers; also

The proportion nearly, which the followers of the army bear to the fighting men, including under the latter description the gun lascars.

It will be desirable also for Lord Cornwallis to know from the General where it is intended to form the magazines; what quantity is proposed to be collected at each magazine, in what manner the magazines are proposed to be filled.

By what time it is supposed they may be filled, and how the magazines and convoys are likely to be well secured and protected.

Lord Cornwallis would wish also to receive the best possible account that can be obtained of the nature of the passes, and that the grounds should be stated on which it is supposed they can be forced if defended.

To be informed likewise of the face of the country and the nature of it, whether enclosed or open, and if enclosed what kind of enclosure.

The state of the roads between Coimbatore and the Ghauts, as far as they have been traversed, and the effect which the Carnatic monsoon has had upon them; and, if this has been considerable, when the obstructions to the army moving from that cause are likely to be removed.

The General is particularly requested to state to Lord Cornwallis the difficulties he expects to encounter from any other cause whatever in advancing into the enemy's country, and the probable period when he thinks it may be practicable to move forward.

In respect to the supplies of grain and provisions for the troops, it is desirable that Lord Cornwallis should know whether the supplies depend exclusively on the provision made by the Company for the carriage of grain, or whether grain merchants follow the camp at any time with supplies, and to what extent resources of that nature may be reckoned upon while the army is below the Ghauts. Whether people of the above description are likely to bring in grain to replenish our magazines in proportion as supplies are drawn from them for the army as it advances, or whether cattle must be left for that purpose.

General Medows may probably be able to judge from local observations, and Lord Cornwallis would wish in that case to know the general opinion whether by the influence of the collectors it would not be possible to press and load, for one

trip only, a sufficient number of bullocks from the Tanjore and Trichinopoly countries to form a magazine of forty days' provisions at the foot of the Ghauts for the southern army. Lord Cornwallis wishes also to receive the General's opinion, whether considerable supplies of provisions might not be conveyed by boats up the Cavery to Erode.

In case it should be thought necessary to reinforce either army from the other, the General is requested to give his sentiments in what manner it will be most eligible to form the junction. CORNWALLIS.

[A similar memorandum was transmitted to the officer commanding the centre army.]

No. XLVI.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

HONOURABLE SIRS, Fort William, Nov. 17, 1790.

. . . I entertain too high an opinion of General Medows' professional abilities, and feel too great a confidence in his zeal to promote the public good, to imagine that the war will be conducted with more success under my own immediate direction; but as Tippoo may have it in his power, during a temporary inactivity on our part, to turn his whole force against our allies, and unless counteracted by us may intimidate or otherwise prevail upon them to treat for a separate peace, I have thought it incumbent upon me on this occasion to step beyond the line of regular official duty, upon the supposition that my presence on the coast may operate in some degree to convince them of our being determined to persevere in a vigorous prosecution of the war, and by that means encourage them to resist the common enemy with firmness until the north-east monsoon shall break up, and we shall in other respects be prepared to act with efficacy in co-operation with them. . . .

I shall beg leave to refer you to the letters from the Board for the particulars of many of the resolutions and transactions of this Government. But I cannot omit to solicit your peculiar attention to the voluminous correspondence between this Board and the Government of Madras on the subject of the complaints which have been preferred by the Nabob of Arcot against the two Messrs. Hollond and Paupiah, the dubash of the elder brother, for diverting very large sums of money to their own use, which are said to have been intended by his Highness to be paid into the Company's treasury.

I should consider it as highly improper in me to attempt by a private opinion of my own, to anticipate the report of the Committee which has been appointed to inquire into the grounds of those and other complaints of a similar nature which have been brought against the persons that I have mentioned, but as not only their characters and fortunes, but also the national honour and the interests of the Company are deeply concerned in the issue, it has become an indispensable duty in this Government, as well as in that of Madras, to take such measures as have appeared to be best calculated for exhibiting and establishing the truth, and particularly to instruct the Committee to give the whole matter that may be laid before them, the most impartial and serious investigation.

His Highness's almost total inattention to his engagements with the Company has occasioned much inconvenience to your affairs; but, although by the failure in his payments it became absolutely necessary to provide for the public safety by putting the management of his revenues into the hands of the servants of the

Company, I was desirous to employ every conciliatory means in my power to obtain from him a good-humoured acquiescence in the measure.

I am sorry, however, to say that, notwithstanding he has always expressed himself in flattering terms in regard to myself, he for some time remonstrated with great warmth against the arrangements that were made by the Government of Fort St. George for taking charge of the collections, although he knew that they were made either with the sanction, or by the express orders of this Board.

I considered it in every respect as proper and incumbent upon me to avoid as much as possible any harsh language in expostulating with his Highness, but I thought myself called upon in justice to the Company and to their governments in this country to state to him fully the nature and extent of his failure in the execution of his treaty with the Company, and to explain to him the reasons which had consequently forced us to interfere in the internal management of his affairs upon the forcible grounds of our mutual safety.

I trust that the general tenor of my letter to the Nabob, a copy of which will be transmitted to you, a number in the packet, will meet with your approbation, and, although his Highness has not hitherto made any reply to it, I am not without hopes that it has made a strong and favourable impression upon his mind.

The present universally distracted state of the French affairs rendered me extremely averse to interfere in any of their internal dissentions, but the daring and outrageous behaviour of part of the inhabitants of Chandernagore in violating the Company's territory, in the execution of their plan to seize their Commandant Colonel de Montigny and several others of their countrymen who had taken up their residence at Gyretty House, obliged me in some degree to deviate from my former intentions; but you will learn from the papers on this subject, which will be transmitted in the public despatches, that, whilst some individuals have profited from the principle of humanity which dictated our interference, no person whatever has suffered the least violence or injury from it. . . .

The particulars of all our discussions and resolutions respecting the new settlement of the revenues, are fully and clearly detailed in the letter from the Board, or in our proceedings in that department, and I shall therefore in this place only say that the good effects which have been already experienced from the settlement that was made last year in the province of Bahar, as well as on the Company's revenue, as in the prospect it affords of improvement to the Country, and of happiness to the inhabitants, have given me singular satisfaction, and I can with pleasure add that the settlement of Bengal is in a progressive and successful state, and promises to be attended with similar advantages. In Benares the revenue has been completely and easily realised, and everything in that district wears the most flourishing aspect.

Your possessions, however, in this country cannot be said to be well governed, nor the lives and property of your subjects to be secure, until the shocking abuses and the wretched administration of justice in the Foujdarry department can be corrected; anxious as I have been to supply a speedy remedy to evils so disgraceful to Government, so ruinous to commerce, and indeed destructive to all civil society, it has still appeared to me to be so important as to make it necessary for me to act with great circumspection. I have therefore not only bestowed much time in framing my propositions, but have also submitted them, previous to their being publicly produced, to the inspection of several persons in whose judgment and knowledge I place particular confidence.

The delay in bringing them forward may likewise be in part attributed to the multiplicity of other business which has lately pressed upon me, but I am so strongly incited by motives of humanity, as well as of regard to the public interest, to establish as early as possible an improved system for the administration

of criminal justice, that I shall use every exertion in my power to effect it before my embarkation for Madras.

You will observe by the account of the salt sales, that the profit which has arisen this season to Government upon that article has been very considerable, but I have derived great satisfaction from the success of our endeavours, both by importation and by liberal encouragement to the molungees to reduce the price of salt within moderate bounds, and to relieve the country from the scarcity which the two succeeding unfavourable seasons of 1787 and 1788 had occasioned.

I have been informed that it has been erroneously supposed in England that the fair and equitable manner now adopted, and wisely confirmed by the orders of your Honourable Court, of disposing of the salt in small lots by public auction, has an effect contrary to that which might have been expected by common reason, and had been the cause of much distress to the natives of this country; I have, however, the strongest grounds to believe that the retail price to the consumers is by no means affected by that measure, but that the late increase of the receipts at the Treasury has principally, if not entirely, consisted of profits, which, instead of going as formerly to intermediate persons, have been by means of the public sales applied solely to the use of the Company.

The arrangements and regulations which have been established in your commercial department prove upon trial to be well calculated to promote your interests and the prosperity of the country; and I am persuaded that the good effects of them, both in the price and quality of the investment, which is to be sent home by the ships of this season, will be very apparent.

I must confess that I sincerely lament the reduction which the exigencies of the war must occasion in the provision of the ensuing investment, which under the present commercial system, aided by the favourable season that we now enjoy, must have proved a source of very great profit to the Company.

I think it unnecessary in this letter to trouble you on military subjects; I have included every important communication in that department in the despatches from the Board.

I have, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

No. XLVII.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO COLONEL DE FRESNE.

SIR, Camp, Feb. 4, 1791.

I had the honour to receive your letter, dated the 28th ultimo, containing a proposal to open negociations for the re-establishment of peace between the English East India Company and Tippoo Sultaun.

I do not make any difficulty in repeating what I said to M. de Canaples, that I could see no ground to consider in an unfavourable point of view a disposition on your part to make a tender of your good offices for endeavouring to put an end to the calamities which attend the present war, and that I shall neither have any objection to receive specific propositions to that effect directly from Tippoo, nor delay returning an answer as soon as I shall be able to obtain the sentiments of the Company's allies upon them.

Negociations for peace cannot in my opinion commence with propriety in any other manner, because, although no man can more ardently wish than I do to see the innocent subjects of the powers now at war relieved from the miseries which they at present suffer from the consequences of Tippoo's inordinate spirit of

ambition, and his total disregard of the laws of humanity and the faith of the most solemn treaties, my own sentiments of honour and justice do not admit of my entering into a discussion of the conditions on which the public tranquillity can be restored, except in concert and with the entire concurrence of the allies of the Company.

Tippoo is well acquainted with the extent of the injuries and losses that the English and their allies have sustained from him, and I must acknowledge that I consider the wanton and savage barbarities which he has recently exercised on the inoffensive ryots of the Carnatic, as the highest aggravation of all the other grounds of complaint which the Company has cause to make against him; but should he now manifest a sincere disposition to put an end to this destructive war, by offering just and ample remuneration for the injuries and losses which the English East India Company and its allies have sustained by his violation of former treaties, he is, as I have said before, at liberty to transmit his propositions directly from himself to me, and, after consulting with our allies, I shall inform him whether these propositions can be considered by us as reasonable preliminaries upon which negociations might be opened with a prospect of bringing all our difficulties to an accommodation.

I am, &c.,

Cornwallis.

No. XLVIII.

Earl Cornwallis to Rajah Teige Wunt.

May 8, 1791.

The army having now reached the open country, I consider it as a duty which I owe to the interest of the common cause, and to the honour of his Highness the Nizam's arms, to call upon you to bring the large body of cavalry under your command into activity, that it may assume the degree of superiority over the enemy to which it is entitled both by its numbers, and by the zeal and spirit of its chiefs, and by that means contribute in the manner which was intended by his Highness to promote the success of the campaign.

As Tippoo has on all occasions since the commencement of the war carefully avoided an action with British armies of very inconsiderable numbers, and in particular would not attack this army when a large part of it was employed in carrying on the siege of Bangalore, there is not the least probability that he will now hazard a battle with the strongest army that was ever brought into the field against him; it therefore falls to the share of the infantry to proceed with the artillery according to the plan which has been settled to attack Seringapatam; and it is the duty of the cavalry to overrun the country, to cut off Tippoo's communication with his capital, and to prevent the approach of his small detachments of light horse to disturb the troops that will be employed in the siege.

To answer these purposes I desire that you will immediately detach a body of his Highness's cavalry of any number that you may judge advisable, and under the command of such chiefs as you may think qualified for executing the service, into the open country to the north-west of the present encampment, with orders to drive the enemy's small parties from the neighbourhood of the army, and to intercept everything going to or coming out of Seringapatam on the roads leading to it from Corapatam and Treagunga.

Tippoo was by the last accounts at a great distance from hence with the main body of his army, and there is no reason to believe that there is at present any considerable body of his cavalry near our front; but whatever the situation

of the enemy may be, the detached corps should leave its heavy baggage with the army and move into the country as lightly equipped as possible, which will enable it either to avoid with facility any detachments of the enemy that may be furnished with infantry and guns, or to attack them with success if a favourable opportunity should offer, and if it should at any time be pressed by superior numbers it will find perfect security in falling back to the army.

I shall order further detachments to be made as the army advances, and I think it right at the same time to state to you that it is only by their own activity and exertions, that it will be possible for the cavalry under your command to procure forage for their horses or subsistence for themselves, and that to continue, as has hitherto been the practice, to encamp with their followers in the rear of the line of infantry, would certainly occasion great distress to the whole army, and ruin to the cause in which we are engaged.

I must likewise request that you will take effectual measures to restrain the troops under your command from insulting or forcing sentries belonging to the English regiments, and to oblige, not only the cavalry, but also the baggage and followers to remain in the situations which are allotted to them by the general order of march.

I am persuaded you will see the necessity for using your utmost authority to prevent a repetition of both these irregularities, when I inform you that by the rules of the English discipline it is the duty of a sentry to put any man to death who attempts to force him upon his post; and that exclusive of the great inconvenience which has been experienced from the multitudes of the cavalry and their followers, who have broken in upon the line of march of the columns of our infantry and artillery, the English troops are exposed to great danger, and have already suffered considerable loss by the similarity of appearance of his Highness's and the enemy's cavalry, which renders it impossible for the officers and soldiers of our army to distinguish the one from the other, and which enables the enemy to mix with the stragglers of the Nizam's cavalry, and to watch for favourable opportunities to attack individuals on the line of march, or upon their arrival at the new encampments. . . . I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

No. XLIX.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO CAPTAIN JOHN KENNAWAY.

SIR, Camp 8 miles north of Seringapatam, May 31, 1791.

The different enclosures of this despatch, consisting of copies of letters to Sir Charles Oakeley, and to Mr. Malet, and of my late correspondence with Tippoo, will give you the fullest information of all the material circumstances that have occurred since the date of my last letter, and of the influence which they have had upon my decisions, and will also convey to you a general outline of my future intentions.

You will deliver a copy of the correspondence with Tippoo, and communicate the substance of the other papers, to the Nizam and the Minister; and you will, according to the directions contained in my letter to Mr. Malet, avail yourself of that opportunity to assure his Highness of my determination to persevere in a vigorous prosecution of the war until the objects of the confederacy can be obtained, and of drawing their particular attention to the pressing advances that Tippoo has repeatedly made to me on account of the Company, and of the uni-

form steadiness with which I have constantly declared to him that I could listen to no propositions for opening a negotiation, except in concert and with the consent of the other members of the confederacy.

I do not at present see any great reason to believe that Tippoo's power is in his own opinion reduced so low as to render it necessary for him to make the sacrifices for peace which the allies will think themselves entitled to demand; but as I have engaged to him to recommend to the Nizam and the Peshwa to send deputies with full powers to Bangalore to meet persons that may be named by him for the purpose of opening a negotiation for the re-establishment of peace, I trust that his Highness will lose no time in nominating his deputies, and should the proposed meeting actually take place he may depend upon me for showing a due regard to his interests.

Although I have been unwilling to express myself to his Highness in harsh terms respecting his cavalry, it is right that you should know that ever since the first ten or twelve days after their junction they have given me numberless reasons to be dissatisfied with their conduct, and that our late distresses for forage and provisions, which have had so material an influence on the operations of this army, are principally to be attributed to them.

The uncertain state of political affairs in Europe made me anxious to use every means in my power to bring the war with Tippoo to a speedy termination; but I should not have ventured to have undertaken the enterprise against Seringapatam so late in the season, if I had not expected that so numerous and powerful a body of cavalry would have been sufficiently able to have procured forage for our cattle, and to have secured supplies of provisions for the troops.

They proved, however, regardless in almost every instance of my orders, and deaf to my representations, after my near approach to the enemy's capital; and, instead of spreading themselves in the country to secure our communications and to cut off those of the enemy, they could hardly even be prevailed upon to go beyond our picquets even in search of forage and provisions for themselves, but persisted in remaining close in our rear in an unwieldy mass and in a state of the most unaccountable inactivity and apathy until they were reduced to the greatest want and misery, whilst they at the same time consumed great quantities of forage and provisions which would have properly fallen to the share of this army, as being within its power and reach, and even in a great measure actually within the bounds of its own encampment.

I can hardly allow myself to suppose that this behaviour of the cavalry, which has given me so much ground for complaint, has proceeded from a premeditated criminal design in any of the chiefs; but it may, perhaps, be more properly ascribed to the incapacity of Rajah Teige Wunt for such a command, and to the discontented and unmanageable disposition of Assud Ali Khan, who appears to engross his entire confidence.

Having long relinquished all hopes of deriving any advantage to the common cause from the services of that cavalry, and the Rajah and the other chiefs having also frequently applied to me for permission to quit the army, I had about a week ago agreed that the whole body should return to their master, but the Rajah having since the junction of the Mahratta armies earnestly requested to be allowed to remain with a few thousand of those that are in the most serviceable condition, I have, from an unwillingness to do anything that might be disagreeable to the Nizam, as well as from other political considerations, consented to it; and Assud Ali Khan with the sick and lame horses of the whole, and with his own troops and those of several of the inferior chiefs, has this day commenced his march to the northward, leaving with the Rajah, Mahommed Ameen,

of whom I must in justice say that I have always had reason, as far as I could judge, to be satisfied with his conduct.

It is only necessary to add, that as the Rajah appears at present to be in a tractable temper of mind, and as I think he may profit from the advice of Mahommed Ameen, I do not desire that he should be removed from the command, but that in case his Highness should send a reinforcement of cavalry, my wish is that Assud Ali Khan shall never again be of the party.

You may take proper occasions to convey to his Highness and the Minister, in the most moderate terms, part of my sentiments of dissatisfaction with the cavalry; but in justice to my own conviction of the Nizam's intention to give me a powerful support, you will always in such conversations give the strongest assurances that, far from looking upon the misconduct of the cavalry as in any degree imputable to him, I remain perfectly persuaded of his earnest desire to fulfil his engagements, and to do everything in his power to promote the success of the alliance against the common enemy.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

No. L.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO SIR CHARLES OAKELEY, BART.

Camp 10 miles east Nagul Mongolum, 24 miles distant from Seringapatam, June 14, 1791.

SIR,

The Cavari river has risen very considerably, but by our last accounts is still fordable. As Tippoo, however, has not only brought his whole force to this side, but a considerable quantity of artillery and stores, I cannot doubt of his intention to give us every disturbance in his power, to interrupt our supplies, and in particular to prevent as much as possible the equipment of our part of the army, from which he well knows he has the most serious misfortunes to fear.

The necessity of our regulating our movements in concert with the Mahrattas, and protecting their supplies, will keep us so much to the westward (although they have agreed to depend only upon the Sera communication) that it will certainly be possible, and I by no means think improbable, that Tippoo, who can now have no apprehension for Seringapatam for these next four months, may make a rapid march to Oussoor, and from thence pass into the Barramaul and Carnatic.

You may be assured that I will give you the earliest intelligence of such an event, but I must desire you in the mean time to be upon your guard, and amongst other precautions to reinforce the garrison of Arnee, and take every means in your power to transport the stores and provisions that are not wanted for the use of the garrison, from thence to Vellore, and if possible to Amboor.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

No. LI.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO SIR CHARLES OAKELEY, BART., ACTING-PRESIDENT, AND COUNCIL, FORT ST. GEORGE.

Camp at Magri, July 1, 1791.

GENTLEMEN,

. . . The suggestion of the Honourable Court of Directors to send home the Hanoverian troops in the empty victuallers appears to me to be

extremely judicious; I therefore desire that you will prepare the vessels without loss of time for the reception of those troops, and you will at the same time communicate to Colonel Wagenheim the determination to embrace so favourable an opportunity of sending his Majesty's electoral regiment to Europe. . . .

I entirely approve of the answer given by your Acting-President to the letter addressed to him by his Highness the Nabob of Arcot respecting the settlement of the revenues of the Carnatic. I have not yet received any letter from His Highness on that subject.

The exertions that have been made by your Government to procure a supply of bullocks, and to forward in every respect the equipment of this army, claim my warmest acknowledgments, and I am happy to find that they have hitherto been attended with greater success than I was sanguine enough to expect; some greater encouragement must be given to bullock-drivers, for without a proper number of that useful class of men, our losses in bullocks must continue to be repeated, either by their starving by the want of people to provide sufficient food for them, or from their being ruined by unskilful driving.

I shall think it necessary to put the cattle that have been procured by the exertions of Government under the management of a public agent, as I am sorry to say from experience, that the contract has been a delusion of a most dangerous nature to a commander-in-chief of an army.

I had the pleasure of hearing last night of Captain Read's safe arrival at Bangalore with a very considerable band of Brinjarries, which had been collected by that most zealous and active officer. The grain, however, which you have ordered to be forwarded to Vencatagherry will still be of great importance in our future operations, but, as the elephants under the care of Captain Williamson were not in very good condition when they began their march from the province of Oude, and as they will be much wanted for the carriage of the camp equipage of the army, I should wish that they may no longer continue to be employed in the removal of the rice from Amboor. . . .

I am much obliged to you for the dispatch which you made in forwarding the first sum which I requested of you to Vellore; and as we are in much want of small currency in camp, I should be glad that in future supplies you could send us to the amount of half or even a whole lack of rupees in silver fanams. . . .

The approbation which the House of Commons has declared of the measures of the Supreme Government respecting the commencement of the present war, has given me particular satisfaction, and I am persuaded that the vigour and unanimity of opinion which have been shown in so many quarters, will essentially tend to bring it to an honourable conclusion.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

Cornwallis.

No. LII.

Earl Cornwallis to Captain Kennaway.

Sir, Camp near Bangalore, July 10, 1791.

I read with the greatest surprise the copy of the letter from Rajah Teige Wunt to the minister Azeem ul Omrah, dated the 17th May. The gross falsehood of every syllable of this letter is so easily to be proved, that no person but so weak a man as the Rajah could have hoped that it would have protected him

against the displeasure of his master, when the heavy complaints that I had to make against him were fully stated to the Nizam. I must now withdraw the request which I made to you in my letter, dated the 31st of May, that you would convey in the most moderate terms part of my sentiments of dissatisfaction with the cavalry; in refutation of so much misrepresentation and falsehood it is necessary that you should tell the whole truth.

I shall now only think it necessary that you should tell the whole truth, and take notice of a few of the most striking points in the Rajah's letter, to show that I felt much more concern than he did, for securing supplies of provisions for his Highness's troops. I pressed him in the most earnest manner (when we were encamped at Vencatagherry, 24 miles from Amboor) to send all his Brinjarries to that fortress, where I assured him they would be supplied with as much rice from our magazine as they could carry away, on the most reasonable terms, and that the payment of it should not be required until it suited the Rajah's convenience. I likewise explained to him that if he missed that opportunity it would be impossible for me afterwards to afford him any assistance. When the army halted in my camp, I recommended, what is I believe practised by all cavalry, that the Rajah would send detachments of his troops to cover his foragers in procuring forage and grain from the villages in the rear of our position, where no force of the enemy could be apprehended except some parties of his looty horse; and in marching days, instead of requiring him to send his cavalry four or five coss for forage after they came to their ground, I requested of him, but in vain, that he would order his numerous foragers to forage in the villages on his flank during the march, where they would be protected by our line which always moved between them and the enemy, and where they would find much more forage and grain than in the villages adjoining to the road, instead of pursuing their constant practice of pressing forward between the head of our column and our advanced guard, and before our line arrived in camp, stripping the villages that were within its limits of the only forage that it was possible for us to procure for the support of our numerous cattle, and specially of the bullocks that were employed in dragging the battering train, and by that means most effectually defeating the great object of the march, which was the attack of the enemy's capital. In answer to his ridiculous complaint of marching double the distance that I did, I would submit it to his Highness's decision whether it would have been practicable, if I had been capable of wishing it, to have given them so unreasonable a degree of fatigue, and in cases where it became necessary to march by different routes whether the cavalry or the four-and-twenty pounders should have taken the shortest road.

The very circumstance, which the Rajah describes so little to his own credit at the head of twenty thousand horse, "that the enemy's looties patrolled round our camp," induced me to give orders, which after the first few days were either directly disobeyed or almost totally eluded, for detachments of his Highness's cavalry to extend during our marches a few miles on our flank that was next to the enemy; and the Rajah well knows that on the particular occasion to which I conceive he alludes, when knowing that the body of the enemy's army was at a considerable distance I directed him to send three thousand horse four or five coss into the country, in order to assert that superiority which so large a body of cavalry ought to have maintained, the small corps, which accompanied them under Captain Dallas, was not meant as a proportional force that was to be given by our troops for that service, but merely to prevent their being mistaken for the enemy on their return to the army.

The Rajah's rhodemontade, respecting his behaviour in the action of the 15th, is really so absurd that I cannot bring myself to enter into a serious

refutation of it. The truth is the cavalry showed on that occasion a better countenance and more good-will than I had expected from them, and I was induced to express my satisfaction, in the hope that it would operate as an incitement to their acting with more spirit in future than they had previously manifested; but it so happened that the victory was completely decided and gained before his cavalry came up, and, instead of his contributing to render it more complete, he placed his troops directly in front of a body of our infantry that I was exceedingly anxious to push forwards on a piece of broken ground in which cavalry could not have acted with advantage, and prevented their pressing the enemy in their retreat at a crisis when it would have been most particularly desirable. The Rajah cannot possibly forget that just at that time I sent Captain Dallas to him to desire that he would make a movement with his cavalry to the left, that he might not impede the advance of our infantry.

After having been driven to the necessity of desiring you to lay the above statement of the Rajah's conduct before the Nizam and the Minister, you will easily conceive that I cannot by any means approve of his being continued in his present command. Although I have long known him destitute of every military qualification that was requisite for the station in which he was placed, yet being in hopes when I wrote my letter of the 31st of May that he would in future be tractable, and probably fall into the hands of better advisers after the departure of Assud Ali Khan, I was unwilling to be the immediate cause of his being publicly disgraced; but having now found him to be capable of acting so falsely and treacherously towards me in his representations to his master, I must desire that you will request his Highness in my name to recall him. I wish that I could accompany this request with a recommendation of a successor, but I freely confess that I do not look upon any of those that have been with us, qualified to fill a station of so great importance. I have a very good opinion of Rochum Vihan, but his bad health renders him incapable of exertion of any kind. Mahomed Ameen appears to have several good qualities, but he is by no means a fit person for the chief command, and you are to recollect that if by any accident Assud Ali Khan should be thought of, I put the strongest negative upon his appointment for very substantial reasons, which perhaps I shall explain to you more particularly hereafter.

I shall therefore only request in general that the Nizam and the minister will in the selection of a successor to Rajah Teige Wunt, endeavour to send me a person in whom, for the interest of his master as well as the other confederates, I may safely confide; and if the idea should occur to them of placing the Nizam's son in that situation, attended by so able an adviser as Mur Abul Cossim, you may readily assure them that the measure will be most perfectly agreeable to me, and that I shall receive him with the most distinguished marks of attention and kindness.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

No. LIII.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO CAPTAIN KENNAWAY.

SIR, Camp at Killimungulum, July 18, 1791.

I yesterday received your letter dated the 29th ultimo, and although the answers that you gave in regard to the adjustment of three points, about which his Highness seemed to be so very solicitous to hear my sentiments, appear to me to have nearly precluded all doubt in his mind respecting my opinion, yet, as

the Nizam again intimates a desire to receive assurances directly from myself, I take the earliest opportunity of requesting that you will acquaint him that I shall receive the prince with every mark of kindness and respect, which it would be my duty as well as inclination to pay to a person of his high birth and exalted rank, and to the son of so faithful an ally to the Company, with whom I have had the happiness to form the closest political connexions, and for whom I personally entertain the greatest esteem. That I will give no decided answer to any propositions from Tippoo, except as far as it may relate to the assembling of a congress, nor enter into a discussion of terms of peace until the arrival of the minister, unless I should receive especial authority from his Highness for that purpose, and lastly, that I can by no means consent to your leaving his court at the time when the minister himself will be absent, and when I have no means but through yourself of making any confidential communication to his Highness. . . .

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

No LIV.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

HONOURABLE SIRS, Camp near Bangalore, Sept. 7, 1791.

I had the honour, in my letter dated at Vencatagherry on the 20th of April last, to give your Honourable Court an account of the principal operations of the army under my command prior to that period, and to communicate my intention to attack Seringapatam, if it should be found practicable, with a view to leave no means untried to bring this war to a speedy termination; and although the multiplicity of objects which perpetually break in upon my time, and press for immediate attention in my present situation, will not permit me to enter into many details, I shall now proceed to explain to you the manner in which the premature setting in of the monsoon rains, the difficulty of passing the Caveri river, and the inactivity of the Nizam's cavalry, operated as irresistible reasons to force me to desist at that time from undertaking the siege of the enemy's capital, and to acquaint you with the occurrences that have materially contributed to reduce Tippoo's strength and resources, and to give a very favourable prospect of success to the plan of operations which has been adopted by all the members of the confederacy for the ensuing campaign.

Previous to the commencement of my march to Seringapatam, Tippoo, in addition to the mortification which he suffered from the loss of Bangalore, had also felt the consequences of that blow at a great distance, and our allies had from its effects gained very decisive advantages.

The strong fortresses of Durwar and Gopaul had long been invested and besieged by the Marattas and the Nizam, and with so little prospect of success, that it had been more than once under the consideration of the Courts of Poona and Hydrabad whether they should not convert these sieges into blockades to set their armies at liberty for more active operations. But the news of the fall of Bangalore, which seemed to have been unexpected by the garrisons of these places, so effectually intimidated them, that, although in no shape reduced to extremity or even distress, they agreed to surrender. Large magazines of military stores, which had been amassed in those places at a vast expense by Tippoo, fell into the hands of the captors; and during the time that I was employed in forming a junction with the Nizam's cavalry, and in drawing supplies and rein-

forcements from the Carnatic, they also obtained complete possession of the whole of the enemy's extensive and valuable territories laying between the Khristna and Tumbuddra.

Nothing of consequence occurred on the march from Vencatagherry to Bangalore, and after having taken out of that place heavy guns and supplies of military stores and provisions to the utmost extent that could be transported by the general zealous assistance that I received from the officers of the army, and by all the draught and carriage cattle in the possession of the public, and after having received information that General Abercromby with a battering train, which, in addition to my own, I was in hopes would be sufficient for the accomplishment of our object, was at the head of the Poodicherrim Ghaut, and in readiness to co-operate with me, I moved on the 3rd of May from the neighbourhood of Bangalore with a respectable and sufficient corps of artillery, the Nizam's Horse, His Majesty's 19th Regiment of Dragoons, five regiments of native cavalry, six King's regiments, and one of the Company's European regiments, and seventeen battalions of native infantry.

Tippoo, after calling in all his detachments, had about that time encamped near Magri, and soon after receiving information of my movement he marched by one of the most direct roads to his capital, where he arrived on the 8th or 9th of May.

I knew that he had long before given orders to burn the villages and to destroy the provisions and forage on all the roads by which we could march to Seringapatam, and therefore no road was in these respects preferable to another; but after the most mature consideration I determined to take the most easterly route which passes through Cankanelly, though it is not the shortest, because it would lead us near the banks of the Caveri for many miles before we should reach Seringapatam; and as there is no place of strength near the capital on the north side of the river in which I could lodge the heavy artillery and stores in security for a few days with a moderate garrison, I was in hopes that I might be able to cross that river with the whole army, and to effect a junction with General Abercromby, before I should find it necessary to approach near to the ultimate object of the movement.

It soon appeared that only a small number of the enemy's irregular horse had been appointed to attend to that road; but by an extraordinary activity on their part, and a most unaccountable supineness and want of exertion on the part of the Nizam's cavalry, which neither my requisitions nor orders could overcome, we suffered some loss both in baggage and followers on the march, and not only the villages were laid in ashes, but all the inhabitants of the country on the whole of the road to Seringapatam, were also with the most unrelenting barbarity carried off, and more completely removed beyond our reach than could have been supposed to be practicable.

These severe measures of the enemy, and the inactivity of the Nizam's cavalry, who could not be prevailed upon to forage at a distance, frequently occasioned a scarcity in the camp both of forage for the cattle and provisions for the followers; and in a country of which no minute or correct description has hitherto been published, or till now been obtained by any European, I experienced the greatest inconveniences in many shapes by the removal of the inhabitants.

The Caveri is never, I believe, lower than it was during the greatest part of last May; and as none of the people who pretended to be acquainted with its course, and who were repeatedly examined upon that point, had ever started a doubt of its being passable for an army with heavy artillery below Seringapatam, I was not a little surprised and disappointed at finding from my own personal

inspection, or from the reports of intelligent officers who were sent with detachments in search of fords at different places, that from its bed being rocky and difficult beyond what I have ever seen for so great a tract in any other river, it appeared nearly, if not utterly, impracticable to pass our heaviest guns over at any ford that could be discovered below Seringapatam.

After several disappointments at other places, I was for a short time encouraged to hope that a ford might, by considerable labour, be rendered practicable near the large village of Arrakerry, which lay upon our road, and about 9 or 10 miles distant from the capital; and if it could have been accomplished, my intention was to have possessed myself of the new fort of Mysore, which is only distant about 12 or 14 miles from that part of the river, and was described to me to be in so unfinished a state as to be incapable of making a considerable resistance against our army, though sufficiently advanced to be easily rendered with a garrison of ours, a safe depôt for a few days for our stores and heavy artillery, and to make two or three marches with the army lightly equipped towards Periapatam, in order to put myself between Tippoo and General Abercromby, and by that means render our junction easy and secure.

The army arrived at Arrakerry on the 13th, and a particular examination of that ford, as well as of the river for a considerable distance above and below it, obliged me early in the forenoon of the 14th to relinquish all idea of being able to execute that plan; and after minutely re-examining every person in the army who was acquainted with the river, my expectations of being able to form an early junction with General Abercromby rested solely on assurances that the ford near the village of Kannambaddy, about 8 or 9 miles above Seringapatam, over which it was positively asserted that Hyder Ali had frequently passed 12-pounders, and sometimes heavier guns, would be practicable.

In the mean time, however, I conceived that Tippoo had furnished an opening which would enable me to force him to risk an action, and I resolved not to let slip so favourable an opportunity to endeavour to obtain the reputation to our arms which must necessarily result from a victory in the sight of his capital, and in the event of my being able to cut off the greatest part of his army, to be prepared to follow up the advantage to the greatest extent that might be possible.

Upon my arrival on the ground which was marked for the encampment at Arrakerry, I saw a considerable body of the enemy at the distance of about six miles in our front, who were drawn up with their right to the river, and their left to a mountain of a very rugged and inaccessible appearance; but I considered them in no other light at that time than as a large detachment sent to observe our motions, without any design to wait for our approach.

My intention to pass the river at that place, if the ford could be rendered practicable, and the hopes that were at first held out of the success of our working parties, occasioned my halting on the 14th in the camp at Arakerry, and I then obtained certain intelligence, that although only a small part of the enemy's force could be seen from the ground in our possession, yet that Tippoo with his whole army had encamped between us and Seringapatam, his right covered by the Caveri, and his left extended along the front of a high mountain, with a deep swampy ravine, the passage of which was defended by batteries running along the whole of his front; and that being encouraged by the advantage of this position, as well as those of the intermediate ground, which by the river on our side, and a steep ridge of hills on the other, was narrowed to a space nowhere between the two encampments exceeding a mile and a half, and within cannon-shot of his line not above one mile in breadth, he had determined, at the hazard of the event of a battle, to endeavour to prevent our nearer approach to his capital.

In consequence of this information, and from my having ascertained from the few people in camp who had any knowledge of the adjoining country, as well as from the observations of intelligent persons who were employed for the purpose, that it was practicable, though difficult, to cross the ridge on our right from the great round on which we were encamped to a road which leads from Cenapatam to Seringapatam, I resolved upon that knowledge to attempt, by a night march, to turn the enemy's left flank, and by gaining his rear before daylight to cut off the retreat of the main body of his army to the island and fort of Seringapatam.

Orders were accordingly given with the utmost secresy to the principal officers who were to be employed, that the 19th Dragoons, the three strongest of the native regiments of cavalry, His Majesty's six regiments, and twelve battalions of native infantry, with field-pieces only, should be in readiness to march at 11 o'clock at night, leaving their piquets and camp-guards behind, and their tents standing; and Colonel Duff, with these detachments and the remainder of the army (except the Nizam's Horse, who were directed to follow me at daylight), was left in charge of the encampment, provisions, stores, and heavy artillery.

We had suffered greatly during the preceding week by rains uncommonly frequent and heavy so early in the season; but unluckily on that particular night we had for several hours the most violent thunder, lightning, and rain, that I have seen in this part of India.

The ground of our encampment having been intersected by some ruined villages and inclosures, and several deep ravines, much valuable time was lost before it was possible to form the troops in the order of march which was directed; and owing to the heavy rain and excessive darkness of the night, I was obliged to halt so frequently, after I had begun to move forward, either on account of many of the regiments losing at different times the line of march, or of the weakness of the gun-bullocks, which were jaded and exhausted by the severity of the storm, that I had only advanced a few miles when the day began to dawn.

All hopes were then at an end of being able to execute my original plan, but having accomplished the part of the march that had been described to me as the most difficult, and having the utmost confidence in the valour and discipline of the King's and Company's troops, I determined to persevere in endeavouring to force Tippoo to hazard an action on ground which I hoped would be less advantageous to him than that which he had chosen, with the expectation that a complete victory might not only relieve many of our temporary distresses, but tend to bring the war to a very speedy conclusion.

The army therefore continued its march, and the movement had been so entirely unexpected by the enemy, that we had begun to descend the heights on the eastward of the deep ravine that I have mentioned, and at the distance of four or five miles from the left of their camp, before they took the alarm.

After some movements, the object of which could not for a short time be clearly ascertained, it appeared that Tippoo, notwithstanding that we were advancing by a route for which he was not prepared, did not decline to risk the event of a battle in a new position. He detached immediately from his main body a large corps of infantry and cavalry with eight guns, to occupy the summit of a rising ground about two miles from the extremity of his left, which terminates to the northward in an abrupt precipice in the middle of a plain, and though the ascent is broken by large rocks, and some intermediate lesser heights rise gradually for about a mile and a half or two miles from a valley that was in our front, and which continued to the Caveri, and divided the ridge of hills that we had crossed during the night from another steep ridge consisting principally of two large mountains (on a projecting point of the southernmost of which stands

the Karighaut Pagoda), running nearly at right angles to the former at the distance of about a mile and a half, and extending very near to the Caveri, opposite to the island of Seringapatam.

Whilst the corps was on its march to possess itself of the summit that I have mentioned, Tippoo was employed in changing the front of his army to the left, covering his left flank with the steep hill which had been in his rear, and his right flank with the ravine which ran along his former front.

The disposition on our side for action could only be made on the ascent of the heights, to the summit of which the enemy's detachment was then moving, and from which it was absolutely necessary to dislodge it before I could attack their main body. Our march was therefore continued in that direction across the valley, through which ran a continuation of the ravine which covered the enemy's right; but owing to the depth of that ravine, the weak state of the gun-bullocks, and the near approach of a large body of the enemy's horse, that, though repulsed in several attempts, appeared to be prepared to take advantage of the least disorder in any of our battalions, it was upwards of two hours after the passage of the head of the column, before the whole infantry could cross to the same side of the ravine with the enemy, and consequently before the disposition for action could be completed; and during that time we suffered some loss from the guns on the heights opposite to the head of the column, and were severely galled by a well-directed though distant fire from the artillery of the enemy's main body, which had formed nearly parallel to the direction of our march.

Under these difficulties, and under the disadvantage of the want of all satisfactory local information, beyond what could be seen, of the intended field of battle and of the adjoining country, nine battalions were formed opposite to the enemy's main body, in a first line under the command of Major-General Medows and Lieut.-Colonel Stuart, four battalions in a second line under Lieut.-Colonel Harris, and five under Lieut.-Colonel Maxwell were destined for the attack of the enemy's corps on the summit of the hill upon our right. This attack had been unavoidably postponed until the other parts of the disposition could be made, and by that means Tippoo should be effectually awed, and prevented from making any attempt on the flank or rear of those troops whilst they were moving forward to drive his detachment from their post. Our own cavalry and the Nizam's Horse were left out of the reach of the cannonade, on the descent of the rising ground on the opposite side of the ravine, in readiness to take advantage of any confusion they might observe in the enemy's army; and orders were given to Lieut.-Colonel Maxwell, after succeeding in his attack, to leave only a sufficient force to retain possession of the summit of the hill, and to advance immediately with the remainder of his corps, and endeavour to possess himself of the mountains which covered the left flank of the main army of the enemy.

A rocky height afforded considerable protection to the troops from the enfilade from the hill on our right, during the time that was necessarily employed in making the disposition and forming the lines; which being accomplished, I began the action by ordering Lieut.-Colonel Maxwell's corps to attack the hill on our right, and upon observing that he had without much loss or difficulty completely succeeded, I moved forward with the main body of the army, and the action soon became general along the whole front.

The enemy's cavalry that had harassed us, and frequently attempted to break in upon the infantry whilst the column was passing the ravine, made no stand after we were prepared to advance, part of it retreating to the westward of the ridge on which the Karighaut Pagoda stands, with the infantry that had been driven from the hill by Lieut.-Colonel Maxwell, and the remainder falling into the rear

of the main army. Their infantry on this occasion showed a much better countenance than usual, which perhaps may be principally attributed to Tippoo's own presence and exertion amongst them; but in a short time they began to waver, and soon after, upon the cavalry moving towards their right, and three battalions of Lieut.-Colonel Maxwell's corps advancing rapidly to gain the heights on their left, they entirely gave way.

At this moment our own cavalry made a gallant charge, but after dispersing and almost destroying a small body of infantry that made a very determined resistance, were soon obliged to fall back from a more considerable body of infantry that had rallied and made a stand on a space of broken rocky ground, extremely disadvantageous for cavalry; and at the moment of their retreat, and whilst the whole of our first line was impeded by it, the Nizam's Horse, which had followed Colonel Floyd across the ravine, with very good intentions, but very injudiciously, threw themselves in an unwieldy mass into the front of our left wing, on a piece of ground so rugged and rocky, as well as so near to the enemy's batteries on the island of Seringapatam, that they could not act with efficacy in front, and continued to prevent our line of infantry from advancing, by which means an invaluable though short space of time was lost, which enabled the enemy to avail themselves of the vicinity of the batteries upon the island, and, by retreating to their protection in the utmost confusion, to save their army from entire destruction.

Fatigued and exhausted as the troops were by the badness of the night, the tediousness of the march, and by their long and extraordinary exertions during an excessive hot day, and covered as the beaten enemy were by the works on the island, and by the guns of the fort, nothing more could then be attempted; and the army accordingly, after the arrival of the tents from Arakerry, encamped just beyond the reach of the cannon on the island, and nearly on the ground upon which the action had terminated.

Three of the enemy's guns were taken on the hill that was attacked by the corps under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Maxwell, and one gun with a great number of standards and colours, were taken from their main body. Their loss in men was very considerable, but the number could not be ascertained.

It may probably appear to you and to any other persons unacquainted with the peculiar situation of Seringapatam, that after having defeated the enemy's army I might have proceeded to the attack of the place without losing time, or putting myself to any material inconvenience to form a junction with General Abercromby; but even if I had thought the heavy guns that I had brought with me sufficient for the siege, I could not there, as at Bangalore, choose my point of attack, and keep my army in a compact state to resist the whole force of the enemy and defend my approaches. In order to besiege the fort it would have been necessary to force my passage over to the island, and this can only be done on the north side, opposite to the Karighaut Pagoda, where there is a good ford at a distance of more than a mile from the fort; for the ford on the south side is not only very rugged and difficult, but is likewise commanded, within seven hundred yards, by the works of Seringapatam, and the bridge which is still standing on that side, is immediately under the guns of the place.

The ground on the south side rises gradually from the river; and as Tippoo would certainly have crossed over with his army to that side, as soon as he saw my batteries in sufficient forwardness to enable me to force the passage of the northern ford, I should have been exposed, on getting upon the island, to a cross fire from the fort and from the enemy's army, which would not only have rendered it impossible for me to attempt the siege, but would probably have obliged me to abandon the island with considerable loss.

It was therefore necessary, before any attempt could be made upon the island, that a force able to resist the attack of Tippoo's whole army should be stationed on the south side of the river, which could only be effected by my joining some of my battalions to the corps under General Abercromby; and I therefore determined, after allowing the troops to recover themselves a little from their fatigues by a halt of two days on the field of battle, to proceed to the Kannambaddy ford according to my former intention.

The soil of all the parts of the Mysore country that I have seen, is in general dry, and by nature unfruitful, and sustenance either for men or animals can only be raised upon it by a most persevering industry in its inhabitants; but the country adjoining to Seringapatam is peculiarly rugged and barren. The mountains are immense bare rocks, and the lower grounds are so thin in soil, and so universally and closely covered with large loose stones, that no considerable produce can be raised from them by the exertions of any degree of industry whatever.

The utmost pains had likewise been taken by the enemy during the two preceding months, to destroy all the villages and every particle of forage and provisions belonging to the inhabitants within a circuit of several miles, and to those circumstances, of so much disadvantage to the operations of the army, was to be added the premature setting in of the monsoon, near a month before the usual period; and by the united operation of the causes that I have stated, we had not only, during the six or eight preceding days suffered very considerable losses amongst our draught and carriage cattle, but the greatest part of those which survived, were at this time reduced to a very weakly condition.

We were obliged to make so great a detour that we could only reach the Kannambaddy ford in two marches; and as the face of the country is exceedingly uneven and hilly, intersected with a number of deep ravines, and the road for the heavy guns was to be made the whole way by our own pioneers, these marches were found so difficult that, notwithstanding the pressure for time, I was forced to halt one day after the first march, by the draught cattle having been completely exhausted in accomplishing it.

Considerable detachments of troops were ordered to attend and assist the heavy guns on the second day's march; but the bullocks were so extremely reduced, that even with the aid of the soldiers at the drag-ropes, their progress was so tedious that the body of the army was upwards of twelve hours in marching as many miles, and the rear-guard did not reach the encampment near the ford till nine o'clock in the evening of the 20th of May.

It was not however till after I had received the reports from the different departments on the following morning, of the general wretched condition of the public cattle of the army, that I saw the impossibility of moving the heavy guns and stores from the spot where they then were, and that it became necessary for me to decide on relinquishing entirely the prosecution of the plan for the campaign, in which General Abercromby has been instructed to co-operate.

I then lost no time in communicating my determination to General Abercromby, who had advanced as far as Periapatam; and I directed him, after descending the Ghaut with the troops under his command, to put them into cantonments on the coast of Malabar during the rains, and until the proper season should return for recommencing our operations.

The effects of several circumstances from which we had already suffered many inconveniences, pressed upon us particularly hard at this juncture, and none more than the conduct of the Nizam's cavalry, who were now, if possible, more inactive and more inattentive to my requisitions than ever.

Far from rendering the services that I had expected from so numerous and

powerful a body of horse, in facilitating our foraging and covering extensive tracts of country, from which our followers as well as themselves might have obtained considerable supplies of provisions, they had, regardless of my remonstrances since the commencement of our march from Bangalore, hardly ever sent a detachment beyond the piquets of our infantry, and had persevered in exhausting the small stock of forage and provisions which, in spite of the devastation made by the enemy, was generally found within the bounds of the encampments, and which, if we had not been encumbered with them, we could have commanded for the use of our own army.

By this extraordinary degree of obstinate supineness, that large body of men, with their horses and numerous followers, about this time experienced the severest distress from scarcity, and the vast multitude of people belonging to our army, for whom it is impossible for the public to carry a stock of provisions, were reduced to nearly the same situation. Rice became so dear in the bazars that either the pressure of hunger or the temptation of the extravagant prices proved too powerful against all precautions that could be taken, and occasioned depredations of the grain that had been provided and brought with us to supply the fighting men of the army to so alarming an extent, that the apprehension that there would be a want of grain for the soldiers long before the stores that had been provided for them ought to have been expended, operated powerfully with other reasons, to force me to fall back to Bangalore.

Urgent, however, as our own necessities were to move nearer to our supplies, I could not leave Tippoo at liberty to employ his whole force against General Abercromby, and therefore resolved to remain in my position near the ford, which held the main body of the enemy's army in check at Seringapatam, until I should have reason to believe that General Abercromby was out of all danger of being interrupted in his retreat, by Tippoo's either marching in person or considerably reinforcing the corps which I knew he had detached against him, which alone was not of sufficient strength to make me apprehend that it could give General Abercromby any material molestation.

In the mean time I gave directions to burst eleven heavy guns (eight eighteen and three four-and-twenty pounders), to bury and destroy the military stores that could not be carried with us, and to deliver nearly the whole of the rice in our possession to the troops, which, on a calculation of easy marches, would have been sufficient to subsist them until they should arrive at Bangalore—measures which had now become the more indispensably necessary, as, in addition to the losses of public cattle that we had suffered from the causes that I have now mentioned, an epidemic disorder, not uncommon in this country, had broke out amongst them, and had carried off several thousands in a few days.

Having remained long enough to give ample time to General Abercromby to fall back from Periapatam, I moved from my encampment near the ford on the morning of the 26th, with the intention to proceed to Bangalore, and to employ a few months in refreshing and refitting the army, and to make every other necessary preparation for resuming our operations against the enemy's capital as soon as the rivers should subside, unless Tippoo should in the mean time agree to make such concessions as the confederates might reasonably think they had a right to exact from him.

Upon reaching the ground that had been fixed upon for the first day's encampment, I was told, to my great surprise, that some Maratta messengers had arrived to inform me that the two Maratta armies, under the command of Hurry Punt and Purseram Bhow, were at no great distance from us, and that their advanced corps under Appa Saheb, Purseram Bhow's son, was almost in sight.

I had for some weeks before given up all hopes of being joined by the Marattas, with whose dilatory conduct I was much dissatisfied; and although I saw that their junction at this critical time would be attended with many advantages to the common cause, I could not help lamenting, as not only our heavy guns were now destroyed, but General Abercromby's corps had actually descended the Ghauts, that by their tardiness in commencing their march, and from my having even been deprived of all knowledge of their approach by the vigilance of the enemy's light troops, and the criminal inactivity of the Nizam's cavalry, an opportunity was lost which could not now be recalled, to drive the enemy's whole army, that had so recently been humbled by a defeat, and would not have dared to keep the field, into the island of Seringapatam, where its distresses must soon have reduced Tippoo to the necessity of submitting to the terms of peace that we might have prescribed to him.

I took measures, however, immediately for fixing as early a day as possible for an interview with the chiefs, which by a movement of both armies took place three days after; and as it was of great consequence to cultivate a good understanding with them, I said very little on the just grounds which I had to complain of the lateness of their arrival, and contented myself at the first meeting with obtaining a knowledge of the nature of their instructions and of their future intentions.

They made the most explicit declarations that they were ordered by the Peshwa, and that it was equally their own inclination, to act entirely in concert with me; and in the course of two or three conferences it was not only settled that all the confederate forces should keep the field in the Mysore country during the rains, but they also acquiesced in a general arrangement that I proposed for the disposition of the armies, the principal objects of which were to give me an easy and safe communication with the Carnatic, to enable me to draw from thence the supplies of artillery and stores that would be necessary for prosecuting the operations of the ensuing campaign, to subsist the allied armies as much as might be possible at the expense of the enemy, and to endeavour to deprive him of the revenues and resources of all the northern parts of his dominions.

Having stated to the Maratta chiefs the danger of attempting to maintain the communication with their own country by the route to the westward of Chitteldroog, by which Purseram Bhow had marched from Darwar, they agreed to relinquish it, and to be satisfied with that by Sera and Roydroog, which I recommended as preferable, on condition that I would delay my march to the eastward, until all the detachments which Purseram Bhow had left upon his route could join the army or be sent back across the Tumbuddra, to which, upon their assurances that we should be able to purchase from the grain-dealers attached to them a sufficient quantity of grain to subsist our troops and followers for some time to come, I consented.

In order therefore to effect those purposes, we halted frequently, and having, soon after the junction of the Marattas, sent back to the Nizam all those of his troops that had either from the loss or the weakness of their horses become unfit for service, the confederate force moved together, gradually though slowly, towards Bangalore; and upon our arrival within about twenty miles of that place, it was thought advisable to acquiesce in Purseram Bhow's wishes to move with the army under his own immediate command towards Sera, to secure that communication and to possess himself of the adjoining country, according to the plan that had been arranged. Hurry Punt, with his division and the Nizam's cavalry, remaining with our army.

After drawing from Bangalore four heavy guns and a supply of provisions, I marched from the neighbourhood of that place on the 15th of July, towards

Oussore, a fortress upon which Tippoo has bestowed much labour and expense, but which, though in a very defensible state, was not completely finished. The garrison abandoned the place on the approach of a detachment that I had sent forward to invest and summon it, but they at the same time sprung a mine under one of the batteries that did considerable damage, and attempted, though unsuccessfully, by a train to blow up the powder magazine.

Conformable to my plan, I placed the heavy guns and the spare stores and provisions, in the fort of Oussore with a good garrison; and the damage occasioned by the explosion was ordered to be repaired with all possible expedition. A strong escort was at the same time sent to bring a large convoy of various kinds of supplies from Amboor.

On the 18th of July the army marched to support a brigade that I had detached to endeavour to reduce the hill forts adjoining to the Palicode Pass, by far the easiest and best in the whole range of mountains that divide the Mysore country from the Carnatic; and in a few days we were fortunate enough, by the spirited behaviour of our troops and the pusillanimity of the garrisons, to obtain possession of a sufficient number of those small but exceedingly strong places to afford considerable protection to the march of our convoys, and to render it hazardous and difficult for the enemy to send troops into the Barramaul.

I conceive it to be needless to trouble you with a detail of the preparations that will be made in the course of the next two months for ensuring success to the plan of operations for the ensuing campaign, which will be nearly similar to that which was intended for the last; and should therefore content myself with assuring you that no exertions of mine shall be wanting to render them complete, and that I have an entire confidence in meeting with the most thorough support from all your Governments.

It would be vain to suppose that we should remain long undisturbed by an enemy so able and active as Tippoo; but although, from the immense extent of our possessions and posts, it may be impossible to prevent him from gaining some small advantage during the period that we are restrained from carrying on offensive operations, I trust it will not be in his power to do anything which can either materially injure or impede the execution of our main objects.

He has lately, as I had long expected, made an attempt to disturb the country of Coimbatore and our southern provinces, in which he has been completely foiled by the gallantry and good conduct of the officers in that quarter; but he has been successful in routing a small detachment of irregulars which Purseram Bhow had left at a great distance from his army to blockade the hill fort of Mudgheri, not far from Sera.

I cannot say that I was much surprised at this accident; and indeed, notwithstanding my repeated recommendations to them to be cautious in detaching, and to avoid bad and distant posts, they are so apt to deviate from system in the execution of any plan, that I am afraid they must feel the ill consequences of improvident conduct still more severely, before I shall be able completely to command their attention.

The inconveniences which the expense of this war must occasion to your finances have given me the most sincere concern; but on the other hand it is a source of satisfaction to myself, as it must be to every other person who feels for the interest and honour of the Company and the nation, that there is at present a favourable prospect that it will be terminated with valuable acquisitions to the Company and to the other members of the Confederacy, and with the humiliation of a Prince who forced us to draw the sword by a wanton violation of a solemn treaty, and whose overgrown power, directed by a perfidious and barbarous disposition, and by a spirit of insatiable ambition, has frequently given just cause of

alarm for the safety of your possessions in this part of India, and has long rendered him an object of the utmost terror to all his other neighbours.

Impelled, however, as I was by the consideration of the state of your finances, to put something to the hazard in attempting to bring the war to a speedy conclusion, the information that I had received of the situation of political affairs in Europe operated also strongly to induce me to make an effort to reduce the enemy's capital, and by that means entirely break his power before the setting in of the periodical rains; and although a number of circumstances combined to counteract my endeavour to shorten in that manner the duration of the war, yet, whilst the failure has reflected no disgrace upon the British arms, the attempt has in other respects produced many solid advantages to the common cause, and without having been attended with any material addition to the expense which we must necessarily have incurred, if the army had during the same period remained in a state of inactivity.

I have reason to be persuaded that all instances on my part would have been ineffectual, and that nothing but an apprehension that their interests might suffer by their not being present at the reduction of Seringapatam, could have prevailed upon both the Maratta chiefs to leave in other hands the collection of the revenues in the enemy's fertile northern dominions that they had overrun, and to advance so rapidly to the southward to form a junction with me; and it is in consequence of the junction, and of their having consented to remain with their numerous and powerful cavalry to act in concert with us, that we have been able for so long a period to hem Tippoo with his army into a very circumscribed space, and to deprive him of all revenue or supplies of any kind from the greatest part of his extensive territories. At the time that we suffered the greatest inconvenience from the inactivity of the Nizam's cavalry, and I expressed my dissatisfaction in the strongest terms at the behaviour of the chiefs, I was perfectly sensible that even their presence contributed to awe the enemy, and was otherwise of value as being a proof of the strong connexion of the Confederacy; and I saw no ground to impute blame to his Highness on their account, in any other shape than that of want of judgment in placing at the head of so large a portion of his forces such a man as Rajah Feige Wunt, who is destitute, to an uncommon degree, of almost every quality which a military commander ought to possess, and in employing several chiefs under him, who, from their rank and superior military experience, must naturally become his advisers, or have great influence with him, but on whose honour and fidelity his Highness should not have placed a dependence.

I have from time to time conveyed these sentiments to the Nizam and his Minister in the most explicit terms, and I have every reason to be satisfied with the impression that my representations have made upon them; for in order to remedy the defect of which I have complained, and render the service of his troops more efficacious in future, he has promised to send his second son, Secundah Jah, with the Minister, Azeem ul Omrah, to command them; and he has given me the strongest assurances through Meer Allum, who lately arrived in camp, that the Minister, with all the intended reinforcements, in which the two Company's battalions in his pay will be included, shall, conformable to my desire, join me before the end of the month of October.

Reduced as Tippoo's resources now are, and diminished and dispirited as his army must be by our repeated success, there can be little doubt of his being desirous of peace, but I have not yet discovered any clear symptoms of his haughty mind being prepared to submit to the terms which the Allies, from a consideration of their future safety and of their right to expect some compensation for their losses and expenses, will think it necessary to impose upon him.

After having been equally unsuccessful with the Peshwa and the Nizam as

with myself, in frequent attempts during the last three or four months to create jealousies amongst the Confederates, by proposing to open separate negotiations with them without admitting his knowledge of the nature of the Confederacy, he at last thought proper to comply with my recommendation to address himself at the same time to the three Powers, and to request permission to send a Vakeel to treat with them collectively.

Permission was accordingly granted, but as the Vakeel preferred claims respecting the forms of his public reception and the mode of opening the negotiation which could not, without the greatest impropriety, be complied with, and from which he declared his instructions did not authorise him to recede, it was thought most advisable by Hurry Punt and Meer Allum (who are invested with full powers from their respective Governments), as well as myself, that he should be requested, after having given him a few days for consideration, to return to his master, and he accordingly proceeded to him from Bangalore on the 24th of last month.

We have not yet received any further message from Tippoo, but I think it highly probable that he will soon renew his proposition for opening a negotiation; and should he at any time appear to be seriously disposed to acquiesce in terms of accommodation which a regard for your honour and interests, as well as those of the Allies, will render it incumbent on us to demand, the strongest considerations, both public and private, will insure my most cordial exertions to bring this contest to a speedy conclusion.

I must however confess that although it may be possible that in case of his other schemes being unsuccessful, he may see the necessity of submitting to our demands before the confederate forces shall be completely ready to move again towards his capital, yet I see no good reason to believe that he has any other design at present than that of endeavouring to disunite the Confederates by underhand intrigues amongst them; and I shall certainly therefore not relax in the smallest degree in forwarding the necessary preparations to enable me, as soon as the season will permit, to resume the most vigorous prosecution of offensive operations.

You are so well informed by your own records of the characters and dispositions of our Allies, that I need hardly state to you that in transacting business with people differing so much from ourselves in language, manners, and customs, so unsystematic in their natures, so ignorant of the military science, and so liable to be biassed from the pursuit of a general good by private and selfish views, many difficulties are unavoidably experienced; and I shall only assure you that neither temper nor perseverance shall be wanting on my part to preserve union amongst the different members of the Confederacy, and to draw the utmost exertions that may be practicable from them, for promoting the general prosperity.

I have thought it my duty to give you the above general statement of the occurrences of the last campaign and of our present situation, and before I conclude this letter I must, in justice to the officers and soldiers both of the King's and Company's troops who compose this army, give my public testimony, that during the course of a campaign which from a concurrence of circumstances has been singularly arduous, they have manifested patience under fatigue and scarcity, gallantry in action, and a general spirit of zeal for the honour and interests of their country, to an extent which in my opinion has never been exceeded by any troops whatever, and which gives them a just claim to the warmest and most substantial marks of your approbation. . . .

I have, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

No. LV.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO COLONEL MACKENZIE.

SIR, Camp near Bangalore, Sept 21, 1791.

The members of the Supreme Board have transmitted to me a copy of their proceedings, including the correspondence that has passed in consequence of a dispute that happened between Mr. Paterson, Civil Magistrate at Dacca, and Captain Maxwell, Commanding Officer of the troops in that district, and have requested my sentiments upon the subject. And it gives me great concern to find myself obliged to say, after perusing these papers, that the opinions maintained by yourself and Captain Maxwell, appear to me no less repugnant to the principles of the British Constitution, than directly incompatible with the state of subordination in which the military power is legally placed under the Company's civil governments in India.

It is of great consequence for the public good that a strict discipline should be established, and that habits of obedience to the legal orders of their superior officers should be uniformly enforced amongst all the troops in the King's or Company's service; but in the eye of the constitutional law of Britain, which in that point strictly applies to the governments in India, it is of still more importance that no military men of any rank or description should be suffered to attempt to resist, or even to affect the least independence of the civil power. No right however or principle of discipline exists, which entitles an officer to expect that illegal orders shall be executed, and as the order proposed by Captain Maxwell for the guidance of the Sepoys upon guard at his house appears to have been of that description, his conduct in giving it cannot be justified; and I do not conceive that any act could have been more criminal than it would have been in them to have obeyed it, by making use of their arms to resist Mr. Paterson, or that a greater insult could have been offered to Government, than that of charging those soldiers with submission to the authority of a civil magistrate, as a crime against military discipline, before a General Court-Martial.

My opinion is, that it will in general be found most expedient both for the purposes of substantial justice, and for the prevention of jealousies and misunderstandings between civil and military officers, that when military men are charged with crimes which come under the cognizance of the civil power, the magistrate should apply for the delivery of them to the officer commanding the station or corps to which they may happen to belong. But Captain Maxwell and all other officers ought to advert, that although the articles of war declare the punishment to which military officers would be liable, if they should upon the application of the civil magistrate, refuse to deliver up to him, or to aid and assist him in apprehending, any accused persons under their command, neither the articles of war, nor any other statute, require of the civil magistrates that they should make such applications to the military officers, if they should judge it more advisable to endeavour to secure military offenders in any other manner.

There are many objections to a public discussion of questions of this nature; and I conceive that few cases can occur, in which a regard to propriety and to the principles of subordination would not render it the duty of a military officer to submit without murmur to the decision of the Government under which he serves. And it has therefore given me particular concern to observe that, upon an occasion where nothing beyond error in judgment was imputed either to yourself or to Captain Maxwell, and on which Government has in every respect acted with so much moderation, both of you have ventured to remonstrate against a

decision of Government, in a case where, after stating your first opinions, you have no share of public responsibility, and that you have done it in a style and form, which nothing less than a direct attack upon your honour and moral character could have rendered in any degree justifiable.

I am fully persuaded that neither yourself nor Captain Maxwell have been conscious that you were acting with impropriety towards Government, and it has therefore given me great pain to be under the necessity, in the due discharge of my duty, to declare an unfavourable public opinion upon your conduct.

I trust that your own reflection and good sense will sufficiently point out to you a line for all parts of your public conduct, which can give Government no ground in future to complain of you; and I must desire that you will inform Captain Maxwell, that after Government had come to a determination upon the principle of the case which had been submitted to them in consequence of the dispute between him and Mr. Paterson, I consider his pertinaciousness in making further remonstrances upon the subject as deserving my highest disapprobation.

I am, &c.,

Cornwallis.

No. LVI.

From the Secret Committee to the Governor-General in Council.

[Secret.] Received Oct. 1791.

My Lord, East India House, May 6, 1791.

. . . We cannot conclude this letter without referring to the present state of the Nabob of Arcot and Rajah of Tanjore, in consequence of the interference you have been obliged to assume in their affairs, for the effectual collection and due administration of their revenues. The grounds which led to that interference will necessarily prevent the countries belonging either to the Nabob or the Rajah being restored to their immediate management, until their proportion of the War expenses shall be discharged, and the arrears which remained due for the Peace contribution are completely liquidated, unless, in the mean time, any arrangement should be formed on the principles stated in Lord Cornwallis's letter of 11th September, 1790, to the Nabob, for securing a punctual payment in future, without retaining the management of the revenues under the Company's direction.

This may be very difficult to be accomplished, but if any plan really adequate to the purpose can be proposed, both the circumstances of the case, and the assurances given by Lord Cornwallis to the Nabob in the letter referred to, render it impossible to reject such a plan, if it is proposed by the Nabob or Rajah respectively, and if no better arrangement can, with their consent, be substituted in its place. It is, however, much more to be wished, that instead of the countries being restored, either in consequence of the adoption of any new plan of the nature now referred to, or of a final settlement of the account after the conclusion of the present war, means should, if possible, be found of bringing both the Nabob and the Rajah voluntarily to concur in leaving the management of the countries permanently in the hands of the Company, on condition of their continuing to receive the same proportion as at present, to their own proper use, in the different contingencies of peace or war. We have formerly had occasion to express to you our sentiments of the ruinous consequences of the system of government which

has for some time subsisted in those countries, and we are disposed to flatter ourselves that the experience of the good effects derived from the administration of the revenue in our hands, may satisfy both the Nabob and the Rajah, that the continuance of the system now adopted will in fact be as advantageous to their true interests as to our own.

By the possession our servants now have of the revenues of those countries, they are furnished with the means of obtaining accurate knowledge of their actual state and resources: we trust these advantages will be duly improved for the purpose of correcting past errors, and laying a solid foundation for the future good government of those countries. It is a cruel feeling to reflect on the small progress to improvement these valuable countries have made under the government of their proper rulers. The Resident of Tanjore, Mr. Ram, says that in the Rajah's country there is from 1786 a balance of upwards of 13 lacs of pagodas unaccounted for. If, upon enquiry, this turns out to be the fact, it is impossible the Rajah can wish for the continuance of such a Minister.

The state of the troops kept up by the Nabob deserves the particular attention of the Governor-General, when he is on the coast. Any other troops than Sibbendies, necessary for the collection of his revenues, are useless and burdensome, and it is impossible he can pay both them and ours.

We have, &c.

No. LVII.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO SIR C. OAKELEY.

SIR, Camp near Seringapatam, Feb. 23, 1792.

I this day received the obliging congratulations of the Board, dated the 17th inst., for which I request that you will assure them of my grateful acknowledgments.

The negotiation which I mentioned in my letter of the 20th is still pending. Some difficulties were stated by the Vakeels relative to peculiar circumstances respecting Tippoo's two elder sons, neither of whom, as I understand, are intended by him to be his heir. Some objections were likewise offered by them to the cession of particular places, on the plea of their being ancient possessions, and proposals were made for paying part of the stipulated sum in jewels or goods.

To all these points I have given distinct and decided answers, and have required that the business may be brought to an immediate issue. The Vakeels who carried my ultimate propositions yesterday to their master, have returned this day to our camp, and as our deputies will meet them either this evening or to-morrow morning, I shall soon be enabled to judge whether the treaty is likely to succeed.

There is in the mean time no relaxation in the operations of the war. We are carrying on our approaches with as much expedition as possible, and General Abercromby, who is encamped on the south side of the river, had yesterday a very smart skirmish in support of an advanced piquet, which the enemy had come out in considerable force to attack. The troops which General Abercromby detached from his camp repulsed the enemy, although they were in a great degree protected by the fire of the fort, but I am sorry to add that this advantage cost him 104 men, killed and wounded.

Colonel Floyd arrived this morning with a convoy of above 25,000 Brinjarries. Purseram Bhow is within three or four days' march of us, and I have strongly urged him, instead of coming forward to our camp, to cross the river and join General Abercromby.

I am, &c.,

Cornwallis.

No. LVIII.

Earl Cornwallis to the Court of Directors.

Honourable Sirs, Camp before Seringapatam, March 4, 1792.

I have now the satisfaction to be able to inform your Honourable Court that the war with Tippoo Sultaun is terminated by a peace with that Prince, and on conditions which I trust will secure solid and lasting advantages to the Company and to the British nation.

The multiplicity of arrangements which it was necessary to combine for transporting our military stores and provisions, and for securing future supplies of subsistence for the vast multitudes of soldiers and followers that belong to the confederate armies, as well as the embarrassment of so many heavy incumbrances with the army, would, even with the most hearty concurrence of all the officers who were intrusted with the principal executive parts of the plan of the campaign, have unavoidably rendered our movement towards the enemy's capital extremely slow; but after the date of my last letter I was further delayed beyond all my calculation in advancing to Seringapatam, by the culpable conduct of Purseram Bhow, who, in direct contradiction to his repeated promises, suffered himself to be allured by the hopes of being able to plunder the rich province of Bednore, and with that view marched his army to the westward, instead of complying with my request that he would move back to the eastward to co-operate in the general plan that had been long settled amongst the confederate powers for the investiture and reduction of Seringapatam.

A very successful expedition, that was made by a large detachment of Tippoo's cavalry for the purpose of relieving the upper fort of Gurrumconda, so entirely deranged the measures that the Nizam's Minister, Azeem ul Omrah, had taken for the security of that quarter, that after having advanced to the southward of Chintomeny-pet, he was obliged to return with his whole corps to re-establish order in the districts adjoining to Gurrumconda, which likewise gave me some interruption. His zeal, however, for the cause, and his earnest desire to bring the Prince Secunder Jah to the army before it moved forward, called forth his utmost exertions on this occasion, and he returned and joined the other allied forces on the 25th of January.

As three Bombay battalions are attached to Purseram Bhow's army, which is also numerous and active, and has long been in the practice of carrying on separate operations and of securing its own supplies, I had placed my dependence upon that corps for crossing the Caveri to join General Abercromby, and to enable him not only to bring on his heavy artillery from the top of the Ghauts, but also to invest Seringapatam completely on the southern side of the river.

The disappointment, however, that I experienced from the Bhow obliged me to make several alterations in my original plan, though the cheerful readiness shown by Azeem ul Omrah upon his junction at first encouraged me to flatter myself that no very great deviation from it would be necessary.

Immediately upon my ascertaining that Purseram Bhow had no intention to

execute the part of the general plan that had been allotted for him, I despatched orders to General Abercromby to place his heavy artillery in a secure post at the top of the Ghauts, and to hold his corps in readiness to move, lightly equipped in every respect, at the shortest notice; and on the day of my arrival in this neighbourhood, I sent further instructions to him to march without delay, and occupy as strong a position as he could find on the south side of the Eratore ford, at the distance of between 30 and 40 miles from hence, and which had been described as one of the best fords upon the river.

My intention then was to have availed myself of the Minister's disposition to comply with my recommendations, and to have sent him with all the Nizam's troops and the two Madras battalions attached to them, to form a junction with General Abercromby on the south bank of the river, and to have directed according to circumstances, either that the combined force should proceed without delay to invest the south side of Seringapatam, or that the General should previously send to the top of the Ghaut for his heavy artillery.

More minute inquiries into the internal state of the Nizam's troops obliged me to relinquish that plan; for I found that the minister's talent for securing regular supplies for the troops under his command, fell so far short of his zeal to promote my wishes and the general interests of the Confederacy, that his corps could not be detached even for a few days to any considerable distance from our Bazars and our northern communications, without exposing it to suffer great distress from want of provisions; and as neither Hurry Punt's health, nor the condition of his army, admitted of his undertaking that service in the room of Azeem ul Omrah, I was subsequently obliged to direct General Abercromby to cross and join me on the north side of the river.

Although all my hopes were at an end of receiving any immediate assistance from Purseram Bhow, and I concluded that our difficulties would be greatly increased by that disappointment, I neither deviated from the execution of the general outlines of the original plan of the campaign, nor felt diffident of ultimate success; but at the same time I stated my sentiments on his conduct in very strong terms, both to himself and to the Court of Poonah. And as the forces under his command were peculiarly well calculated for giving essential aid either in holding the place closely invested, or in making head against any corps which Tippoo might keep in the field for the purpose of intercepting our supplies during the siege, I requested of him to quit the pursuits in which he was engaged, and move (late as it was, and different from the plan that had been settled) with the utmost expedition by the route that he had marched last season towards our army.

The Bhow had met with considerable success in his desultory expedition; for by the good conduct of Captain Little, and the gallantry of the three Bombay battalions under his command, he totally defeated, in a thick woody country in the neighbourhood of Samoga, the corps commanded by the Nabob Riza Ali, which Tippoo had stationed in that quarter for the protection of the Bednore country, and in consequence of that victory he obtained possession of Samoga after a slight resistance, and of all the other posts belonging to the enemy, within a few miles' distance from the town of Bednore; and it afterwards appeared that although he had reasonable grounds then to flatter himself that the place would soon have fallen into his hands, he came to a sudden resolution to return from thence by rapid marches to join us, which he effected two days after the preliminaries of peace were signed. But whether his determination to return to the southward was owing, as it was reported, to his having received peremptory orders to that effect from Poonah, or to the letters that I had written to him, I

do not know, nor have I now thought it worth while to be at much pains to ascertain.

There was in the mean time no intermission in the exertions that were necessary to complete our own preparations, and to enable me to proceed to attack the enemy's army and capital with the confederate forces under my own immediate direction; and as soon as I could move from the neighbourhood of Hooliadroog I advanced, and after a few easy marches, encamped on the 5th of February behind the French rocks, at the distance of about seven or eight miles from Seringapatam.

Upon my arrival there I found, conformable to information that I had previously received, that Tippoo, trusting to the strength of his position, appeared to have determined to keep his ground, and as the badness of all the fords near the town, and indeed the security of our northern supplies, put it equally out of my power to attempt to pass the river with the main army and all its stores and heavy artillery, I did not hesitate in resolving to attack him, his removal being an indispensable preliminary to the commencement of the siege of his capital.

In order therefore to be enabled to take proper measures for carrying my determination into execution, the afternoon of the 5th was employed in examining hircarrahs, who had been frequently sent to Tippoo's camp to make observations upon it; and on the following morning the whole position was carefully reconnoitred under cover of a strong detachment, from the tops of eminences, which, though at a considerable distance, commanded a view of it through its whole extent from the right to the left.

It then clearly appeared to have been chosen with great judgment, and fortified with extraordinary care, on a tract of land close to the north bank of the river, and nearly parallel to the island with the heights of the Karigaut Pagoda, almost within the distance of a cannon-shot, on the right, and those of Somarpet and the Ead-gah (a place of Mahomedan worship) on the left; the front not only covered by a bound-hedge and six large redoubts well furnished with cannon, but the approach to it also rendered uncommonly difficult by a number of rice-fields, ravines, and water-courses, with which it was almost in every part intersected; and the whole was within reach and protected either by the guns of the fort, or by batteries and intrenchments that had been constructed on the island.

Under these circumstances it was evident that the event of an attack in daylight might have been doubtful, and that the loss of a great number of our best soldiers would have been certain, whilst at the same time, when he had a retreat for his army so near and so well covered, I could hardly have been sanguine enough to hope that any advantage which it would have been possible to have gained in the day would have been decisive.

I therefore determined to attack him in the night, and without loss of time; and as little use could be expected from our guns in the dark, and the nature of the ground between us and the enemy's camp would have rendered it extremely difficult to convey them, I resolved to march without artillery of any kind; and in such an enterprise neither our own nor the cavalry of the allies could afford any assistance.

Having arranged the plan of attack in the afternoon of the 6th, and allotted the reserve, consisting of our own cavalry and one European and one native battalion, the camp-guard of the other regiment, and the corps of artillery, the whole under the command of Colonel Duff, for the protection of all our baggage, guns, and stores, nineteen battalions were ordered to be ready to march as soon as it was dark, in three columns: the right column, composed of two European

and five native battalions, commanded by Major-General Medows; the centre column, composed of three European and five native battalions, under my own immediate direction; and the left column, composed of one European and three native battalions, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Maxwell. Lieut.-Colonels Cockerell and Nesbitt were attached to the right; Lieut.-Colonels Stuart and Knox to the centre; and Lieut.-Colonel Baird to the left column. A small detachment of the corps of artillery was ordered to march in the rear of each of the columns, to be in readiness to make use of any of the enemy's guns that might fall into our hands.

The commanding nature of the ground on which the Ead-gah stands, had induced Tippoo to construct a redoubt upon that eminence, but though within the bound-hedge, as it was not less than half-a-mile distant from the front of his army, and I had received certain information that the work was uncommonly strong, and as I likewise conceived that from its advanced situation it would soon be evacuated if we should succeed in routing the army, it was not my intention that it should be attacked.

Directions were accordingly given that the right column should penetrate the enemy's line about half-a-mile to the eastward of the Ead-gah; the centre column a few hundred yards to the eastward of the road which leads to the ford at the Dowlat Baug; and the column under Lieut.-Colonel Maxwell was destined at the same time to attack the Karigaut Pagoda, and some works that the enemy had very lately begun to construct on an high hill that overlooks the pagoda at a small distance from it.

The officers leading the advanced divisions of the right and centre columns were instructed to endeavour, after penetrating the enemy's line, to pass the river if possible with the fugitives, and obtain possession of the batteries upon the island; and Lieut.-Colonel Maxwell was also directed, after possessing himself of the objects of his attack, to do his utmost to enter the island by the Karigaut Ford, when he should observe that the attacks upon the enemy's army had been successful.

A considerable time was required to arrange the troops from an extensive line of encampment in the order which had been prescribed for the respective columns; but the whole were ready to march forward about nine, and soon after eleven o'clock the centre and left columns reached the first points of their destination, and immediately attacked with the most complete success.

At the centre attack, the fire of the enemy's infantry and artillery was heavy for a short time, but our loss there was not great; and the head of the column, according to instructions, after carrying a large redoubt near which Tippoo's own tent was pitched, and upon which he principally depended for the protection of his right wing, mixed with the fugitives and crossed over to the island with them, with the greatest spirit and rapidity.

Lieut.-Colonel Maxwell having in the mean time driven the enemy from the posts that he was ordered to attack with very little loss on his side, descended the hill with three battalions of the left column upon observing the success of the centre attack; and upon finding it impracticable to force the Karigaut Ford under the heavy fire of the enemy's entrenchments on the opposite side, he moved with the utmost expedition to the ford at which part of the centre column was passing under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Stuart, and crossed over to the island with him.

The European flank companies of the centre column had in the mean time crossed at another ford, and by the united exertions of the whole we immediately became masters and retained possession of the Sultaun's principal garden, and the whole of the island to the eastward of the Pettah of Shahar Ganjam.

The right column, by a concurrence of several of those untoward circumstances to which attacks in the night must ever be liable, was delayed and disappointed in executing the part of the general arrangement that had been assigned to it.

The route of its intended march was across a space of country, which, though apparently open, is cut by several difficult ravines, with a deep water-course running through it, the channel of which winds so much that the column was obliged to pass it two or three times in endeavouring to march straight to the point of attack; and the guides who conducted it having by that means, and from their having been instructed to avoid the great roads, lost the proper direction of the march, unluckily carried the head of the column close to the Ead-gah redoubt, and before the mistake could be rectified the ardour of those that led engaged them in the assault.

Great pains had not only been taken in constructing the redoubt, and in providing it with cannon, but Tippoo had also intrusted the defence of it to a large body of the choice of his infantry.

The struggle was therefore violent, and for a short time almost doubtful; for the first efforts of our troops, though gallant to the utmost degree, were not successful, and it was not carried at last without much effusion of blood on both sides.

General Medows immediately occupied the post with a strong detachment, and being within the bound-hedge, moved towards the point of the enemy's position at which it had been originally intended that he should penetrate; but the firing having long before ceased at the attacks of the other two columns, he concluded that the defeat of the enemy had been completed; and finding great difficulty from swamps and ravines in marching within the bound-hedge, he returned to the outside of it, and marched along its front to the Karigaut Pagoda, where he expected to be in immediate communication with the other divisions of the army.

In the mean time, however, part of the enemy's centre and left having a little recovered from the panic with which they had been struck by our success against their right, made a disposition and advanced about an hour before the day began to break, with a considerable degree of order and resolution, to attack the troops that occupied the ground at which we had first penetrated; but having luckily retained with myself near four battalions for the security of that point, the enemy were beaten and driven back after a sharp conflict; and day approaching fast, and the ground on which we stood being commanded by the guns of the fort, it was necessary to move from thence soon after, leaving a detachment in possession of the redoubt on the enemy's right, which had been carried in the beginning of the action.

Great and repeated exertions were made by Tippoo during the succeeding day to retake that redoubt, which the vicinity of the fort, and the excessive fatigue of the troops, rendered it difficult for us to succour; but all efforts proving fruitless, he desisted from the attempt in the afternoon; and in the course of the following night he evacuated all the other redoubts in his possession on the north side of the river.

Our loss in killed and wounded, though not great in number, must, from the value of the gallant officers and soldiers who fell, be estimated as very considerable: that of the enemy it has been impossible to ascertain with precision. It has however appeared in general, that his cavalry suffered considerably, and that his infantry, either in the action or by desertion since that day, has been so much diminished, that he never seemed to have considered the remainder as more than sufficient for the defence of Seringapatam. And besides other tro-

phies, seventy-seven pieces of cannon, thirty-five of which are brass, of different calibres, from nine to two-pounders, fell into our hands.

Exhausted as the troops were, nothing further could be done on the 7th than to take some steps for securing our posts upon the island, which I had occupied with eight battalions; and in order to provide against all disappointment in the co-operation of the Bombay army, as well as that it might be as little exposed as possible to be harassed on the march by Tippoo's cavalry, I despatched in the afternoon of that day the instructions that I have already mentioned to General Abercromby, to cross and join me with the utmost expedition on the north side of the river. And having two days after sent our own cavalry, a large body of the Nizam's and the Maratta horse, and one of the Company's battalions in the Nizam's pay, to meet him on the march, a corps of Tippoo's cavalry that had crossed the river for the purpose, was completely foiled in an attempt to disturb him, and he joined us on the 15th of February.

All the necessary measures were also taken in the mean time to quicken the preparations for commencing the siege, and to counterbalance a multitude of obstacles which the bareness of the country on the north side, and many circumstances in the situation of the place prescribed to us, we were lucky enough to find ample materials for fascines and gabions in Tippoo's extensive gardens on the island.

Some of the most capable of the Frenchmen and other foreigners, who had long been in Tippoo's service, came over to us in the course of a few days after the action, and it soon appeared from their accounts as well as from the result of our own reconnoitring, that all the descriptions that we had hitherto obtained of the situation and of the works of the fort, and even the remarks that had been made upon them last season by ourselves, were extremely incorrect and imperfect. Instead therefore of attacking it as I had at first proposed, on the island side, where, besides some outworks, it is defended by two deep ditches, and two strong walls with bastions and cavaliers constructed with great care, and well furnished with heavy artillery, I resolved, after the most mature consideration, and notwithstanding the difficulties that were to be apprehended in establishing communications to the breaches across the north branch of the river, to carry on the attack against the space which includes the Sultan Bastion and the Western Cavalier; and although the weakness of the wall, the shallowness of the ditch, and the incomplete state of part of the glacis in that quarter, would perhaps have appeared to me to afford sufficient grounds for that resolution, I was still further encouraged to adopt it, by having ascertained that it would, at this season of the year, be practicable to throw the greatest part of the water of the Caveri out of the two branches that form the island of Seringapatam, by repairing and improving a dam that goes across the river a few miles above the island, which seems to be an ancient work, and constructed, like several others on the Caveri, for the purpose of forcing part of the current into canals that have been cut with great skill and labour, to furnish water for the cultivation of a long tract of land on both sides of the river.

Having determined upon the above plan of attack, it became necessary to strengthen further our posts upon the island, in order that I might be able, without endangering their safety, to withdraw some part of the force that had hitherto been sent upon that duty, to assist in carrying on the siege.

Strong working parties, in addition to those that were constantly occupied in making fascines and gabions, were accordingly employed to render those posts secure; and this object being accomplished, six battalions were allotted as a stationary guard of the island, and for furnishing such working parties as might be necessary to afford a certain and ample supply of fascines and gabions for the works.

Our arrangements of every other kind being likewise completed, the trenches were opened on the night of the 18th February, and on the following morning General Abercromby was ordered to cross the river with nine battalions, about two miles above the ford, to occupy an advantageous and strong position at the distance of about random cannon-shot from the works, and he was instructed to make immediate preparations for carrying on approaches, and for constructing batteries to assist in destroying the enemy's works, and to enfilade the whole front that was to be attacked.

During the time that the military operations that I have described were carrying on with unremitting vigour, Tippoo, sensible of the danger of his situation, had made several overtures to treat with the Confederates; and a few days after the action, a negotiation was opened by deputies from all the parties, which, after various discussions, terminated the contest.

Before the Confederate armies moved from the neighbourhood of Outradroog, letters were received from Tippoo, in which he repeated his request to be permitted to send Vakeels to treat; but with the warm approbation and concurrence of Hurry Punt and Azeem ul Omrah, I told him that I should insist upon his executing the capitulation of Coimbatoor as a preliminary to all negotiation.

In answer to my letter he denied that any capitulation for that garrison had taken place between Lieut. Chalmers and Kumarwad-dien Khan; and as it was far from my wish to drive him to despair, by treating so shameless an assertion in the manner it deserved, and by that means shutting the door against all treaty, I replied, with the same concurrence of the Confederates, that it depended entirely upon himself to state this matter in a clear and uncontrovertible light, by communicating again with Kumarwad-dien Khan upon the subject, and by a personal examination of Lieuts. Chalmers and Nash, who were still in his possession; and that if I had been misinformed, he could, without the least prejudice to his interests, as I should engage that neither of the gentlemen should serve against him during the war, easily convince me of it, by sending out Lieuts. Chalmers and Nash, or one of them, to declare the truth.

Of this proposition he took no notice till after the defeat of his army; but in the afternoon of the 8th he sent to camp Lieuts. Chalmers and Nash and the few other Europeans that had been taken with them at Coimbatoor, accompanied with letters requesting again that Vakeels might be received from him to open a negotiation for peace.

Although Tippoo's flagrant breach of the capitulation was clearly established by the personal testimony of Lieuts. Chalmers and Nash, yet knowing as I did how important it was for the interests of the Company and the British nation, that no time should be unnecessarily lost in securing a safe and honourable peace, and seeing likewise that a perseverance in requiring a literal compliance with my first demand would amount to a virtual refusal to enter into any negotiation, as I had learnt from Lieut. Chalmers that the garrison of Coimbatoor was so much dispersed that it was not in Tippoo's power to execute the capitulation immediately, I judged it advisable to relax upon that point. And accordingly, after consulting with our Allies, I contented myself with saying, that, as he had shewn a disposition to make atonement for the breach of the capitulation, I should not, on account of the present critical state of affairs, insist upon its being fully executed previous to all negotiation, and that he was at liberty to send Vakeels to a spot that was pointed out, where deputies from the Confederate Powers would meet them to hear their propositions.

In consequence of this permission he appointed Gholam Ali Khan, who had been at the head of his embassy to Constantinople, and Ali Riza, his Vakeels;

and they arrived and encamped at the place that had been fixed upon for them on the afternoon of the 13th.

Conceiving it to be very improbable that Tippoo would authorise his Vakeels to make any specific propositions to us, I thought it would be proper, in the event of their declining to offer any terms, that our Deputies should be prepared to state those on which the Allies would agree to desist from further hostilities.

The Deputies having accordingly met the Vakeels on the morning of the 14th, and the latter having, as I expected, declined to make any offer, a demand was made on our part of the cession of country to the extent of three crores of rupees of revenue, and of eight crores of rupees in ready money; to which the Vakeels replied by protesting the total inability of their master to comply with the demand, but added that they would immediately go to the fort and lay it before him, and return as soon as possible with his own answer to it.

The Vakeels accordingly returned next morning, and after many references to Tippoo upon the modified conditions that were proposed at several different meetings by the Deputies of the Allies, of which it is unnecessary to trouble you with a detail, the preliminary articles of peace, of which I have now the honour to inclose a copy, were at last finally settled and agreed to by Tippoo on the night of the 23rd of February; and, at Tippoo's earnest request, all hostilities ceased, without waiting for the delivery of the hostages, on the following forenoon.

It was said that the want of punctuality in the delivery of the hostages was occasioned by some domestic difficulties in Tippoo's own family, as well as by it requiring some time to arrange their attendants, and to settle the ceremonials of their reception in camp; but on the 26th he sent out his second and third son to be delivered into my hands.

All the points that came under discussion in the course of the negotiation were regularly communicated to Hurry Punt and to Azeem ul Omrah, and their sentiments requested upon them; and it will no doubt give you pleasure to hear that in every measure that was determined upon respecting this important negotiation, there has uniformly been the most cordial concurrence and union in our opinions.

Indeed the general confidence that has been shown on the occasion in our good faith cannot fail of being highly gratifying to you; for the Deputies that were named by Hurry Punt and Azeem ul Omrah came to me previous to their meeting with Tippoo's Vakeels, to declare that they were instructed to agree to any terms of peace that should appear to me to be suitable to the interests of the three States, and no murmur or discontent has been expressed at the hostages remaining, according to the desire of their father, in my particular custody.

I did not expect that Tippoo's nature would suddenly change, and that he would act with openness and candour in executing the articles of the treaty. I was therefore in no degree surprised at finding, when his revenue accounts were produced, an evident design to practise every art to impose upon us, by exaggerating the value of the districts that lie contiguous to the territories of the Allies, and underrating those in the interior parts of his dominions, and which consequently are not to be ceded.

He has however in the mean time paid above one crore of rupees, which has been divided equally amongst the three Powers; and I persuade myself that by a firm perseverance in the demand that we have made of the production of original papers for our inspection, we shall before long be able to ascertain the amount of his revenue with sufficient accuracy for regulating the extent of the districts that are to be ceded by him, according to the terms of the treaty; and the armies will not only remain in this neighbourhood, but even the guard of the trenches will continue to mount regularly, until all these arrangements shall be completed.

I have in many instances derived great advantage from Sir John Kennaway's services in acting as a channel of intercourse between me and Azeem ul Omrah, but it has proved peculiarly fortunate that his attendance upon the Minister put it in my power, at this important juncture, to avail myself, by naming him as my Deputy, of his address and conciliatory manners in conducting the negotiations to so happy an issue; and it is very satisfactory to me that I can equally depend upon the most able assistance from him, both in obtaining from Tippoo the execution of the preliminaries and in framing the articles of the definitive treaty of peace.

The territory that the Company will acquire by the peace will be considerable in point of revenue, though, from the wide difference in several statements of Tippoo's whole revenues that have been produced, I cannot yet form a judgment of the amount; but important as an addition of revenue may be, I consider it of infinitely more consequence to the interests of the Company and the nation than almost any sum whatever, that the overgrown power of Tippoo, from which we have at different times suffered so much, and which has so long threatened your possessions on both coasts with total destruction, has been reduced, by the event of this war, within bounds which will deprive him of the power, and perhaps of the inclination, to disturb us for many years to come; whilst at the same time I hope that our acquisitions by this peace will give so much additional strength and compactness to the frontiers of our possessions, both in the Carnatic and on the coast of Malabar, as to render it extremely difficult for any power above the Ghauts to invade them.

The firmness and gallantry that has been displayed by the troops that compose this army, under the uncommon hardships and difficulties to which they have so often been exposed during the course of this war, reflects the highest honour upon themselves as soldiers, and gives them the strongest claim to the applause and favour of the Company and the nation; and the zeal and alacrity with which my instructions have been uniformly obeyed, as well as the personal attachment that has been shown to me on several trying occasions by the officers and soldiers in general, will ever be remembered by me with the warmest gratitude.

Although circumstances prevented General Abercromby from sharing in some of the active scenes in which the principal army was engaged, I am not the less sensible of his ardent desire to promote the public good, or of his ability in executing the services that were allotted to him; and no words can express the sense that I shall entertain throughout life of the ability and refined generosity and friendship with which General Medows has invariably given me his support and assistance.

I have thought it necessary, as a reward to the soldiers for the cheerfulness with which they have performed so many various duties, and as some compensation to the officers for the extraordinary expenses to which they have been exposed, to order a gratuity equal to six months' batta (about 22 lacs of rupees) to be issued from the money that has been paid by Tippoo, to all the troops that have been employed upon this service, which I hope will meet with your approbation; and as General Abercromby's situation would not justify him in following General Medows' and my own example in declining to accept any share in prize-money or gratuity, and from his receiving no batta, there is no rule upon that ground for regulating his portion, I have judged it most equitable to direct that he shall receive half a sixteenth of the amount of the whole sum that shall be issued to the army; being the proportion of prize-money which he is entitled to draw according to the principles of division which we understand to be established for the Flag Officers of His Majesty's navy, and which has been adopted for the General Officers of this army.

This despatch will be delivered to you by Captain Madan, my aide-de-camp, whom I beg leave to recommend to your notice; and as he obtained my leave to go from Bengal to join the army in the Carnatic at the breaking out of the war, and has since that time served constantly in the field, he will be able to explain the details of many transactions of which you may be desirous to receive particular information.

Captain Kyd has my directions to prepare a sketch of the ground on which the action was fought, and it will be transmitted to your Honourable Court with this despatch.

I have, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

No. LIX.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

HONOURABLE SIRS, Camp in Mysore, April 5, 1792.

I have the honour to enclose a copy of the definitive treaty which has been concluded with Tippoo Sultaun, conformable to the tenor and spirit of the preliminary articles which I transmitted to you by the last despatch, with a copy of the schedule which was annexed to the treaty, containing the names of the districts that have been ceded by Tippoo to the Allies.

You were informed by my letter dated the 4th ultimo, that being aware that Tippoo would practise every possible art to evade a strict execution of his engagements, I had determined to maintain the posts that we occupied before Seringapatam, until every arrangement for carrying the preliminary articles of peace into full effect could be completed; and I had soon reason to believe that none of my precautions were superfluous.

After sending out by some of his revenue officers some statements of his revenues that were evidently fabricated and incorrect, and which consequently were rejected, he at last declared that, owing to his having lost a great number of his papers in places that had been taken by the Allies, or in his camp on the night of the action, it was not in his power to give a regular authenticated account of the revenues of the different districts of his country, though he persevered in asserting that after deducting the expenses of collection, they did not much exceed two crore.

A statement therefore was formed from the best materials in the possession of the Allies, which rated his dominions at two crores and sixty lacks of net revenue, and upon which it was proposed that the division of his country should be made according to the terms of the preliminary articles; but upon its being produced he positively objected to its correctness, offering however, after some discussion, to allow the division to take place upon the ground that his net revenue amounted to something above two crore and thirty-seven lacks, to which, with the entire concurrence of Hurry Punt and Azeem ul Omrah, I judged it advisable to give my assent.

Upon the adjustment of this indispensable preliminary point, further difficulties were started, by his objecting with great warmth to cede some of the districts which had been included by the Allies in the selection of their respective portions, and above all others his repugnance to relinquish the Coorga country, which I was determined to obtain for the Company, as being necessary to form a secure barrier for our new possessions on the coast of Malabar, against every power above the Ghauts, appeared at one time to be almost unsurmountable.

At this stage of the negotiation the Allies were not only in possession of his two sons as hostages, but also of above eleven hundred thousand pounds of the sum that he had agreed to pay in ready money, which I should have considered as sufficient pledges from any other man for the performance of the whole of the preliminary articles, but faithless and violent as Tippoo's character was known to be, I judged it incumbent upon me to be prepared to support by force, if it should prove necessary, the rights that we had acquired by the preliminaries; and with that view I requested, in addition to several other measures, that Purseram Bhow would cross the Caveri and join General Abercromby, in order that we might be ready to act with efficacy and without loss of time against Seringapatam if a renewal of hostilities should become unavoidable, resolving at the same time that the armies should not quit the positions that they occupied until the articles of the definitive treaty should be arranged and actually signed.

As any material interruption, and still more a total breach in the negotiation, would have been attended with great inconvenience to our affairs, I was relieved from much anxiety when Tippoo, upon further reflection, withdrew all his objections, and consented on the 16th ultimo to sign the definitive treaty; and the first payment of one crore and sixty-five lacks of rupees being also completed in a few days, Purseram Bhow repassed the river, and after evacuating the trenches and our posts upon the island, all the Confederate forces began to move from Seringapatam on the 26th ultimo. The orders for the mutual cession of forts and districts conformable to the treaty having also been previously interchanged, I trust that in the course of a few weeks Tippoo will be in possession of the dominions that are left to him, and that the armies of the Allies will have returned within the new boundaries of their respective countries.

It must no doubt be highly gratifying to you, that a war into which we were forced by every consideration of good faith and sound policy, has not only terminated in the reduction of the strength of a neighbour of great power, and of the most inordinate ambition, but also in securing acquisitions to ourselves, which, exclusive of their inestimable value in point of situation, add considerably to your revenues, and promise to open sources of commerce in pepper, cardamums, teak, sandal-wood, &c., that may be looked upon as of great importance both to the Company and to the nation.

By the statement of Tippoo's revenues, upon which it was finally agreed by all parties that his country should be divided according to the terms of the preliminary articles, the Company's portion amounted to something above thirty-nine lacks and a-half of rupees of net revenue; and by an inspection of the General Map, you will readily perceive that, although in order to reduce the Company's share to that sum I was obliged to relinquish a few small districts on the top of the Ghauts, that properly belonged to the Barramaul, but which are not necessary for the security of our frontier, I have availed myself of our right of selection, by demanding and obtaining for the Company's portion countries that are both strong in themselves, and peculiarly well calculated to form a barrier to your ancient possessions.

The districts ceded to us on the coast of Malabar, consist of the whole of the tract of country below the Ghauts, laying between Travancore and the Kaway River, which is our northern boundary, and they are so fortunately situated, that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for Tippoo or any future sovereign of Mysore to disturb them.

Palacatcherry commands the only road by which an army can approach them from the Carnatic side. The only passes that lead into them from the Mysore country, viz. the Tambercherry and Pondicherrum Passes, are, from their belonging to our tributaries, in reality in our own possession; and the northern frontier

is, from the ruggedness of the country, and from its being intersected with a number of deep ravines and several considerable rivers, exceedingly inaccessible.

Dindigul constitutes a substantial protection to the southern provinces, and by the acquisition of the Barramaul, and of the country which, though composed of several different districts, is commonly called the Salem country, which gives us the command of all the passes of the Ghauts to the northward of the Caveri, we have obtained an effectual barrier to the Carnatic against all future invasions of the westward; and exclusive of the principal forts of Sankerydroog, Namcool, Ottoor, Khistnagerry, and Ryacotta, which no power in India could take from us, and which an invading army could not pass without hazarding the loss of its supplies, there are a number of smaller forts in those districts, that, in case of a temporary irruption of a corps of cavalry, would be capable of affording great protection to the persons and property of the inhabitants.

Had the extent of our share of the cessions made by Tippoo admitted of it, I should have had great satisfaction in adding the country of Coimbatore to the Company's other possessions, principally for the purpose of depriving the Mysore power of all footing below the Ghauts on the Carnatic side; but the disappointment is of the less consequence, as it is a defenceless open country which, in case of a future rupture, nothing less than Tippoo's whole force could attempt to defend against us, and from which he could not, without the greatest difficulty and danger, venture to invade the Carnatic.

A pass called the Caveriporam Pass is marked upon some of the sketches of that part of the country, but as it does not appear that Tippoo or his father ever brought guns down that pass, there is no good reason to suppose that it is at present, or that it could easily be made practicable for an army; and having lately had occasion to order a detachment to ascend the Guzzlehutty Pass, we have had an opportunity to ascertain that it is, of all the passes leading into the Carnatic, by much the most steep and difficult.

The nature therefore of the pass by which his artillery and stores must come from Mysore, would prove no inconsiderable obstacle to Tippoo in forming a a design against the Carnatic from that quarter; and as I trust that he could neither take Dindigul, Trichinopoly, Tanjore, Sankerydroog, or Namcool, which are our frontier forts on that side, I look upon it to be almost impossible that he or any of his successors will venture to pass the Coleroon with an army into the centre of the Carnatic, leaving their supplies and communications of all kinds exposed to be attacked and interrupted by the garrisons of the places that I have mentioned, supported by bodies of troops that might be stationed for the purpose under their cover and protection.

I am convinced that Sir Charles Oakeley and General Abercromby will select the most capable and trustworthy of your servants to manage the newly-acquired territories; and General Abercromby agreed so perfectly with me, that it was of the utmost importance for the national character and for the interest of the Company that we should commence our government of the countries on the coast of Malabar upon a good plan, that it was concerted between us that it would be most prudent, before we divided them finally into districts, to appoint commissioners to make a temporary settlement with all the chiefs for this season, and then to proceed upon an active and earnest investigation of the amount of revenue that those acquisitions are capable of paying, the extent of the different articles of commerce, the natures of the tenures of the Rajahs or other chiefs, and the classes and numbers of the inhabitants, in order that the Supreme Government may be enabled from their report, and the observations and suggestions of the Government of Bombay, to propose a system for the future management of that country, which may include rules for the conduct of the revenue and com-

mercial departments, and above all for a strict and impartial administration of justice; and as many of the Bengal servants have had great experience in conducting the internal business of extensive Indian Provinces, it is my intention to depute two of those in whom I can place particular confidence, as soon as the change of the monsoon will render it practicable to join two Commissioners that General Abercromby will at my recommendation appoint, immediately to commence upon the undertaking that I have described, and to assist in collecting the necessary materials, and in framing the report that will be expected from them.

The Malabar coast has been in a state of great distraction and confusion since the time that Tippoo's troops and the officers of his government were driven out of it, the two great and inimical classes of the people, the Nairs and the Moplas, being almost at open war with each other, and great dissentions about boundaries and revived old claims prevailing amongst the Nair Rajahs themselves; but as General Abercromby will, immediately upon descending the Ghauts, detach troops into the different districts, I hope that I shall soon hear that tranquillity has been restored, and the Company's authority completely established throughout all those countries. . . .

It must give you very great satisfaction to hear that there neither is at present, nor will be at the arrival of the troops in quarters, one single rupee of arrears due to them, or to any of the public departments, and that the accounts of all descriptions of military expenditure are so closely brought up, that I can at present see no good reason to prevent the three Presidencies from making up, in the course of the next six months at farthest, distinct statements of the whole of the extraordinary expenses that have been incurred by the war. . . .

Purseram Bhow, with the corps under his immediate command, proceeded directly from Seringapatam towards his own country, and Hurry Punt and the Nizam's son and Minister will separate from this army in a few days. General Abercromby commenced his march to the coast of Malabar on the 26th ultimo, and was on the same day joined by Captain Little's detachment, which had only been engaged to serve with the Maratta army during the Maratta war.

I have, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

P.S.—Tippoo's country having been divided according to its revenue, and not its extent, it will be obvious to you that the Nizam and Marattas could not, in the highly cultivated and fertile countries in which their portions were claimed, receive the same number of square miles that fell to the Company, as in our portion the Coorga country is included, which pays only a small and limited tribute, and there are considerable tracts of hilly and barren ground in several of our other districts; and for similar reasons, the division left to Tippoo greatly exceeds in the number of square miles the whole of that which was ceded to the Allies, as the rugged and unproductive countries of Mysore and Chittledroog constituted the principal portion of the dominions that remain in his possession.

No. LX.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE SECRET COMMITTEE.

GENTLEMEN, Camp near Vaskallah, May 2, 1792.

I had the honour to receive your letter dated the 21st September, 1791, on the 16th of March, 1792; and it gave me peculiar satisfaction to find from its

contents that I had, a few days before it reached me, anticipated your wishes, and even exceeded your expectations, in the preliminary articles of peace which had been agreed upon and settled on the 23rd of February last between the Confederate Powers and Tippoo Sultaun.

Having in my letters to the Court of Directors given a detail of all the material circumstances that attended the negotiation and conclusion of the definitive treaty, and a description of the countries that have been acquired by the Honourable Company, I have nothing farther at present to add concerning Tippoo, except that his Vakeels who negotiated the treaty, and who are still in our camp, take frequent opportunities to give me the strongest assurances that he is not only determined to execute the articles of the present treaty with the utmost punctuality, but that it is also his earnest desire to cultivate in future a close and friendly connexion with the English nation; and although, from Tippoo's general character, I am not inclined to place much confidence in the sincerity of any of his professions, it must be observed that no circumstance has yet occurred inconsistent with the declarations of the Vakeels; for he has readily delivered up the forts and countries that he had agreed by the treaty to cede to us; and although the difficulties that we have experienced in the removal of our stores and numerous sick have detained this army in the countries that are to be restored to him, probably much beyond the period at which he had looked for their evacuation, he has not yet discovered the least symptom of distrust or impatience.

It has, I believe, rarely happened in this or any other country that the operations of war and the negotiations for peace have been conducted with more general cordiality and mutual confidence amongst the members of a Confederacy, than that which has prevailed between us and our Allies in the late war; and it must prove highly gratifying to you to be informed that even after the accomplishment of the main objects of the Alliance (I mean obtaining satisfaction to the Company for the insult and injury committed by Tippoo in the wanton attack which he made upon one of its allies, and the reduction of his dangerous power), both Hurry Punt and Azeem ul Omrah, previous to their separation from this army, repeatedly expressed, in the name of their respective masters, the most unreserved reliance upon our good faith, and the warmest desire to bind the union which subsists at present still closer, if possible, between the three States.

The mutual guarantee of the newly-acquired countries to which we already are all engaged by the original treaties of Confederacy, but which must be put into a much more distinct and qualified form, will, upon my return to Bengal, be the first and indeed principal object of my attention in that line; but when that necessary business is once adjusted on clear and safe conditions, I must confess that, after the knowledge I have acquired of the situations and views of the different Powers of this country, I feel it incumbent upon me to state to you, that whilst on one hand our honour as well as our political interest will ever require great plainness and candour in all our declarations, and the most correct performance on our part of whatever engagements we may contract, it is on the other hand, on account of the irregularity and weakness of the Nizam's Government, and the spirit of avarice and ambition which so frequently shows itself in the Maratta character, and the disjointed feudal system of the Government of that State, impossible for us to be too cautious in examining all new propositions that may be made to us from either of these quarters, in order that our assent may be given or withheld from the result only of a deliberate consideration how far our acquiescence might involve us in measures that would affect our future interests or safety; and in some late private conferences with Hurry Punt and Azeem ul

Omrah, the substance of which it is necessary that you should be acquainted with, my own conduct has been regulated by those principles.

Several circumstances had, in the course of the last six or eight months, concurred to induce me to entertain suspicions that Madagee Scindia was forming designs to take advantage of our being involved in an expensive and dangerous war, and to pursue some objects of ambition to the prejudice of the Peshwa or the Company, or even of both States.

I did not, however, judge it prudent to communicate such suspicions either to Scindia himself or to any of the other Marattas; but soon after the conclusion of the peace Hurry Punt requested to have a private and confidential conversation with me, and after a complimentary preamble towards myself, he acknowledged that Nana Furnavese had discovered that Scindia had proposed to the Nizam and to Raggogie Boosla, and some other members of the Maratta States, to unite with him in endeavouring to terminate the war in which the Allies were engaged with Tippoo, and that he had good grounds to believe that in other respects he indulged himself in views which were incompatible with his duty to the Peshwa, adding that he was instructed by Nana to make this communication to me, and to request that I would, as a friend, candidly declare whether, in the event that Scindia should so far forget himself as to take an undutiful part against the Peshwa's authority, our connexion with him was of a nature that entitled him to expect it, or whether our inclination would lead us to afford him support.

As no such connexion as that to which Hurry Punt alluded subsists between the Company and Scindia, and as I was at that time under an impression of much dissatisfaction with that chief for the exceptionable tone that he had taken the liberty to assume, in pressing the Resident of Benares to support several unreasonable claims that he had brought forward against some unfortunate individuals who, after escaping from countries that he had lately reduced, had taken refuge in that city, I should, if I had given way to my private feelings alone, have told Hurry Punt that, in case of a breach between the Peshwa and Scindia, the Company's Government would leave the latter entirely to his fate; but as it would not be suitable to our interests that Scindia should be crushed, nor proper to avow too much coldness about a chief with whom we have been so long connected, I thought it most advisable to answer that I could not bring myself to believe that Scindia was capable of entertaining views of the nature and to the extent that Nana seemed to apprehend, and that it would give me the greatest concern if events should prove that I had been mistaken; but that if unfortunately any serious difference should arise between the Peshwa and Scindia, I should, on account of the latter having been at one time the happy instrument of terminating hostilities, and of beginning the friendly connexion which had now ripened to such maturity, between the former and the Company, as well as from a sincere desire to promote the real interests of both parties, think it my duty to use my utmost endeavours to effect a reconciliation between them; at the same time, however, authorising Hurry Punt to assure the Minister that, whilst the present cordial connexion subsists between our two Governments, I should not interfere in those or any other internal disputes of the Maratta State in any manner but by an offer of friendly mediation.

Hurry Punt declared himself highly satisfied with this answer, and requested that as the subject regarding Scindia was of a very delicate nature, I would instruct Sir Charles Malet not to touch upon it with any person but the Minister, or with himself, after his return to Poonah, which I accordingly promised.

The point on which Azeem ul Omrah wished to ascertain my sentiments, was also of considerable delicacy and importance: it was to be informed whether I would engage to support the Nizam's choice of his successor according to the right that he possessed by the law of the Koran, and the custom of Mahometan

governments; and this question appears to me to have arisen from its being the Nizam's intention to pass over his eldest son, and declare Secunder Jah the successor.

I give his Highness and the Minister not only full credit for their late exertions in the common cause, but also for their being warmly disposed to preserve a close connexion with the English in preference to any other power; and on the day before the armies separated, Secunder Jah wrote a letter to me containing the strongest assurances of his desire to promote the Company's interests at his father's durbar, and requesting that I would sometimes write to him. But exclusive of the restraints which the Legislature has wisely imposed upon the Supreme Government respecting new engagements with the native powers of this country, the indolence and want of energy of the Nizam's character, and the propensity which I have observed in that of the Minister to act hastily, and engage in schemes hardly plausible without previously taking any reasonable measures to forward their success, would have sufficiently deterred me from undertaking to interfere in the internal affairs of that Government.

My reply was accordingly in very general terms, and in substance, that I should always feel much interested about everything that related to his Highness's private comfort and satisfaction, or to the prosperity of his Government; but that I had so good an opinion of his prudence and good sense as to entertain the most sanguine hopes, that with the Minister's assistance he would be able to take such effectual measures for securing a quiet succession to the Prince of his own choice, as to render support or even interference in his favour from any of his neighbours entirely unnecessary; and although this answer in some degree disappointed the Minister's wishes, he expressed no ill-humour, and desisted from pressing me further on the subject.

You will readily conceive that Hurry Punt and Azeem ul Omrah would take particular care to withhold all knowledge from each other of what had passed between them and myself upon the above subjects; but upon another point which called for equal caution on my part, they made a joint request, though it was some time before either party could be prevailed upon to speak so plain as to admit of my comprehending the specific object of their solicitation.

Both Hurry Punt and the Minister at separate conferences began with expressing their hopes, that from the friendship which I professed for the Nizam and the Peshwa, I should not decline to promise to interpose my good offices to bring any differences that might occasionally arise between their respective Governments to an amicable adjustment; but seeing grounds to suppose that each party had some particular object in view, I told them that to a request in terms so general, and not coming directly from the Peshwa and the Nizam, I could only reply by assuring them that I should at all times be happy to show every mark of friendship in my power towards allies with whom I had so much reason to be satisfied, and that I should be particularly desirous to take any step that might tend to prevent an interruption of the harmony which had so long and so happily subsisted between their respective Governments.

Upon the subject being resumed it soon appeared that my supposition had been well founded, and that the immediate object of both parties was a difference then actually existing in regard to certain arrears of chout, which the Marattas claim as their right, and the Nizam has for some time withheld; but I likewise discovered that their expectations from me were diametrically opposite—Hurry Punt wishing for my friendly interposition to persuade the Nizam to discharge these arrears and to pay the chout regularly in future, and Azeem ul Omrah

hoping that I would endeavour to prevail upon the Marattas to desist altogether from the demand.

You are not ignorant that the Marattas never fail to make a demand of chout in every part of Hindostan and the Deccan in which they think that they can enforce it, and I therefore made no scruple in acknowledging to Hurry Punt that it was necessary for me to be extremely cautious not to give an avowed countenance to a claim under that general description; but as I had understood that in this instance the Maratta claim was founded upon a specific agreement entered into some time ago by the Nizam, I gave no encouragement to the Minister to expect that I would use any influence to induce the Peshwa to relinquish the above claim upon his master.

I requested however that both parties would take the trouble to state in writing the grounds upon which they respectively hoped for my interference in their favour, which they promised, but have not yet executed. Should no such statements make their appearance, I shall consider the subject as dropped; and if they should be transmitted to me, you may depend upon my weighing the substance of them very maturely before I declare an opinion upon them.

It is proper that you should know that Purseram Bhow, on every occasion when the subject was agitated in his presence, was in the practice of declaring his utter aversion to all negotiation with Tippoo, and after the conclusion of the peace he made no ceremony in avowing his disapprobation of it. This was easily accounted for from the rooted animosity which subsists between Tippoo and the Bhow, as well as from the Bhow's depredations being in some measure checked by the treaty, and from his seeing an early prospect of being obliged by it to relinquish his collections in large tracts of countries which were either to be restored to Tippoo, or to be annexed to the dominions of the Maratta State.

After the Bhow's junction near Seringapatam, Tippoo made complaints to me almost daily that his troops, notwithstanding the treaty, continued to ravage and plunder the country; and although I did not choose to acknowledge it to Tippoo, I am afraid that several of those complaints were too well founded, and I took every means to put a stop to the causes of them.

I was however in my own mind convinced that there would be constant reasons for a repetition of those representations, until the Marattas should entirely evacuate his country; and being confident that the Bhow, who was to return to the Maratta territories by a short route, would not venture to loiter upon the road, and ravage the country at leisure with his own corps alone, from an apprehension that Tippoo might send a body of cavalry to attend and retaliate upon him, I was happy to avail myself of the terms of our treaty with the Poonah Government, by which it was agreed that our battalions of infantry should only serve with their army during the war; and I accordingly notified both to Hurry Punt and Purseram Bhow my desire that, previous to the separation of the armies, Captain Little's detachment should join General Abercromby to return with him to the coast of Malabar.

Purseram Bhow consented with great reluctance to Captain Little's leaving him; but in addition to the reasons that I have stated, I was further induced to persevere in my request, from a belief that the services of three battalions would be of great value to General Abercromby, either for securing our new acquisitions on the Malabar coast, or for putting proper garrisons in the other places belonging to the Presidency of Bombay; and I think it also right on this occasion to declare, that on account of the frequent disputes between the Peshwa and the great chiefs, that naturally arise from the form of government of the Maratta

State, and the consequent uncertainty whether our battalions would always be employed upon services that we should approve, I doubt much the policy of our ever lending troops to the Peshwa, unless in time of an actual war in which he may be engaged by alliance with us, and when we can clearly see that such troops may act in some manner that will essentially tend to promote the success of the common cause.

I have, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

No. LXI.

EARL CORNWALLIS TO THE SECRET COMMITTEE.

[Secret.]

HONOURABLE SIRS, Fort St. George, July 9, 1792.

Being fully sensible of the detriment that the interests of the Honourable Company and the nation have suffered in this part of India by the defective system of the Government of the Carnatic, I was no less prompted by inclination than by the recommendation contained in your letter dated the 6th of May, 1791, addressed to the Governor-General in Council, to embrace the first favourable opportunity that offered, to endeavour to make a new arrangement between the Company and the Nabob of Arcot which should be calculated to remedy as many of the evils that have been hitherto experienced as might be found practicable.

There cannot be the least doubt that it would have been most desirable for securing both parties against external attacks, and for promoting the internal prosperity of the Carnatic, that the Nabob should have agreed to invest the Company with the entire management of his country, reserving to himself a liberal portion of its revenues for the maintenance of his family and the support of his dignity, and allotting the remainder for defraying his share of the charge for general defence, and for the liquidation of his private debts; but as I did not see the most distant prospect of obtaining his free consent to it, I did not choose to run the hazard of irritating him by making the proposition when the negotiation was opened with him soon after my return to this Presidency, and of rendering it by that means more difficult to gain his acquiescence to several very important points.

I have thought it most regular to transmit a copy of the new treaty that I have concluded with the Nabob to the Court of Directors, with copies of all the correspondence in the course of the negotiation; and as all those papers will be laid before you, it is unnecessary for me in this letter to enlarge further on the subject than to express my expectation that my having induced his Highness to allow the Polygars to pay their tribute directly to the Company, to authorize the Government to take possession of certain districts that are named, in case he shall fail in the regular payment of his Kists, and to agree that the Company shall take the entire management of his country in the event of a war with any of the neighbouring powers, will prove acceptable to you, and be considered as circumstances well adapted to protect the Company against pecuniary losses and disappointments from the Nabob in future, and to promote in an essential degree the quiet and general prosperity of the country.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

No. LXII.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN COUNCIL TO THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

HONOURABLE SIRS, Fort William, Aug. 25, 1792.

. . . . . .

LAND REVENUE.[1]

The Board of Revenue having been unable to prepare the final settlements of the decennial arrangements, owing chiefly to the settlements of some of the zemindarries, which have been unavoidably protracted, not being yet completed, we are disappointed in the expectations expressed in our letter of the 10th of March last by the Dutton, of having it in our power to furnish you with those statements by the present despatch. We have issued the necessary directions for the conclusion of these settlements, and trust that the whole of the arrangements will be shortly accomplished.

We have the pleasure, however, to forward to you, a number in the packet, statements of the revenue of the Bengal and Fussily districts in the second year of the decennial settlement compared with the revenues of the same districts in the year immediately preceding that settlement, and also comparative statements of the revenues of the Bengal and Fussily districts in the first and second years of the decennial settlement.

From the explanatory letter from the Board of Revenue which accompanies these accounts you will observe that the decrease of Sa. Rs. 13,84,869 14 12 appearing in the gross collection of the Bengal districts in 1198 compared with the gross collections of 1196, is to be attributed to the abolition of the Sayer or internal duties in 1197, the annual revenue arising from which amounted to about Rs. 7,50,000, to the suspension of revenue on account of drought and inundation in 1198, amounting to Sa. Rs. 4,28,517 6 16 2, and to a suspension of Sa. Rs. 3,00,000 in Burdwan, and Sa. Rs. 2,56,661 in Rajeshaye in the last-mentioned year.

The decrease of Sa. Rs. 10,84,980 10 8 3 in the gross collections of the Bengal districts in the second year of the decennial settlement, compared with the first year of that settlement, is to be ascribed partly to the suspension on account of drought and inundation allowed in the former year, amounting to Sa. Rs. 4,28,517 6 16 2, as before stated. It is to be observed also that the abolition of the Sayer, or internal duties, did not take place until nearly four months of the year 1197 had elapsed, and consequently a proportionate part of these collections, which, as above specified, amounted annually to about 7,50,000 rupees, was brought to account in that year. A further cause of the decrease in the gross collections of 1198 compared with those of 1197, is, that in the collections of the latter year are comprised the gross receipts from several of the large zemindarries, as Burdwan and Rajeshaye, but the settlement having been in 1198 concluded with the zemindars, and the amount of their Moshaira and charges deducted from the gross demand as it stood in 1197, the gross collections of 1198 were necessarily so much diminished.

It appears from the statement of the collections of 1197 and 1198 that the net collections of the latter year fell short of those of the former, in the sum of Rs. 4,29,119 7 9 1 only, notwithstanding the general drought preceded by storms and inundations which happened in the past year. But for these calamities

[1] The earlier part of this letter contains an outline of the Regulations proposed by Lord Cornwallis for the protection of the Ryots against the oppression of the Zemindars.

the net collections of that year would at least have equalled those of the preceding, and had it not been for a heavy and unexpected balance of about 3,00,000 of rupees which occurred in Rajeshaye, owing to the misconduct of the late collector, Mr. Henckell (the enquiry into which will, we trust, be completed by our next despatch), they would have considerably exceeded them.

There is every ground to expect that a considerable part of the deficiencies occasioned by the abolition of the internal duties will be made good by the tax on spirituous liquors, as hereafter noticed. By the decennial arrangements a considerable increase is assessed on several of the districts for the current year, which, supposing no calamity of season to occur, will be realized with facility. The greater part of the suspensions granted on account of the drought in the past year are in a course of payment. The suspension of 3,00,000 of rupees allowed to the Rajah of Burdwan on the Jumma of 1198, as noticed in our letter of the 10th of August last by the Swallow, is to be discharged in the current and the two ensuing years with the full jumma of his zemindarry, and we make no doubt but that the jumma assessed in Rajeshahy will in future be completely realized, so that there is every reason to expect that the net collections in the current year, 1792-93, will be at least equal to the net collections of 1789-90, the year preceding the decennial settlement, including the internal duties collected in that year, which have been since abolished.

We shall, likewise, endeavour to effect such reductions as may be practicable in the charges of collection, and particularly in the Tehseeldarry establishments. An increase of revenue, more than adequate to the charges of these establishments, has been obtained in the districts in which they have been authorized. But in proportion as the talookdars and petty zemindars who have been rendered independent, can be brought to pay their revenue through bankers or other channels immediately to the collector's treasury, instead of paying it to a tehseeldar or native collector stationed on the part of Government on the spot, these establishments will become unnecessary, and every reduction of them will be so much addition to your net revenue.

We likewise transmit, a number in the packet, statements of the gross and net revenues of the provinces of Bengal, Behar, Orissa, and Benares for the two past years 1790-1 and 1791-2.

In our letter of the 12th of April, 1791, by the Chesterfield, we acquainted you that we had taken the collection of the tax on spirituous liquors into the hands of Government. The receipts from this tax were inconsiderable whilst it was levied by the landholders in common with the other internal duties. Upon the resumption and subsequent abolition of those duties throughout the provinces on the 11th June and 28th July, 1790, we resolved to continue the collection of the tax on spirituous liquors for the same reasons which originally induced us to resume it. Having desired the Board of Revenue to ascertain from the collectors whether it would be advisable to levy the tax on stills or on licences for distilling and vending the liquor, we at the recommendation of that Board determined on the general adoption of the latter plan except in Behar Proper, in which district, at the suggestion of the collector, we directed a tax to be levied on the stills. The success which has attended this arrangement in Behar Proper will appear from the collector's letters of the 11th November and 15th May last, transmitted to you a separate number in the packet. From the first of these letters you will observe that the amount realized by him in the first year 1198 Fussily (which ended in September last), from the mere tax on intoxicating liquors in his district (exclusive of the city of Patna), exceeds in the sum of Rs. 3,246 the whole of the Sayer or internal duties including this tax whilst incorporated with the land-revenue and under the management of the landholders.

You will also see that the collector stated his expectations that the tax would prove still more productive in the current year. The result has proved that these expectations were well founded. From the account accompanying his last-mentioned letter of the 15th May, it appears that his net receipts from this tax for the first seven months of the current year 1199 amount to rupees 73,491, which exceeds his receipts for the corresponding period in the past year in the sum of rupees 48,888, so that supposing the receipts for the remaining five months even to fall considerably short of the average amount of the collections in the preceding seven, the produce on the tax on spirituous liquors for the current year in the collectorship of Behar Proper alone (exclusive of the city of Patna) will be nearly, if not fully, equal to the net annual amount realized by the landholders and farmers in the four collectorships, comprising the province of Behar, from the various internal duties, including the tax in question, heretofore levied by them on the trade of the country, and for which, in consequence of the abolition thereof, deductions and compensations have been granted to them. This will appear from a comparison of the probable amount of the receipts from the tax in Behar in the current year as above estimated, and the following statement extracted from the account No. 5 which accompanied the letter from the Board of Revenue dated the 3rd August, 1791, transmitted a separate number with our letter of the 10th of the same month by the Swallow.

Internal duties abolished, and tax on spirituous liquors resumed in the Soubah of Behar (exclusive of the city of Patna) for which deductions and compensations have been allowed to the landholders under the regulations of the 11th June and 28th July, 1790:—

Collectorship of Behar Proper (exclusive of the city of Patna)	36,468
Ditto Tirhoot	29,286
„ Shahabad	10,865
„ Suran	25,043
Total annual amount, deductions, and compensations ..	1,01,662

On the above statement we think it sufficient to observe that whilst the abolition of the internal duties has given a free trade to the inhabitants of this province, the immediate diminution of your resources occasioned by granting to them this valuable immunity, will be made good by a single tax that neither impedes commerce nor discourages agriculture, and which, in proportion as it is increased and made to add to the public income, must contribute to prevent drunkenness and all the disorders which arise from the present prevalence of this vice amongst the lower classes of the people.

The receipts from the tax levied on licences in the other collectorships being inconsiderable when compared with the produce of the tax on stills, as collected in Mr. Seton's district, we have directed the latter plan to be adopted in the other collectorships in Behar and throughout Bengal, and your possessions in Orissa, and shall make the improvement of this branch of revenue an object of our particular attention.

The severities exercised by the landholders and farmers over their ryots and under-tenants have frequently been brought under your notice. These oppressive practices had their origin under the native Government, and they have continued to exist, although in a much less degree, from the want of laws defining the nature and extent of the coercion which landholders and farmers of land are entitled to exercise over their ryots and under-renters to enforce payment of arrears. From the silence or uncertainty of the existing laws on this point, many

persons, availing themselves of the sanction of former usage, have recourse to the most oppressive means to compel the discharge of arrears, and often employ the same severities for the purposes of extortion; whilst others, doubtful what measures they may legally take to enforce payment from defaulters, and apprehensive of subjecting themselves to prosecution for oppression, refrain from all compulsion, and are often defrauded of their just dues. These defects in the regulations tending to screen oppression and dishonesty on the one hand, and to discourage moderation and good faith on the other, and it being as essential to the prosperity of the country and the punctual collection of the public revenue that landholders and farmers of land should have the means of enforcing payment from defaulters without being obliged to have recourse to the courts of justice, and incurring the delay and expense necessarily attending a law process for the recovery of every arrear, as that tenants and cultivators of the soil should be protected from oppression and unjust demands, we have passed the regulations transmitted to you, a separate number in the packet, which we trust will effect the important objects proposed to be obtained by them.

MISCELLANEOUS OCCURRENCES.

By the Regulations for the Criminal Courts passed on the 3rd December, 1790, the heirs of murdered persons were debarred from pardoning the murderer. Instances have since occurred in which the intended effect of the above Regulation has been evaded by the heir refusing to prosecute at all; the allowing of this evasion would open a door to the most flagitious practices, as persons might commit murder, and, although convicted by the most undeniable evidence, might elude punishment by prevailing upon the heir by corrupt or other means to refuse to prosecute. To give full effect, therefore, to the original Regulation above mentioned, we have adopted the following Rules:—

First. That in cases of murder, the refusal of the relations to prosecute shall no longer be considered a bar to the trial or condemnation of the offender, but that, in the event of such refusal, the Courts of Circuit shall proceed in the trial in the same manner as if the slain had no heir, and that when the proceedings are completed, they shall require their law officers to declare what would have been their fetwah upon the case supposing the heir had been the prosecutor and been present at the trial.

Second. That the rule laid down in the preceding article shall also be applied to all cases of murder wherein it shall be known that the slain has an heir who is legally empowered to claim kesaus or retaliation, and such heir shall neither appear after a reasonable time has been allowed to elapse for him to hear of the murder and to repair to the station at which the prisoner is to be tried, or communicate his intention, by vakeel or otherwise, of pardoning the offender.

Third. That, in either of the cases mentioned in the above Regulations, the judges shall not pass any sentence, but shall forward the record of the trial and the fetwah of their law officers to the Nizamut Adawlut, which court, provided they approve of the proceedings held on the trial, shall pass such sentence as they would have passed had the heir been the prosecutor and been present at the trial.

By the Mahomedan law no Mussulman can be capitally convicted on the evidence of a zimme, or infidel, under which denomination are included all persons who do not profess the Mahomedan religion. In order that Hindoos and other classes of people not of the Mahomedan persuasion (who form at least nine-tenths of the inhabitants of your territories), may enjoy equal security of person and property with the Mahomedans, we have thought proper to abolish a distinction, the absurdity of which is too glaring to require a comment. We have accordingly passed the following Regulations:—

First. That the religious tenets of witnesses shall no longer be considered as a bar to the conviction or condemnation of a prisoner; but in cases in which the evidence given on a trial would be deemed incompetent by the Mahomedan law, solely on the plea of the person giving such evidence not being of the Mahomedan religion, that the law officers of the Courts of Circuit do declare what would have been their fetwah in the case, supposing such witnesses had been of the Mahomedan persuasion.

Second. That in the case specified in the preceding Article, the Courts of Circuit shall not pass sentence, but shall complete the trial and transmit a copy of their proceedings and of the fetwah to the Nizamut Adawlut, which court, provided they approve of such proceedings, shall pass such sentence as they would have passed had the witnesses for the prosecution been Mahomedans.

We have also made it a general Regulation that in the above and other cases, in which the Courts of Circuit are directed not to pass any sentence, but to submit the proceedings held on the trial to the Nizamut Adawlut, that the judges shall accompany the record of the trial with their opinion on the merits of the case.

The above Regulations in the cases of heirs refusing to prosecute, or of there being no witnesses to convict a prisoner but such as are not of the Mahomedan persuasion, will enable the Court of Nizamut Adawlut, with the aid of the law officers, to pass such sentence on the offenders as may be consistent with substantial justice and the peace and happiness of society, in instances in which the crime shall be clearly proved, and there shall be no obstacle to the punishment of the offender but the above absurd and unjust distinction of the Mahomedan code. It is to be understood that this legal discretion is to be exercised only by the Nizamut Adawlut, upon a consideration of the opinions of the judges of the Courts of Circuit, and of the law officers of those courts, and of the Nizamut Adawlut. The Courts of Circuit are required in all cases to conform strictly to the law.

It has hitherto been the practice to attach the property of persons committed to the criminal courts. If the prisoner was convicted, the property was sold. If he was acquitted, it was returned to him. Many abuses having been committed under this rule, and it appearing injurious to the family and relations of the offender, and contrary to the principles of equity, we have thought it advisable to abolish it.

We transmit to you, a number in the packet, a copy of a letter from the judges of the Court of Circuit for the division of Calcutta, in which they state that dacoits, or gangs of robbers by profession, had met with considerable check, amounting almost to suppression. The few cases that have occurred in their division have happened only in the neighbourhood of Calcutta and the foreign settlements. The difficulty of suppressing these marauders, where there are so many places in which they can take refuge, is apparent.

The police regulations which we have under consideration, and which will be carried into effect before November next, will we trust annihilate that professional and systematic marauding which from the earliest times has existed in this country.

We have thought it advisable to offer a reward of ten sicca rupees for every dacoit that may be apprehended, to be paid on conviction of the offender.

Offenders discharged from gaol after a long imprisonment being frequently destitute of every means of subsistence until they can repair to their former place of residence, or find employment, are often compelled by absolute want to revert to their former malpractices. We have, therefore, thought it advisable to pass the following Regulation, which, at the same time that the expense that it will occasion cannot be considerable, will be the means of preventing many offenders replunging into vice from the pressure of immediate want:—

That the magistrates be directed to pay to all persons who shall be released from the foujdarry, after having suffered an imprisonment of six months or upwards, calculating from the date of their sentence, and who shall appear to be in actual need of such assistance, a sum sufficient to maintain them for one month. The sum to be paid to each individual to be regulated by his situation in life, but in no case to exceed five rupees, and in every instance to be confined as much within that amount as may be consistent with the purposes of the Regulation. . . . .

We have the honour to submit to you, a separate number in the packet, a copy of the Nepaul Treaty, as concluded by the Resident at Benares. Our correspondence with Mr. Duncan during the negotiation since our last advices, is recorded on the proceedings noted in the margin. . . .

The Resident having carefully explained to the Rajah of Nepaul that the object of the treaty is solely to establish a commercial intercourse between the two countries for the mutual benefit, we are in hopes that this arrangement will be adhered to by the Rajah, and that in a course of time it will be the means of opening an extensive mart for the productions of Bengal.

You will observe that at the recommendation of the Resident, we have granted a jaghire of rupees 2,573 per annum to Gujraj Misser, a person possessing considerable influence in the Nepaul Government, as well on account of the assistance which he has given in forwarding the negotiation, as with a view to ensure his good offices in favour of the merchants who may resort to Nepaul. . . .

We have the pleasure to transmit to you, a number in the packet, a copy of a letter from the Resident of Benares, from which it will appear that the whole of the increased land revenue assessed upon the zemindarry of Benares for the year 1199 Fussily (which expires on the 15th of the ensuing month) has been realized under all the disadvantages of a most unfavourable season, and without distress to the inhabitants or cultivators of the soil. A stronger proof cannot be afforded of the solidity of the Resident's arrangements, and the prosperous state of that country. The amount realized from the land revenue and customs exceeds the fixed revenue of 40 lacs assessed on the zemindarry in the sum of rupees 5,692 5 9, notwithstanding that receipts from the customs have fallen short of the amount collected in the past year in the sum of rupees 88,311 9 9. This branch of the revenue is particularly liable to fluctuation in Benares, as the duties are levied chiefly on the exports from the Deccan, the western provinces, and your territories which pass through the zemindarry of Benares, and the value of which must of course depend upon causes that relate solely to the state of the trade of those countries. It is with pleasure we avail ourselves of this opportunity of repeating the approbation we have so often expressed of Mr. Duncan's able and successful administration of the affairs of Benares. . . .

We have, &c.

No. LXIII.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN COUNCIL TO THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

HONOURABLE SIRS, Fort William, Dec. 14, 1792.

The Government of Madras, in despatches dated the 6th of September, laid before us a minute from Sir Charles Oakeley on the subject of the agreement recommended by the Governor-General to be made with the Rajah of Tanjore previous to the restoration of that country to his management, and a copy of the

treaty framed in consequence on the same principles as that lately entered into with the Nabob, and comprehending the latest arrangement of your Honourable Court with respect to the Rajah's payments, and this draft of the treaty had our entire approbation.

But before our answer could have been received at Fort St. George, we were advised that the Rajah had declined executing the treaty for various reasons stated in his letter, to which we beg leave to refer, but of very insufficient weight to induce a departure from any one of its several stipulations. . . .

We could not help taking notice of the terms in which the Rajah's letter was expressed, and although we entertained a very unfavourable opinion of his character, we could hardly believe that he would have ventured to write such a letter accompanied with so gross a misstatement of facts, if he had not been encouraged by some European adviser; and as such advisers might continue to interfere with the most mischievous effects both to the Rajah's own real interests and those of the Company, we thought that unless he could be brought to disengage himself from them, and to reflect seriously on the duty which he owed to you and to his own subjects, it might be deserving of consideration whether, as he had no male heirs, it might not be advisable as a measure of restraint upon his conduct, to declare Serfojee presumptive heir to the Raje. We were also of opinion that unless the Government of Madras should see any material objections to it that did not occur to us, Serfojee and the females of the late Rajah's family should be removed to Madras, not only as a means of securing good treatment to the whole family, but particularly to enable the Government to take care that the young man should be properly educated.

Another letter from the Rajah of Tanjore to Sir Charles Oakeley, and one to the Governor-General continuing his objections to the treaty, were now laid before us. . . .

The necessity of removing Serfojee from Tanjore according to the opinion sent to the Madras Government, who entirely concurred in it, soon became apparent, his person being exposed to immediate danger from the Rajah's disposition towards him, as you will observe from the enclosed copies of despatches from the Madras Government, and the Rev. Mr. Swartz, dated the 17th and 12th of last month. . . .

To these we shall add the copy of a further letter, dated the 20th, from the Governor in Council, and of the papers that came with it, exhibiting the temper and conduct of the Rajah of Tanjore in so unfavourable a light that it became a doubt with the Government of Fort St. George how far it would be safe or prudent at this juncture to trust him with the management of his country, under the provisions contained in the treaty which he had not yet executed. Difficulties were also stated to arise from the time he had taken to consider it, and the Governor in Council has given us notice that he should delay the execution of it and the delivery of the Rajah's country to him until he should receive our further authority for that purpose. We shall take up the question after the close of these despatches, and acquaint you with our determination in our next letter.

We have the satisfaction to acquaint you that the boy Serfojee and the widows of the late Rajah, by the means of Mr. Swartz and Captain Wallace, have effected their release from the palace, without occasioning the least disturbance, and are now, probably, on their way to Madras. They are extremely grateful for their deliverance from the Rajah's authority and the vexations they suffered under it. . . .

You will observe in Sir Charles Malet's letter to Lord Cornwallis, dated the 22nd September, that he requests directions for his guidance in the event of any

application (similar to that of Nizam Ally Khan for permission to purchase arms &c., to a considerable extent at Madras) being made by the Maratta Government, and that he states the consequence to which the permission given to the Nizam is likely to be liable unless a similar indulgence should be given to the Court at Poonah.

We are not unapprised of the opinion which we delivered upon this subject in general in our letter to your Secret Committee, dated the 6th November, 1788, but we confess ourselves to be now of opinion that although an export from England, for the express purpose, will not be necessary as an article of commerce, without a particular indent from hence, or your other Presidencies, it is advisable for the Company to furnish the neighbouring native powers with certain quantities of fire-arms at reasonable prices rather than drive them to the necessity of establishing manufactories of their own, and, in the particular instance before us, we thought that, as the Marattas had it in their power to procure any quantity of arms and military stores that they want from foreign nations, it was the less worth our while to disappoint them of a supply should they ask for it.

It was therefore mentioned to the Resident at Poona that if Nana Furnavese should apply for permission to purchase some arms at Bombay, either in consequence of his hearing that the Nizam had obtained a similar indulgence at Madras, or for any other reasons, we should not be disposed to refuse it; but that, in order to enhance the favour, Sir Charles Malet might agree to refer the application to the Governor-General. We are, &c.

No. LXIV.

Marquis Cornwallis to the Vizier.

Calcutta, Jan. 29, 1793.

On my first arrival from Europe I understood that the distressed state of your Excellency's finances prevented the establishment of a just system of Government, such as would increase the cultivation of your country, give ease to the ryots, restore commerce, and discourage oppression, which are so injurious to your revenues. In consequence, from the period of my taking charge of the government of the Company's affairs, I have on my part used my utmost endeavours to ease your Excellency's finances; and I did, after consulting and advising with the late Hyder Beg Khan, fix the subsidy for the support of the Company's troops stationed for the defence of your dominions, the stipend of the Nawab Saadel Alli Khan, the pensions of the Rohillas, and the expenses of the Residency at Lucknow, at fifty lacks of rupees per annum. The arguments which I used, and the motives for the measure, were fully contained in the letter which I had the honour to address to your Excellency, by Hyder Beg Khan, when he took leave of me. In order still further to relieve your finances, I relinquished the exemption from duties which had been heretofore enjoyed both on account of the goods of the Company and those of all Europeans residing or trading under the Company's protection. I put a stop also to sundry practices in the camp bazars belonging to the Company's troops stationed in your dominions, which had tended to the prejudice of your revenues; and I prohibited the Resident at Lucknow, and all other dependents of the Company, from interfering in any manner whatever in the internal affairs of your Government, in order that your

ministers might exercise, undisputed by any foreign influence, that authority with which they are trusted by your Excellency in the administration of your revenues and finances. Nay, influenced by the same desire for the prosperity of your Government as for the success of the Company's affairs, I suggested a commercial treaty to you, which was executed for our mutual benefit, whereby the payment of duties was stipulated in a manner most conducive to the security and dispatch of the commerce carried on between the subjects of both Governments; and as the detail of all these arrangements had been fully discussed with Hyder Beg Khan, who was the confidential minister of your Excellency entrusted with the administration of your affairs, and enjoying the free and undivided authority of his office, I was sanguine enough to hope that all the benefits which were expected from an arrangement concerted with the assistance of your Excellency's Minister, and framed on the part of the Company in the most sincere wish for your prosperity, would have been realized.

On my return however from the war in the Deccan, I had the mortification to find, that after a period of five years, the evils which prevailed at the beginning of that time had increased; that your finances had fallen into a worse state by an enormous accumulated debt; that the same oppressions continue to be exercised by rapacious and overgrown aumils towards the ryots; and that not only the subjects and merchants of your own dominions, but those residing under the Company's protection, suffered many exactions, contrary to the commercial treaty, from the custom-house officers, and from zemindars, aumils, &c.

Considering the close connexion between the two states, which has for many years produced a mutual protection and assistance towards each other, I am naturally led to reflect seriously on the situation of your Government, and to avail myself of the privilege given to me by our long and intimate friendship to open my mind to you.

It is not now to any undue interference, or to unjust demands on the part of the Company, nor from the want of every assistance from them, either personally from me, or from the troops stationed in your territories, that these evils are to be attributed; neither do I conceive that they owe their rise to any defect in the arrangements made while the late Hyder Beg Khan was in Calcutta: their sources are to be found in the internal management of your Excellency's Government; and while I have no proposition to suggest to you, varying in any respect from the conditions in force between the Company and you, nor am I actuated by any desire to interfere in your internal affairs, I trust that I shall be considered as pursuing the part of a friend only, in giving my advice on such points as, relating to your internal government, do not come immediately within the scope of my privilege authorised by existing engagements.

As in a state the evils that are practised by the lower class of men are to be attributed to the example held out to them by their superiors, and to their connivance, or to their weak government, so am I obliged to represent that all the oppressions and exactions committed by the aumils on the peasantry, take their source in the connivance and irregularities of the administration at Lucknow; for your ministers, compelled by your Excellency to provide for the unbounded and profuse sums peremptorily demanded of them for your own expenses, are under the necessity of complying with the exorbitant demands of the bankers, from whom, at the moment, they must borrow the money at a most usurious interest, and thus, from the profusion of your own disbursements, from the exorbitant interest paid to the bankers, and the ultimate resource of the ministers to answer these accumulating demands being the revenues of your dominions, spring oppressions and exactions that fall from your own household through your Minister, through the bankers, the aumils, and under-farmers, to the ryot, without

a possibility of redress; nor do your ministers find the resources from your revenues sufficient, for an enormous debt has accumulated; and though the Company's subsidy is at present paid up with regularity, yet I cannot risk my reputation, nor neglect my duty, by remaining a silent spectator of evils which will in the end (and perhaps that end is not very remote) render abortive even your Excellency's earnest desire that the subsidy should be punctually paid: thus I recommend economy in your own household disbursements, as the first measure from whence all other corrections are to take place. I do not neglect the dignity of your station, nor am I actuated by views for the Company's subsidy only. Your dignity does not flow from a splendid retinue and unnecessary establishment of household servants, elephants, sumptuous ceremonies on marriages in your family, and other circumstances of similar nature, but from a just and wise administration of your government and finances.

In order that the administration of your government may be conducted with energy and wisdom, it is expedient that certain officers should be nominated to conduct the detail of it. These officers are now Hossein Reza Khan, and Rajah Ticket Roy; to them belong every executive measure, while your Excellency, as the Ruler, should pursue a conduct founded in wisdom and prudence. These Ministers, invested with full powers by you, are responsible for the good order and management of your Government; but as an act of justice they should be entitled to your firm support and confidence; and while by their stations they are enabled to see prevailing evils, and to suggest remedies for them, it behoves your Excellency to give ear to their advice, and to listen to their recommendations. The present ministers are your own choice, and, convinced of the necessity that they should be supported in the execution of their duty, I have and ever will give them that countenance which the connexion between our Governments enables me to do. I feel this to be a duty incumbent on me for the credit of the Company, as well as your reputation, since the connexion between us, the employment of the Company's troops in your dominions, and the effect reciprocally felt of a good or bad government in our respective territories, equally affect us both in the eyes of all Hindostan. I have therefore further to recommend to your Excellency to attend to the representations which Hossein Reza Khan and Rajah Ticket Roy (of whose zeal and attachment you can have no doubt) may at all times make to you, with the view of introducing economy into your household disbursements, for liquidating the debts due from your Government, and for the abolition of oppression and irregularities in the management of your revenues.

That system which exists between us to the support of your dignity, and to the maintenance of the connexion between the two states, while it leaves you the ruler of your country, has debarred me from the means of bringing forward specific instances of oppressions committed in the internal part of the country; but the irregularities and unjust exactions committed in the department of the Customs, which I understand is entrusted to the charge of Tehseen Ally Khan, are reported to me by virtue of the commercial treaty concluded between us. These I am compelled to listen to, and they are so numerous, and of so serious a nature, that I trust your Excellency will direct an investigation to be made into the charges produced against Tehseen Ally Khan, and, on conviction of his guilt, that you will remove him from this office. For this purpose I have desired Mr. Ives to represent to you the repeated acts which are said to have been committed by Tehseen Ally Khan and his subordinate officers, contrary to the spirit and stipulations of the commercial treaty. This is one branch of the internal management of your affairs which comes to my knowledge, from the inevitable effect of its connexion with the Company's interests, and I request that your Excellency will

consider this department of the Customs equally under the control of your Ministers as the rest of your revenues and affairs, for the good management of which they are equally responsible; and that you will support them in correcting the evils existing in it, by nominating another person to the charge of it, in the event of the removal of Tehseen Ally Khan at their recommendation, so that he may consider his station to be owing to their influence in your councils, and obey their orders accordingly. The responsibility which lays on Hossein Reza Khan and Rajah Ticket Roy involved the external as well as the internal administration of your affairs, nor is there a power in Hindostan that does not watch not only your choice of ministers, but even the weight and influence which they may enjoy in your Government; for instance, the death of Hyder Beg Khan and the nomination of the present persons were events that every paper of intelligence, even to the Deccan, made mention of, with comments on the wisdom and prudence of your present choice. From this you will judge how necessary it is that the Powers in India should know that the ministers of your choice are the efficient ministers of your Government, and that their influence at your Court is not destroyed or diminished by the interference of persons under no responsibility in affairs regarding the connexion of your Excellency's Government with foreign powers. Those powers have long been convinced of the intimacy subsisting between us, and know how far that intimacy implicates both in the measures of either. In consequence of this conviction I think it necessary also to request that your Excellency will entrust all concerns with foreign courts, such as the reception of Vakeels and others at your court, the nomination of those deputed to other states, even the department of intelligence, which it is highly incumbent on your Excellency to see well managed, to the conduct of your ministers. I am informed that the Rajah Jow Saul, not sufficiently under the authority of the ministers, has charge of the department for secret intelligence. This also I advise your Excellency to alter, by placing this department, whether continued in charge of Jow Saul, or by the nomination of any other person, under the immediate responsibility of your ministers.

Your Excellency must be aware that such is our close connexion, that every Chief in India must consider the two states as forming one power, and you have so uniformly adhered to that connexion, that hitherto no political transaction has been concerted but with the advice of each other; and as the Company have expressed their approbation of the choice which you have made of Hossein Reza Khan and Rajah Ticket Roy, I shall naturally consider the political measures of your Government to be dependent on them as well as the domestic; but I can place no dependence on their sentiments, unless I am assured that they enjoy your undivided confidence.

I have been induced to enter into this detail from the conviction of the necessity for it, as well with respect to your Excellency's Government as to the connexion between the two states, and shall conclude with requesting that your Excellency will not consider that I have deviated in any respect from the plan arranged by the late Hyder Beg Khan, which is, and will ever remain in full force. I have offered my advice as a friend, and flatter myself that you set that value on the Company's friendship that will induce you to listen to their counsels in a manner that may render unnecessary any other measures on the part of the Company, for their own security and defence.

I have conversed fully with Mr. Ives on every topic contained in this letter, and I have desired him on his return to your presence to communicate fully and truly on every article as occasion may require. I flatter myself that your Excellency will listen to his arguments with attention, and I hope that you will look on all he may say as coming directly from me, who am your zealous and warm friend.

No. LXV.

TRANSLATION OF A LETTER FROM HIS HIGHNESS THE NABOB TO GOVERNOR OAKELEY.

6th Rajib, 1207, Hegira; or 18th Feb., 1793.

On the ship that sailed last from hence for Europe, I sent two Arabian horses and a young elephant for the King of Great Britain, and I wrote to my agent that other articles would follow; that he should keep the horses and elephant till they arrive, upon which he is to present them to His Majesty, to the Queen, and to the Prince of Wales, through my friends the Company, the Vizier, the son of Lord Cornwallis, and Mr. Dundas. I have accordingly got ready eight bales and two horses (one of the horses for the Prince and the other for Dr. Storey) and a small box containing bottles of otta, which I request you will please to forward to Europe on the ship that is now under dispatch. Whenever you please, I will send the freight-money of the bales and horses together with the bales and horses and two horse-keepers to my friend.

Make me happy by a speedy answer.

What can I say more?

No. LXVI.

TO HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF GREAT BRITAIN FROM HIS HIGHNESS THE NABOB WALLAUJAH BEHAUDER.

After offering up praise to the Almighty and to His Prophet, I beg leave to express my thanks to your Majesty, who, in like manner with your Royal Grandfather, nay in a greater degree, are the protector of my honour and country, and the prayers of myself and my subjects are constantly offered up to heaven for your Majesty's health and prosperity.

In the warmth of my attachment I have assumed the liberty of sending a young elephant for your Majesty's Royal Consort the Queen, and two horses, with a little otta, and some other presents for your Majesty, and one horse for His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, all which I hope will be honoured with acceptance.

At this time there are several irregularities committed at the holy city of Mecca, and as my ancestors as well as myself have always hitherto continued to send alms to, and carry on charitable transactions at that holy place, in order to remove those irregularities I have addressed a letter to the Grand Signor, which, with some boxes of presents, I have forwarded to your Majesty's royal presence, and have enclosed in this address copy of the said letter and a list of the articles which accompany it. I hope your Majesty will be graciously pleased to forward the letter and presents to the Grand Turk with a line under your own Royal hand in my recommendation, whereby the business of charity will, with the blessing of God, be properly settled by me; and when your Majesty shall receive an answer to my address from the Grand Signor, I request your Majesty will be pleased to direct it to be transmitted to me, and this will be considered by me and all my subjects as the greatest instance of your Royal esteem and regard.

May the Almighty God long preserve your Majesty as a blessing to the world.

What can I say more?

No. LXVII.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN COUNCIL TO THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

HONOURABLE SIRS, Fort William, March 6, 1793.

. . . . The same principle which induced us to resolve upon the separation of the Talooks prompted us to recommend to you on the 30th March, 1792, the abolition of a custom introduced under the native Government, by which most of the principal zemindarries in the country are made to descend entire to the eldest son, or next heir of the last incumbent, in opposition both to the Hindoo and the Mahomedan law, which admit of no exclusive right of inheritance in favour of primogeniture, but require that the property of a deceased person shall be divided amongst his sons or heirs in certain specified proportions. Finding, however, upon a reference to your former orders, that you had frequently expressed a wish that the large zemindarries should be dismembered if it could be effected consistently with the principles of justice, we did not hesitate to adopt the measure without waiting for your sanction. We are happy to find that this measure corresponds so entirely with the sentiments which you have expressed in this paragraph respecting the good policy of dismembering these very large zemindarries, the evils attending which become every day more strongly impressed upon our minds. The zemindars whom the regulation will affect, cannot fail to be satisfied with it, as it leaves them at liberty to divide their property or to allow it to devolve to their heirs after their death, in the proportions to which they are entitled by law, or to keep it entire by devising the whole of it by will to any one of their heirs or relations. There can be no doubt but this regulation will be productive of the desired effect in due course of time, as it is to be presumed that many of the principal landholders from motives of affection to their children, or with a view to conform to the dictates of the law, will divide the property amongst their sons or heirs, or, by making no will, leave it to devolve to them in the proportions which they may be respectively entitled to inherit.

With respect to your suggestion regarding waste lands, we do not hesitate to offer it as our opinion that any attempt to stipulate for a proportion of their produce would not only be considered a breach of the engagements entered into with the landholders, but that it would greatly counteract, if not altogether damp, that spirit of industry and improvement to excite which is the great object of fixing the tax upon each estate.

It is necessary to apprise you (of what you could not have been aware) that all waste lands form a part of the estates of the different landholders, and the boundaries of the portions of these lands that belong to each individual are as well defined as the limits of the cultivated parts of their property, and that they are as tenacious of their right of possession in the former as the latter.

The waste lands may in general be comprehended under two descriptions. First, those in the level country which are interspersed in more or less extensive tracts amongst the cultivated lands; and secondly, the Sunderbunds (the country along the sea-shore between the Hoogly and Megna Rivers) and the foot of the vast range of mountains which nearly encircle your Bengal provinces.

The first-mentioned description of waste ground will be easily brought into cultivation when the zemindars have funds for that purpose, and provided they are certain of reaping the profit arising from the improvement. These lands, however, are not wholly unproductive to them at present. They furnish pasture for the great herds of cattle that are necessary for the plough, and also to supply the inhabitants with ghee (a species of butter) and milk, two of the principal

necessaries of life in this country. It is true that the lands in this desolate state far exceed what would suffice for the above purposes, but it is the expectation of bringing them into cultivation, and reaping the profit of them, that has induced many to agree to the decennial jumma which has been assessed upon their lands. It is this additional resource alone which can place the landholders in a state of affluence, and enable them to guard against inundation or drought, the two calamities to which this country must ever be liable until the landholders are enabled to provide (as we are of opinion they in a great measure might) by the above-mentioned and other works of art. To stipulate with them, therefore, for any part of the produce of their waste lands would not only diminish the incitement to these great and essential improvements in the agriculture of the country, but deprive them of the means of effecting it. In addition to these weighty objections it would be necessary, in order to obtain any revenue from the waste lands of this description, to enter into innumerable and complicated scrutinies and measurements in the first instance to ascertain the proportions of waste and cultivated lands in each individual's estate, and to renew them annually or occasionally to know the progress made in the cultivation of the latter. The altercations and vexatious oppressions, and the great expence which would inevitably result in settling what proportion of these waste lands should be liable to assessment, and the rates at which they should be taxed, would certainly destroy all ideas of a fixed taxation, and prevent the introduction of that spirit of industry and confidence in our good faith which is expected to result from it. The landholders and cultivators of the soil would continue (as they have hitherto been) little more than the farmers and labourers upon a great estate, of which Government would be the landlord. In endeavouring, therefore, to obtain an addition to the public income by reserving a portion of the produce of the waste lands, Government would risk the realizing of the very ample revenue which has been assessed upon the country, and landed property would continue at the very depreciated value which it has hitherto borne.

With respect to the second description of waste lands (the lower parts of the Sunderbunders perhaps excepted) they also include the estates of the individuals with whom the settlement is made. But supposing these lands to be at the disposal of Government, as they have for the most part been covered with forest or underwood from time immemorial, and as the soil is in itself, compared with that of the open country, unproductive, and (besides the labour and expense which would attend the bringing it into cultivation) its produce would be comparatively of little value, from the distance of the high roads and navigable rivers, and the consequent difficulty of bringing it to market. We are of opinion, therefore, that whilst there is a call for all the labour not only of the present inhabitants, but of the greatest increased population that peace and prosperity can be expected to produce, to bring the waste lands in the open country into cultivation, the labour of any considerable number of people would be unprofitably bestowed upon such wild and inhospitable tracts, supposing it could be directed thereto by the grant of rewards or immunities, or by any other means. When the open country is brought into cultivation the industry of the people will then of itself be directed to these desolate tracts; but as this cannot be expected to be the case for a long period of years, we think that any premature attention to these objects that might tend in any degree to interfere with the noble system of which you have laid the foundation, would be inconsistent with good policy, and defeat the end which it might be expected to answer.

We think this a proper opportunity to observe that if at any future period the public exigencies should require an addition to your resources, you must look for this addition in the increase of the general wealth and commerce of the country,

and not in the augmentation of the tax upon the land. Although agriculture and commerce promote each other, yet in this country, more than in any other, agriculture must flourish before its commerce can become extensive. The materials for all the most valuable manufactures are the produce of its own lands. It follows therefore that the extent of its commerce must depend upon the encouragement given to agriculture, and that whatever tends to impede the latter destroys the two great sources of its wealth. At present almost the whole of your revenue is raised upon the lands, and any attempt to participate with the landholders in the produce of the waste lands would (as we have said) operate to discourage their being brought into cultivation, and consequently prevent the augmentation of articles for manufacture or export. The increase of cultivation (which nothing but permitting the landholders to reap the benefit of it can effect) will be productive of the opposite consequences. To what extent the trade and manufactures of this country may increase under the very liberal measures which have been adopted for enabling British subjects to convey their goods to Europe at a moderate freight, we can form no conjecture. We are satisfied, however, that it will far exceed general expectation, and the duties on the import and export trade (exclusive of any internal duties which it may in future be thought advisable to impose), that may hereafter be levied, will afford an ample increase to your resources, and without burdening the people or affecting in any shape the industry of the country.

From the proceedings which we shall forward to you by the next despatch, you will find that we have anticipated your wishes respecting the pattahs to be granted by the landholders to the ryots. It is with pleasure we acquaint you that throughout the greater part of the country specific agreements have been exchanged between the landholders and the ryots, and that where these writings have not been entered into, the landholders have bound themselves to prepare and deliver them by fixed periods. We shall here only observe that under the new arrangements to which we shall presently advert, the ryots will always have it in their own power to compel an adherence to the agreements by an appeal to the courts of justice, whenever the landholders may attempt to infringe them.

We now come to the very important part of your instructions empowering us to declare the tax assessed upon the lands in the provinces fixed for ever.

From the advices which we have forwarded to you since the date of the latest letter acknowledged in your instructions, you will have perceived that so far from any circumstances having occurred to defeat your reasonable expectations of the result of the settlement, the jumma of it has exceeded the estimated amount, and that every occurrence has tended to confirm and strengthen the decided opinions which we formerly expressed of the expediency of the measure. We are not aware of any material reason that would render it advisable to postpone the declaration, whereas there are a variety of considerations which appear to us to make it highly expedient that the valuable rights and tenures which you have conferred upon the landholders in these provinces should be announced to them without delay. The seasons this year have been remarkably favourable, and abundance reigns throughout the country. The public credit is high, the paper in circulation bearing an interest of 8 per cent. selling at a premium of 1 per cent., and the interest of money is proportionably low. As this paper is in course of payment, there is every ground to expect that the large capitals possessed by many of the natives (which they will have no means of employing when the public debt is discharged) will be applied to the purchase of landed property as soon as the tenure is declared to be secure, and they are capable of estimating what profit they will be certain of deriving from it by the public tax upon it being unalterably fixed. With respect to those landholders with whom a ten

years' settlement has been concluded, the announcing to them that their jumma is fixed for ever, will not only incline them to pay their current revenue with cheerfulness, but add to their ability to discharge it by the credit which they will obtain from the increased value of their tenures. On the other hand the declaration will not fail to render the few landholders who have not entered into engagements, eager to secure to themselves the same valuable rights and privileges.

For the above reasons we should think it impolitic to delay the declaration that you have empowered us to make, the announcing of which will, we are persuaded, be considered as the commencement of the æra of improvement and prosperity in this country. We shall be particularly careful that the notification is drawn up in the manner you prescribe, and that the terms of it may be calculated to impress the landholders with the value and importance of the rights conferred upon them, and of your solicitude for their welfare and prosperity. We shall likewise, to prevent any future misconception, expressly reserve to you the right of establishing and collecting any internal duties that you may hereafter think proper to impose, and also declare your determination to assess all alienated or rent-free lands that may hereafter revert to Government, or be proved, after a regular trial in a court of justice, to be held under an invalid tenure. We shall further declare (although a clause to that effect has been inserted in the engagements with the landholders) that you do not mean, by fixing the public demand upon the lands, to debar yourselves from the exercise of the right inherent in you as sovereigns of the country, of making such regulations as you may occasionally think proper for the protection of the ryots and inferior landholders, or other orders of people concerned in the cultivation of the lands. A desire to give this notification the consideration that the importance of it merits, is the reason of its not having been transmitted to you by this despatch.

We now come to the close of your instructions, "the watching over and maturing of this system, maintaining under future administrations the energy which has commenced it," and to the other important points detailed in the paragraphs specified in the margin.

It is with much satisfaction we acquaint you that we have endeavoured to provide for these important points, as well as for the administration of the laws and regulations in general, both civil and criminal. The arrangements which we have adopted for this purpose are contained in the accompanying copy of a minute from the Governor-General recorded in our proceedings of the 11th ultimo, and we have resolved to carry them into execution as soon as the collections for the Bengal year are brought to a close. For the reasons at large which have induced us to adopt these arrangements, as well as for the detail of them, we must refer you to the minute itself. We shall here only state some observations respecting them, as they are immediately connected with the part of your instructions above noticed.

The next object which is most essential to the prosperity of your dominions, is the providing for the due enforcement not only of the regulations respecting the decennial settlement, but of the laws and regulations in general which in any respect affect the rights or property of your subjects. You will observe from the Governor-General's minute that we have anticipated your remark (than which nothing can be more just) that the neglect of instituted regulations has been most noxious to your affairs, and we have long been of opinion that no system will ever be carried into effect so long as the personal qualifications of the individuals that may be appointed to superintend it, form the only security for the due execution of it. In this country, as in every other, security of property must be established by a system upheld by its inherent principles, and not by the men who are to have the occasional conduct of it. The body of the people must feel and

be satisfied of this security before industry will exert itself, or the moneyed men embark their capitals in agricultural or commercial speculations. There are certain powers and functions which can never be vested in the same officers without destroying all confidence in the protection of the laws. This remark is particularly applicable to the various functions vested in the present collectors. All causes relating to the rights of the several descriptions of landholders and cultivators of the soil, and all claims arising between them and their securities, have been excepted from the cognizance of the regular courts of justice, and made exclusively cognizable by the collector of the revenue. This officer has of late years been allowed a commission upon the collections, and at all times the realizing of the revenue has been considered as his most important duty, and any failure in the successful collection of it has subjected him to dismission from his office; under such circumstances it was naturally to be expected that the collection of the revenue would be deemed by these officers the most important of their duties, and that all considerations of right would be made subservient to it. Where the power to redress oppressions, and functions that must always have a tendency to promote or screen the commission of them, are united in the same person, a strict adherence to the principles of justice cannot be expected, and still less can it be hoped that the people will feel a confidence of obtaining justice. Upon these and other grounds, which are fully detailed in the Governor-General's minute, we resolved to abolish the Maal Adawluts or Revenue Courts, and to withdraw from the Board of the Revenue and the collectors, all judicial powers, thereby confining their duties and functions to the mere collection of the public dues, and to transfer the cognizance of the causes hitherto tried in these courts to the courts of justice.

For a more particular detail of the constitution of these courts we must refer you to the Governor-General's minute, and we shall here only observe that courts of justice are to be continued in each collectorship as heretofore, which are to be denominated *Zillah* or District Courts, and that the judge thereof is to have cognizance over civil causes of all descriptions that may arise in his jurisdiction, whether of the nature of those termed revenue causes, and hitherto tried in the Revenue Courts, or of the description of those which have been cognizable in the courts of Dewanny Adawlut. We have resolved, likewise, that the collectors of revenue and their officers, and indeed all the officers of Government, shall be amenable to the courts for acts done in their official capacities, and that Government itself, in cases in which it may be a party with its subjects in matters of property, shall submit its rights to be tried in these courts under the existing laws and regulations. That these courts may have complete authority over all persons residing in their jurisdictions, and that natives may be able to procure redress against Europeans with the same facility as the latter can obtain it against the former, we have determined that no British subject (excepting King's officers and the civil and the military covenanted servants of the Company) shall be allowed to reside beyond the limits of Calcutta, without entering into a bond to make himself amenable to the court of justice of the district in which he may be desirous of taking up his abode, in all civil causes that may be instituted against him by natives. The judges of these courts are also to be vested with the powers of magistrates to preserve the peace, and to apprehend and commit offenders to take their trials before the Courts of Circuit.

We have likewise resolved to establish four provincial Courts of Appeal at the cities of Patna, Dacca, Moorshedabad, and Calcutta; each of these courts to be superintended by three judges: an appeal to lie to them in all cases whatsoever from the decisions of the Zillah or District and the City Courts within their respective jurisdictions. The appellate jurisdiction of these courts is to extend

over the same districts as are now comprehended in the jurisdictions of the Courts of Circuit, and are as follows:— . . . .

The city of Calcutta being under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Judicature, the provincial Courts of Appeal will not have cognizance of any civil or criminal causes arising in it.

The decrees of the provincial Courts of Appeal are to be final in all causes of personal property not exceeding in value one thousand rupees, and in suits for real property being malguzary, or paying revenue to Government, where the annual produce shall not exceed five hundred rupees, and in causes for lakerage property (that is, paying no revenue to Government) where the annual produce shall not exceed one hundred. All decisions respecting personal or real property in causes exceeding the above amounts, are to be appealable to the Supreme Board as a Court of Appeal in the last resort, in their capacity of a Court of Sudder Dewanny Adawlut.

We have likewise resolved that the judges of the provincial Courts of Appeal shall be judges of Circuit in their respective divisions. In this capacity they will exercise the same powers and duties as were vested in the judges of the Courts of Circuit on the 3rd December, 1790 (whose offices will consequently be abolished), and will be subordinate to the Supreme Government in its capacity of a Nizamut Adawlut, or Superior Criminal Court. The great additional advantage, however, which will result from this arrangement is that the provincial Courts of Appeal will consist of three judges; the senior judge will go the circuit of one-half of the stations within their jurisdiction, whilst the other two perform the circuit of the remainder, and consequently the two annual gaol-deliveries will by this means be effected in one-half of the time in which they are accomplished at present by the two judges proceeding together to each station. As to the cities, we have resolved that there shall be a gaol-delivery every month, excepting during the time that the judge may be upon the circuit in the districts.

We are, &c.

No. LXVIII.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO SIR JOHN KENNAWAY, BART.

SIR, Calcutta, April 12, 1793.

I have received your letters of the 17th and 22nd ultimo, and I now enclose an answer to the last letter of his Highness on the subject of Kurnool, in which, agreeably to my former sentiments upon this subject, I have again explicitly declared my decided opinion that he ought to withdraw from all interference whatever, and leave the succession and the payment of the Peshcush to be settled between Tippoo and the sons of Runmust Khan.

Nothing appears to me more evident than that the Nizam has in fact, though not in form, suffered his title of Lord Paramount of Kurnool to be superseded, and that he must be considered to have given it up when he ceased to protect his territory against the usurpations of Hyder Ally; and even if it was otherwise, it would be impossible to reconcile the discordant claims of a demand for tribute by Tippoo, with that of a paramount right in the Nizam.

Considering the measures that his Highness has already adopted, I suppose that it will not be without a considerable degree of repugnance that he will agree to follow my advice; but I conclude that he will ultimately adopt that resolution

in consequence of the explicit declaration which I have made, that he must not expect the interference of the allies in support of his claim. His interference could only be warranted by a formal establishment of the Nizam's right to the property of Kurnool; to this he does not pretend, and his title of Lord Paramount was certainly, as I have already said, superseded, when Hyder exacted a tribute from his alleged feudatory without resistance on the part of the Nizam. . . .

When you deliver my letter to his Highness, you will of course endeavour by the most conciliatory language to reconcile him to the advice which it contains, and you will support the sentiments that I have expressed in it by such arguments as may occur to yourself, or by such of those that I have made use of in the course of the correspondence on this subject, as can with prudence be stated to himself or to the minister; and with the view of softening their disappointment, as well as of discouraging Tippoo from making any further attempt upon Kurnool than that of realising the pesheush, you will recommend to them to do no more than merely to withdraw from all interference in the affairs of Kurnool without agitating further the question of right, or making any declaration of their having relinquished the intention of exercising it.

I trust that by these means his Highness and the Minister will be brought to reflect with temper and coolness upon the imprudence of their own conduct, and the propriety of my advice, and as this discussion has already continued too long, and the danger of protracting it is so evident, I cannot but express an anxiety that it may now be finally closed.

I am, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

No. LXIX.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE NIZAM.

Calcutta, April 12, 1793.

I have been honoured with your Highness's letter in reply to my address on the subject of Kurnool.

In the commencement of this business when your Highness did me the honour to desire my opinion, I considered myself bound by the ties of personal friendship and political regard, to weigh the circumstances of the case in all their relations as affecting the rights of your Highness and Tippoo Sultaun, or as involving in their consequences the interference of the Allies, and after the most mature deliberation on the subject in which so many important interests were concerned, I could not hesitate upon the ground of justice and policy to recommend to your Highness to desist from interfering in the affairs of that district. It appeared to me that your interference might involve serious consequences to your Highness's government alone, as no engagements existed by virtue of which the Company could unite with your Highness, nor any, as far as I was informed, between your Highness and the Peshwah that could warrant the assistance of the Maratta state in support of such measures.

The respect which I entertain for your Highness's wisdom and character, as well as the sincere regard which I possess for your Highness and the interests of your Government, have induced me to reconsider what I before wrote, and to weigh and compare the reasons which I afford to your consideration in support of my opinion, with the arguments which you have urged in reply to them; and I should be wanting in that friendship and esteem which I profess for you if I did not candidly and explicitly declare, that the more I have deliberated upon

the subject the more my opinion is confirmed that you should leave the discussion of the succession to Kurnool and the demand for the Peshcush to be settled by the sons of Runmust Khan and Tippoo Sultaun, and that it is for your Highness's dignity and interest to withdraw your interference.

The proper time for discussing the claims of Tippoo Sultaun to the Peshcush from Kurnool, was before the conclusion of the peace with him. At the conferences upon this subject your Highness's Ministers objected to the insertion of the Peshcush in the schedule of Tippoo Sultaun's revenues, and denied the existence of any agreement under the signature of Runmust Khan to pay the Peshcush. Here the matter rested; affirmed by one party and denied by the other, and your Highness's Minister, although importuned by the sons of Runmust Khan to obtain an adjustment of the business, did not prosecute their objections and bring the point in dispute to a final decision; thus the opportunity of deciding this affair was lost, and the right of Tippoo Sultaun to the Peshcush of Kurnool, which he and his father had exercised at different times for upwards of twenty years, was not rejected by the Allies when they had the power to reject or admit what they pleased. I request, therefore, your Highness to consider with what justice this right can now be contested, or with what equity Tippoo Sultaun can now be called upon to produce the agreement of the Nabob of Kurnool. It is my duty and determination, as well as that of the English nation, to adhere inviolably to the faith of their treaties and the terms of their agreements. When it pleased the Almighty to crown the arms of the Allies with success, they demanded what they thought proper from Tippoo, and whatever they did not exact must be considered as his property, which they have no right to demand at this time. It is certainly probable that at the period of the negotiation for peace, if a proper attention had been given to the affair of Kurnool on the part of your Highness's Ministers, the amount of the Peshcush or a territorial equivalent would have been required by the Allies; but since from haste, inadvertence, or other cause, the matter remained then undecided, and no claim on this account was made upon Tippoo Sultaun, he would have just reason to complain of an infringement of that amity which has been established by the treaty of peace, if a demand were now made upon him.

These are the reflections which have occurred to me, and which I have already communicated to your Highness, who on this occasion, as in all others, will act agreeably to the dictates of wisdom and justice. Your Highness, adverting to the mode by which Hyder and Tippoo acquired their present power, and rendered the Nabob of Kurnool tributary to them, seems to consider it as no foundation of right on their parts; but every page of history, in which your Highness is so well instructed, shows that the Almighty Disposer of events bestows kingdoms and victory, and raises and depresses according to the inevitable decrees of His eternal Wisdom, and that most of the great monarchies now existing were founded, under the permission of His Providence, by the power of the sword; and in fact, unfortunately for the peace of mankind and for the prosperity of states, the rights of sovereigns are too often decided by an appeal to force instead of being settled by amicable counsels and reciprocal conciliation. It was by taking advantage of the times that Hyder Ali, as your Highness observes, established his power, and such is also the foundation of other great powers in Hindostan. By the blessing of God, peace is now everywhere established, and my endeavours, as well as those of successors to this Government, will be constantly exerted to render it perpetual.

Your Highness proposes to engage for the payment of the arrears of Peshcush to Tippoo Sultaun, and of the Peshcush itself in future, when the amount is ascertained by the production of the agreement of the Nabob of Kurnool. Permit

me to state to your Highness, that on this point it has occurred to me that in fact it would be to make your Highness tributary to Tippoo Sultaun, and I request that you will reflect that even if you could submit to such degradation, by making a private agreement of that nature with Tippoo, the country of Kurnool can never be considered by the Allies in the same light as the other dominions of your Highness, for the guarantee of which against the attacks of Tippoo Sultaun the faith of the Allies is mutually pledged.

I have complied with the duties of friendship in communicating without reserve what has occurred to me on this subject, and I trust that your Highness will be persuaded that in doing so I have been actuated by the most sincere concern for the interests of your Government. Your Highness, in calling for my opinion, has imposed this task upon me, and I should have been happy if my sentiments on this occasion had coincided with those of your Highness, as it is my earnest wish to act conformably to your inclination; but the obligations of friendship indispensably require that I should write what, after the most mature consideration, appears to me dictated by justice and policy. The decision rests with your Highness's wisdom, which will no doubt suggest what is proper and right.

No. LXX.

Minute by the Governor-General.

May 17, 1793.

On a perusal of these papers from Madras I have been induced to give the subject of the right of succession to the Raje of Tanjore on the demise of the Rajah Tuljajee, a more attentive consideration. I have in consequence revised the papers which have been recorded on this subject, and upon a reference to them it appears to me, that the proceedings relating to the succession of Ameer Sing to the Raje of Tanjore, have been conducted with an attention equal to the importance of the object, and that seemed to preclude the possibility of any question as to the propriety or rectitude of the decision then pronounced. Both, however, are now impeached by the letter of Mr. Swartz, and the papers accompanying it.

When the information of the late Rajah's demise was communicated to this Government, it was assumed as a principle, that the determination upon the respective claims of the Regent Ameer Sing and the adopted son Serfojee, could not with propriety take place in Bengal, and instructions presenting the mode of enquiry and rules of decisions were accordingly sent to the Presidency of Fort St. George, in terms calculated to prevent any further reference upon a supposition that the opinions obtained might be irreconcilable from their discordancy, and that no test should occur for the discrimination of them, or that the rights of the contesting parties should still appear doubtful, after the fullest inquiry upon the principles laid down, the claims of the Rajah Swammy as possessing natural rights superior to those of the adopted son, were to be admitted in preference.

In conformity to these instructions, Sir Archibald Campbell proceeded to Tanjore, and the particulars and result of his enquiries are detailed in the journal of his proceedings at that place, from which the following points are summarily extracted.

That Sir A. Campbell had the most positive assurances from the principal European gentlemen of the settlement, and from the most intelligent native merchants and others, who were intimately acquainted with the laws and reli-

gious principles of the Hindoos, that the legal rights of Ameer Sing were certainly well established, and the adoption in itself was highly irregular and deceptive.

That the late Rajah Tuljajee had never once declared Ameer Sing illegitimate, but on the contrary treated him with the respect and attention of a brother, on whom he had placed as great a degree of confidence as Hindu princes generally do to their next ostensible successors.

That the adoption of a distant relation without the public consent of his parents, of a boy of nine instead of five years old, was adverse and repugnant to the religious principles of the Hindoos, and legally defective. That the adoption must be imputed to an undue advantage taken of the Rajah during the infirmities of his approaching dissolution, when his mind was disordered, or be accounted for on a supposition that he had lost his senses; that it was too irregular, improbable, and irreconcilable with the tenets and usages of his religion, to have proceeded from any other motive.

To ascertain still farther the validity of the rights of the claimants, certain queries were proposed to twelve pundits in the presence of Sir A. Campbell, A. Macleod, Esq., Resident, Col. James Stuart, J. Cox Hippesly, Esq., the Rev. Mr. Swartz, and A. Montgomery Campbell. The whole, with their answers, are consolidated into the following recapitulation.

That the late Rajah of Tanjore considered Ameer Sing as his brother, and gave him apartments in the palace; two of the pundits also add that he procured him a wife.

That he never publicly declared Ameer Sing illegitimate; this is very strongly expressed by all. That by the Shaster he had no legal right to adopt a dsitant relation to the prejudice of a brother then living.

That the pundits and chief people of Tanjore consider the adoption in opposition to the rights of the brother to the succession, according to the laws and religion of the parties, improper.

That the adoption of Serfojee is defective in form, and by three pundits is declared contrary to the religious opinions of the chief people of Tanjore.

That in the general opinion of the principal people of Tanjore, the natural rights of Ameer Sing to the succession are greater than those of the adopted son.

Some of the pundits express their opinions stronger than others. Their answers were translated by Mr. Swartz.

In my Minute, delivered on the 26th February, 1787, I declared it as my opinion that the determination of this point should be referred to the Presidency of Madras, as it could not with propriety take place in Bengal, but however my sentiments may have induced me to refer the matter to the Presidency of Madras at that time, yet the papers before us now point out the absolute necessity that we should pursue every means in our power to procure the most accurate and lawful information on the several points appertaining to the Hindoo laws and customs, on which this case appears very materially to depend; and with that view I did, some time ago, direct two questions to be submitted to the pundits in Calcutta and at Benares. Such answers as have been received to them have been recorded.

I have however been induced to draw up a few more questions, which have occurred to me on a more deliberate consideration of the subject, and wish that they should be translated into Sanscrit, and submitted to the pundits, both here and at Benares, for their opinions; and on learning their sentiments I shall take into consideration the letter received from the widows of the late Rajah Tuljajee, relative to a mode therein suggested for deciding on the impeachment of the propriety and rectitude of the decisions pronounced in 1787, which is contained in the letter from Mr. Swartz.

Questions to be proposed to the pundits for solution :—

1st. Under what circumstances is it lawful or unlawful for a Hindoo Rajah to adopt a son?

2nd. Are there any limitations as to the persons who may be lawfully adopted with regard to age, caste, affinity, or otherwise?

3rd. Is it lawful for an Hindoo Rajah to adopt a distant relation to the prejudice of a brother living at the time of adoption?

4th. Supposing that brother illegitimate, is the adoption of a distant relation whilst that brother is living lawful?

5th. What constitutes legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth?

6th. Can a boy be legally adopted from a family which has no other son, but where there are daughters older than the boy?

7th. If with a view to the due observation of the religious ceremonies on the death of relations it is not lawful to adopt an only son, according to the Shaster, is such adoption lawful under any particular manner of adoption which does not prevent the performance of those ceremonies, or has such adoption become lawful by usage?

The above questions are to be answered according to the Shaster, and the authorities in support of the opinions given are to be accurately quoted.

But the pundits are also required to consider whether in any of the instances contained in the proposed questions, the practice of customs is different from the laws of the Shaster, and to specify every instance in which such difference may occur, with their opinions how far the authority of custom in such instances can be lawfully admitted when different from the ordination of the Shaster.

10. Is a *verbal* Wilk valid if made in express words before credible witnesses?

11. If a paternal uncle treat his nephew, a little boy, with great cruelty, what punishment has the law ordained for him? Is it a forfeiture of all right of inheritance, as in the case of an elder brother?

No. LXXI.

The Governor-General in Council to the Court of Directors.

My Lord, Fort William, May 18, 1793.

We informed you in the 35th paragraph of our despatches by the Melville Castle, that Captain Kirkpatrick had proceeded to Nepaul, the obstacles which had caused a temporary delay having been removed. He met the Rajah and his ministers at a place where they happened to be on an occasional excursion, at some distance from Catmandu, in the beginning of March; and at an interview which he had with them on the 7th, the Rajah informed him that being under the necessity of returning to his capital, he had left his uncle to transact his business with him in his place. Previous to Captain Kirkpatrick's commencing business with the Regent Behauder Shah, the Rajah's uncle, he had learned from the Gooroo, that his continuing in Nepaul beyond the end of March was a matter not wished for by the Durbar. He also received information from the same quarter, that, although the Regent was perfectly sensible of the advantages which were likely to be derived to his country from cultivating an intimate intercourse with the English Government, and that he was, personally, well disposed to avail himself of those advantages, yet that he had at length been compelled to yield to the obstinate resistance of a certain powerful party,

who could not be reconciled to the idea of our Minister remaining long in Nepaul. This party had, originally, opposed the invitation given to Captain Kirkpatrick to proceed from Patna; nor could they now be induced to consent to his stay, though their chief objection to his introduction had been removed, as he had then had opportunities of observing the weakness of the country, and this it was much their wish to prevent. At the head of the party was the Deputy Regent, together with several others who possessed much weight at the Durbar.

Great as the credit and power of Behauder Shah were, yet they were not sufficient to render him regardless of the remonstrances of this party, and to that must be added the prospect of the Rajah's taking the Government into his own hands, however averse to such a measure he might hitherto have appeared.

Under these circumstances it might possibly have afforded matter of complaint sufficient to have induced the Rajah to take the government into his own hands, should Behauder Shah have attempted to detain Captain Kirkpatrick in Nepaul contrary to the advice of his coadjutors in the ministry.

In the conference held between Captain Kirkpatrick and Behauder Shah, subsequent to the Rajah's departure, the Regent recapitulated the chief incidents of the war with China, acknowledged the friendly advice which he had received from this Government, on the imprudence of carrying on hostilities against so formidable a power, and the high sense of the obligation he felt for our wishes to bring about an accommodation with the Chinese; and he slightly alluded to the disappointment felt at not having received the assistance which was requested from the English Government.

To this Captain Kirkpatrick answered, that it had been an invariable rule with us to remain neuter in all disputes between the neighbouring powers, except in such cases as affected the rights or the honour of the Company; and he appealed to Behauder Shah, whether the conduct of this Government had not uniformly tended to cement the growing friendship between the Company and the Rajah of Nepaul. The adjustment of all questions relative to boundaries, and the commercial intercourse between your territories and those of the Rajah, Captain Kirkpatrick next observed, were subjects upon which the English and Nepaul Governments must necessarily feel themselves much interested, and which he doubted not would soon be arranged to the mutual satisfaction of both. To this Behauder Shah gave general assurances of his goodwill towards the Company, and of his readiness to facilitate every commercial or other arrangement with us, on grounds equally advantageous and honourable for all parties; but the season was fast approaching when the nature of the climate would obstruct all intercourse between Catmandu and the surrounding countries, and that the trade of Bontan and Thibet was at present totally suspended, owing to the late hostilities, and could not for some time be restored to its former channels. Captain Kirkpatrick, knowing from the information which he had received from the Gooroo that his longer continuance in Nepaul would not be agreeable to the Durbar, and thinking it most suitable to the dignity of this Government that the proposition for his returning to Bengal should originate with himself, availed himself of the approach of the unwholesome season as a pretext for soliciting permission to depart; and after some general expressions of a desire that he should remain longer, a day was fixed for his audience of leave, which accordingly took place on the 24th of March. Behauder Shah renewed his former professions of friendship and attachment, and expressed some solicitude lest a future English Government should not exert themselves equally with the present in maintaining the friendship, newly-formed, with the Government of Nepaul. To which he received for answer that, as the maintenance of the Company's true interests must always be the object of every English Government, and as the cultivation of a

friendly intercourse with Nepaul was blended in an intimate degree with that object, he might be assured that there never could be a British administration in India who would so far forget their duty, as to act upon different principles. The deputation left Catmandu on the 24th of March, and experienced the utmost attention during their passage through the Rajah's territories. Captain Kirkpatrick is now returned to Calcutta.

Although every purpose that could have been wished has not been effected by this deputation, owing to the state of the internal Government of Nepaul, yet it is of no small importance to us to have commenced an immediate intercourse with that Government, and to have had an opportunity of making observations on the manners of the people and the real situation of that country, by the means of our own servants.

Captain Kirkpatrick's conduct upon this mission met with our entire approbation, being sensible that under the circumstances that occurred, and the state of things as he found them in Nepaul, no one could have acquitted himself with more ability, prudence, and circumspection.

We are, &c.

No. LXXII.

Marquis Cornwallis to the Nabob of Arcot.

Calcutta, July 27, 1793.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Highness's letters, and have paid particular attention to their enclosures.

It is not now necessary for me to enter into any explanation of the mutual interest which the Company and your Highness naturally have in the success of a war in the Carnatic, whether it be with an European or a native power, and it is equally unnecessary to repeat my sentiments of your Highness's anxiety for the Company's success in the present undertaking. I have derived great satisfaction, as your Highness is pleased to expect that I should, on the completion of one year's engagements pursuant to the last treaty, and beg leave to assure you that my gratification on this event does not arise less from having had the opportunity of concluding engagements with you in person, which at that time appeared so well calculated to afford satisfaction to all the parties concerned, than from the punctuality with which your Highness has executed your part of the stipulations. They were founded on mutual protection and defence against all disturbance of the general tranquillity, and your Highness must be sensible that, independent of the national honour which will rule the measures of the English Government in the present siege, rigid adherence to the engagements which have been entered into with your Highness will also at all times induce the Company to exert themselves for the preservation of tranquillity in your Highness's and their own territories.

The measures which have been adopted with this view in the appointment of an army to undertake the siege of Pondicherry, are already known to your Highness, and I have perused your Highness's assurances of furnishing every assistance towards the maintenance of the army during the siege, with additional pleasure, as I have that confidence in your friendship as to be convinced that you will heartily co-operate with the Government of Madras in such measures as may be thought advisable in that respect.

I lose no time therefore on perusing the application from Sir C. Oakeley and your Highness's reply to it, to suggest to your Highness the mode by which the army may be supplied with every necessary article, which my own experience during the long and arduous war with Tippoo Sultaun proved not only effectual in regard to the object, but at the same time beneficial to the country. Convinced that it is to the interest of the inhabitants to find a profitable market for the sale of such articles of consumption as they might be possessed of, where neither tax nor molestation of any kind prevailed, I issued dustucks for all goods coming for sale in my camp; and I positively forbad the collection of any duty whatever on them, either in the country through which they passed, or in the bazars where they were sold. The consequence of this measure was the ample supply of every article necessary, while the sellers were enriched by the assistance which they furnished to the army, and were thereby enabled to discharge their rents to Government. I have therefore now to request that your Highness will give positive orders throughout your country, such as I have directed may be issued in the Northern Circars and in the Jagheer, and shall recommend may be enjoined to the Rajah of Tanjore, that all people under your Highness's authority shall not only have liberty, but even encouragement, to sell every article which they can spare, and that all goods going to the camp for the use of the army may pass free from all duties and impediments whatever. Did not my own experience of the success of this measure authorise me to make the recommendation of it to your Highness, I should have had no doubt that the expediency of it would have had full force on your mind; and therefore I shall not trouble you with any further arguments in its favour, than the fair prospects which it holds out of supplying the army without constant application to your Highness, and to the prosperity of the country, which will fully compensate for the trifling deficiency from the exemption of the duties, a deficiency which the Company will also experience, and which they will bear from a conviction of the advantages which both your Highness and themselves will derive in the successful issue of the campaign.

I shall have the pleasure of an interview with your Highness on my arrival at Madras, where it will afford me particular happiness to converse with your Highness on those points which you may think proper to suggest; for your Highness may be assured that I am not willing to recommend any measure to you, nor to adopt any myself, which may be repugnant to your pleasure: my earnest desire is to provide for the general welfare.

No. LXXIII.

THE following pages contain the substance of the plan proposed by Lord Cornwallis for the amalgamation of the King's and Company's armies. It is detailed in 164 paragraphs. Of these some are printed *in extenso*, some are condensed, and a good many, which refer to unimportant points, are altogether omitted.

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS TO THE RIGHT HON. HENRY DUNDAS.

SIR, London, 7th November, 1794.

1. I have had the honour to receive your letter dated September 1st, requesting me to give my opinion on the best mode of new-modelling the army in India, with a view to give safety and permanence to our Indian empire, and to prevent the continuance or revival of those discontents and jealousies which have

so often manifested themselves between the King's and Company's troops, as well as between the Company's troops belonging to the different Presidencies in that part of the world.

2. Having been informed by a letter which I received from you before I left India, that this arrangement would be postponed till my return to this country, I took the opportunity of the leisure which was afforded me on my passage to Europe, and since my landing in England I have employed much of my thoughts in reflecting very deliberately on this important and complicated subject; and the following Plan, being the result of those reflections, is now submitted to your consideration.

3. I am not so confident in my opinions as to imagine that they will not admit of many material alterations and improvements; but I can assure you that in arranging my ideas on a subject in which the interests, wishes, and prejudices of a great number of individuals, and the interests of the East India Company and of the nation at large, are so intimately concerned and blended, I have endeavoured to divest my mind of every kind of partiality and prejudice, and that, in stating the principles and regulations of this plan, it has been my intention, according to the best of my judgment, to pay equal regard to the present and future just rights of officers serving in a distant and unhealthy climate, and to a consideration of the means which I conceive will be necessary to give a reasonable prospect of securing the permanent possession of our valuable Asiatic territories to the British nation.

4. The Company's military arrangements have by no means kept pace with the gradual increase of their territories, and the consequent occasional augmentations of their establishments; and the defects in the constitution of the army are now of a nature, that, unless remedied, they would soon render the officers in general no less discontented with their situations, than unfit for the discharge of the duties which may be necessary for the protection of the British interests in India.

5. Previous to my proposing remedies for these defects, I shall take a general view of the present constitution, and of some of the usages in the Company's army; and after proposing the new establishments, and explaining the principles on which my recommendations are founded, I shall suggest several regulations which appear to me to be indispensably necessary for carrying those propositions into complete effect. . . .

Lord Cornwallis then proceeds to describe the existing state of the Indian army. The promotion was by seniority, regulated by the vacancies in each Presidency. There were no generals, and only 52 field-officers out of upwards of 1000 officers, exclusive of cavalry, engineers, and artillery. Thus the hope of promotion, so powerful an engine in animating the exertions of military men, was so slight, that few could expect to attain the rank of colonel while fit for active service.

No officer, even if compelled from bad health to solicit a short furlough, could return to Europe without resigning his commission; and if he remained in Europe beyond a very limited time, he could not be re-admitted into the service. Should he be allowed to return to India, he was seconded, upon greatly diminished pay and allowances, until a vacancy occurred in his own rank. Those permanently quitting the service had no retirement, except the pittance they could derive from Lord Clive's Fund. Under these circumstances officers had often been forced, in order to realize independent fortunes, to have recourse to means incompatible with the principles which should actuate military men.

The native infantry differed in many points from the European; from the

ranks of the latter, the former were supplied with European commissioned and non-commissioned officers, who were generally selected with great care. Hence the remaining officers took but little pains with their European soldiers, who were almost universally recruited from a class far inferior to those who filled the ranks of the King's regiments.

The artillery, having the choice of all the Company's recruits, was well composed. The officers of engineers generally good, but with little experience. The native cavalry too few in number to deserve any particular notice. In the Madras Presidency the cavalry were generally, and in the Bengal Presidency almost entirely, composed of Mahometans. In all the Presidencies the infantry were mostly Hindoos, with a few Christians on the coast of Coromandel, and a few Jews on the coast of Malabar. Great differences existed both in language and customs, but the men were in every case much attached to their respective countries and kindred. With regard to the pay of all ranks, and gratuities to captains and subalterns, there was little or no difference in the several Presidencies. But such was not the case as to batta. The allowances varied from no batta at all in Bombay, to double full batta at some of the Bengal stations; and as in many cases the allowances were smallest where the price of provisions was highest, there seemed to be no means of accounting for these differences, except from the state of the finances of the respective Presidencies. Such want of uniformity in the systems, naturally produced jealousy and discontent to a very serious extent. . . .

30. The climate of India, and several customs that cannot easily be altered, expose European officers to some articles of expense, which are not indispensably requisite in other parts of the world where British troops are stationed; and it will therefore be necessary to attend to those considerations in fixing their allowances; but as the following propositions for new-modelling the army, are calculated not only for putting the officers of the Indian army on an equal footing with those of the King's troops serving in different parts of the world in their future prospects of promotion, but also for enabling them to visit their native country occasionally during the period of their service, and ultimately to return to spend the latter part of their days in it, with every convenience and advantage which is enjoyed by the officers of the British army in general the necessity of their endeavouring to acquire independent fortunes in India, for the purpose of securing those high gratifications, will no longer exist.

31. From the unfortunate propensity to intemperance which is so general amongst all the European soldiers in India, I am clear in opinion that allowances beyond what will procure for them the real comforts of life in abundance (for which half-batta in addition to their pay, in peace, and in almost any situation in war, would be fully sufficient), would not only be unadvisable in regard to the public finances, but pernicious to the soldiers themselves; and the pay of all ranks of the native troops is so ample, both in proportion to their own wants and habits of living, and to the pay which is allowed the troops in the service of the Native Powers, that it can seldom be necessary to allow any batta, and never more than half-batta to the troops of that description.[1]

32. The foregoing general statement of the constitution and allowances of the army, will show some of the defects of the Company's military system, which in several essential points is totally different from the internal constitution and many of the usages of the King's army; and as I am most decidedly of opinion, that the Company's possessions in India cannot be secured without the assistance

[1] By this it was never intended to deprive such of the Native troops of HALF batta as have hitherto enjoyed it.

of a considerable body of His Majesty's troops, I shall not hesitate to declare that I do not conceive it possible that any system can be devised, which would have a permanent and useful effect for the satisfaction of the individuals of both services, and for the public good, unless, as a preliminary measure, the whole of our force in India, as well Native as European, shall be transferred to His Majesty's service, and, with a few modifications, be regulated and conducted in future according to the rules which have long operated in the King's army.

33. It must however at the same time be clearly understood, that all His Majesty's troops serving in India are to be perfectly subordinate to the Company's Governments in that country, and to obey all orders that they may receive either directly from those Governments, or through them from the Court of Directors.

34. The new arrangement that I shall propose for the Indian army will therefore be founded upon the supposition that the above measure will be adopted; and as I am strongly impressed with a conviction that it will be of essential importance to the interests of Britain, that Europeans should be discouraged and prevented as much as possible from colonizing and settling in our possessions in India, I look upon it to be highly expedient that it should be a fundamental principle in the new system, not only to relieve the corps of European troops frequently, but also to secure the return of all military men, who may be entitled to any provision from the public, to their mother country, by rendering all pensions and allowances to them after they are worn out, or may have been permitted to retire from the service, payable to those only who shall actually claim them in Europe.

35. The pernicious effects upon the state of the European regiments, which have been already experienced, and would ever be felt from the frequent removals of officers from European to Native Corps, would alone induce me to recommend that these two branches of the service should be entirely separated, and no interchange of officers be in future admitted between them; but should frequent reliefs take place in the European branch, an additional objection would arise to the appointment of officers to Native corps from European regiments, in opening a possible door to the abuse of patronage in a Commander-in-Chief, by putting it in his power to give an officer just arrived from Europe, who has had no opportunity to acquire the language, or the least knowledge of the manners and customs of the natives, an advantageous situation in the Native branch of the service, which might be attended with the most ruinous consequences to the public interest.

36. It is true that in point of qualification for the duties of an European regiment, there could be no material objection to the removal of officers from the Native to the European branch; but as it is proposed that the officers of the Native branch shall have a prospect of equal advantage in their own line with the officers of the European branch, it would become unjust to allow the former to interfere with the promotion of those who are not suffered to enjoy a reciprocal advantage.

37. No distinction should, in my opinion, be made either in the mode of promotion of officers, or in any other respect, between the Company's European troops that may be transferred to the King's service, and those of the corresponding branches which at present compose His Majesty's army; but some deviations from the rules that are sufficiently suitable to the European troops will be necessary in the Native branch of the service, particularly in regard to the promotion of officers, which I recommend to be made (with certain exceptions that will be proposed under the head of Native Establishments) by regimental seniority as

far as the rank of Major, and afterwards by seniority in the line at each Presidency: because I conceive it to be improbable that the indulgence of a temporary leave of absence, which the officers of the Native troops will enjoy in common with those of the European regiments, will afford them the same advantage of obtaining support from their connexions at home, as the others may derive from a more permanent residence near them, in consequence of the occasional reliefs of the European corps; and I therefore think that the officers whose services are unalterably fixed in so distant a quarter of the globe, ought to be protected by established regulations, against the hazard of suffering by the abuse of patronage in any Commander-in-Chief.

38. I am perfectly aware that the assistance of European non-commissioned officers is extremely convenient to the officers of the native corps; and, when proper non-commissioned officers can be found, that they are in several respects of substantial use in that branch of the service; but as I know that in an European regiment it is seldom possible to find a sufficient number of sober and properly-qualified men to fill its own establishments of non-commissioned officers, and it would be unreasonable to expect that the European regiments would consent to derange their own internal economy and discipline, by parting with careful non-commissioned officers, I shall not propose that description of men as part of the Native establishment; and as I shall recommend a considerable augmentation of commissioned European officers to the Native troops, I do not apprehend that this alteration can occasion any material detriment to the service.

39. It is also proper to observe, that it is impracticable to procure, in a short time, a considerable number of men of proper caste, and of sufficient size and strength for the duties of a soldier, for the Native troops on the Madras and Bombay establishments; and that on the contrary, an unlimited number of men of the best quality for Native soldiers, may at any time be raised in a very short period for the Bengal troops, from the populous provinces in that quarter of the Company's dominions.

40. I shall therefore recommend a lower establishment for each of the companies of the Bengal troops during peace, than for those of the Madras and Bombay establishments, because on any emergency there can be no difficulty in augmenting them at the shortest warning.

41. Considering the state of the other Powers of India, the great extent and value of our possessions, and the long period which must unavoidably elapse before assistance can be sent from Europe, it does not appear advisable that any material reduction should be made in the number of the men, either Europeans or Natives, that are now employed in India: in order, however, to remedy the radical defects of the present establishments, some additional expense must be incurred; but I trust that the increase will not be found considerable; and, in return, it is hoped that the proposed plan will sufficiently secure the attachment of the Natives, afford an encouraging prospect to the desponding British officers, and render the European forces more useful and efficient for promoting and maintaining the interests of their country.

42. To effect these purposes, it is, in my opinion, necessary to lay down as fundamental principles, that the European and Native branches of the service (the Lascars excepted) should be entirely separated, and that the Native establishments should continue distinct and separate, as at present, at the different Presidencies in India. I shall now give my sentiments with regard to the new establishments, which I recommend. . . .

Lord Cornwallis then proceeds to recommend the following changes in the different branches of the service.

The Artillery.

The six battalions of Company's European artillery (30 companies) to be formed into three, and incorporated into the King's artillery, and the Engineers to be treated in a similar manner: due regard being had in this arrangement to the just claims of the King's officers from their long standing in the service.

Cavalry.

The Madras cavalry—five regiments to be consolidated into four, forming one brigade, with five field-officers among them.

Supernumerary officers to be seconded till they succeed to vacancies.

Officers on leave in Europe to draw their pay, but not their allowances; which should go to the officers discharging their duties.

The Governor-General's body-guard to remain on the existing footing.

Officers under the rank of colonel, may, after serving a certain number of years, retire on full pay, or, with permission, sell their commissions.

If a lieutenant-colonel should retire on full pay, the senior major in the brigade to succeed, but the vacancies so made to be filled up by regimental promotion.

European Infantry.

The 12 battalions of eight companies each to be formed into eight of 10 companies:—Bengal four, Madras three, and Bombay one. Three field-officers, eight captains, 29 subalterns, besides staff, and 850 rank and file, besides serjeants and drummers, in each battalion.

The rules in the King's service as to promotion and sale of commissions to be observed in these corps.

All soldiers already enlisted to be permitted to complete their engagements, if they think fit, according to their original stipulations, and non-commissioned officers in Native regiments to remain there, or be seconded on the European regiments as the Commander-in-Chief may think fit.

European soldiers to be encouraged, if fit for service, to remain in India when their regiments go home, and a bounty to be paid if they re-enlist.

Native Infantry.

The Native regiments to be formed into 26 regiments of two battalions each, and in each battalion 10 companies:—12 at Bengal, 10 at Madras, and 2 at Bombay. The establishment of each battalion in Bengal to be 45 European officers, and 1702 Native officers and men.

In Madras and Bombay 200 Native privates more.

The allowances to be generally according to the existing system in Bengal, but to be called "India pay."

Paymasters to be nominated as in the King's service, and allowances for repair of arms, &c., to be as in the King's regiments.

All officers, of whatever rank, to be allowed to sell their regimental commissions on retiring from the service, without reference to any brevet rank they may hold.

Off-reckonings to be for the benefit of the colonel.

The Bombay Marine battalion to remain on its existing footing.

Arrangements to be made for giving an option to the medical officers, to remain as civil servants of the Company, or to enter into the military branch. And, as all sale of commissions in this class must be strictly prohibited, pensions

to be granted on retirement, varying from 150*l.* to 500*l.*, according to rank and length of service.

CHAPLAINS.

To be regulated on the same principles as the medical officers.

Detailed regulations were suggested for the Lascars and other unimportant branches of the service.

Provision to be made for an immediate supply of cadets to fill vacancies caused by the new arrangements.

Pay and allowances, when not specially mentioned, to be the same as among the King's troops. . . .

108. All officers belonging to the Company's cavalry and infantry, under the rank of Colonel, who, consistently with the standing regulations, can be re-admitted into the army, and may hereafter obtain leave from His Majesty (in the place of the Court of Directors) to return to India, to serve with such corps as the Commander-in-Chief or the Commander of the Forces at the Presidency to which they belong may think proper, and to receive the pay and allowances of their rank, until vacancies in the Native establishment shall fall for them. It has been proposed that field-officers should have rank in the line at each Presidency. Lieutenant-colonels and majors will therefore take their proper place in the list at the Presidency to which they belong, upon their arrival. But to do justice to the captains and subalterns now in Europe, who may not be able to avail themselves of the opportunity of being placed in the new corps at their first foundation according to their standing in the service, I propose that they shall be exempted from the effect of the rule which is to apply to officers who exchange from one regiment to another after the new arrangement shall have taken place; and that when vacancies fall for them in their respective ranks, they shall come into the corps in which such vacancies may fall, according to their original standing in the service at the Presidency to which they belong. . . .

111. The great promotion in all ranks of the Company's service, which would immediately take place on the adoption of the proposed arrangement, even if the officers were to be confined to the Native service alone, without being admitted into the eight European regiments which are henceforward to be incorporated into the general mass of the British army, renders it absolutely necessary to pay some attention to the officers of the King's regiments now serving in India—who must on this occasion suffer a most mortifying supercession; who, from the distance of their situation, have been in a great measure precluded from participating in the rapid preferment which has generally taken place in other corps of the British army in consequence of the present war, and who have at least as many grievances in point of promotion at present to complain of, as any part of the Company's army; although I admit, that if the existing system was to continue, the case of the latter, and especially of those of the Bengal establishment, would become most deplorable. I am therefore clearly of opinion that as, exclusive of the promotions that will take place in the corps of artillery and engineers, an addition will be made by the new arrangement in the Native line of infantry only, of fourteen colonels to the Company's present establishment in India, the preference should be given in the disposal of the eight European regiments, to the officers of the rank of colonel in the King's army, who served in the Mysore war, before those of the Company's service of an inferior rank; which, at the same time that it must be considered as an act of justice due to officers who filled very high and important stations during that critical period, would afford a means of bringing forward the senior officers of the succeeding ranks, who have in general long services to plead, and who must severely feel a total neglect of their pre-

tensions, at a time that so much consideration is shown to the merits and claims of every part of the military establishment in India.

112. Upon the new establishment being completed, lists of all the Company's officers who shall have come into the King's service, to be transmitted to the War Office, particularly specifying the dates of their Brevet commissions of King's rank; and it will, in my opinion, be reasonable and just that a retrospect should then be had to those dates, and that the same advanced rank by the brevet should be given to officers above the rank of subaltern, which they would have obtained if they had been previously in the list of the King's army, in consequence of any general brevets that have been granted by His Majesty since 9th July, 1783.

113. The same rule to be followed with regard to the Company's officers now in England, who may hereafter obtain leave from His Majesty (in the place of the Court of Directors) to return to India, to be re-admitted into the army; and not only the colonels to be in future promoted in their turn to take the rank of General officers, but all other officers are likewise to be considered as equally intitled with those of the rest of His Majesty's troops, to be included in any brevet promotion that the King may be pleased occasionally to make in their respective ranks; but, conformable to the practice of His Majesty's service, a colonel is not to vacate his regiment by his promotion to the rank of General officer, nor are any other officers who may obtain promotion by brevet, to have a claim to higher pay than that of their regimental rank.

114. All officers at present in the Company's service, who shall arrive at the rank of General officers, to be eligible to serve His Majesty in any part of the world. . . .

The next subjects entered upon, were the reduction of military expenses, the reformation of existing abuses, and the rendering the military department sufficiently subordinate to the civil government.

Lord Cornwallis thought it highly necessary that the rank and authority of the person entrusted with the charge of so large a portion of His Majesty's forces should be upheld as much as possible; and he advised that to him alone should be given the title of Commander-in-Chief, and that commanding officers at the subordinate settlements should be styled "Commanding Officer of the Forces at Madras," "Bombay," &c.; they, by authority of the Court of Directors, having seats as second in Council, except when the offices of Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief happened to be united in the same person.

All Company's infantry officers were to choose between the European and Native branches of the service; and should there be a larger number for either, than could be at once provided for, preference to be given to seniors in each rank, and supernumeraries to be *en second*, with pay and allowances, until absorbed.

In arranging the new cavalry and infantry establishments, officers to be appointed according to seniority; but in future, captains and subalterns exchanging, must enter their new regiments as juniors in their respective ranks. . . .

120. In order to prevent abuse of the indulgence of leave of absence to Europe, by officers prolonging their stay at home upon improper pretexts, or making use of intrigue and private interest to obtain a renewal of their leave, it ought to be an established rule that the pay of all officers under the rank of colonel, whether of the European or Native branch of the service, should be stopped after the expiration of the period which has been proposed for their leave of absence from India; and, to render all solicitation ineffectual for the recovery of such

pay, it should, when stopped, become immediately the property of some charity-fund in India.

121. Should the stoppage of pay prove inefficacious for inducing officers to return without further loss of time to their duty in India, the names of such of them as shall prolong their stay in Europe two years beyond the above-mentioned period, are, without admitting any excuse whatever, to be struck out of the list of the army as having resigned the service, and their vacancies to be filled up according to the standing regulations. . . .

The following articles provided that, officers appointed to regiments in India (if not on the strength of the additional company) must embark within two years after being gazetted. In consideration of the incidental expenses, Indian officers appointed to the staff, are, as a general rule, to continue upon it for four years. Staff-officers, besides their liberal pay, to receive allowances in time of peace for travelling expenses, camp-equipage, &c., with an increase in time of war.

Leave may be given to General officers and colonels of regiments in India, not required on the Staff, to reside in Europe; but neither there nor in India will they receive more than regimental pay and the profits of the off-reckoning fund.

The army to continue furnishing officers to fill the posts of military auditor-general, judge-advocates, fort-majors and adjutants, general commissioners of stores, &c. &c.; but all so employed to be on the strength of some European or Native regiment: no officer, after the embarkation of his own regiment, being permitted to hold any staff office in India, excepting those of military auditor-general or deputy, adjutant and quarter-master general or deputies; fort-major or adjutant, and A. D. C., staff officers having certain indulgences as to visiting Europe. . . .

135. As the above propositions not only secure a competent income to the military officers serving in India during the early periods of their service, but also the substantial advantage and gratification of an opening being made for their attaining high military rank, as well as the indulgence of being enabled to visit Europe occasionally without relinquishing their pay, and the satisfaction of having it in their power to spend the latter part of their lives in their native country, either by retiring on their full pay, by selling their commissions, or by remaining in service until they obtain the command and emoluments of a regiment,—all ideas must be given up in the army, of looking for perquisites or advantages in any shape whatever, beyond the open and avowed allowances which shall be allotted to the respective ranks; and if any officer shall be detected in making such attempt, he ought to be tried by a General Court Martial, for behaving in a manner unbecoming the character of an officer and a gentleman, and, if convicted, be dismissed from the service.

136. The collection of bazar duties, and the practice in some parts of India of making usurious loans at country stations, to aumildars, zemindars, and other natives, being two of the most objectionable of the modes by which officers have acquired emoluments in India, are to be particularly pointed out to them as being strictly prohibited; and any officer who shall be convicted before a General Court Martial of having disgraced himself and the character of his profession, by having been guilty of either of those practices, ought to be dismissed from the service, and, if possible, to be obliged to refund the money that he may have acquired by such unworthy means.

137. The only exception from the above regulation should be made in the case of an army or detachment upon actual service in the field during the war; when the commanding officer may be permitted to levy a moderate duty upon spirits and intoxicating drugs, for the purpose of restraining the excessive use of

those articles, and of raising a fund for defraying the expense of the conduct and management of the public bazars of that army or detachment.

138. No duty ought, in any case whatever, to be levied in military bazars, except upon spirits and intoxicating drugs. . . .

In the next articles frequent change of quarters and stations was enjoined, as tending to improve the discipline of the Native troops, and to lessen the temptations of officers to make loans, &c. No officer under the rank of colonel to retain command at any station from whence his corps is removed.

Allowances to field-officers, called revenue-money, or commission on revenue, to be discontinued, because, comparatively with their brother officers in different parts of the world their income is competent to their station; and as the indulgences from which they will derive essential benefit increase the Company's expenses, it is just to make this saving.

Allowances for camp-equipage and carriage to be continued to sepoy officers in Bengal, and extended to other parts of the Company's possessions, where regular reliefs by land can be established. Fixed allowances to be given to certain officers, in lieu of the lascars, &c., furnished to them.

The Company to pay the passages of officers sent to and from India. Efficacious measures to be taken to repress exorbitant charges, and to secure, on reasonable terms, passages in the Company's ships for officers, whether such passages are paid for by themselves or by the Company.

The Commander-in-Chief to have the sole power of granting leave of absence to Europe, transmitting the particulars to the Supreme Government, and Governments of the respective Presidencies.

The rule requiring officers to produce certificates of having satisfied all public demands before they can retire or go home on leave, to continue in force.

No augmentations or reductions of the army in India to be made except by instructions from England, or by explicit orders from the Supreme Government, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, and to the Governments and Commanding-Officers at the subordinate Presidencies. Regiments and detachments not to be moved, nor any general reliefs nor movements of troops to take place, without the express consent of the Supreme Government.

No additions to be made to military allowances in India without the express consent of the Court of Directors.

Annual demands for ordnance and other stores to be transmitted as usual by the Company's Government to the Court of Directors: such stores to be furnished by the Company, or, on the requisition of the Court of Directors, by the Board of Ordnance, the Company paying the freight, &c.

The Court of Directors and Company's Government to retain complete power to examine and control all contingent charges, &c.

Should the Military Boards at the different Presidencies (after the transfer of the army to the King's service) not appear sufficiently dependent upon the Company's Governments to ensure minute obedience to their orders for enforcing rigid economy, these Governments may establish other Boards, or adopt any measures they think necessary.

No persons who are not descended on both sides from European parents, can be admitted into the European branch of the service, except as drummers, fifers, or other musicians: nor can such persons be hereafter admitted on the establishment of European officers in Native troops, though those already in may remain. . . .

158. In order to prevent, as far as may be practicable, the pernicious

effects of dissensions or of want of subordination in the military department to the civil Governments, at so great a distance from the seat of Government of the British Empire, the Company's Governments in India to be authorized to suspend and send home, in the most summary manner, any officer of the army, from the highest to the lowest rank, when they shall think it necessary for the public good.

159. The charge against an officer so suspended, or sent home, to be examined in the manner that His Majesty may be pleased to direct; and the respective Governments by which such measures may have been adopted, are to be responsible for their conduct to the Court of Directors; but every attempt in a military officer to resist the authority of any of the Governments in India, to be rendered highly criminal.

160. The subordinate Governmtsen are not however to proceed to the extremity of sending home an officer of the army, without previously obtaining the approbation and sanction of the Supreme Government, unless the circumstances of the case should be of so extraordinary and dangerous a nature, as obviously to justify the adoption of so strong a measure.

161. In new-modelling the army, attention must be paid to the existing charitable institutions at the different Presidencies for taking care of the children of European officers and soldiers.

162. The numbering of the eight new regiments relative to each other, to be determined by lot, by the direction of the Commander-in-Chief; and in placing them on the general list of His Majesty's army, it is to be considered whether they are to precede or immediately follow the four regiments that were raised a few years ago for the service of India.

163. As it is proposed that the whole of the Company's military establishments to the eastward of the Cape of Good Hope, should be transferred from the Company to the Crown, it may also be thought expedient that the small body of troops stationed at the island of Saint Helena should form a part of the King's army, and be occasionally relieved.

164. In proposing the above regulations, I have not presumed to suggest the authority by which they ought to be established; but every means should be taken to render such of them as it may be thought proper to adopt, efficient and permanent; and I must likewise add, that in order to prevent contradictory instructions from being transmitted to India, and to preserve a systematic uniformity in conducting the business of that country, it appears to me indispensably necessary that all despatches from the public offices in Europe, all those addressed to them from India, and all despatches from the Commander-in-Chief in India, should pass through the office of His Majesty's confidential servant, for the time being, for the India department.

I have, &c.,

CORNWALLIS.

END OF VOL. II.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET,
AND CHARING CROSS.

J. & C. Walker Sculp.

Published by John Murray, Albemarle Street, London.

00038860

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 26 March, 2016